CVE-2026-106454: Twisted Denial of Service Vulnerability

MODERATE
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-8pqf-f4m5-798g
CVSS 4.3
CWE-1333
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-106454 is a MODERATE (CVSS 4.3) denial of service vulnerability (CWE-1333: Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity) affecting Twisted libraries in the PyPI ecosystem. The issue involves imap wildcardtoregexp() redos. Remediation is available in the latest vendor maintenance releases.

CVE-2026-106454 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-106454
GHSA Identifier GHSA-8pqf-f4m5-798g
Severity MODERATE
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 4.3
CWE Classification CWE-1333: Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity
Affected Product Twisted
Package Ecosystem PyPI
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 4.3

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality None (C:N)
Integrity None (I:N)
Availability Low (A:L)

How to Fix CVE-2026-106454

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Twisted dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

Twisted fixed: Latest secure release
pip install Twisted>=Latest secure release
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

pip show Twisted

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Python environment is affected by CVE-2026-106454, inspect your installed packages using pip:

pip show Twisted

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Twisted in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than the patched release), your application is affected.

Note: The pip show Twisted command checks currently installed packages in your active Python environment.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-1333: Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity, where the product uses a regular expression with a worst-case computational complexity that is inefficient and possibly exponential. In Twisted, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Summary `wildcardToRegexp()` in `twisted/mail/imap4.py` converts IMAP LIST/LSUB wildcard patterns to Python regular expressions. It substitutes the two IMAP wildcards (`*` → `(?:.*?)` and `%` → `(?:(?:[^\\/])*?)`) but passes every other character through unchanged to `re.compile()`. This means that an authenticated IMAP client can send a quoted pattern string containing arbitrary regex syntax - including catastrophic-backtracking constructs such as `(a+)+z`. Because Twisted runs a cooperative, single-threaded reactor, a blocking regex match freezes **all** I/O on the server for the duration of the match. --- ## Vulnerable Code ### `twisted/mail/imap4.py` ```python # line 4595 def wildcardToRegexp(wildcard, delim=None): wildcard = wildcard.replace("*", "(?:.*?)") if delim is None: wildcard = wildcard.replace("%", "(?:.*?)") else: wildcard = wildcard.replace("%", "(?:(?:[^%s])*?)" % re.escape(delim)) return re.compile(wildcard, re.I) # ← user input compiled verbatim ``` ```python # line 4993 class MemoryAccountWithoutNamespaces: def listMailboxes(self, ref, wildcard): ref = self._inferiorNames(_parseMbox(ref.upper())) wildcard = wildcardToRegexp(wildcard, "/") # ← user-supplied wildcard return [(i, self.mailboxes[i]) for i in ref if wildcard.match(i)] ``` --- ### Proof of Concept ```python from twisted.mail.imap4 import wildcardToRegexp import time rx = wildcardToRegexp("(a+)+z", "/") for n in [20, 22, 24, 26, 28]: victim = "a" * n t0 = time.perf_counter() rx.match(victim) print(f"n={n}: {time.perf_counter() - t0:.3f}s") ``` **Output on Twisted 25.5.0:** ``` [*] Compiled regex: '(a+)+z' [*] Note: metacharacters ( ) + ? are NOT escaped - they go straight to re.compile() n time --- ---------- 20 0.153s 22 0.651s 24 2.941s 26 14.545s 28 55.019s ``` Timing doubles roughly every two characters (exponential growth), confirming catastrophic backtracking. --- ## Impact Twisted's reactor is single-threaded and cooperative. A blocking `re.match()` call suspends the entire event loop - no other connection can be accepted, read, or written while the match runs. A single authenticated LIST command with a 28-character target mailbox name can stall the server for ~55 seconds. An attacker who can register an account (or obtain credentials through other means) can: 1. `CREATE` a mailbox whose name is an exponential-blowup trigger string. 2. Issue `LIST "" "(a+)+z"` (or equivalent ReDoS pattern). 3. Repeat at ~1-minute intervals to keep the server permanently unavailable. No exploit code or special privileges beyond an IMAP login are required. --- ## Fix Escape non-wildcard characters before compiling: ```python def wildcardToRegexp(wildcard, delim=None): # Split on the two IMAP wildcards, escape everything else parts = re.split(r'([*%])', wildcard) result = [] for p in parts: if p == '*': result.append('(?:.*?)') elif p == '%': if delim is None: result.append('(?:.*?)') else: result.append('(?:(?:[^%s])*?)' % re.escape(delim)) else: result.append(re.escape(p)) # ← escape all other characters return re.compile(''.join(result), re.I) ``` Alternatively, apply `re.escape()` to the entire wildcard first, then substitute the (now-escaped) `\*` and `\%` tokens back with their regex equivalents.

