CVE-2026-32941: Github.com/bishopfox/sliver Sliver Vulnerable To Authenticated OOM Vulnerability

MODERATE
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-97vp-pwqj-46qc
CWE-789 CWE-770
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-32941 is a MODERATE sliver vulnerable to authenticated oom vulnerability (CWE-789: Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value) affecting Github.com/bishopfox/sliver libraries in the Go ecosystem. The issue involves sliver vulnerable to authenticated oom via memory exhaustion in mtls/wireguard transports. Remediation is available in the latest vendor maintenance releases.

CVE-2026-32941 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-32941
GHSA Identifier GHSA-97vp-pwqj-46qc
Severity MODERATE
CVSS v3.1 Base Score N/A
CWE Classification CWE-789: Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value
Affected Product Github.com/bishopfox/sliver
Package Ecosystem Go
Published Date
Last Updated

How to Fix CVE-2026-32941

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Github.com/bishopfox/sliver dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

github.com/bishopfox/sliver fixed: Latest secure release
Upgrade github.com/bishopfox/sliver to Latest secure release
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for github.com/bishopfox/sliver

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-32941, inspect your project dependencies for Github.com/bishopfox/sliver:

inspect dependencies for github.com/bishopfox/sliver

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Github.com/bishopfox/sliver in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than the patched release), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-789: Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value, where the product allocates memory based on an untrusted, large size value, but it does not ensure that the size is within expected limits, allowing arbitrary amounts of memory to be allocated. In Github.com/bishopfox/sliver, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

# Summary A Remote OOM (Out-of-Memory) vulnerability exists in the Sliver C2 server's mTLS and WireGuard C2 transport layer. The `socketReadEnvelope` and `socketWGReadEnvelope` functions trust an attacker-controlled 4-byte length prefix to allocate memory, with `ServerMaxMessageSize` allowing single allocations of up to **~2 GiB**. A compromised implant or an attacker with valid credentials can exploit this by sending fabricated length prefixes over concurrent yamux streams (up to 128 per connection), forcing the server to attempt allocating **~256 GiB** of memory and triggering an OS OOM kill. This crashes the Sliver server, disrupts all active implant sessions, and may degrade or kill other processes sharing the same host. The same pattern also affects all implant-side readers, which have **no** upper-bound check at all. --- # Root Cause Analysis The C2 envelope framing protocol uses a 4-byte little-endian length prefix to delimit protobuf messages on the wire: ``` [raw_signature (74 bytes)] [uint32 length] [protobuf data] ``` In [socketReadEnvelope](https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/blob/master/server/c2/mtls.go#L337-L392), after reading the length prefix, the server immediately allocates a buffer of the attacker-specified size: ```go // server/c2/mtls.go const ServerMaxMessageSize = (2 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024) - 1 // ~2 GiB dataLength := int(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(dataLengthBuf)) if dataLength <= 0 || ServerMaxMessageSize < dataLength { return nil, errors.New("[pivot] invalid data length") } dataBuf := make([]byte, dataLength) // ← Allocates up to ~2 GiB // ... data is read into buffer ... // Envelope signature verification happens AFTER allocation and read: if !ed25519.Verify(pubKey, dataBuf, signature) { return nil, errors.New("[mtls] invalid signature") } ``` **Key issues:** 1. **Excessive limit**: `ServerMaxMessageSize` is set to `(2 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024) - 1` ≈ **2 GiB**, far exceeding any legitimate protobuf envelope (large payloads like screenshots and downloads are chunked at the RPC layer). 2. **Allocation before envelope verification**: While the TLS handshake validates the client certificate, the per-envelope ed25519 signature check (`ed25519.Verify`) occurs **after** the buffer allocation and `io.ReadFull`. Once the TLS connection is established, no further cryptographic proof is needed to trigger the allocation. 3. **Yamux amplification**: The yamux session allows up to `mtlsYamuxMaxConcurrentStreams = 128` concurrent streams. Each stream processes `socketReadEnvelope` independently, so a single connection can trigger **128 parallel ~2 GiB allocations**. 4. **Implant-side exposure**: The implant-side readers ([ReadEnvelope](https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/blob/master/implant/sliver/transports/mtls/mtls.go#L184) in mTLS/WireGuard, [read()](https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/blob/master/implant/sliver/pivots/pivots.go#L478) in pivots) have **no upper-bound check at all** — they accept any `dataLength > 0`. The same pattern exists in [socketWGReadEnvelope](https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/blob/master/server/c2/wireguard.go#L428-L487) for the WireGuard transport. _Note: The same unbounded allocation pattern is also present in implant-side readers, though it poses no immediate risk to the server [1](https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/blob/master/implant/sliver/transports/mtls/mtls.go#L185), [2](https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/blob/master/implant/sliver/transports/wireguard/wireguard.go#L178), [3](https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/blob/master/implant/sliver/pivots/pivots.go), [4](https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/blob/master/implant/sliver/transports/pivotclients/pivotclient.go)._ --- # Proof of Concept PoC Links: [mtls_poc.go](https://github.com/skoveit/Sliver-OOM-DoS-PoC/) or [Gist Version](https://gist.github.com/skoveit/08f3ec08ffbf3deeff189a83ef827dcf) 1. **Establish mTLS connection**: Complete a valid TLS 1.3 handshake presenting a valid implant client certificate. 2. **Negotiate yamux**: Send the `MUX/1` preface to enter multiplexed stream mode. 3. **Open concurrent streams**: Open multiple yamux streams (up to 128). 4. **Send malicious length prefix**: On each stream, send a 74-byte raw signature buffer followed by a 4-byte length prefix claiming `0x7FFFFFFF` (2,147,483,647 bytes ≈ 2 GiB). No actual data needs to follow. 5. **Result**: Each stream triggers a `make([]byte, 0x7FFFFFFF)` allocation. With 128 concurrent streams, the server process attempts to allocate **up to ~256 GiB** of memory, causing the OS OOM killer to terminate the process. # Impact - **Server availability**: The Sliver server process is killed. Active implant sessions are disrupted until the operator manually restarts the server. - **Host degradation**: On hosts with swap enabled, the OOM event may cause swap thrashing and degrade other services sharing the same host before the process is killed.

