CVE-2026-47418: praisonai-platform Project Endpoints Accept Any Project_id Vulnerability

{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-943m-6wx2-rc2j",
  "modified" : "2026-06-01T14:17:04Z",
  "published" : "2026-06-01T14:17:04Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-47418" ],
  "summary" : "praisonai-platform: Project endpoints accept any project_id without workspace ownership check, cross-workspace read/update/delete IDOR",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\n**Type:** Insecure Direct Object Reference. The project CRUD endpoints (`GET / PATCH / DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}/projects/{project_id}` and `GET .../{project_id}/stats`) gate access on `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` only, then resolve `project_id` through `ProjectService.get(project_id)` / `update(project_id, ...)` / `delete(project_id)` / `get_stats(project_id)`. None of these calls thread `workspace_id` through to constrain the lookup. A user who is a member of any workspace `W1` can read, modify, delete, or read stats for projects that belong to a different workspace `W2`.\n**File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/services/project_service.py`, lines 47-108; route handlers at `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/projects.py`, lines 51-108.\n**Root cause:** identical to the agent and issue IDORs in this codebase. The route accepts `workspace_id` from URL, uses it solely for the membership gate, then calls `ProjectService.get(project_id)` which is `session.get(Project, project_id)` — a primary-key-only lookup with no `workspace_id` predicate. `update` and `delete` call `self.get(project_id)` first, inheriting the gap. `get_stats` likewise has no workspace check.\n\n## Affected Code\n\n**File 1:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/services/project_service.py`, lines 47-108.\n\n```python\nclass ProjectService:\n    ...\n\n    async def get(self, project_id: str) -> Optional[Project]:\n        \"\"\"Get project by ID.\"\"\"\n        return await self._session.get(Project, project_id)         # <-- BUG: no workspace_id predicate\n\n    async def update(\n        self,\n        project_id: str,\n        ...\n    ) -> Optional[Project]:\n        project = await self.get(project_id)                        # <-- inherits the gap\n        ...\n\n    async def delete(self, project_id: str) -> bool:\n        project = await self.get(project_id)                        # <-- inherits the gap\n        ...\n\n    async def get_stats(self, project_id: str) -> dict:\n        ...                                                          # <-- also no workspace check; returns issue counts for any project\n```\n\n**File 2:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/projects.py`, lines 51-108.\n\n```python\n@router.get(\"/{project_id}\", response_model=ProjectResponse)\nasync def get_project(\n    workspace_id: str,\n    project_id: str,\n    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),\n    session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),\n):\n    svc = ProjectService(session)\n    project = await svc.get(project_id)                             # <-- workspace_id never threaded through\n    if project is None:\n        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=\"Project not found\")\n    return ProjectResponse.model_validate(project)\n\n\n@router.patch(\"/{project_id}\", response_model=ProjectResponse)\nasync def update_project(...):\n    svc = ProjectService(session)\n    project = await svc.update(project_id, title=body.title, ...)   # <-- writes to any project in the DB\n\n@router.delete(\"/{project_id}\", ...)\nasync def delete_project(...):\n    deleted = await svc.delete(project_id)                          # <-- deletes any project in the DB\n\n@router.get(\"/{project_id}/stats\")\nasync def project_stats(...):\n    return await svc.get_stats(project_id)                          # <-- returns stats for any project in the DB\n```\n\n**Why it's wrong:** `workspace_id` from the route is treated as a UI hint (gates \"are you in some workspace W?\") rather than an authoritative predicate (should also gate \"is the project you are addressing actually inside W?\"). The `MemberService` in this same codebase uses a composite `(workspace_id, user_id)` key and demonstrates the safe pattern; the project service simply did not apply it.\n\n## Exploit Chain\n\n1. Attacker registers a workspace `W_attacker` (where they are a member) and harvests a target project UUID `P_T`. Project IDs leak through the activity feed (`act_svc.log` records `entity_id`), issue records (every issue carries `project_id`), webhook payloads, error messages, exported issue dumps, or operator screenshots. State: attacker holds `P_T`.\n2. Attacker authenticates and sends `GET /workspaces/W_attacker/projects/P_T`. `require_workspace_member(W_attacker, attacker)` passes. State: control flow enters `get_project` with `workspace_id=W_attacker, project_id=P_T`.