CVE-2026-45309: Asyncssh Path Traversal Vulnerability
MODERATECVE-2026-45309 is a MODERATE path traversal vulnerability (CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')) affecting Asyncssh libraries in the PyPI ecosystem. The issue involves asyncssh `authorizedkeysfile %u` path traversal allows attacker-selected authorized keys to authenticate a traversal username. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 2.23.0.
CVE-2026-45309 at a Glance
How to Fix CVE-2026-45309
To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Asyncssh dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.
pip install asyncssh>=2.23.0
Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:
pip show asyncssh
How to Check if You Are Affected
To determine whether your Python environment is affected by CVE-2026-45309, inspect your installed packages using pip:
pip show asyncssh
Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Asyncssh in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 2.23.0), your application is affected.
Note: The pip show asyncssh command checks currently installed packages in your active Python environment.
Technical Details
Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal'), where the product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory. In Asyncssh, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.
Source Advisory Statement
CVE-2026-45309 Affected Asyncssh Versions
1 component(s)| Product / Package | Ecosystem | Affected Versions | Fixed Version |
|---|---|---|---|
|
asyncssh
|
PyPI |
≥ 2.22.0
< 2.23.0
All 1 versions
2.22.0
|
2.23.0
|
References
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-45309?
Which Asyncssh versions are affected?
What version fixes CVE-2026-45309?
Is asyncssh affected?
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-45309?
How can I check PyPI dependencies for CVE-2026-45309?
Machine-readable OSV JSON
OSV v1.5 Schema
{
"schema_version" : "1.4.0",
"id" : "GHSA-g794-3fmp-753h",
"modified" : "2026-05-27T21:35:06Z",
"published" : "2026-05-27T21:35:06Z",
"aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-45309" ],
"summary" : "AsyncSSH `AuthorizedKeysFile %u` path traversal allows attacker-selected authorized keys to authenticate a traversal username",
"details" : "## Summary\nAsyncSSH 2.22.0 expands the OpenSSH-compatible `AuthorizedKeysFile` `%u` token with the raw SSH username during pre-authentication server config reload. A server configured with a documented per-user key pattern such as `AuthorizedKeysFile authorized_keys/%u` can be made to read an authorized-keys file outside the intended directory when the SSH username contains path traversal segments. If the attacker can place or reference a readable authorized-keys-format file containing their public key, the attacker can authenticate over SSH as the traversal username.\n\n## Affected Product\n- Package: asyncssh\n- Ecosystem: pip\n- Affected versions: confirmed on 2.22.0; exact lower bound not finalized\n- Tested version: 2.22.0\n- Audit commit/tag: tag `v2.22.0`, commit `af5a81e669633d83d535163f93b6bf3f957c9238`\n- PyPI sdist SHA256: `c3ce72b01be4f97b40e62844dd384227e5ff5a401a3793007c42f86a5c8eb537`\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n- CWE: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory\n- Component: AsyncSSH server config reload and public-key authentication (`asyncssh/config.py`, `asyncssh/connection.py`, `asyncssh/auth_keys.py`, `asyncssh/misc.py`)\n- Root cause: `%u` in `AuthorizedKeysFile` is expanded from the remote username without rejecting path separators or `..` segments, and the resulting path is opened without constraining it to the intended authorized-keys directory.\n- Security boundary violated: the configured authorized-keys directory and public-key authentication trust boundary.\n- Direct impact: public-key authentication succeeds using an attacker-selected authorized-keys file outside the intended directory.\n- Chain impact, if any: none claimed; direct authentication impact is primary.\n\n## Attack Preconditions\n- The AsyncSSH server uses a config or equivalent pattern where `AuthorizedKeysFile` contains `%u`, for example `AuthorizedKeysFile authorized_keys/%u`.\n- Public-key authentication is enabled.\n- The attacker can place or reference a readable authorized-keys-format file outside the intended directory, such as a file in a world-writable or application-writable location.\n- The application does not separately reject usernames containing `/`, `\\`, or `..` before AsyncSSH uses the username for key-file selection.\n\n## Reproduction\nThe run-scoped evidence contains a safe localhost proof:\n\n1. Start the proof harness saved at \n[harness_app.py](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/27232526/harness_app.py)\n\n2. Run \n[exploit_proof.py](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/27232538/exploit_proof.py)\nthrough \n[run_proof.sh](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/27232545/run_proof.sh)\n\n3. The harness creates `sshd_config` with `AuthorizedKeysFile authorized_keys/%u`, writes the attacker's public key to a file outside `authorized_keys/`, starts a real AsyncSSH server, and attempts two SSH logins.\n4. Expected result: the normal username `victim` fails, while the traversal username authenticates with the same attacker key.\n\nObserved proof output:\n\n```text\n[CONTROL] username=victim success=False\n[ATTACK] username=../../../asyncssh-proof-exploit-proof-8b2bd23daeeb.pub success=True\n[ATTACK] output=AUTH_BYPASS_SUCCESS username=../../../asyncssh-proof-exploit-proof-8b2bd23daeeb.pub\nPASS: traversal username authenticated with attacker-controlled authorized_keys file\n```",
"severity" : [ {
"type" : "CVSS_V4",
"score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P"
} ],
"affected" : [ {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "PyPI",
"name" : "asyncssh"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "2.22.0"
}, {
"fixed" : "2.23.0"
} ]
} ],
"versions" : [ "2.22.0" ]
} ],
"references" : [ {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/ronf/asyncssh/security/advisories/GHSA-g794-3fmp-753h"
}, {
"type" : "PACKAGE",
"url" : "https://github.com/ronf/asyncssh"
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-22" ],
"severity" : "MODERATE",
"github_reviewed" : true,
"github_reviewed_at" : "2026-05-27T21:35:06Z",
"nvd_published_at" : null
}
}