CVE-2026-52737: Zebra consensus Zebra Has Sync Restart Poisoning Vulnerability
MODERATECVE-2026-52737 is a MODERATE (CVSS 5.3) zebra has sync restart poisoning vulnerability (CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity) affecting Zebra consensus libraries in the crates.io ecosystem. The issue involves zebra has sync restart poisoning from single unauthenticated peer via above-lookahead block. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 7.0.0, 4.5.0.
CVE-2026-52737 at a Glance
Security Impact
CVSS: 5.3
The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L).
How to Fix CVE-2026-52737
To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Zebra consensus dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.
Upgrade zebra-consensus to 7.0.0
Upgrade zebrad to 4.5.0
Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:
inspect dependencies for zebra-consensus
How to Check if You Are Affected
To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-52737, inspect your project dependencies for Zebra consensus:
inspect dependencies for zebra-consensus
Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Zebra consensus in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 7.0.0), your application is affected.
Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.
Technical Details
Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity, where the product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data. In Zebra consensus, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.
Source Advisory Statement
CVE-2026-52737 Affected Zebra consensus Versions
2 component(s)| Product / Package | Ecosystem | Affected Versions | Fixed Version |
|---|---|---|---|
|
zebra-consensus
|
crates.io |
< 7.0.0
|
7.0.0
|
|
zebrad
|
crates.io |
< 4.5.0
|
4.5.0
|
References
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-52737?
Which Zebra consensus versions are affected?
What version fixes CVE-2026-52737?
Is zebra-consensus affected?
Is zebrad affected?
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-52737?
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-52737?
How can I check crates.io dependencies for CVE-2026-52737?
Machine-readable OSV JSON
OSV v1.5 Schema
{
"schema_version" : "1.4.0",
"id" : "GHSA-gvjc-3w7c-92jx",
"modified" : "2026-07-02T19:44:25Z",
"published" : "2026-07-02T19:44:24Z",
"aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-52737" ],
"summary" : "Zebra has sync restart poisoning from single unauthenticated peer via above-lookahead block",
"details" : "### Am I affected\n\nYou are affected if:\n\n1. You run `zebrad` up to and including `v4.4.1`.\n2. Your node accepts inbound P2P connections and is syncing or catching up to the chain tip.\n\n### Summary\n\nA malicious peer can answer Zebra's outbound `getblocks`/`FindBlocks` request with a small two-hash inventory, then serve a syntactically valid block whose coinbase height is far above the victim's local tip. The `AboveLookaheadHeightLimit` error in the sync download pipeline triggers a global sync restart rather than being scoped to the offending peer. The peer is never scored or disconnected because the error type does not carry the advertiser address.\n\nOn mainnet, each successful cycle imposes a 67-second sync restart delay. All in-flight downloads from honest peers are cancelled on each restart.\n\n### Details\n\nThe bug is the interaction of three layers:\n\n1. The syncer promotes unvalidated `FindBlocks` peer responses into concrete download schedules without checking that the advertised hashes are plausible chain extensions.\n\n2. When a downloaded block's coinbase height exceeds `tip + VERIFICATION_PIPELINE_DROP_LIMIT`, the sync downloader returns `BlockDownloadVerifyError::AboveLookaheadHeightLimit`. This error variant carries only the block height and hash, not the advertiser peer address.\n\n3. The sync error handler in `handle_block_response` only sends misbehaviour scores for `BlockDownloadVerifyError::Invalid` errors that carry an `advertiser_addr` and have a nonzero `misbehavior_score()`. `AboveLookaheadHeightLimit` falls through to the default restart-worthy path, cancelling all in-flight downloads and waiting 67 seconds before restarting sync.\n\nThe attacker needs only an unauthenticated P2P connection (post-handshake), a tiny payload (one two-hash `inv` message plus one small block per cycle), and no mining capability, funds, or valid chain data. The peer is never penalised, so the attack is repeatable indefinitely.\n\nAdditionally, several other pre-consensus sync-layer errors had zero misbehaviour scores even when peer-attributed. Contextual validation failures (`InvalidDifficultyThreshold`, `TimeTooEarly`, `TimeTooLate`, `NonSequentialBlock`) and locktime failures from block-serving peers all scored zero, allowing repeated abuse without penalty.\n\n### Patches\n\nPatched in Zebra 4.4.2. The fix:\n\n- Carries `advertiser_addr` through `AboveLookaheadHeightLimit` and `InvalidHeight` error variants.\n- Makes above-lookahead and invalid-height failures peer-local (the block is dropped and the peer is banned with score 100) rather than triggering a global sync restart.\n- Expands `misbehavior_score()` across `BlockError`, `VerifyBlockError`, and `CommitBlockError` to cover contextual validation failures that previously scored zero.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNo configuration-level workaround is available. The attack is mitigated by having a diverse honest peer set, but cannot be prevented while the vulnerable code is running.\n\n### Impact\n\nA single unauthenticated peer can repeatedly stall a syncing Zebra node by forcing 67-second global sync restart cycles. All unrelated in-flight downloads are cancelled on each restart. The node does not crash and no state is corrupted, but sync progress is significantly degraded for the duration of the attack.\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by `@ipwning`.",
"severity" : [ {
"type" : "CVSS_V3",
"score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L"
} ],
"affected" : [ {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "crates.io",
"name" : "zebra-consensus"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "0"
}, {
"fixed" : "7.0.0"
} ]
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 6.0.0"
}
}, {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "crates.io",
"name" : "zebrad"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "0"
}, {
"fixed" : "4.5.0"
} ]
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 4.4.1"
}
} ],
"references" : [ {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-gvjc-3w7c-92jx"
}, {
"type" : "PACKAGE",
"url" : "https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra"
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-345" ],
"severity" : "MODERATE",
"github_reviewed" : true,
"github_reviewed_at" : "2026-07-02T19:44:24Z",
"nvd_published_at" : null
}
}