CVE-2026-102695: OmniFaces Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-fp43-vj7g-pg92",
  "modified" : "2026-10-14T15:58:54Z",
  "published" : "2026-07-24T22:35:27Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-102695" ],
  "summary" : "OmniFaces: Forged combined-resource IDs and related output/push boundaries",
  "details" : "## 1. Forged combined-resource IDs\n`CombinedResourceInfo` accepts a path-derived ID without an authenticity check,\ninflates it without an output limit, converts it to attacker-selected resource\nidentifiers, and retains unique IDs in an unbounded static cache. In bounded\ntests, 20,754 encoded bytes inflated to 16,000,000 characters (about 770:1;\nabout 49 MB observed heap delta), and 200 unique IDs added 200 permanent cache\nentries. A legitimately shaped short ID remained about 1:1, while malformed\ninput was rejected; the missing distinction is between a server-issued ID and\nan attacker-minted but structurally valid ID.\n\nThe minimal application also confirmed three sink tails from the same forged-ID\nroot:\n\n- A wildcard CDN mapping performed a server-side fetch and relayed the exact\n  loopback-canary body. This requires the documented combined-resource and\n  wildcard-CDN configuration.\n- A forged inner `.xhtml` resource bypassed the excluded-resource boundary and\n  returned its raw content.\n- A forged `omnifaces.graphic` inner resource plus a canary `Host` header caused\n  an outbound GET to that host. This result is blind and deployment-dependent;\n  I am not claiming arbitrary-scheme or arbitrary-destination SSRF.\n\nThese behaviors reproduce after the fix for CVE-2026-41883 /\nGHSA-vp6r-9m58-5xv8. That advisory concerned EL evaluation order in the wildcard\nCDN path. This report has a different root: unsigned combined IDs and missing\ndecode/cache bounds, with separately demonstrated residual sink behavior.\n\n## 2. Source-map cache \n\nWith the documented optional source-map handler above a synthetic resource\nhandler, 40 unique missing combined-resource requests grew the process-wide\nsource-map cache from 13 to 92 entries. It has no size or eviction bound. This\nhas a separate cache, configuration prerequisite, and fix from family 1.\n\n## 3. HashParam callback output\n\nA URL-fragment value containing a single-quote JavaScript payload was stored by\n`o:hashParam` and later written unescaped into the Ajax callback script. On the\nfollow-up Ajax render, real Chrome executed the canary\n`window.__omniXss=1337`. This requires a page using `o:hashParam` and the\nfollow-up Ajax render.\n\n## 4. Session/view push-channel replay \n\nA fresh WebSocket client with no HTTP cookie connected using a victim's\nsession-scoped channel ID and received the victim's subsequent push. The code\nchecks application-wide ID existence but does not bind the handshake to the\ncurrent HTTP session, despite the documented current-session guarantee. The\nUUID remains an unguessable bearer-token prerequisite; this is replay after\ntoken exposure, not brute force.\n\n## 5. Push idle-connection and fanout behavior \n\nTwelve independent clients joined one application-scoped channel and all 12\nreceived the same push. Current code sets every accepted session's maximum idle\ntimeout to zero, retains sessions in an unbounded per-channel queue, and walks\nthe full queue on each push. I am reporting the demonstrated mechanism as a\nbounded design weakness: container connection limits remain an outer bound,\nand I am not claiming unbounded heap growth from the 12-client test.\n\n## Intentionally excluded leads\n\n- A duplicate-Range response-amplification lead was disproved. Twenty-four\n  ranges produced only one response body because the stream wrapper closes\n  after the first range. I am not reporting it as a security issue.\n- The older `Servlets.facesRedirect` XML issue is fixed on the current branch.\n  I am not reporting it as a new current-upstream issue.\n\n## Expected invariants\n\n- Only server-issued combined IDs should be accepted; decoding and caches\n  should be bounded; excluded resources and dynamic handlers should not become\n  attacker-selected inner resources.\n- Dynamic URLs should not derive an outbound destination from an untrusted\n  `Host` header.\n- Source-map lookups should not create unbounded process-lifetime state.\n- `HashParam` values must be escaped for a JavaScript string inside an XML\n  CDATA callback.\n- Session/view push subscriptions should be bound to the owning HTTP session or\n  authenticated principal; idle limits and per-channel caps should remain\n  operator-controllable.\n\n## Suggested fixes and available evidence\n\n- Authenticate generated combined IDs with a per-deployment secret, cap\n  inflated output, bound the combined cache, and avoid caching failed loads.\n- Require an existing/registered inner resource before wildcard remapping and\n  reject excluded resource types at serve time.\n- Derive dynamic-resource origins from trusted configuration rather than the\n  request `Host` value.\n- Bound or evict the source-map cache.\n- Apply JavaScript-string plus CDATA-safe encoding to `HashParam` callback\n  values.\n- Capture and verify HTTP-session or principal ownership during the WebSocket\n  handshake; retain a finite idle timeout and configurable per-channel limits.\n\nDaniel Birtwhistle",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Maven",
      "name" : "org.omnifaces:omnifaces"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "1.14.3"
      } ]
    } ]
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Maven",
      "name" : "org.omnifaces:omnifaces"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "2.0.0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "2.7.33"
      } ]
    } ]
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Maven",
      "name" : "org.omnifaces:omnifaces"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "3.0.0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "3.14.23"
      } ]
    } ]
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Maven",
      "name" : "org.omnifaces:omnifaces"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "4.0.0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "4.7.12"
      } ]
    } ]
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Maven",
      "name" : "org.omnifaces:omnifaces"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "5.0.0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "5.4.2"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/omnifaces/omnifaces/security/advisories/GHSA-fp43-vj7g-pg92"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/omnifaces/omnifaces/commit/59d6c5188c39418546fe500d05036645987a77d1"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/omnifaces/omnifaces/commit/a52b92461cf39d983f51ce8724fe7e6b944073e4"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/omnifaces/omnifaces/commit/aa42da361821ddfbb85b126564e71587347d2786"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/omnifaces/omnifaces/commit/c43eef01174a4dc09cec44eff553ff6284150af7"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/omnifaces/omnifaces/commit/d5cae243c4692555efaa4ba774e0f8f60e3f4db5"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/omnifaces/omnifaces"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-345", "CWE-770", "CWE-79", "CWE-862" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-07-24T22:35:27Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}