CVE-2026-52737: Zebra consensus Zebra Has Sync Restart Poisoning Vulnerability

MODERATE
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-gvjc-3w7c-92jx
CVSS 5.3
CWE-345
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-52737 is a MODERATE (CVSS 5.3) zebra has sync restart poisoning vulnerability (CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity) affecting Zebra consensus libraries in the crates.io ecosystem. The issue involves zebra has sync restart poisoning from single unauthenticated peer via above-lookahead block. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 7.0.0, 4.5.0.

CVE-2026-52737 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-52737
GHSA Identifier GHSA-gvjc-3w7c-92jx
Severity MODERATE
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 5.3
CWE Classification CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
Affected Product Zebra consensus
Package Ecosystem crates.io
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 5.3

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality None (C:N)
Integrity None (I:N)
Availability Low (A:L)

How to Fix CVE-2026-52737

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Zebra consensus dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

zebra-consensus fixed: 7.0.0
Upgrade zebra-consensus to 7.0.0
zebrad fixed: 4.5.0
Upgrade zebrad to 4.5.0
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for zebra-consensus

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-52737, inspect your project dependencies for Zebra consensus:

inspect dependencies for zebra-consensus

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Zebra consensus in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 7.0.0), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity, where the product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data. In Zebra consensus, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Am I affected You are affected if: 1. You run `zebrad` up to and including `v4.4.1`. 2. Your node accepts inbound P2P connections and is syncing or catching up to the chain tip. ### Summary A malicious peer can answer Zebra's outbound `getblocks`/`FindBlocks` request with a small two-hash inventory, then serve a syntactically valid block whose coinbase height is far above the victim's local tip. The `AboveLookaheadHeightLimit` error in the sync download pipeline triggers a global sync restart rather than being scoped to the offending peer. The peer is never scored or disconnected because the error type does not carry the advertiser address. On mainnet, each successful cycle imposes a 67-second sync restart delay. All in-flight downloads from honest peers are cancelled on each restart. ### Details The bug is the interaction of three layers: 1. The syncer promotes unvalidated `FindBlocks` peer responses into concrete download schedules without checking that the advertised hashes are plausible chain extensions. 2. When a downloaded block's coinbase height exceeds `tip + VERIFICATION_PIPELINE_DROP_LIMIT`, the sync downloader returns `BlockDownloadVerifyError::AboveLookaheadHeightLimit`. This error variant carries only the block height and hash, not the advertiser peer address. 3. The sync error handler in `handle_block_response` only sends misbehaviour scores for `BlockDownloadVerifyError::Invalid` errors that carry an `advertiser_addr` and have a nonzero `misbehavior_score()`. `AboveLookaheadHeightLimit` falls through to the default restart-worthy path, cancelling all in-flight downloads and waiting 67 seconds before restarting sync. The attacker needs only an unauthenticated P2P connection (post-handshake), a tiny payload (one two-hash `inv` message plus one small block per cycle), and no mining capability, funds, or valid chain data. The peer is never penalised, so the attack is repeatable indefinitely. Additionally, several other pre-consensus sync-layer errors had zero misbehaviour scores even when peer-attributed. Contextual validation failures (`InvalidDifficultyThreshold`, `TimeTooEarly`, `TimeTooLate`, `NonSequentialBlock`) and locktime failures from block-serving peers all scored zero, allowing repeated abuse without penalty. ### Patches Patched in Zebra 4.4.2. The fix: - Carries `advertiser_addr` through `AboveLookaheadHeightLimit` and `InvalidHeight` error variants. - Makes above-lookahead and invalid-height failures peer-local (the block is dropped and the peer is banned with score 100) rather than triggering a global sync restart. - Expands `misbehavior_score()` across `BlockError`, `VerifyBlockError`, and `CommitBlockError` to cover contextual validation failures that previously scored zero. ### Workarounds No configuration-level workaround is available. The attack is mitigated by having a diverse honest peer set, but cannot be prevented while the vulnerable code is running. ### Impact A single unauthenticated peer can repeatedly stall a syncing Zebra node by forcing 67-second global sync restart cycles. All unrelated in-flight downloads are cancelled on each restart. The node does not crash and no state is corrupted, but sync progress is significantly degraded for the duration of the attack. ### Credit Reported by `@ipwning`.

