CVE-2026-54771: Langroid Handle_message() Executes User-supplied Tool JSON Vulnerability

{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-gjgq-w2m6-wr5q",
  "modified" : "2026-07-06T20:42:18Z",
  "published" : "2026-07-06T20:42:18Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-54771" ],
  "summary" : "Langroid: handle_message() executes user-supplied tool JSON without sender verification ",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\nA Langroid application exposing a chat interface to untrusted users may allow direct tool invocation via raw JSON payloads, even when tools are registered with `use=False, handle=True`.\n\n## Details\n\n`enable_message(..., use=False, handle=True)` only prevents the LLM from being instructed to generate the tool. The tool dispatch path in `agent_response()` → `handle_message()` → `get_tool_messages()` does not check whether the message originated from `Entity.USER` or `Entity.LLM`:\n\nlangroid/agent/base.py\n\nAs a result, a user who sends raw tool JSON as chat input can directly invoke the handler.\n\n## PoC\n\nThe following script demonstrates that a tool registered with `use=False, handle=True` can still be invoked directly by a user-supplied chat message.\n\n```python\nfrom langroid.agent.chat_agent import ChatAgent, ChatAgentConfig\nfrom langroid.agent.task import Task\nfrom langroid.agent.tool_message import ToolMessage\nfrom langroid.mytypes import Entity\n\n\nclass SecretTool(ToolMessage):\n    request: str = \"secret_tool\"\n    purpose: str = \"Return a secret marker\"\n    value: str\n\n    def handle(self) -> str:\n        return f\"SECRET:{self.value}\"\n\n\nagent = ChatAgent(ChatAgentConfig())\nagent.enable_message(SecretTool, use=False, handle=True)\n\ntask = Task(agent, interactive=False, done_if_response=[Entity.AGENT])\nresult = task.run('{\"request\":\"secret_tool\",\"value\":\"pwned\"}', turns=1)\nprint(result.content)\n```\n\nObserved result:\n\n```python\nSECRET:pwned\n```\n\n`agent.get_tool_messages(user_msg)` returns the parsed tool and `agent.handle_message(user_msg)` executes it, even though `has_tool_message_attempt(user_msg)` returns `False` for USER-origin messages.\n\n## Impact\n\nDepending on which handled tools are enabled, the impact can include file read/write, database query execution, or access to internal orchestration tools. Developers may reasonably interpret `use=False` as meaning the tool is not invocable by end users.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "langroid"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "0.65.3"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 0.65.2"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/langroid/langroid/security/advisories/GHSA-gjgq-w2m6-wr5q"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/langroid/langroid"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-74" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-07-06T20:42:18Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}