CVE-2026-32111: Ha mcp Ha-mcp OAuth 2.1 DCR Mode Vulnerability

MODERATE
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-fmfg-9g7c-3vq7
CVSS 5.3
CWE-918
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-32111 is a MODERATE (CVSS 5.3) ha-mcp oauth 2.1 dcr mode vulnerability (CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)) affecting Ha mcp libraries in the PyPI ecosystem. The issue involves ha-mcp oauth 2.1 dcr mode enables network reconnaissance via an error oracle. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 7.0.0.

CVE-2026-32111 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-32111
GHSA Identifier GHSA-fmfg-9g7c-3vq7
Severity MODERATE
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 5.3
CWE Classification CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Affected Product Ha mcp
Package Ecosystem PyPI
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 5.3

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality Low (C:L)
Integrity None (I:N)
Availability None (A:N)

How to Fix CVE-2026-32111

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Ha mcp dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

ha-mcp fixed: 7.0.0
pip install ha-mcp>=7.0.0
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

pip show ha-mcp

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Python environment is affected by CVE-2026-32111, inspect your installed packages using pip:

pip show ha-mcp

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Ha mcp in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 7.0.0), your application is affected.

Note: The pip show ha-mcp command checks currently installed packages in your active Python environment.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), where the web server receives a url or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this url, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination. In Ha mcp, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Summary The ha-mcp OAuth consent form (beta feature) accepts a user-supplied `ha_url` and makes a server-side HTTP request to `{ha_url}/api/config` with no URL validation. An unauthenticated attacker can submit arbitrary URLs to perform internal network reconnaissance via an error oracle. Two additional code paths in OAuth tool calls (REST and WebSocket) are affected by the same primitive. The primary deployment method (private URL with pre-configured `HOMEASSISTANT_TOKEN`) is not affected. ### Details **Code path 1 — Consent form validation** (reported) When a user submits the OAuth consent form, `_validate_ha_credentials()` (`provider.py`) makes a server-side GET request to `{ha_url}/api/config` with no scheme, IP, or domain validation. Different exception types produce distinct error messages, creating an error oracle: | Outcome | Message returned | Information leaked | |---------|------------------|--------------------| | `ConnectError` | "Could not connect..." | Host down or port closed | | `TimeoutException` | "Connection timed out..." | Host up, port filtered | | HTTP 401 | "Invalid access token..." | Service alive, requires auth | | HTTP 403 | "Access forbidden..." | Service alive, forbidden | | HTTP ≥ 400 | "Failed to connect: HTTP {N}" | Service alive, exact status | An attacker can drive the flow programmatically: register a client via open DCR (`POST /register`), initiate authorization, extract a `txn_id`, and submit arbitrary `ha_url` values. No user interaction required. **Code path 2 — REST tool calls with forged token** OAuth access tokens are stateless base64-encoded JSON payloads (`{"ha_url": "...", "ha_token": "..."}`). Since tokens are not signed, an attacker can forge a token with an arbitrary `ha_url`. REST tool calls then make HTTP requests to hardcoded HA API paths on that host (`/config`, `/states`, `/services`, etc.). JSON responses are returned to the caller. In practice, path control is limited — most endpoints use absolute paths that ignore the `ha_url` path component. Useful exfiltration requires the target to return JSON at HA API paths, which is unlikely for non-HA services. **Code path 3 — WebSocket tool calls with forged token** The same forged token triggers WebSocket connections to `ws://{ha_url}/api/websocket`. The client follows the HA WebSocket handshake protocol (waits for `auth_required`, sends `auth`, expects `auth_ok`). Non-HA targets fail at the protocol level and return nothing useful. Realistic exploitation is limited to pivoting to another HA instance on the internal network. ### Impact **Confirmed:** Internal network reconnaissance via error oracle (all 3 code paths). An attacker can map reachable hosts and open ports from the server's network position. ### Scope OAuth mode is a **beta** feature, documented separately in `docs/OAUTH.md` and not part of the main setup instructions. The standard deployment method (pre-configured `HOMEASSISTANT_URL` and `HOMEASSISTANT_TOKEN`) is not affected. ### Fix Upgrade to 7.0.0

CVE-2026-32111 Affected Ha mcp Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
7.0.0
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
ha-mcp
PyPI
< 7.0.0
7.0.0

