CVE-2026-33544: Github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth Tinyauth Has OAuth Account Confusion Vulnerability
HIGHCVE-2026-33544 is a HIGH (CVSS 7.7) tinyauth has oauth account confusion vulnerability (CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')) affecting Github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth libraries in the Go ecosystem. The issue involves tinyauth has oauth account confusion via shared mutable state on singleton service instances. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 1.0.1-0.20260401140714-fc1d4f2082a5.
CVE-2026-33544 at a Glance
Security Impact
CVSS: 7.7
The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N).
How to Fix CVE-2026-33544
To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.
Upgrade github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth to 1.0.1-0.20260401140714-fc1d4f2082a5
Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:
inspect dependencies for github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth
How to Check if You Are Affected
To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-33544, inspect your project dependencies for Github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth:
inspect dependencies for github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth
Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 1.0.1-0.20260401140714-fc1d4f2082a5), your application is affected.
Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.
Technical Details
Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition'), where the product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently. In Github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.
Source Advisory Statement
CVE-2026-33544 Affected Github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth Versions
1 component(s)| Product / Package | Ecosystem | Affected Versions | Fixed Version |
|---|---|---|---|
|
github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth
|
Go |
< 1.0.1-0.20260401140714-fc1d4f2082a5
|
1.0.1-0.20260401140714-fc1d4f2082a5
|
References
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-33544?
Which Github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth versions are affected?
What version fixes CVE-2026-33544?
Is github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth affected?
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-33544?
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-33544?
How can I check Go dependencies for CVE-2026-33544?
Machine-readable OSV JSON
OSV v1.5 Schema
{
"schema_version" : "1.4.0",
"id" : "GHSA-9q5m-jfc4-wc92",
"modified" : "2026-04-06T17:18:24Z",
"published" : "2026-04-01T19:52:04Z",
"aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-33544" ],
"summary" : "Tinyauth has OAuth account confusion via shared mutable state on singleton service instances",
"details" : "### Summary\n\nAll three OAuth service implementations (`GenericOAuthService`, `GithubOAuthService`, `GoogleOAuthService`) store PKCE verifiers and access tokens as mutable struct fields on singleton instances shared across all concurrent requests. When two users initiate OAuth login for the same provider concurrently, a race condition between `VerifyCode()` and `Userinfo()` causes one user to receive a session with the other user's identity.\n\n### Details\n\nThe [`OAuthBrokerService.GetService()`](https://github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth/blob/592b7ded24959013f8af63ab9930254c752c8c8e/internal/service/oauth_broker_service.go#L70-L72) returns a single shared instance per provider for every request. The OAuth flow stores intermediate state as struct fields on this singleton:\n\n**Token storage** — [`generic_oauth_service.go` line 96](https://github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth/blob/592b7ded24959013f8af63ab9930254c752c8c8e/internal/service/generic_oauth_service.go#L96):\n```go\ngeneric.token = token // Shared mutable field on singleton\n```\n\n**Verifier storage** — [`generic_oauth_service.go` line 81](https://github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth/blob/592b7ded24959013f8af63ab9930254c752c8c8e/internal/service/generic_oauth_service.go#L81):\n```go\ngeneric.verifier = verifier // Shared mutable field on singleton\n```\n\nIn the callback handler [`oauth_controller.go` lines 136–143](https://github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth/blob/592b7ded24959013f8af63ab9930254c752c8c8e/internal/controller/oauth_controller.go#L136-L143), the code calls:\n```go\nerr = service.VerifyCode(code) // line 136 — stores token on singleton\n// ... race window ...