\n3. `ProjectService.get(P_T)` runs `session.get(Project, \"P_T\")`, which is `SELECT * FROM projects WHERE id = 'P_T' LIMIT 1` with no `workspace_id` filter. The row is returned: `title`, `description` (often the project's confidential roadmap), `status`, `lead_type`, `lead_id`, `icon`, `created_at`, `workspace_id` (the foreign workspace's UUID is itself disclosed). State: response body is the JSON-serialised foreign project.\n4. Attacker repeats with `PATCH /workspaces/W_attacker/projects/P_T` and `{\"title\": \"<reset>\", \"description\": \"<wiped>\", \"status\": \"archived\"}`. `update_project` calls `svc.update(P_T, ...)` and mutates the foreign row. State: target project is silently re-titled, re-described, and archived.\n5. Attacker calls `DELETE /workspaces/W_attacker/projects/P_T` to delete the foreign project entirely. State: target project is gone (every issue still referencing it now has a dangling `project_id`).\n6. Attacker calls `GET /workspaces/W_attacker/projects/P_T/stats` to read aggregate issue counts (open/closed/in-progress) for the foreign project — useful for competitive intelligence even when full-issue read is not possible.\n7. Final state: any attacker with one workspace-member token can enumerate, exfiltrate, rewrite, and delete every project in the multi-tenant deployment given the project UUIDs.\n\n## Security Impact\n\n**Severity:** sec-high. CVSS: network attack, low complexity, low privileges, no user interaction, scope unchanged, high confidentiality (project content + cross-workspace metadata via the leaked `workspace_id` field), high integrity (arbitrary writes / deletes), no availability claim (issue rows survive parent-project deletion).\n**Attacker capability:** read, edit, archive, delete, and stats-fingerprint any project in the multi-tenant deployment given the project UUID. Beyond plain content disclosure, the response also includes `workspace_id`, allowing the attacker to map the deployment's workspace topology (which workspaces exist, which projects each owns).\n**Preconditions:** `praisonai-platform` is deployed multi-tenant; the attacker has any membership token; the target project's UUID is known or guessable.\n**Differential:** source-inspection-verified end-to-end. The asymmetry between `ProjectService.get(project_id)` (no workspace check) and `MemberService.get(workspace_id, user_id)` (composite key check) confirms the gap. With the suggested fix below, `ProjectService.get(workspace_id, project_id)` returns `None` for foreign-workspace projects and the route handler returns 404.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nSame shape as the companion agent and issue advisories. Make the resource-lookup query include the workspace predicate; treat foreign-workspace rows as 404.\n\n```diff\n--- a/src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/services/project_service.py\n+++ b/src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/services/project_service.py\n@@ -45,9 +45,12 @@ class ProjectService:\n         await self._session.flush()\n         return project\n\n-    async def get(self, project_id: str) -> Optional[Project]:\n-        \"\"\"Get project by ID.\"\"\"\n-        return await self._session.get(Project, project_id)\n+    async def get(self, workspace_id: str, project_id: str) -> Optional[Project]:\n+        \"\"\"Get project by ID, scoped to a workspace.\"\"\"\n+        stmt = select(Project).where(\n+            Project.id == project_id, Project.workspace_id == workspace_id\n+        )\n+        return (await self._session.execute(stmt)).scalar_one_or_none()\n\n     async def update(\n         self,\n+        workspace_id: str,\n         project_id: str,\n         ...\n     ) -> Optional[Project]:\n-        project = await self.get(project_id)\n+        project = await self.get(workspace_id, project_id)\n\n-    async def delete(self, project_id: str) -> bool:\n+    async def delete(self, workspace_id: str, project_id: str) -> bool:\n-        project = await self.get(project_id)\n+        project = await self.get(workspace_id, project_id)\n\n-    async def get_stats(self, project_id: str) -> dict:\n+    async def get_stats(self, workspace_id: str, project_id: str) -> dict:\n+        # Also constrain the underlying issue counts query by workspace_id.\n```\n\nUpdate the route handlers in `routes/projects.py` to thread `workspace_id` through every call. The same single-key-lookup pattern is filed separately for `AgentService`, `IssueService`, `CommentService`, and `LabelService`.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "praisonai-platform"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "0.1.4"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-943m-6wx2-rc2j"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-639" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-06-01T14:17:04Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}