CVE-2026-44428: Github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry MCP Registry's GitHub OIDC Tokens Vulnerability

LOW
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-95c3-6vvw-4mrq
CVSS 4.7
CWE-918
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-44428 is a LOW (CVSS 4.7) mcp registry's github oidc tokens vulnerability (CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)) affecting Github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry libraries in the Go ecosystem. The issue involves mcp registry's github oidc tokens are replayable across registry deployments due to shared audience. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 1.7.6.

CVE-2026-44428 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-44428
GHSA Identifier GHSA-95c3-6vvw-4mrq
Severity LOW
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 4.7
CWE Classification CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Affected Product Github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry
Package Ecosystem Go
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 4.7

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction Required (UI:R)
Scope Changed (S:C)
Confidentiality None (C:N)
Integrity Low (I:L)
Availability None (A:N)

How to Fix CVE-2026-44428

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry fixed: 1.7.6
Upgrade github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry to 1.7.6
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-44428, inspect your project dependencies for Github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry:

inspect dependencies for github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 1.7.6), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), where the web server receives a url or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this url, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination. In Github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

# [SECURITY] registry_001 Vulnerability Report While analyzing the code logic, an area that may lead to unintended behavior under specific conditions was discovered. ## Overview - Verified Version: `c5c4b9e8890dd5754bee889b2f1417f4fe3b5ce5` - Vulnerability Type: Authentication bypass via cross-registry OIDC token replay - Affected Location: `cmd/publisher/commands/login.go:67-105,130-135,199-224`; `cmd/publisher/auth/github-oidc.go:24-38,58-75,108-165`; `internal/api/handlers/v0/auth/github_oidc.go:75-135,229-277,280-296` - Trigger Scenario: a workflow invokes `mcp-publisher login github-oidc --registry <other-registry>` (or equivalent publish flow) and the publisher still requests a GitHub Actions ID token with the shared audience `mcp-registry`; any other registry deployment running this code can replay that token to its own `/v0/auth/github-oidc` endpoint and mint a publish-capable registry JWT for the same GitHub owner namespace. ## Root Cause The client-side and server-side GitHub OIDC flow is bound only to a global audience string, not to the specific registry instance being targeted. On the client side, the publisher always appends `audience=mcp-registry` when requesting the GitHub Actions ID token, regardless of the selected `--registry` URL. On the server side, the exchange endpoint validates only that same fixed audience and then derives publish permissions directly from `repository_owner`. As a result, a token legitimately obtained while interacting with one registry deployment remains acceptable to any other deployment that shares the same code and audience string. ## Source-to-Sink Chain 1. Source `cmd/publisher/commands/login.go:67-105,130-135,199-224` parses the user-controlled `--registry` flag into `flags.RegistryURL`, creates a `GitHubOIDCProvider`, and calls `authProvider.GetToken(ctx)` for the chosen authentication method. 2. Propagation `cmd/publisher/auth/github-oidc.go:24-38` obtains an OIDC token and immediately exchanges it against the selected registry URL. `cmd/publisher/auth/github-oidc.go:58-75` builds `exchangeURL := o.registryURL + "/v0/auth/github-oidc"` and posts the GitHub token to whichever registry instance was selected. `cmd/publisher/auth/github-oidc.go:108-165` constructs `fullURL := requestURL + "&audience=mcp-registry"` and therefore requests the same audience for every registry deployment. 3. Sink `internal/api/handlers/v0/auth/github_oidc.go:75-135` validates only the shared audience value passed into `ValidateToken`. `internal/api/handlers/v0/auth/github_oidc.go:254-277` calls `h.validator.ValidateToken(ctx, oidcToken, "mcp-registry")` and, on success, signs a new registry JWT. `internal/api/handlers/v0/auth/github_oidc.go:280-296` converts `claims.RepositoryOwner` into the publish permission pattern `io.github.<owner>/*`, which is then embedded into the new registry JWT. ## Exploitation Preconditions 1. The victim uses the GitHub Actions OIDC publishing path. 2. The victim workflow targets another registry deployment first, such as staging, self-hosted infrastructure, or an attacker-controlled registry URL. 3. The receiving registry deployment can observe the posted OIDC token and replay it before expiry to another registry deployment running the same shared audience configuration. ## Risk This breaks deployment isolation between registry instances. A token issued for one registry interaction can be replayed across trust boundaries, allowing one deployment to impersonate the same GitHub owner identity on another deployment. ## Impact An attacker-controlled or compromised registry deployment can mint a valid registry JWT on another deployment and inherit publish permissions for the victim GitHub owner namespace. In practical terms, this enables unauthorized publication or update actions for names such as `io.github.<owner>/*` on the victim registry instance. ## Remediation 1. Replace the shared audience string with a registry-specific audience, such as a deployment-specific client ID or origin-derived identifier. 2. Ensure the publisher requests the audience that matches the exact registry instance it is targeting, and ensure the server validates that same instance-specific value. 3. Consider binding the exchange to additional deployment-specific claims so that a token captured by one registry cannot be replayed on another. 4. Add regression tests that cover cross-deployment replay attempts between different registry URLs.

