CVE-2026-77248: MCP Atlassian Unauthenticated Arbitrary Local File Read Vulnerability
HIGHCVE-2026-77248 is a HIGH (CVSS 8.6) unauthenticated arbitrary local file read vulnerability (CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')) affecting MCP Atlassian libraries in the PyPI ecosystem. The issue involves unauthenticated arbitrary local file read via upload_attachment file_path, chained with missing auth on streamable-http transport. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 0.22.0.
CVE-2026-77248 at a Glance
Security Impact
CVSS: 8.6
The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N).
How to Fix CVE-2026-77248
To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected MCP Atlassian dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.
pip install mcp-atlassian>=0.22.0
Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:
pip show mcp-atlassian
How to Check if You Are Affected
To determine whether your Python environment is affected by CVE-2026-77248, inspect your installed packages using pip:
pip show mcp-atlassian
Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of MCP Atlassian in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 0.22.0), your application is affected.
Note: The pip show mcp-atlassian command checks currently installed packages in your active Python environment.
Technical Details
Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal'), where the product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory. In MCP Atlassian, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.
Source Advisory Statement
CVE-2026-77248 Affected MCP Atlassian Versions
1 component(s)| Product / Package | Ecosystem | Affected Versions | Fixed Version |
|---|---|---|---|
|
mcp-atlassian
|
PyPI |
< 0.22.0
|
0.22.0
|
References
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-77248?
Which MCP Atlassian versions are affected?
What version fixes CVE-2026-77248?
Is mcp-atlassian affected?
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-77248?
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-77248?
How can I check PyPI dependencies for CVE-2026-77248?
Machine-readable OSV JSON
OSV v1.5 Schema
{
"schema_version" : "1.4.0",
"id" : "GHSA-cc5h-2pwp-pvcc",
"modified" : "2026-09-22T20:34:43Z",
"published" : "2026-09-22T20:34:43Z",
"aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-77248" ],
"summary" : "MCP Atlassian: Unauthenticated arbitrary local file read via upload_attachment file_path, chained with missing auth on streamable-http transport",
"details" : "### Summary\nIn the documented multi-user HTTP deployment (`--transport streamable-http` with global operator Atlassian credentials), sooperset/mcp-atlassian exposes all tools to **unauthenticated network clients**, and the `upload_attachment` tool reads an attacker-supplied `file_path` with **no path validation**. Chained, an unauthenticated network attacker reads arbitrary files on the MCP server host (e.g. `/proc/self/environ` → the operator's Atlassian API token + `.env` secrets, `~/.ssh/id_rsa`, `/etc/passwd`) by uploading them to an attacker-chosen page/issue and reading them back.\n\n### Details\n**Missing authentication (transport):**\n- streamable-http binds `0.0.0.0` by default (`src/mcp_atlassian/__init__.py:151`).\n- The OAuth-proxy auth provider is opt-in (`ATLASSIAN_OAUTH_PROXY_ENABLE`, default false), so `main_mcp` is built with `auth=None` (`src/mcp_atlassian/servers/main.py:724-731, 813-817`).\n- `UserTokenMiddleware._parse_auth_header` sets `auth_validation_error` only for a *malformed* Authorization header; a request with **no** Authorization header passes through (`main.py:416-446, 582-595`).\n- `_get_fetcher` then falls through to the global credential fallback using the operator's `.env` Atlassian token (`src/mcp_atlassian/servers/dependencies.py:644-676`). `check_write_access` gates only on read-only mode, not auth → read **and** write tools reachable.\n\n**Arbitrary file read (sink):**\n- `upload_attachment`'s `file_path` flows unsanitized into `open(file_path, 'rb')` — Confluence `src/mcp_atlassian/confluence/attachments.py:477` (from `servers/confluence.py:1294-1369`); Jira `src/mcp_atlassian/jira/attachments.py:386` (from `servers/jira.py:1609-1673`). No `validate_safe_path` / allowlist (contrast the download flow, hardened after CVE-2026-27825).\n\n### Proof of Concept\n```\n# unauthenticated (no Authorization header) against a default streamable-http deployment:\ntools/call upload_attachment { \"file_path\": \"/proc/self/environ\", \"page_id\": \"<attacker-chosen>\" }\n# then read it back:\ntools/call download_attachment { ... } # returns the bytes (base64) -> operator's ATLASSIAN token + .env secrets\n```\n\n### Impact\nUnauthenticated arbitrary local file read on the MCP server host — including the operator's Atlassian API token and `.env` secrets — a boundary the Atlassian-scoped tool must not cross, plus unauthenticated use of every read/write Atlassian tool as the operator's (often admin) principal. Distinct from GHSA-xjgw-4wvw-rgm4 (file *write* via download_path) and GHSA-7r34-79r5-rcc9 (URL-header SSRF). \n\n### Suggested fix\nRequire authentication on the streamable-http transport by default (do not fall back to operator global credentials for unauthenticated requests); apply `validate_safe_path`/allowlist to `file_path` in `upload_attachment` as the download flow already does.\n\n### Affected\n`mcp-atlassian` <= 0.21.1.",
"severity" : [ {
"type" : "CVSS_V3",
"score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N"
} ],
"affected" : [ {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "PyPI",
"name" : "mcp-atlassian"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "0"
}, {
"fixed" : "0.22.0"
} ]
} ]
} ],
"references" : [ {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/security/advisories/GHSA-cc5h-2pwp-pvcc"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/pull/1448"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/commit/b041733473f95119dd539542a43c280737a8e460"
}, {
"type" : "PACKAGE",
"url" : "https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/releases/tag/v0.22.0"
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-22" ],
"severity" : "HIGH",
"github_reviewed" : true,
"github_reviewed_at" : "2026-09-22T20:34:43Z",
"nvd_published_at" : null
}
}