CVE-2026-32941 Affected Github.com/bishopfox/sliver Versions

1 component(s)
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
github.com/bishopfox/sliver
Go
≤ 1.7.3

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-32941?
CVE-2026-32941 is a security vulnerability in Github.com/bishopfox/sliver involving Sliver Vulnerable to Authenticated OOM via Memory Exhaustion in mTLS/WireGuard Transports under CWE-789: Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value.
Which Github.com/bishopfox/sliver versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to current release patches across affected packages: github.com/bishopfox/sliver.
What version fixes CVE-2026-32941?
Upgrading to current release patches (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is github.com/bishopfox/sliver affected?
Yes, github.com/bishopfox/sliver is affected in releases prior to Latest secure release. Upgrade your dependency to Latest secure release or later.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-32941?
CVE-2026-32941 is classified under CWE-789: Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value (The product allocates memory based on an untrusted, large size value, but it does not ensure that the size is within expected limits, allowing arbitrary amounts of memory to be allocated.).
How can I check Go dependencies for CVE-2026-32941?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for github.com/bishopfox/sliver'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-97vp-pwqj-46qc",
  "modified" : "2026-03-30T14:04:02Z",
  "published" : "2026-03-17T17:48:45Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-32941" ],
  "summary" : "Sliver Vulnerable to Authenticated OOM via Memory Exhaustion in mTLS/WireGuard Transports",
  "details" : "# Summary\nA Remote OOM (Out-of-Memory) vulnerability exists in the Sliver C2 server's mTLS and WireGuard C2 transport layer. The `socketReadEnvelope` and `socketWGReadEnvelope` functions trust an attacker-controlled 4-byte length prefix to allocate memory, with `ServerMaxMessageSize` allowing single allocations of up to **~2 GiB**. A compromised implant or an attacker with valid credentials can exploit this by sending fabricated length prefixes over concurrent yamux streams (up to 128 per connection), forcing the server to attempt allocating **~256 GiB** of memory and triggering an OS OOM kill. This crashes the Sliver server, disrupts all active implant sessions, and may degrade or kill other processes sharing the same host. The same pattern also affects all implant-side readers, which have **no** upper-bound check at all.\n\n---\n# Root Cause Analysis\n\nThe C2 envelope framing protocol uses a 4-byte little-endian length prefix to delimit protobuf messages on the wire:\n\n```\n[raw_signature (74 bytes)] [uint32 length] [protobuf data]\n```\n\nIn [socketReadEnvelope](https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/blob/master/server/c2/mtls.go#L337-L392), after reading the length prefix, the server immediately allocates a buffer of the attacker-specified size:\n\n```go\n// server/c2/mtls.go\nconst ServerMaxMessageSize = (2 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024) - 1  // ~2 GiB\n\ndataLength := int(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(dataLengthBuf))\nif dataLength <= 0 || ServerMaxMessageSize < dataLength {\n    return nil, errors.New(\"[pivot] invalid data length\")\n}\ndataBuf := make([]byte, dataLength)  // ← Allocates up to ~2 GiB\n\n// ... data is read into buffer ...\n\n// Envelope signature verification happens AFTER allocation and read:\nif !ed25519.Verify(pubKey, dataBuf, signature) {\n    return nil, errors.New(\"[mtls] invalid signature\")\n}\n```\n\n**Key issues:**\n\n1. **Excessive limit**: `ServerMaxMessageSize` is set to `(2 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024) - 1` ≈ **2 GiB**, far exceeding any legitimate protobuf envelope (large payloads like screenshots and downloads are chunked at the RPC layer).