CVE-2026-46519: MCP Server Kubernetes Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-cr22-wjx7-2w6m
CVSS 8.8
CWE-863
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-46519 is a HIGH (CVSS 8.8) remote code execution vulnerability (CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization) affecting MCP Server Kubernetes libraries in the npm ecosystem. The issue involves tool access control bypass via presentation-layer filtering without execution-layer enforcement. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 3.6.0.

CVE-2026-46519 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-46519
GHSA Identifier GHSA-cr22-wjx7-2w6m
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 8.8
CWE Classification CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization
Affected Product MCP Server Kubernetes
Package Ecosystem npm
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 8.8

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2026-46519

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected MCP Server Kubernetes dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

mcp-server-kubernetes fixed: 3.6.0
npm install mcp-server-kubernetes@3.6.0
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

npm ls mcp-server-kubernetes

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Node.js application is affected by CVE-2026-46519, inspect your project dependencies using npm:

npm ls mcp-server-kubernetes

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of MCP Server Kubernetes in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 3.6.0), your application is affected.

Note: The npm ls mcp-server-kubernetes command inspects dependencies declared in your package.json and lockfile; it does not perform automated runtime dynamic scanning.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization, where the product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check. In MCP Server Kubernetes, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Summary `mcp-server-kubernetes` exposes three environment variables (`ALLOW_ONLY_READONLY_TOOLS`, `ALLOW_ONLY_NON_DESTRUCTIVE_TOOLS`, `ALLOWED_TOOLS`) documented as access controls for restricting which Kubernetes operations are available. These controls are enforced at the tool discovery layer (`tools/list`) but not at the execution layer (`tools/call`). Any client that knows a tool name can invoke it directly regardless of the configured restriction mode. The access control was effectively cosmetic. Fixed in v3.6.0. ## Impact An attacker or misconfigured AI agent with network access to the MCP server's HTTP endpoint could invoke any Kubernetes tool regardless of the restriction mode configured by the operator -- including `kubectl_delete`, `exec_in_pod`, `kubectl_generic`, and `node_management`. The project explicitly supports and documents multi-client HTTP deployment scenarios (Streamable HTTP and SSE transports, in-cluster deployments, Codex CLI and Gemini CLI integrations). In these deployments, operators relied on the tool restriction env vars to enforce least-privilege access across users or roles. The bypass invalidated that model entirely. Severity scales with the Kubernetes service account's permissions. In environments where the MCP server runs with `cluster-admin` (common in dev/staging), this is equivalent to full cluster compromise for any client that can reach the endpoint. The `MCP_AUTH_TOKEN` / `X-MCP-AUTH` mechanism controls who can reach the endpoint but provides no per-tool authorization. An authenticated client restricted to `ALLOWED_TOOLS=kubectl_get` could still invoke `kubectl_delete` after authentication. ## Root Cause In `src/index.ts`, the `ListToolsRequestSchema` handler applied the configured filtering logic before returning available tools. The `CallToolRequestSchema` handler dispatched directly by tool name with no equivalent check -- every tool was reachable unconditionally. ## Proof of Concept Tested across all three restriction modes against a live kind cluster. In each case, `kubectl_delete` was absent from `tools/list` but executed successfully via a direct `tools/call` request: ```shell curl -s http://<HOST>:3003/mcp \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -H 'Accept: application/json, text/event-stream' \ -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"kubectl_delete","arguments":{"resourceType":"pod","name":"test-pod","namespace":"default"}}}' ``` Result: `{"result":{"content":[{"type":"text","text":"pod \"test-pod\" deleted\n"}]}}` Confirmed across `ALLOW_ONLY_READONLY_TOOLS=true`, `ALLOW_ONLY_NON_DESTRUCTIVE_TOOLS=true`, and `ALLOWED_TOOLS=kubectl_get`. ## Remediation The fix applies the same filtering logic from `ListToolsRequestSchema` at the start of the `CallToolRequestSchema` handler, returning an error for any tool call outside the active allowed set. Fixed in v3.6.0. ## Credit Discovered by [Francisco Rosales](https://www.linkedin.com/in/francisco-rosales-celis/) of [Manifold Security](https://manifold.security), coordinated by [Ax Sharma](https://www.linkedin.com/in/axsharma/), Head of Research at Manifold Security.

