CVE-2026-44741: Pimcore/admin ui classic bundle SQL Injection Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-h4ph-crvj-9h92
CVSS 8.8
CWE-89
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-44741 is a HIGH (CVSS 8.8) sql injection vulnerability (CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')) affecting Pimcore/admin ui classic bundle libraries in the Packagist ecosystem. The issue involves pimcore admin classic bundle vulnerable to sql injection in translation grid date filter via unsanitized property parameter. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 2.3.6, 1.7.18.

CVE-2026-44741 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-44741
GHSA Identifier GHSA-h4ph-crvj-9h92
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 8.8
CWE Classification CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')
Affected Product Pimcore/admin ui classic bundle
Package Ecosystem Packagist
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 8.8

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2026-44741

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Pimcore/admin ui classic bundle dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

pimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundle fixed: 2.3.6
Upgrade pimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundle to 2.3.6
pimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundle fixed: 1.7.18
Upgrade pimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundle to 1.7.18
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for pimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundle

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-44741, inspect your project dependencies for Pimcore/admin ui classic bundle:

inspect dependencies for pimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundle

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Pimcore/admin ui classic bundle in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 2.3.6), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection'), where the product constructs all or part of an sql command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended sql command when it is sent to a downstream component. without sufficient removal or quoting of sql syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated sql query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as sql instead of ordinary user data. In Pimcore/admin ui classic bundle, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

# GitHub Security Advisory Draft — GM-369 ## Summary SQL injection in Pimcore's translation grid date filter — the user-supplied `property` field from the filter JSON is interpolated directly into a `UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME(...)))` SQL expression without parameterization or allowlist validation. ## Severity CVSS 3.1: 8.8 (High) — AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H ## Affected Component - **Package:** `pimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundle` - **File:** `src/Controller/Admin/TranslationController.php` - **Lines:** 565 (input), 569 (inadequate sanitization), 593 (injection point) - **Endpoint:** `POST /admin/translation/translations` ## Description The translation grid endpoint processes JSON filter parameters. When a filter has `type: "date"`, the `property` field is extracted and used to construct a SQL expression: ```php $fieldname = $filter[$propertyField]; // Line 565 — user input $fieldname = str_replace('--', '', $fieldname); // Line 569 — trivially bypassable $fieldname = $tableName . '.' . $fieldname; // Line 577 $fieldname = "UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME({$fieldname})))"; // Line 593 — injection ``` The `str_replace('--', '')` sanitization is trivially bypassable (use `/**/` comments or `----`). In non-language mode, `$fieldname` is concatenated directly into the SQL condition without quoting or parameterization. ## Impact Authenticated user with translations view permission can extract arbitrary database data via UNION-based or error-based SQL injection. Combined with GM-249 (unsafe unserialize), this enables an SQLi → deserialization → RCE chain. ## Proof of Concept ``` POST /admin/translation/translations filter=[{"property":"1))) UNION SELECT password FROM users WHERE ((1","type":"date","operator":"eq","value":"2026-01-01"}] ``` ## Suggested Fix Validate `$fieldname` against an allowlist of valid column names before SQL interpolation: ```php $allowedDateColumns = ['creationDate', 'modificationDate']; if (!in_array($fieldname, $allowedDateColumns, true)) { continue; } ``` ## References - CWE-89: SQL Injection - Related: CVE-2026-27461 (RLIKE injection in Dependency/Dao.php — different code path) --- ## Suggested Fix In `TranslationController.php`: (1) Add allowlist check for non-language fieldnames before processing. (2) Replace raw string interpolation `UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME({$fieldname})))` with `$db->quoteIdentifier($fieldname)` to prevent SQL injection in date filter expressions. ```diff --- a/src/Controller/Admin/TranslationController.php +++ b/src/Controller/Admin/TranslationController.php @@ -569,7 +569,15 @@ class TranslationController extends AdminAbstractController $fieldname = str_replace('--', '', $fieldname); if (!$languageMode && in_array($fieldname, $validLanguages) || $languageMode && !in_array($fieldname, $validLanguages)) { continue; } + // Allowlist non-language fieldnames to prevent SQL injection + $allowedNonLanguageFields = ['key', 'type', 'creationDate', 'modificationDate']; + if (!$languageMode && !in_array($fieldname, $allowedNonLanguageFields) && !in_array($fieldname, $validLanguages)) { + continue; + } + if (!$languageMode) { $fieldname = $tableName . '.' . $fieldname; } @@ -582,7 +590,7 @@ class TranslationController extends AdminAbstractController } elseif ($filter[$operatorField] == 'eq') { $operator = '='; - $fieldname = "UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME({$fieldname})))"; + // Use validated fieldname only — never interpolate raw user input into SQL functions + $fieldname = sprintf('UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME(%s)))', $db->quoteIdentifier($fieldname)); } ``` --- ## Proposed Fix ```diff --- a/src/Controller/Admin/TranslationController.php +++ b/src/Controller/Admin/TranslationController.php @@ -569,7 +569,15 @@ class TranslationController extends AdminAbstractController $fieldname = str_replace('--', '', $fieldname); if (!$languageMode && in_array($fieldname, $validLanguages) || $languageMode && !in_array($fieldname, $validLanguages)) { continue; } + // Allowlist non-language fieldnames to prevent SQL injection + $allowedNonLanguageFields = ['key', 'type', 'creationDate', 'modificationDate']; + if (!$languageMode && !in_array($fieldname, $allowedNonLanguageFields) && !in_array($fieldname, $validLanguages)) { + continue; + } + if (!$languageMode) { $fieldname = $tableName . '.' . $fieldname; } @@ -582,7 +590,7 @@ class TranslationController extends AdminAbstractController } elseif ($filter[$operatorField] == 'eq') { $operator = '='; - $fieldname = "UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME({$fieldname})))"; + // Use validated fieldname only — never interpolate raw user input into SQL functions + $fieldname = sprintf('UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME(%s)))', $db->quoteIdentifier($fieldname)); } ``` Happy to submit this as a PR against a private fork if that is the preferred workflow.