\n2. **Allocation before envelope verification**: While the TLS handshake validates the client certificate, the per-envelope ed25519 signature check (`ed25519.Verify`) occurs **after** the buffer allocation and `io.ReadFull`. Once the TLS connection is established, no further cryptographic proof is needed to trigger the allocation.\n3. **Yamux amplification**: The yamux session allows up to `mtlsYamuxMaxConcurrentStreams = 128` concurrent streams. Each stream processes `socketReadEnvelope` independently, so a single connection can trigger **128 parallel ~2 GiB allocations**.\n4. **Implant-side exposure**: The implant-side readers ([ReadEnvelope](https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/blob/master/implant/sliver/transports/mtls/mtls.go#L184) in mTLS/WireGuard, [read()](https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/blob/master/implant/sliver/pivots/pivots.go#L478) in pivots) have **no upper-bound check at all** — they accept any `dataLength > 0`.\n\nThe same pattern exists in [socketWGReadEnvelope](https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/blob/master/server/c2/wireguard.go#L428-L487) for the WireGuard transport.\n\n\n_Note: The same unbounded allocation pattern is also present in implant-side readers, though it poses no immediate risk to the server [1](https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/blob/master/implant/sliver/transports/mtls/mtls.go#L185), [2](https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/blob/master/implant/sliver/transports/wireguard/wireguard.go#L178), [3](https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/blob/master/implant/sliver/pivots/pivots.go), [4](https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/blob/master/implant/sliver/transports/pivotclients/pivotclient.go)._\n\n\n---\n\n# Proof of Concept\nPoC Links: [mtls_poc.go](https://github.com/skoveit/Sliver-OOM-DoS-PoC/) or [Gist Version](https://gist.github.com/skoveit/08f3ec08ffbf3deeff189a83ef827dcf)\n1. **Establish mTLS connection**: Complete a valid TLS 1.3 handshake presenting a valid implant client certificate.\n2. **Negotiate yamux**: Send the `MUX/1` preface to enter multiplexed stream mode.\n3. **Open concurrent streams**: Open multiple yamux streams (up to 128).\n4. **Send malicious length prefix**: On each stream, send a 74-byte raw signature buffer followed by a 4-byte length prefix claiming `0x7FFFFFFF` (2,147,483,647 bytes ≈ 2 GiB). No actual data needs to follow.\n5. **Result**: Each stream triggers a `make([]byte, 0x7FFFFFFF)` allocation. With 128 concurrent streams, the server process attempts to allocate **up to ~256 GiB** of memory, causing the OS OOM killer to terminate the process.\n\n# Impact\n- **Server availability**: The Sliver server process is killed. Active implant sessions are disrupted until the operator manually restarts the server.\n- **Host degradation**: On hosts with swap enabled, the OOM event may cause swap thrashing and degrade other services sharing the same host before the process is killed.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V4",
    "score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/bishopfox/sliver"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "last_affected" : "1.7.3"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/security/advisories/GHSA-97vp-pwqj-46qc"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32941"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://gist.github.com/skoveit/08f3ec08ffbf3deeff189a83ef827dcf"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-770", "CWE-789" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-03-17T17:48:45Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-03-20T04:16:49Z"
  }
}