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-32111?
CVE-2026-32111 is a security vulnerability in Ha mcp involving ha-mcp OAuth 2.1 DCR mode enables network reconnaissance via an error oracle under CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF).
Which Ha mcp versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 7.0.0 across affected packages: ha-mcp.
What version fixes CVE-2026-32111?
Upgrading to 7.0.0 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is ha-mcp affected?
Yes, ha-mcp is affected in releases prior to 7.0.0. Upgrade your dependency to 7.0.0 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-32111?
CVE-2026-32111 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 5.3 (MODERATE) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-32111?
CVE-2026-32111 is classified under CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) (The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.).
How can I check PyPI dependencies for CVE-2026-32111?
Run the dependency tree command: 'pip show ha-mcp'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-fmfg-9g7c-3vq7",
  "modified" : "2026-03-12T14:23:37Z",
  "published" : "2026-03-12T14:23:37Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-32111" ],
  "summary" : "ha-mcp OAuth 2.1 DCR mode enables network reconnaissance via an error oracle",
  "details" : "### Summary\n\nThe ha-mcp OAuth consent form (beta feature) accepts a user-supplied `ha_url` and makes a server-side HTTP request to `{ha_url}/api/config` with no URL validation. An unauthenticated attacker can submit arbitrary URLs to perform internal network reconnaissance via an error oracle. Two additional code paths in OAuth tool calls (REST and WebSocket) are affected by the same primitive.\n\nThe primary deployment method (private URL with pre-configured `HOMEASSISTANT_TOKEN`) is not affected.\n\n### Details\n\n**Code path 1 — Consent form validation** (reported)\n\nWhen a user submits the OAuth consent form, `_validate_ha_credentials()` (`provider.py`) makes a server-side GET request to `{ha_url}/api/config` with no scheme, IP, or domain validation. Different exception types produce distinct error messages, creating an error oracle:\n\n| Outcome | Message returned | Information leaked |\n|---------|------------------|--------------------|\n| `ConnectError` | \"Could not connect...\" | Host down or port closed |\n| `TimeoutException` | \"Connection timed out...\" | Host up, port filtered |\n| HTTP 401 | \"Invalid access token...\" | Service alive, requires auth |\n| HTTP 403 | \"Access forbidden...\" | Service alive, forbidden |\n| HTTP ≥ 400 | \"Failed to connect: HTTP {N}\" | Service alive, exact status |\n\nAn attacker can drive the flow programmatically: register a client via open DCR (`POST /register`), initiate authorization, extract a `txn_id`, and submit arbitrary `ha_url` values. No user interaction required.\n\n**Code path 2 — REST tool calls with forged token**\n\nOAuth access tokens are stateless base64-encoded JSON payloads (`{\"ha_url\": \"...\", \"ha_token\": \"...\"}`). Since tokens are not signed, an attacker can forge a token with an arbitrary `ha_url`. REST tool calls then make HTTP requests to hardcoded HA API paths on that host (`/config`, `/states`, `/services`, etc.). JSON responses are returned to the caller.\n\nIn practice, path control is limited — most endpoints use absolute paths that ignore the `ha_url` path component. Useful exfiltration requires the target to return JSON at HA API paths, which is unlikely for non-HA services.\n\n**Code path 3 — WebSocket tool calls with forged token**\n\nThe same forged token triggers WebSocket connections to `ws://{ha_url}/api/websocket`. The client follows the HA WebSocket handshake protocol (waits for `auth_required`, sends `auth`, expects `auth_ok`). Non-HA targets fail at the protocol level and return nothing useful. Realistic exploitation is limited to pivoting to another HA instance on the internal network.\n\n### Impact\n\n**Confirmed:** Internal network reconnaissance via error oracle (all 3 code paths). An attacker can map reachable hosts and open ports from the server's network position.\n\n### Scope\n\nOAuth mode is a **beta** feature, documented separately in `docs/OAUTH.md` and not part of the main setup instructions. The standard deployment method (pre-configured `HOMEASSISTANT_URL` and `HOMEASSISTANT_TOKEN`) is not affected.\n\n### Fix\n\nUpgrade to 7.0.0",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "ha-mcp"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "7.0.0"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/homeassistant-ai/ha-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-fmfg-9g7c-3vq7"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32111"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/homeassistant-ai/ha-mcp"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-918" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-03-12T14:23:37Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-03-11T21:16:17Z"
  }
}