\nuser, err := controller.broker.GetUser(req.Provider) // line 143 — reads token from singleton\n```\n\nBetween these two calls, a concurrent request's `VerifyCode()` can overwrite the `token` field, causing `GetUser()` → `Userinfo()` to fetch the **wrong user's** identity claims.\n\nThe same pattern exists in all three implementations:\n- [`github_oauth_service.go` lines 34–39, 77, 86–99](https://github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth/blob/592b7ded24959013f8af63ab9930254c752c8c8e/internal/service/github_oauth_service.go#L34-L39)\n- [`google_oauth_service.go` lines 22–27, 65, 73–87](https://github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth/blob/592b7ded24959013f8af63ab9930254c752c8c8e/internal/service/google_oauth_service.go#L22-L27)\n\n### PoC\n\n**Race scenario** (two concurrent OAuth callbacks):\n\n1. User A and User B both click \"Login with GitHub\" on the same tinyauth instance\n2. Both are redirected to GitHub, authorize, and GitHub redirects both back with authorization codes\n3. Both callbacks arrive at tinyauth nearly simultaneously:\n\n```\nTimeline:\n t0: Request A → service.VerifyCode(codeA) → singleton.token = tokenA\n t1: Request B → service.VerifyCode(codeB) → singleton.token = tokenB (overwrites tokenA)\n t2: Request A → broker.GetUser(\"github\") → Userinfo() reads singleton.token = tokenB\n t3: Request A receives User B's identity (email, name, groups)\n```\n\nUser A now has a tinyauth session with User B's email, gaining access to all resources User B is authorized for via tinyauth's ACL.\n\n**PKCE verifier DoS variant**: Even with PKCE, concurrent `oauthURLHandler` calls overwrite the `verifier` field, causing `VerifyCode()` to send the wrong verifier to the OAuth provider, which rejects the exchange.\n\n**Static verification**: Run Go's race detector on a test that calls `VerifyCode` and `Userinfo` concurrently on the same service instance — the `-race` flag will flag data races on the `token` and `verifier` fields.\n\n**Go race detector confirmation**: Running a concurrent test with `go test -race` on the singleton service detects **4 data races** on the `token` and `verifier` fields. Without the race detector, measured token overwrite rate is 99.9% (9,985/10,000 iterations).\n\n**Test environment**: tinyauth v5.0.4, commit `592b7ded`, Go race detector + source code analysis\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker who times their OAuth callback to race with a victim's callback can obtain a tinyauth session with the victim's identity. This grants unauthorized access to all resources the victim is permitted to access through tinyauth's ACL system. The probability of collision increases with concurrent OAuth traffic.\n\nThe PKCE verifier overwrite additionally causes a denial-of-service: concurrent OAuth logins for the same provider reliably fail.\n\n### Suggested Fix\n\nPass verifier and token through method parameters or return values instead of storing them on the singleton:\n\n```go\nfunc (generic *GenericOAuthService) VerifyCode(code string, verifier string) (*oauth2.Token, error) {\n return generic.config.Exchange(generic.context, code, oauth2.VerifierOption(verifier))\n}\n\nfunc (generic *GenericOAuthService) Userinfo(token *oauth2.Token) (config.Claims, error) {\n client := generic.config.Client(generic.context, token)\n // ...\n}\n```\n\nStore the PKCE verifier in the session/cookie associated with the OAuth `state` parameter, not on the service struct.",
"severity" : [ {
"type" : "CVSS_V3",
"score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N"
} ],
"affected" : [ {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "Go",
"name" : "github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "0"
}, {
"fixed" : "1.0.1-0.20260401140714-fc1d4f2082a5"
} ]
} ]
} ],
"references" : [ {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth/security/advisories/GHSA-9q5m-jfc4-wc92"
}, {
"type" : "ADVISORY",
"url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33544"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth/commit/f26c2171610d5c2dfbba2edb6ccd39490e349803"
}, {
"type" : "PACKAGE",
"url" : "https://github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth/releases/tag/v5.0.5"
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-362" ],
"severity" : "HIGH",
"github_reviewed" : true,
"github_reviewed_at" : "2026-04-01T19:52:04Z",
"nvd_published_at" : "2026-04-02T15:16:39Z"
}
}