CVE-2026-93243: Software Security Vulnerability Vulnerability

UNKNOWN
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-9q86-wxfp-682m
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-93243 is a security vulnerability vulnerability (General Security Weakness) affecting Software libraries in the Maven ecosystem. Remediation is available in the latest vendor maintenance releases.

CVE-2026-93243 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-93243
GHSA Identifier GHSA-9q86-wxfp-682m
Severity N/A
CVSS v3.1 Base Score N/A
CWE Classification General Security Weakness
Affected Product Software
Package Ecosystem Maven
Published Date
Last Updated

How to Fix CVE-2026-93243

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Software dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

mvn dependency:tree

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Java application is affected by CVE-2026-93243, inspect your build dependencies using the Maven Dependency Plugin:

mvn dependency:tree

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Software in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than the patched release), your application is affected.

Note: The mvn dependency:tree command inspects the resolved dependency graph declared in your project's POM files; it does not perform automated security scanning or inspect runtime dynamic classpaths. Always verify runtime container classpaths and shaded JARs.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under General Security Weakness. In Software, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/secretmem: properly account locked pages secretmem accounts folios by treating memory as if it were mlock()'d and thus limited by the RLIMIT_MEMLOCK limit. However the folios are unevictable and remain so until the inode is evicted, eliminating usual mlock() semantics - mapping folios then unmapping them does not clear their unevictable state, since it depends on AS_UNEVICTABLE, not PG_mlocked. A user can therefore easily work around the RLIMIT_MEMLOCK limit - simply map then unmap and VmLck no longer counts the secretmem range. Worse, folios are not accounted in the process's RSS, meaning the OOM killer won't know to kill the process. Repeatedly mapping/unmapping (or forking) can then result in the consumption of all available system memory with unevictable folios and cause system instability. A secretmem fd can be passed between processes and over fork so a per-process limit simply does not make sense, so follow the precedent set by io_uring, perf, skbuff, iommufd and xdp by tracking the number of locked pages in user_struct->locked_vm. Since the scope tracked is actually inode lifetime, the RLIMIT_MEMLOCK applies per-user not per-process, so it doesn't make sense to bypass for users with CAP_IPC_LOCK, therefore remove this bypass. There is simply no reason to carry on marking the mapping as mlock()'d since it's misleading and the lifecycle is now correctly handled, so remove this too. Note that secretmem does not support any form of truncation (including hole punching) and the folios are unreclaimable, so the folios need only be accounted on fault and unaccounted on inode destruction. __secretmem_account_pages() is more or less a duplicate of the code that io_uring etc. use, but since this is a bug fix that needs backporting, defer any de-duplication efforts to a follow-up. test_mlock_limit() asserts mlock_future_ok() on mmap(), however this has been removed, so remove the test altogether for the fix. A new test will be sent separately for upstream.

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-93243?
CVE-2026-93243 is a security vulnerability in Software classified as a security vulnerability vulnerability under General Security Weakness.
Which Software versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to current release patches.
What version fixes CVE-2026-93243?
Upgrading to current release patches (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-93243?
CVE-2026-93243 is classified under General Security Weakness.
How can I check Maven dependencies for CVE-2026-93243?
Run the dependency tree command: 'mvn dependency:tree'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-9q86-wxfp-682m",
  "modified" : "2026-10-15T12:30:53Z",
  "published" : "2026-09-24T18:31:23Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-93243" ],
  "details" : "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmm/secretmem: properly account locked pages\n\nsecretmem accounts folios by treating memory as if it were mlock()'d and\nthus limited by the RLIMIT_MEMLOCK limit.\n\nHowever the folios are unevictable and remain so until the inode is\nevicted, eliminating usual mlock() semantics - mapping folios then\nunmapping them does not clear their unevictable state, since it depends on\nAS_UNEVICTABLE, not PG_mlocked.\n\nA user can therefore easily work around the RLIMIT_MEMLOCK limit - simply\nmap then unmap and VmLck no longer counts the secretmem range.  Worse,\nfolios are not accounted in the process's RSS, meaning the OOM killer\nwon't know to kill the process.\n\nRepeatedly mapping/unmapping (or forking) can then result in the\nconsumption of all available system memory with unevictable folios and\ncause system instability.\n\nA secretmem fd can be passed between processes and over fork so a\nper-process limit simply does not make sense, so follow the precedent set\nby io_uring, perf, skbuff, iommufd and xdp by tracking the number of\nlocked pages in user_struct->locked_vm.\n\nSince the scope tracked is actually inode lifetime, the RLIMIT_MEMLOCK\napplies per-user not per-process, so it doesn't make sense to bypass for\nusers with CAP_IPC_LOCK, therefore remove this bypass.\n\nThere is simply no reason to carry on marking the mapping as mlock()'d\nsince it's misleading and the lifecycle is now correctly handled, so\nremove this too.\n\nNote that secretmem does not support any form of truncation (including\nhole punching) and the folios are unreclaimable, so the folios need only\nbe accounted on fault and unaccounted on inode destruction.\n\n__secretmem_account_pages() is more or less a duplicate of the code that\nio_uring etc.  use, but since this is a bug fix that needs backporting,\ndefer any de-duplication efforts to a follow-up.\n\ntest_mlock_limit() asserts mlock_future_ok() on mmap(), however this has\nbeen removed, so remove the test altogether for the fix.  A new test will\nbe sent separately for upstream.",
  "severity" : [ ],
  "affected" : [ ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-93243"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3b4f72bdddff69819d665395376329ef21f37a06"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/853043cb129473ff2fa0090602be944d96b9d5c9"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/97d34aa65c29cca85e3e9050f4c936389b38a054"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a41c95ac90f285cbe473b9606428b14518896ea4"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ ],
    "severity" : null,
    "github_reviewed" : false,
    "github_reviewed_at" : null,
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-09-24T16:17:20Z"
  }
}