CVE-2026-44428 Affected Github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
1.7.6
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry
Go
< 1.7.6
1.7.6

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-44428?
CVE-2026-44428 is a security vulnerability in Github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry involving MCP Registry's GitHub OIDC tokens are replayable across registry deployments due to shared audience under CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF).
Which Github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 1.7.6 across affected packages: github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry.
What version fixes CVE-2026-44428?
Upgrading to 1.7.6 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry affected?
Yes, github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry is affected in releases prior to 1.7.6. Upgrade your dependency to 1.7.6 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-44428?
CVE-2026-44428 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 4.7 (LOW) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-44428?
CVE-2026-44428 is classified under CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) (The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.).
How can I check Go dependencies for CVE-2026-44428?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-95c3-6vvw-4mrq",
  "modified" : "2026-05-15T23:47:13Z",
  "published" : "2026-05-08T17:06:22Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-44428" ],
  "summary" : "MCP Registry's GitHub OIDC tokens are replayable across registry deployments due to shared audience",
  "details" : "# [SECURITY] registry_001 Vulnerability Report\n\nWhile analyzing the code logic, an area that may lead to unintended behavior under specific conditions was discovered. \n\n## Overview\n- Verified Version: `c5c4b9e8890dd5754bee889b2f1417f4fe3b5ce5`\n- Vulnerability Type: Authentication bypass via cross-registry OIDC token replay\n- Affected Location: `cmd/publisher/commands/login.go:67-105,130-135,199-224`; `cmd/publisher/auth/github-oidc.go:24-38,58-75,108-165`; `internal/api/handlers/v0/auth/github_oidc.go:75-135,229-277,280-296`\n- Trigger Scenario: a workflow invokes `mcp-publisher login github-oidc --registry <other-registry>` (or equivalent publish flow) and the publisher still requests a GitHub Actions ID token with the shared audience `mcp-registry`; any other registry deployment running this code can replay that token to its own `/v0/auth/github-oidc` endpoint and mint a publish-capable registry JWT for the same GitHub owner namespace.\n\n## Root Cause\nThe client-side and server-side GitHub OIDC flow is bound only to a global audience string, not to the specific registry instance being targeted. On the client side, the publisher always appends `audience=mcp-registry` when requesting the GitHub Actions ID token, regardless of the selected `--registry` URL. On the server side, the exchange endpoint validates only that same fixed audience and then derives publish permissions directly from `repository_owner`. As a result, a token legitimately obtained while interacting with one registry deployment remains acceptable to any other deployment that shares the same code and audience string.\n\n## Source-to-Sink Chain\n1. Source\n   `cmd/publisher/commands/login.go:67-105,130-135,199-224` parses the user-controlled `--registry` flag into `flags.RegistryURL`, creates a `GitHubOIDCProvider`, and calls `authProvider.GetToken(ctx)` for the chosen authentication method.\n2. Propagation\n   `cmd/publisher/auth/github-oidc.go:24-38` obtains an OIDC token and immediately exchanges it against the selected registry URL.\n   `cmd/publisher/auth/github-oidc.go:58-75` builds `exchangeURL := o.registryURL + \"/v0/auth/github-oidc\"` and posts the GitHub token to whichever registry instance was selected.\n   `cmd/publisher/auth/github-oidc.go:108-165` constructs `fullURL := requestURL + \"&audience=mcp-registry\"` and therefore requests the same audience for every registry deployment.\n3. Sink\n   `internal/api/handlers/v0/auth/github_oidc.go:75-135` validates only the shared audience value passed into `ValidateToken`.\n   `internal/api/handlers/v0/auth/github_oidc.go:254-277` calls `h.validator.ValidateToken(ctx, oidcToken, \"mcp-registry\")` and, on success, signs a new registry JWT.\n   `internal/api/handlers/v0/auth/github_oidc.go:280-296` converts `claims.RepositoryOwner` into the publish permission pattern `io.github.<owner>/*`, which is then embedded into the new registry JWT.\n\n## Exploitation Preconditions\n1. The victim uses the GitHub Actions OIDC publishing path.\n2. The victim workflow targets another registry deployment first, such as staging, self-hosted infrastructure, or an attacker-controlled registry URL.\n3. The receiving registry deployment can observe the posted OIDC token and replay it before expiry to another registry deployment running the same shared audience configuration.\n\n## Risk\nThis breaks deployment isolation between registry instances. A token issued for one registry interaction can be replayed across trust boundaries, allowing one deployment to impersonate the same GitHub owner identity on another deployment.\n\n## Impact\nAn attacker-controlled or compromised registry deployment can mint a valid registry JWT on another deployment and inherit publish permissions for the victim GitHub owner namespace. In practical terms, this enables unauthorized publication or update actions for names such as `io.github.<owner>/*` on the victim registry instance.\n\n## Remediation\n1. Replace the shared audience string with a registry-specific audience, such as a deployment-specific client ID or origin-derived identifier.\n2. Ensure the publisher requests the audience that matches the exact registry instance it is targeting, and ensure the server validates that same instance-specific value.\n3. Consider binding the exchange to additional deployment-specific claims so that a token captured by one registry cannot be replayed on another.\n4. Add regression tests that cover cross-deployment replay attempts between different registry URLs.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N"
  }, {
    "type" : "CVSS_V4",
    "score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "1.7.6"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/security/advisories/GHSA-95c3-6vvw-4mrq"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44428"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/pull/1229"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/commit/3f89fc2b1fb34fd49f3c0e1b39e964a5c67b613f"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/releases/tag/v1.7.6"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-918" ],
    "severity" : "LOW",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-05-08T17:06:22Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-05-14T22:16:44Z"
  }
}