CVE-2026-44741 Affected Pimcore/admin ui classic bundle Versions

2 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
2.3.61.7.18
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
pimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundle
Packagist
≥ 2.0.0-RC1
< 2.3.6
2.3.6
pimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundle
Packagist
< 1.7.18
1.7.18

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-44741?
CVE-2026-44741 is a security vulnerability in Pimcore/admin ui classic bundle involving Pimcore Admin Classic Bundle Vulnerable to SQL Injection in Translation Grid Date Filter via Unsanitized Property Parameter under CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection').
Which Pimcore/admin ui classic bundle versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 2.3.6, 1.7.18 across affected packages: pimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundle.
What version fixes CVE-2026-44741?
Upgrading to 2.3.6, 1.7.18 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is pimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundle affected?
Yes, pimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundle is affected in releases prior to 2.3.6, 1.7.18. Upgrade your dependency to 2.3.6, 1.7.18 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-44741?
CVE-2026-44741 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 8.8 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-44741?
CVE-2026-44741 is classified under CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection') (The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data.).
How can I check Packagist dependencies for CVE-2026-44741?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for pimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundle'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-h4ph-crvj-9h92",
  "modified" : "2026-07-10T19:07:21Z",
  "published" : "2026-05-27T00:35:56Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-44741" ],
  "summary" : "Pimcore Admin Classic Bundle Vulnerable to SQL Injection in Translation Grid Date Filter via Unsanitized Property Parameter",
  "details" : "# GitHub Security Advisory Draft — GM-369\n\n## Summary\nSQL injection in Pimcore's translation grid date filter — the user-supplied `property` field from the filter JSON is interpolated directly into a `UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME(...)))` SQL expression without parameterization or allowlist validation.\n\n## Severity\nCVSS 3.1: 8.8 (High) — AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H\n\n## Affected Component\n- **Package:** `pimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundle`\n- **File:** `src/Controller/Admin/TranslationController.php`\n- **Lines:** 565 (input), 569 (inadequate sanitization), 593 (injection point)\n- **Endpoint:** `POST /admin/translation/translations`\n\n## Description\nThe translation grid endpoint processes JSON filter parameters. When a filter has `type: \"date\"`, the `property` field is extracted and used to construct a SQL expression:\n\n```php\n$fieldname = $filter[$propertyField];              // Line 565 — user input\n$fieldname = str_replace('--', '', $fieldname);    // Line 569 — trivially bypassable\n$fieldname = $tableName . '.' . $fieldname;        // Line 577\n$fieldname = \"UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME({$fieldname})))\";  // Line 593 — injection\n```\n\nThe `str_replace('--', '')` sanitization is trivially bypassable (use `/**/` comments or `----`). In non-language mode, `$fieldname` is concatenated directly into the SQL condition without quoting or parameterization.\n\n## Impact\nAuthenticated user with translations view permission can extract arbitrary database data via UNION-based or error-based SQL injection. Combined with GM-249 (unsafe unserialize), this enables an SQLi → deserialization → RCE chain.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n```\nPOST /admin/translation/translations\nfilter=[{\"property\":\"1))) UNION SELECT password FROM users WHERE ((1\",\"type\":\"date\",\"operator\":\"eq\",\"value\":\"2026-01-01\"}]\n```\n\n## Suggested Fix\nValidate `$fieldname` against an allowlist of valid column names before SQL interpolation:\n```php\n$allowedDateColumns = ['creationDate', 'modificationDate'];\nif (!in_array($fieldname, $allowedDateColumns, true)) {\n    continue;\n}\n```\n\n## References\n- CWE-89: SQL Injection\n- Related: CVE-2026-27461 (RLIKE injection in Dependency/Dao.php — different code path)\n\n\n---\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nIn `TranslationController.php`: (1) Add allowlist check for non-language fieldnames before processing. (2) Replace raw string interpolation `UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME({$fieldname})))` with `$db->quoteIdentifier($fieldname)` to prevent SQL injection in date filter expressions.