CVE-2026-47074: ex_aws_sns Trusted-attacker `SigningCertURL` Permits Complete SNS Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-8jgf-23q5-x7xx
CWE-295
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-47074 is a HIGH trusted-attacker `signingcerturl` permits complete sns vulnerability (CWE-295: Improper Certificate Validation) affecting ex_aws_sns libraries in the Hex ecosystem. The issue involves trusted-attacker `signingcerturl` permits complete sns signature bypass. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 2.3.5.

CVE-2026-47074 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-47074
GHSA Identifier GHSA-8jgf-23q5-x7xx
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score N/A
CWE Classification CWE-295: Improper Certificate Validation
Affected Product ex_aws_sns
Package Ecosystem Hex
Published Date
Last Updated

How to Fix CVE-2026-47074

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected ex_aws_sns dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

ex_aws_sns fixed: 2.3.5
Upgrade ex_aws_sns to 2.3.5
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for ex_aws_sns

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-47074, inspect your project dependencies for ex_aws_sns:

inspect dependencies for ex_aws_sns

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of ex_aws_sns in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 2.3.5), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-295: Improper Certificate Validation, where the product does not validate, or incorrectly validates, a certificate. In ex_aws_sns, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Summary `ExAws.SNS.verify_message/1` fetches the signing certificate from the `SigningCertURL` field of the incoming SNS message without validating that the URL uses HTTPS or that its host is an AWS-owned SNS certificate domain. An unauthenticated attacker who can POST to any endpoint that calls `verify_message/1` can supply an attacker-controlled `SigningCertURL`, sign a forged SNS message with their own RSA key, and cause the function to return `:ok`, completely bypassing SNS signature verification. ### Details In `lib/ex_aws/sns.ex` (lines 475–483), `verify_message/1` performs three checks: `validate_message_params/1` (confirms required fields are present), `validate_signature_version/1` (confirms `SignatureVersion == "1"`), then signature verification. The signature step calls `ExAws.SNS.PublicKeyCache.get(message["SigningCertURL"])` and passes the result to `:public_key.verify/4`. Neither `validate_message_params/1` nor any other step checks that `SigningCertURL` is an HTTPS URL or that the hostname matches the expected pattern (e.g. `sns.<region>.amazonaws.com`). `PublicKeyCache.get/1` in `lib/ex_aws/sns/public_key_cache.ex` fetches whatever URL is provided and caches the certificate. The RSA signature then verifies against the attacker's own public key, and `verify_message/1` returns `:ok`. ### PoC 1. Generate an RSA keypair and host the DER/PEM public certificate at any URL reachable from the target server (e.g. `http://attacker.example/cert.pem`). 2. Build a forged `Notification` payload with an arbitrary `TopicArn` and `Message`, compute the canonical string-to-sign per the SNS spec, and sign it with the attacker private key. 3. Set `SigningCertURL` to the attacker URL and `Signature` to the base64-encoded signature. 4. POST the forged payload to any SNS webhook endpoint that calls `ExAws.SNS.verify_message/1`. 5. The function returns `:ok`; the application treats the message as authentic. ### Configurations The application must expose an HTTP endpoint that calls `ExAws.SNS.verify_message/1` on incoming request bodies (the standard SNS webhook pattern). ### Impact Complete SNS signature authentication bypass. Affects `ex_aws_sns` from 2.0.1 through 2.3.4. Consequences include spoofing arbitrary `Notification` payloads, auto-confirming attacker-controlled `SubscribeURL` values to hijack topic delivery, and spoofing `UnsubscribeConfirmation` to disrupt legitimate subscriptions. No authentication or special configuration on the attacker side is required. CVSS v4.0: **8.7 (HIGH)**. ## Resources * Introduction commit: https://github.com/ex-aws/ex_aws_sns/commit/a7ec21880943f4dac1d59bda557db0ffcd2b61fa * Patch commit: https://github.com/ex-aws/ex_aws_sns/commit/1853d280b152d10384a1e21a22cf22152a60be48

CVE-2026-47074 Affected ex_aws_sns Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
2.3.5
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
ex_aws_sns
Hex
≥ 2.0.1
< 2.3.5
2.3.5