CVE-2026-52737 Affected Zebra consensus Versions

2 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
7.0.04.5.0
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
zebra-consensus
crates.io
< 7.0.0
7.0.0
zebrad
crates.io
< 4.5.0
4.5.0

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-52737?
CVE-2026-52737 is a security vulnerability in Zebra consensus involving Zebra has sync restart poisoning from single unauthenticated peer via above-lookahead block under CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity.
Which Zebra consensus versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 7.0.0, 4.5.0 across affected packages: zebra-consensus, zebrad.
What version fixes CVE-2026-52737?
Upgrading to 7.0.0, 4.5.0 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is zebra-consensus affected?
Yes, zebra-consensus is affected in releases prior to 7.0.0. Upgrade your dependency to 7.0.0 or later.
Is zebrad affected?
Yes, zebrad is affected in releases prior to 4.5.0. Upgrade your dependency to 4.5.0 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-52737?
CVE-2026-52737 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 5.3 (MODERATE) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-52737?
CVE-2026-52737 is classified under CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity (The product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data.).
How can I check crates.io dependencies for CVE-2026-52737?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for zebra-consensus'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-gvjc-3w7c-92jx",
  "modified" : "2026-07-02T19:44:25Z",
  "published" : "2026-07-02T19:44:24Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-52737" ],
  "summary" : "Zebra has sync restart poisoning from single unauthenticated peer via above-lookahead block",
  "details" : "### Am I affected\n\nYou are affected if:\n\n1. You run `zebrad` up to and including `v4.4.1`.\n2. Your node accepts inbound P2P connections and is syncing or catching up to the chain tip.\n\n### Summary\n\nA malicious peer can answer Zebra's outbound `getblocks`/`FindBlocks` request with a small two-hash inventory, then serve a syntactically valid block whose coinbase height is far above the victim's local tip. The `AboveLookaheadHeightLimit` error in the sync download pipeline triggers a global sync restart rather than being scoped to the offending peer. The peer is never scored or disconnected because the error type does not carry the advertiser address.\n\nOn mainnet, each successful cycle imposes a 67-second sync restart delay. All in-flight downloads from honest peers are cancelled on each restart.\n\n### Details\n\nThe bug is the interaction of three layers:\n\n1. The syncer promotes unvalidated `FindBlocks` peer responses into concrete download schedules without checking that the advertised hashes are plausible chain extensions.\n\n2. When a downloaded block's coinbase height exceeds `tip + VERIFICATION_PIPELINE_DROP_LIMIT`, the sync downloader returns `BlockDownloadVerifyError::AboveLookaheadHeightLimit`. This error variant carries only the block height and hash, not the advertiser peer address.\n\n3. The sync error handler in `handle_block_response` only sends misbehaviour scores for `BlockDownloadVerifyError::Invalid` errors that carry an `advertiser_addr` and have a nonzero `misbehavior_score()`. `AboveLookaheadHeightLimit` falls through to the default restart-worthy path, cancelling all in-flight downloads and waiting 67 seconds before restarting sync.\n\nThe attacker needs only an unauthenticated P2P connection (post-handshake), a tiny payload (one two-hash `inv` message plus one small block per cycle), and no mining capability, funds, or valid chain data. The peer is never penalised, so the attack is repeatable indefinitely.\n\nAdditionally, several other pre-consensus sync-layer errors had zero misbehaviour scores even when peer-attributed. Contextual validation failures (`InvalidDifficultyThreshold`, `TimeTooEarly`, `TimeTooLate`, `NonSequentialBlock`) and locktime failures from block-serving peers all scored zero, allowing repeated abuse without penalty.\n\n### Patches\n\nPatched in Zebra 4.4.2. The fix:\n\n- Carries `advertiser_addr` through `AboveLookaheadHeightLimit` and `InvalidHeight` error variants.\n- Makes above-lookahead and invalid-height failures peer-local (the block is dropped and the peer is banned with score 100) rather than triggering a global sync restart.\n- Expands `misbehavior_score()` across `BlockError`, `VerifyBlockError`, and `CommitBlockError` to cover contextual validation failures that previously scored zero.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNo configuration-level workaround is available. The attack is mitigated by having a diverse honest peer set, but cannot be prevented while the vulnerable code is running.\n\n### Impact\n\nA single unauthenticated peer can repeatedly stall a syncing Zebra node by forcing 67-second global sync restart cycles. All unrelated in-flight downloads are cancelled on each restart. The node does not crash and no state is corrupted, but sync progress is significantly degraded for the duration of the attack.\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by `@ipwning`.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "crates.io",
      "name" : "zebra-consensus"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "7.0.0"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 6.0.0"
    }
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "crates.io",
      "name" : "zebrad"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "4.5.0"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 4.4.1"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-gvjc-3w7c-92jx"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-345" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-07-02T19:44:24Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}