\n\n```diff\n--- a/src/Controller/Admin/TranslationController.php\n+++ b/src/Controller/Admin/TranslationController.php\n@@ -569,7 +569,15 @@ class TranslationController extends AdminAbstractController\n                 $fieldname = str_replace('--', '', $fieldname);\n \n                 if (!$languageMode && in_array($fieldname, $validLanguages)\n                     || $languageMode && !in_array($fieldname, $validLanguages)) {\n                     continue;\n                 }\n \n+                // Allowlist non-language fieldnames to prevent SQL injection\n+                $allowedNonLanguageFields = ['key', 'type', 'creationDate', 'modificationDate'];\n+                if (!$languageMode && !in_array($fieldname, $allowedNonLanguageFields) && !in_array($fieldname, $validLanguages)) {\n+                    continue;\n+                }\n+\n                 if (!$languageMode) {\n                     $fieldname = $tableName . '.' . $fieldname;\n                 }\n@@ -582,7 +590,7 @@ class TranslationController extends AdminAbstractController\n                         } elseif ($filter[$operatorField] == 'eq') {\n                             $operator = '=';\n-                            $fieldname = \"UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME({$fieldname})))\";\n+                            // Use validated fieldname only — never interpolate raw user input into SQL functions\n+                            $fieldname = sprintf('UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME(%s)))', $db->quoteIdentifier($fieldname));\n                         }\n\n```\n\n---\n\n## Proposed Fix\n\n```diff\n--- a/src/Controller/Admin/TranslationController.php\n+++ b/src/Controller/Admin/TranslationController.php\n@@ -569,7 +569,15 @@ class TranslationController extends AdminAbstractController\n                 $fieldname = str_replace('--', '', $fieldname);\n \n                 if (!$languageMode && in_array($fieldname, $validLanguages)\n                     || $languageMode && !in_array($fieldname, $validLanguages)) {\n                     continue;\n                 }\n \n+                // Allowlist non-language fieldnames to prevent SQL injection\n+                $allowedNonLanguageFields = ['key', 'type', 'creationDate', 'modificationDate'];\n+                if (!$languageMode && !in_array($fieldname, $allowedNonLanguageFields) && !in_array($fieldname, $validLanguages)) {\n+                    continue;\n+                }\n+\n                 if (!$languageMode) {\n                     $fieldname = $tableName . '.' . $fieldname;\n                 }\n@@ -582,7 +590,7 @@ class TranslationController extends AdminAbstractController\n                         } elseif ($filter[$operatorField] == 'eq') {\n                             $operator = '=';\n-                            $fieldname = \"UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME({$fieldname})))\";\n+                            // Use validated fieldname only — never interpolate raw user input into SQL functions\n+                            $fieldname = sprintf('UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME(%s)))', $db->quoteIdentifier($fieldname));\n                         }\n```\n\nHappy to submit this as a PR against a private fork if that is the preferred workflow.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Packagist",
      "name" : "pimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundle"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "2.0.0-RC1"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "2.3.6"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 2.3.5"
    }
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Packagist",
      "name" : "pimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundle"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "1.7.18"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/security/advisories/GHSA-h4ph-crvj-9h92"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/pimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundle/pull/1111"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/pimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundle/commit/80e57a23d9e19574eddfe9b08e8f26785b2b0d90"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/pimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundle/releases/tag/v2.3.6"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-89" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-05-27T00:35:56Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}