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-47074?
CVE-2026-47074 is a security vulnerability in ex_aws_sns involving Trusted-attacker `SigningCertURL` permits complete SNS signature bypass under CWE-295: Improper Certificate Validation.
Which ex_aws_sns versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 2.3.5 across affected packages: ex_aws_sns.
What version fixes CVE-2026-47074?
Upgrading to 2.3.5 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is ex_aws_sns affected?
Yes, ex_aws_sns is affected in releases prior to 2.3.5. Upgrade your dependency to 2.3.5 or later.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-47074?
CVE-2026-47074 is classified under CWE-295: Improper Certificate Validation (The product does not validate, or incorrectly validates, a certificate.).
How can I check Hex dependencies for CVE-2026-47074?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for ex_aws_sns'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-8jgf-23q5-x7xx",
  "modified" : "2026-06-30T17:16:17Z",
  "published" : "2026-06-26T22:50:27Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-47074" ],
  "summary" : "ex_aws_sns: Trusted-attacker `SigningCertURL` permits complete SNS signature bypass",
  "details" : "### Summary\n\n`ExAws.SNS.verify_message/1` fetches the signing certificate from the `SigningCertURL` field of the incoming SNS message without validating that the URL uses HTTPS or that its host is an AWS-owned SNS certificate domain. An unauthenticated attacker who can POST to any endpoint that calls `verify_message/1` can supply an attacker-controlled `SigningCertURL`, sign a forged SNS message with their own RSA key, and cause the function to return `:ok`, completely bypassing SNS signature verification.\n\n### Details\n\nIn `lib/ex_aws/sns.ex` (lines 475–483), `verify_message/1` performs three checks: `validate_message_params/1` (confirms required fields are present), `validate_signature_version/1` (confirms `SignatureVersion == \"1\"`), then signature verification. The signature step calls `ExAws.SNS.PublicKeyCache.get(message[\"SigningCertURL\"])` and passes the result to `:public_key.verify/4`.\n\nNeither `validate_message_params/1` nor any other step checks that `SigningCertURL` is an HTTPS URL or that the hostname matches the expected pattern (e.g. `sns.<region>.amazonaws.com`). `PublicKeyCache.get/1` in `lib/ex_aws/sns/public_key_cache.ex` fetches whatever URL is provided and caches the certificate. The RSA signature then verifies against the attacker's own public key, and `verify_message/1` returns `:ok`.\n\n### PoC\n\n1. Generate an RSA keypair and host the DER/PEM public certificate at any URL reachable from the target server (e.g. `http://attacker.example/cert.pem`).\n2. Build a forged `Notification` payload with an arbitrary `TopicArn` and `Message`, compute the canonical string-to-sign per the SNS spec, and sign it with the attacker private key.\n3. Set `SigningCertURL` to the attacker URL and `Signature` to the base64-encoded signature.\n4. POST the forged payload to any SNS webhook endpoint that calls `ExAws.SNS.verify_message/1`.\n5. The function returns `:ok`; the application treats the message as authentic.\n\n### Configurations\n\nThe application must expose an HTTP endpoint that calls `ExAws.SNS.verify_message/1` on incoming request bodies (the standard SNS webhook pattern).\n\n### Impact\n\nComplete SNS signature authentication bypass. Affects `ex_aws_sns` from 2.0.1 through 2.3.4. Consequences include spoofing arbitrary `Notification` payloads, auto-confirming attacker-controlled `SubscribeURL` values to hijack topic delivery, and spoofing `UnsubscribeConfirmation` to disrupt legitimate subscriptions. No authentication or special configuration on the attacker side is required. CVSS v4.0: **8.7 (HIGH)**.\n\n## Resources\n\n* Introduction commit: https://github.com/ex-aws/ex_aws_sns/commit/a7ec21880943f4dac1d59bda557db0ffcd2b61fa\n* Patch commit: https://github.com/ex-aws/ex_aws_sns/commit/1853d280b152d10384a1e21a22cf22152a60be48",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V4",
    "score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Hex",
      "name" : "ex_aws_sns"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "2.0.1"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "2.3.5"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/security/advisories/GHSA-jq4m-q6p2-8gwc"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/ex-aws/ex_aws_sns/security/advisories/GHSA-8jgf-23q5-x7xx"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47074"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/ex-aws/ex_aws_sns/commit/1853d280b152d10384a1e21a22cf22152a60be48"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/ex-aws/ex_aws_sns"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-47074"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-295" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-06-26T22:50:27Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}