CVE-2026-46519 Affected MCP Server Kubernetes Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
3.6.0
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
mcp-server-kubernetes
npm
< 3.6.0
3.6.0

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-46519?
CVE-2026-46519 is a security vulnerability in MCP Server Kubernetes involving Tool Access Control Bypass via Presentation-Layer Filtering Without Execution-Layer Enforcement under CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization.
Which MCP Server Kubernetes versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 3.6.0 across affected packages: mcp-server-kubernetes.
What version fixes CVE-2026-46519?
Upgrading to 3.6.0 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is mcp-server-kubernetes affected?
Yes, mcp-server-kubernetes is affected in releases prior to 3.6.0. Upgrade your dependency to 3.6.0 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-46519?
CVE-2026-46519 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 8.8 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-46519?
CVE-2026-46519 is classified under CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization (The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.).
How can I check npm dependencies for CVE-2026-46519?
Run the dependency tree command: 'npm ls mcp-server-kubernetes'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-cr22-wjx7-2w6m",
  "modified" : "2026-06-12T19:26:31Z",
  "published" : "2026-05-21T20:33:46Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-46519" ],
  "summary" : "MCP Server Kubernetes: Tool Access Control Bypass via Presentation-Layer Filtering Without Execution-Layer Enforcement",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\n`mcp-server-kubernetes` exposes three environment variables (`ALLOW_ONLY_READONLY_TOOLS`, `ALLOW_ONLY_NON_DESTRUCTIVE_TOOLS`, `ALLOWED_TOOLS`) documented as access controls for restricting which Kubernetes operations are available. These controls are enforced at the tool discovery layer (`tools/list`) but not at the execution layer (`tools/call`). Any client that knows a tool name can invoke it directly regardless of the configured restriction mode. The access control was effectively cosmetic.\n\nFixed in v3.6.0.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker or misconfigured AI agent with network access to the MCP server's HTTP endpoint could invoke any Kubernetes tool regardless of the restriction mode configured by the operator -- including `kubectl_delete`, `exec_in_pod`, `kubectl_generic`, and `node_management`.\n\nThe project explicitly supports and documents multi-client HTTP deployment scenarios (Streamable HTTP and SSE transports, in-cluster deployments, Codex CLI and Gemini CLI integrations). In these deployments, operators relied on the tool restriction env vars to enforce least-privilege access across users or roles. The bypass invalidated that model entirely.\n\nSeverity scales with the Kubernetes service account's permissions. In environments where the MCP server runs with `cluster-admin` (common in dev/staging), this is equivalent to full cluster compromise for any client that can reach the endpoint.\n\nThe `MCP_AUTH_TOKEN` / `X-MCP-AUTH` mechanism controls who can reach the endpoint but provides no per-tool authorization. An authenticated client restricted to `ALLOWED_TOOLS=kubectl_get` could still invoke `kubectl_delete` after authentication.\n\n## Root Cause\n\nIn `src/index.ts`, the `ListToolsRequestSchema` handler applied the configured filtering logic before returning available tools. The `CallToolRequestSchema` handler dispatched directly by tool name with no equivalent check -- every tool was reachable unconditionally.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nTested across all three restriction modes against a live kind cluster. In each case, `kubectl_delete` was absent from `tools/list` but executed successfully via a direct `tools/call` request:\n\n```shell\ncurl -s http://<HOST>:3003/mcp \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n  -H 'Accept: application/json, text/event-stream' \\\n  -d '{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":2,\"method\":\"tools/call\",\"params\":{\"name\":\"kubectl_delete\",\"arguments\":{\"resourceType\":\"pod\",\"name\":\"test-pod\",\"namespace\":\"default\"}}}'\n```\n\nResult: `{\"result\":{\"content\":[{\"type\":\"text\",\"text\":\"pod \\\"test-pod\\\" deleted\\n\"}]}}`\n\nConfirmed across `ALLOW_ONLY_READONLY_TOOLS=true`, `ALLOW_ONLY_NON_DESTRUCTIVE_TOOLS=true`, and `ALLOWED_TOOLS=kubectl_get`.\n\n## Remediation\n\nThe fix applies the same filtering logic from `ListToolsRequestSchema` at the start of the `CallToolRequestSchema` handler, returning an error for any tool call outside the active allowed set. Fixed in v3.6.0.\n\n## Credit\n\nDiscovered by [Francisco Rosales](https://www.linkedin.com/in/francisco-rosales-celis/) of [Manifold Security](https://manifold.security), coordinated by [Ax Sharma](https://www.linkedin.com/in/axsharma/), Head of Research at Manifold Security.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "npm",
      "name" : "mcp-server-kubernetes"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "3.6.0"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/Flux159/mcp-server-kubernetes/security/advisories/GHSA-cr22-wjx7-2w6m"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46519"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/Flux159/mcp-server-kubernetes"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/Flux159/mcp-server-kubernetes/releases/tag/v3.6.0"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-863" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-05-21T20:33:46Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-06-11T19:16:42Z"
  }
}