CVE-2026-31411: Software Security Vulnerability Vulnerability

MODERATE
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-9q92-j4jr-j3jp
CVSS 5.5
CWE-476
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-31411 is a MODERATE (CVSS 5.5) security vulnerability vulnerability (CWE-476: NULL Pointer Dereference) affecting Software libraries in the Maven ecosystem. The weakness occurs when the product dereferences a pointer that it expects to be valid but is null.. Remediation is available in the latest vendor maintenance releases.

CVE-2026-31411 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-31411
GHSA Identifier GHSA-9q92-j4jr-j3jp
Severity MODERATE
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 5.5
CWE Classification CWE-476: NULL Pointer Dereference
Affected Product Software
Package Ecosystem Maven
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 5.5

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H).

Attack Vector Local (AV:L)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality None (C:N)
Integrity None (I:N)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2026-31411

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Software dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

mvn dependency:tree

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Java application is affected by CVE-2026-31411, inspect your build dependencies using the Maven Dependency Plugin:

mvn dependency:tree

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Software in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than the patched release), your application is affected.

Note: The mvn dependency:tree command inspects the resolved dependency graph declared in your project's POM files; it does not perform automated security scanning or inspect runtime dynamic classpaths. Always verify runtime container classpaths and shaded JARs.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-476: NULL Pointer Dereference, where the product dereferences a pointer that it expects to be valid but is null. In Software, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: atm: fix crash due to unvalidated vcc pointer in sigd_send() Reproducer available at [1]. The ATM send path (sendmsg -> vcc_sendmsg -> sigd_send) reads the vcc pointer from msg->vcc and uses it directly without any validation. This pointer comes from userspace via sendmsg() and can be arbitrarily forged: int fd = socket(AF_ATMSVC, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); ioctl(fd, ATMSIGD_CTRL); // become ATM signaling daemon struct msghdr msg = { .msg_iov = &iov, ... }; *(unsigned long *)(buf + 4) = 0xdeadbeef; // fake vcc pointer sendmsg(fd, &msg, 0); // kernel dereferences 0xdeadbeef In normal operation, the kernel sends the vcc pointer to the signaling daemon via sigd_enq() when processing operations like connect(), bind(), or listen(). The daemon is expected to return the same pointer when responding. However, a malicious daemon can send arbitrary pointer values. Fix this by introducing find_get_vcc() which validates the pointer by searching through vcc_hash (similar to how sigd_close() iterates over all VCCs), and acquires a reference via sock_hold() if found. Since struct atm_vcc embeds struct sock as its first member, they share the same lifetime. Therefore using sock_hold/sock_put is sufficient to keep the vcc alive while it is being used. Note that there may be a race with sigd_close() which could mark the vcc with various flags (e.g., ATM_VF_RELEASED) after find_get_vcc() returns. However, sock_hold() guarantees the memory remains valid, so this race only affects the logical state, not memory safety. [1]: https://gist.github.com/mrpre/1ba5949c45529c511152e2f4c755b0f3

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-31411?
CVE-2026-31411 is a security vulnerability in Software classified as a security vulnerability vulnerability under CWE-476: NULL Pointer Dereference.
Which Software versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to current release patches.
What version fixes CVE-2026-31411?
Upgrading to current release patches (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-31411?
CVE-2026-31411 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 5.5 (MODERATE) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-31411?
CVE-2026-31411 is classified under CWE-476: NULL Pointer Dereference (The product dereferences a pointer that it expects to be valid but is NULL.).
How can I check Maven dependencies for CVE-2026-31411?
Run the dependency tree command: 'mvn dependency:tree'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
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  "details" : "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: atm: fix crash due to unvalidated vcc pointer in sigd_send()\n\nReproducer available at [1].\n\nThe ATM send path (sendmsg -> vcc_sendmsg -> sigd_send) reads the vcc\npointer from msg->vcc and uses it directly without any validation. This\npointer comes from userspace via sendmsg() and can be arbitrarily forged:\n\n    int fd = socket(AF_ATMSVC, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);\n    ioctl(fd, ATMSIGD_CTRL);  // become ATM signaling daemon\n    struct msghdr msg = { .msg_iov = &iov, ... };\n    *(unsigned long *)(buf + 4) = 0xdeadbeef;  // fake vcc pointer\n    sendmsg(fd, &msg, 0);  // kernel dereferences 0xdeadbeef\n\nIn normal operation, the kernel sends the vcc pointer to the signaling\ndaemon via sigd_enq() when processing operations like connect(), bind(),\nor listen(). The daemon is expected to return the same pointer when\nresponding. However, a malicious daemon can send arbitrary pointer values.\n\nFix this by introducing find_get_vcc() which validates the pointer by\nsearching through vcc_hash (similar to how sigd_close() iterates over\nall VCCs), and acquires a reference via sock_hold() if found.\n\nSince struct atm_vcc embeds struct sock as its first member, they share\nthe same lifetime. Therefore using sock_hold/sock_put is sufficient to\nkeep the vcc alive while it is being used.\n\nNote that there may be a race with sigd_close() which could mark the vcc\nwith various flags (e.g., ATM_VF_RELEASED) after find_get_vcc() returns.\nHowever, sock_hold() guarantees the memory remains valid, so this race\nonly affects the logical state, not memory safety.\n\n[1]: https://gist.github.com/mrpre/1ba5949c45529c511152e2f4c755b0f3",
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