CVE-2026-55496: Cloudreve Information Exposure Vulnerability

{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-8r7f-r8hj-r3rv",
  "modified" : "2026-07-24T20:46:49Z",
  "published" : "2026-07-24T20:46:49Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-55496" ],
  "summary" : "Cloudreve: Information Exposure in `GET /api/v4/user/search`: `SearchActive` omits the active-status predicate, leaking inactive/banned account emails",
  "details" : "## Summary\n \n`GET /api/v4/user/search` is available to any logged-in user. The service calls `userClient.SearchActive`, but despite its name that method filters only by email/nickname keyword and **never adds a `StatusActive` predicate** — while the sibling lookups `GetActiveByID` and `GetActiveByDavAccount`, defined a few lines above it, do. Search hits are serialized at `RedactLevelUser`, which includes the email address.\n \nA normal logged-in user can therefore enumerate and retrieve the email (plus nickname, avatar, creation time, redacted group, profile share-visibility) of **inactive and banned** accounts that an active-user directory is supposed to suppress. No global status interceptor compensates — the only User query interceptor is soft-delete, and inactive/banned rows are not soft-deleted.\n\n### Details\n## Root cause (verified at `26b6b10`)\n \n**1. Route — logged-in + `UserInfo.Read` scope** (`routers/router.go`):\n```go\nuser := v4.Group(\"user\")            // protected user group (login required)\nuser.GET(\"search\",\n    middleware.RequiredScopes(types.ScopeUserInfoRead),\n    controllers.FromQuery[usersvc.SearchUserService](...), controllers.UserSearch)\n```\nThe `RequiredScopes` check applies to scoped OAuth tokens; plain session requests are not gated by it — so any logged-in user reaches the search.\n \n**2. Service — 2-char keyword to `SearchActive`** (`service/user/info.go`):\n```go\ntype SearchUserService struct { Keyword string `form:\"keyword\" binding:\"required,min=2\"` }\nconst resultLimit = 10\nfunc (s *SearchUserService) Search(c *gin.Context) ([]*ent.User, error) {\n    return dep.UserClient().SearchActive(c, resultLimit, s.Keyword)\n}\n```\n \n**3. The bug — `SearchActive` has no status predicate** (`inventory/user.go`):\n```go\nfunc (c *userClient) SearchActive(ctx context.Context, limit int, keyword string) ([]*ent.User, error) {\n    ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, LoadUserGroup{}, true)\n    return withUserEagerLoading(ctx,\n        c.client.User.Query().\n            Where(user.Or(user.EmailContainsFold(keyword), user.NickContainsFold(keyword))).\n            Limit(limit),                       // <-- no user.StatusEQ(user.StatusActive)\n    ).All(ctx)\n}\n```\nContrast the siblings immediately above:\n```go\nfunc (c *userClient) GetActiveByID(...)        { ... Where(user.ID(id)).Where(user.StatusEQ(user.StatusActive)) ... }\nfunc (c *userClient) GetActiveByDavAccount(...) { ... Where(user.EmailEqualFold(email)).Where(user.StatusEQ(user.StatusActive)) ... }\n```\n`withUserEagerLoading` only eager-loads the group/passkey edges; it adds no status filter. Status values are `active`/`inactive`/`manual_banned`/`sys_banned` (`ent/user/user.go`).\n \n**4. No global status interceptor** — `User.Mixin()` is `CommonMixin{}` (`ent/schema/user.go`), whose `Interceptors()` returns only `softDeleteInterceptors` (`ent/schema/common.go`). Inactive/banned users are not soft-deleted, so nothing filters them out at query time.\n \n**5. Results serialized with email** (`routers/controllers/user.go` → `service/user/response.go`):\n```go\n// UserSearch:\nreturn user.BuildUserRedacted(item, user.RedactLevelUser, hasher)\n// BuildUserRedacted:\nif level == RedactLevelUser { user.Email = userRaw.Email }   // email included\n```\n \n**Secondary path:** `GET /api/v4/user/info/:id` → `GetUser` uses `GetByID` (no status filter), and the controller picks `RedactLevelUser` for any non-anonymous caller (`RedactLevelAnonymous` only for anonymous). So a logged-in caller with an inactive/banned user's hashed ID also receives the email-bearing profile. (Less practical than search, since it needs the hashed ID rather than a 2-char keyword.)\n\n## Steps to reproduce (requires a live instance)\n \n1. Ensure a target account exists in `inactive` or `manual_banned`/`sys_banned` status (e.g., an unconfirmed registration or a banned user).\n2. As any logged-in user:\n   ```\n   GET /api/v4/user/search?keyword=<>=2 chars of the target email/nick>\n   Cookie: cloudreve-session=<attacker-session>\n   ```\n3. Observe the inactive/banned account in the results, including its `email`.\n**Expected:** only active accounts appear (matching the method name and the sibling `GetActive*` behavior).\n**Actual:** inactive/banned accounts are returned with their email addresses.\n \n## Impact\n \nAny logged-in user can enumerate and harvest the email addresses (and basic profile metadata) of inactive and banned accounts that active-user lookups intentionally hide. No account access, passwords, or 2FA secrets are exposed; the impact is PII leakage and user enumeration.\n \n## Remediation\n \n- Add `Where(user.StatusEQ(user.StatusActive))` to `SearchActive` (matching `GetActiveByID`).\n- Apply the same active-status requirement to `GET /api/v4/user/info/:id`, or fall back to anonymous-level redaction unless the target account is active.\n- Consider not returning email from directory search at all — display name + hashed ID is usually sufficient.\n- Regression tests: searching a keyword that matches an inactive/banned account must return no result (or no email).",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "4.0.0-20260613023921-7e1289d55279"
      } ]
    } ]
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v3"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "last_affected" : "3.0.0-20250225100611-da4e44b77af4"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/cloudreve/cloudreve/security/advisories/GHSA-8r7f-r8hj-r3rv"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/cloudreve/cloudreve/commit/7e1289d552794bdbeb551be78456115c87dcb3da"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/cloudreve/cloudreve"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/cloudreve/cloudreve/releases/tag/4.17.0"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-200", "CWE-359" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-07-24T20:46:49Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}