CVE-2026-98070: Software Security Vulnerability Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-c3rf-2q38-4hg9
CVSS 8.1
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-98070 is a HIGH (CVSS 8.1) security vulnerability vulnerability (General Security Weakness) affecting Software libraries in the Maven ecosystem. Remediation is available in the latest vendor maintenance releases.

CVE-2026-98070 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-98070
GHSA Identifier GHSA-c3rf-2q38-4hg9
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 8.1
CWE Classification General Security Weakness
Affected Product Software
Package Ecosystem Maven
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 8.1

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity High (AC:H)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2026-98070

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Software dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

mvn dependency:tree

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Java application is affected by CVE-2026-98070, inspect your build dependencies using the Maven Dependency Plugin:

mvn dependency:tree

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Software in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than the patched release), your application is affected.

Note: The mvn dependency:tree command inspects the resolved dependency graph declared in your project's POM files; it does not perform automated security scanning or inspect runtime dynamic classpaths. Always verify runtime container classpaths and shaded JARs.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under General Security Weakness. In Software, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/rds: acquire RDS_IN_XMIT in rds_tcp_reset_callbacks() rds_tcp_reset_callbacks() quiesces the transmit path by setting the path state to RDS_CONN_RESETTING and then waiting for RDS_IN_XMIT to be sampled clear before swapping the underlying socket and calling rds_send_path_reset(). Sampling the bit clear is not the same as owning it: rds_send_xmit() can re-acquire RDS_IN_XMIT right after the wait_event() returns. Its state recheck after taking the lock is a store-buffering pattern (the resetter writes the state and reads the bit, the sender writes the bit and reads the state) and acquire_in_xmit() is only an acquire operation, so on weakly ordered architectures both sides can miss each other's write and the transmit path then runs concurrently with rds_send_path_reset() rewriting cp_xmit_* state - which is exactly what the comment above rds_send_path_reset() tells its callers to prevent. Take the lock instead, hold it across the socket swap and rds_send_path_reset(), and release it with a wake-up at the end. The lock-ordering constraint documented above the wait still holds: the lock is acquired before lock_sock(), so a sender inside tcp_sendmsg() can never be waited on while we hold the socket lock. Two details of the old code go away with the same change: - t_sock is now read only after the lock is acquired. The old code cached it before waiting; the teardown in rds_conn_shutdown() releases that socket and clears t_sock, so a pointer cached before the wait can be stale by the time the accept path resumes. Reading it under RDS_IN_XMIT is what makes the exclusion complete once the teardown owns the same lock, which the next patch arranges; until then the teardown still only samples the bit, and the two paths remain as exposed to each other as they are today. - The old !osock early path called rds_send_path_reset() with no serialization at all. It now runs under the lock like the normal path. The conditional RDS_CONN_RESETTING transition of the previous patch happens before the socket check either way: a path found without a socket is either still connecting (its reconnect worker blocked on t_conn_path_lock) and legitimately goes RESETTING -> UP on the new socket, or it has been torn down meanwhile and is dropped. The in-function comment describing the old wait-based quiesce is rewritten to describe the lock-based one, and the stale block comment above the function (which still described a return value and an incomplete list of t_sock writers) is refreshed to name all four writers - the connect, accept, teardown and swap paths - and what serializes each of them.

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-98070?
CVE-2026-98070 is a security vulnerability in Software classified as a security vulnerability vulnerability under General Security Weakness.
Which Software versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to current release patches.
What version fixes CVE-2026-98070?
Upgrading to current release patches (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-98070?
CVE-2026-98070 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 8.1 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-98070?
CVE-2026-98070 is classified under General Security Weakness.
How can I check Maven dependencies for CVE-2026-98070?
Run the dependency tree command: 'mvn dependency:tree'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-c3rf-2q38-4hg9",
  "modified" : "2026-10-03T12:31:26Z",
  "published" : "2026-09-25T12:31:35Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-98070" ],
  "details" : "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/rds: acquire RDS_IN_XMIT in rds_tcp_reset_callbacks()\n\nrds_tcp_reset_callbacks() quiesces the transmit path by setting the\npath state to RDS_CONN_RESETTING and then waiting for RDS_IN_XMIT to\nbe sampled clear before swapping the underlying socket and calling\nrds_send_path_reset().\n\nSampling the bit clear is not the same as owning it: rds_send_xmit()\ncan re-acquire RDS_IN_XMIT right after the wait_event() returns.  Its\nstate recheck after taking the lock is a store-buffering pattern (the\nresetter writes the state and reads the bit, the sender writes the\nbit and reads the state) and acquire_in_xmit() is only an acquire\noperation, so on weakly ordered architectures both sides can miss\neach other's write and the transmit path then runs concurrently with\nrds_send_path_reset() rewriting cp_xmit_* state - which is exactly\nwhat the comment above rds_send_path_reset() tells its callers to\nprevent.\n\nTake the lock instead, hold it across the socket swap and\nrds_send_path_reset(), and release it with a wake-up at the end.  The\nlock-ordering constraint documented above the wait still holds: the\nlock is acquired before lock_sock(), so a sender inside tcp_sendmsg()\ncan never be waited on while we hold the socket lock.\n\nTwo details of the old code go away with the same change:\n\n - t_sock is now read only after the lock is acquired.  The old code\n   cached it before waiting; the teardown in rds_conn_shutdown()\n   releases that socket and clears t_sock, so a pointer cached before\n   the wait can be stale by the time the accept path resumes.  Reading\n   it under RDS_IN_XMIT is what makes the exclusion complete once the\n   teardown owns the same lock, which the next patch arranges; until\n   then the teardown still only samples the bit, and the two paths\n   remain as exposed to each other as they are today.\n\n - The old !osock early path called rds_send_path_reset() with no\n   serialization at all.  It now runs under the lock like the normal\n   path.  The conditional RDS_CONN_RESETTING transition of the\n   previous patch happens before the socket check either way: a path\n   found without a socket is either still connecting (its reconnect\n   worker blocked on t_conn_path_lock) and legitimately goes\n   RESETTING -> UP on the new socket, or it has been torn down\n   meanwhile and is dropped.\n\nThe in-function comment describing the old wait-based quiesce is\nrewritten to describe the lock-based one, and the stale block comment\nabove the function (which still described a return value and an\nincomplete list of t_sock writers) is refreshed to name all four\nwriters - the connect, accept, teardown and swap paths - and what\nserializes each of them.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98070"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/02c5f9dc2efd823e061954d564ce00bacd1bebeb"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/062d9e008c67289e8e1b221ecdd8f9d60566d012"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/670af4e4a4de5e6bb5daee3838485571a0caa5fa"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/830a2e21b200c6b6fdccc63dd3f23932bf7a894b"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8e4c3b7844c906c7097b4cfedd9dd1f48c9a6a92"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a05790cb4ff03f797d76906990b148d83f63e7a3"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d184e6dd4b8f3c20c018595fd09795a66b46c8ef"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d625112564c3e980e02504270222b49b82690cee"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : false,
    "github_reviewed_at" : null,
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-09-25T11:17:36Z"
  }
}