CVE-2026-106454 Affected Twisted Versions

1 component(s)
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
Twisted
PyPI
≤ 26.4.0

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-106454?
CVE-2026-106454 is a security vulnerability in Twisted involving IMAP wildcardToRegexp() ReDoS under CWE-1333: Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity.
Which Twisted versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to current release patches across affected packages: Twisted.
What version fixes CVE-2026-106454?
Upgrading to current release patches (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is Twisted affected?
Yes, Twisted is affected in releases prior to Latest secure release. Upgrade your dependency to Latest secure release or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-106454?
CVE-2026-106454 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 4.3 (MODERATE) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-106454?
CVE-2026-106454 is classified under CWE-1333: Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity (The product uses a regular expression with a worst-case computational complexity that is inefficient and possibly exponential.).
How can I check PyPI dependencies for CVE-2026-106454?
Run the dependency tree command: 'pip show Twisted'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-8pqf-f4m5-798g",
  "modified" : "2026-10-15T14:02:08Z",
  "published" : "2026-10-07T16:18:30Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-106454" ],
  "summary" : "Twisted: IMAP wildcardToRegexp() ReDoS",
  "details" : "### Summary\n`wildcardToRegexp()` in `twisted/mail/imap4.py` converts IMAP LIST/LSUB wildcard patterns to Python regular expressions.  It substitutes the two IMAP wildcards (`*` → `(?:.*?)` and `%` → `(?:(?:[^\\\\/])*?)`) but passes every other character through unchanged to `re.compile()`.  This means that an authenticated IMAP client can send a quoted pattern string containing arbitrary regex syntax - including catastrophic-backtracking constructs such as `(a+)+z`.\n\nBecause Twisted runs a cooperative, single-threaded reactor, a blocking regex match freezes **all** I/O on the server for the duration of the match.\n\n---\n\n## Vulnerable Code\n\n### `twisted/mail/imap4.py`\n\n```python\n# line 4595\ndef wildcardToRegexp(wildcard, delim=None):\n    wildcard = wildcard.replace(\"*\", \"(?:.*?)\")\n    if delim is None:\n        wildcard = wildcard.replace(\"%\", \"(?:.*?)\")\n    else:\n        wildcard = wildcard.replace(\"%\", \"(?:(?:[^%s])*?)\" % re.escape(delim))\n    return re.compile(wildcard, re.I)   # ← user input compiled verbatim\n```\n\n```python\n# line 4993\nclass MemoryAccountWithoutNamespaces:\n    def listMailboxes(self, ref, wildcard):\n        ref = self._inferiorNames(_parseMbox(ref.upper()))\n        wildcard = wildcardToRegexp(wildcard, \"/\")   # ← user-supplied wildcard\n        return [(i, self.mailboxes[i]) for i in ref if wildcard.match(i)]\n```\n---\n\n### Proof of Concept\n\n```python\nfrom twisted.mail.imap4 import wildcardToRegexp\nimport time\n\nrx = wildcardToRegexp(\"(a+)+z\", \"/\")\nfor n in [20, 22, 24, 26, 28]:\n    victim = \"a\" * n\n    t0 = time.perf_counter()\n    rx.match(victim)\n    print(f\"n={n}: {time.perf_counter() - t0:.3f}s\")\n```\n\n**Output on Twisted 25.5.0:**\n\n```\n[*] Compiled regex: '(a+)+z'\n[*] Note: metacharacters ( ) + ? are NOT escaped - they go straight to re.compile()\n\n    n        time\n  ---  ----------\n   20       0.153s\n   22       0.651s\n   24       2.941s\n   26      14.545s\n   28      55.019s\n```\n\nTiming doubles roughly every two characters (exponential growth), confirming catastrophic backtracking.\n\n---\n\n## Impact\n\nTwisted's reactor is single-threaded and cooperative.  A blocking `re.match()` call suspends the entire event loop - no other connection can be accepted, read, or written while the match runs.  A single authenticated LIST command with a 28-character target mailbox name can stall the server for ~55 seconds.\n\nAn attacker who can register an account (or obtain credentials through other means) can:\n\n1. `CREATE` a mailbox whose name is an exponential-blowup trigger string.\n2. Issue `LIST \"\" \"(a+)+z\"` (or equivalent ReDoS pattern).\n3. Repeat at ~1-minute intervals to keep the server permanently unavailable.\n\nNo exploit code or special privileges beyond an IMAP login are required.\n\n---\n\n## Fix\n\nEscape non-wildcard characters before compiling:\n\n```python\ndef wildcardToRegexp(wildcard, delim=None):\n    # Split on the two IMAP wildcards, escape everything else\n    parts = re.split(r'([*%])', wildcard)\n    result = []\n    for p in parts:\n        if p == '*':\n            result.append('(?:.*?)')\n        elif p == '%':\n            if delim is None:\n                result.append('(?:.*?)')\n            else:\n                result.append('(?:(?:[^%s])*?)' % re.escape(delim))\n        else:\n            result.append(re.escape(p))   # ← escape all other characters\n    return re.compile(''.join(result), re.I)\n```\n\nAlternatively, apply `re.escape()` to the entire wildcard first, then substitute the (now-escaped) `\\*` and `\\%` tokens back with their regex equivalents.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "Twisted"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "last_affected" : "26.4.0"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/twisted/twisted/security/advisories/GHSA-8pqf-f4m5-798g"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-106454"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/twisted/twisted/pull/12788"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/twisted/twisted/commit/2f8a3c29246f4eb324690e06a9767a11dc4aec9f"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/twisted/twisted"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-1333" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-10-07T16:18:30Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-10-06T20:17:27Z"
  }
}