CVE-2025-69263: Pnpm Pnpm Has Lockfile Integrity Bypass Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw
CVSS 7.5
CWE-494
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2025-69263 is a HIGH (CVSS 7.5) pnpm has lockfile integrity bypass vulnerability (CWE-494: Download of Code Without Integrity Check) affecting Pnpm libraries in the npm ecosystem. The issue involves pnpm has lockfile integrity bypass that allows remote dynamic dependencies. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 10.26.0.

CVE-2025-69263 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2025-69263
GHSA Identifier GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 7.5
CWE Classification CWE-494: Download of Code Without Integrity Check
Affected Product Pnpm
Package Ecosystem npm
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 7.5

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity High (AC:H)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction Required (UI:R)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2025-69263

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Pnpm dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

pnpm fixed: 10.26.0
npm install pnpm@10.26.0
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

npm ls pnpm

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Node.js application is affected by CVE-2025-69263, inspect your project dependencies using npm:

npm ls pnpm

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Pnpm in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 10.26.0), your application is affected.

Note: The npm ls pnpm command inspects dependencies declared in your package.json and lockfile; it does not perform automated runtime dynamic scanning.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-494: Download of Code Without Integrity Check, where the product downloads source code or an executable from a remote location and executes the code without sufficiently verifying the origin and integrity of the code. In Pnpm, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Summary HTTP tarball dependencies (and git-hosted tarballs) are stored in the lockfile without integrity hashes. This allows the remote server to serve different content on each install, even when a lockfile is committed. ### Details When a package depends on an HTTP tarball URL, pnpm's tarball resolver returns only the URL without computing an integrity hash: `resolving/tarball-resolver/src/index.ts`: ```javascript return { resolution: { tarball: resolvedUrl, // No integrity field }, resolvedVia: 'url', } ``` The resulting lockfile entry has no integrity to verify: ```yaml remote-dynamic-dependency@http://example.com/pkg.tgz: resolution: {tarball: http://example.com/pkg.tgz} version: 1.0.0 ``` Since there is no integrity hash, pnpm cannot detect when the server returns different content. This affects: - HTTP/HTTPS tarball URLs (`"pkg": "https://example.com/pkg.tgz"`) - Git shorthand dependencies (`"pkg": "github:user/repo"`) - Git URLs (`"pkg": "git+https://github.com/user/repo"`) npm registry packages are not affected as they include integrity hashes from the registry metadata. ### PoC See attached [pnpm-bypass-integrity-poc.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/23819648/pnpm-bypass-integrity-poc.zip) The POC includes: - A server that returns different tarball content on each request - A `malicious-package` that depends on the HTTP tarball - A `victim` project that depends on `malicious-package` To run: ```bash cd pnpm-bypass-integrity-poc ./run-poc.sh ``` The output shows that each install (with `pnpm store prune` between them) downloads different code despite having a committed lockfile. ### Impact An attacker who publishes a package with an HTTP tarball dependency can serve different code to different users or CI/CD environments. This enables: - Targeted attacks based on request metadata (IP, headers, timing) - Evasion of security audits (serve benign code during review, malicious code later) - Supply chain attacks where the malicious payload changes over time The attack requires the victim to install a package that has an HTTP/git tarball in its dependency tree. The victim's lockfile provides no protection.

CVE-2025-69263 Affected Pnpm Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
10.26.0
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
pnpm
npm
< 10.26.0
10.26.0

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2025-69263?
CVE-2025-69263 is a security vulnerability in Pnpm involving pnpm Has Lockfile Integrity Bypass that Allows Remote Dynamic Dependencies under CWE-494: Download of Code Without Integrity Check.
Which Pnpm versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 10.26.0 across affected packages: pnpm.
What version fixes CVE-2025-69263?
Upgrading to 10.26.0 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is pnpm affected?
Yes, pnpm is affected in releases prior to 10.26.0. Upgrade your dependency to 10.26.0 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2025-69263?
CVE-2025-69263 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 7.5 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2025-69263?
CVE-2025-69263 is classified under CWE-494: Download of Code Without Integrity Check (The product downloads source code or an executable from a remote location and executes the code without sufficiently verifying the origin and integrity of the code.).
How can I check npm dependencies for CVE-2025-69263?
Run the dependency tree command: 'npm ls pnpm'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw",
  "modified" : "2026-01-08T20:05:32Z",
  "published" : "2026-01-07T19:06:59Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2025-69263" ],
  "summary" : "pnpm Has Lockfile Integrity Bypass that Allows Remote Dynamic Dependencies",
  "details" : "### Summary\n\nHTTP tarball dependencies (and git-hosted tarballs) are stored in the lockfile without integrity hashes. This allows the remote server to serve different content on each install, even when a lockfile is committed.\n\n### Details\n\nWhen a package depends on an HTTP tarball URL, pnpm's tarball resolver returns only the URL without computing an integrity hash:\n\n`resolving/tarball-resolver/src/index.ts`:\n```javascript\nreturn {\n  resolution: {\n    tarball: resolvedUrl,\n    // No integrity field\n  },\n  resolvedVia: 'url',\n}\n```\n\nThe resulting lockfile entry has no integrity to verify:\n```yaml\nremote-dynamic-dependency@http://example.com/pkg.tgz:\n  resolution: {tarball: http://example.com/pkg.tgz}\n  version: 1.0.0\n```\n\nSince there is no integrity hash, pnpm cannot detect when the server returns different content. \n\nThis affects:\n- HTTP/HTTPS tarball URLs (`\"pkg\": \"https://example.com/pkg.tgz\"`)\n- Git shorthand dependencies (`\"pkg\": \"github:user/repo\"`)\n- Git URLs (`\"pkg\": \"git+https://github.com/user/repo\"`)\n\nnpm registry packages are not affected as they include integrity hashes from the registry metadata.\n\n### PoC\n\nSee attached [pnpm-bypass-integrity-poc.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/23819648/pnpm-bypass-integrity-poc.zip)\n\nThe POC includes:\n- A server that returns different tarball content on each request\n- A `malicious-package` that depends on the HTTP tarball\n- A `victim` project that depends on `malicious-package`\n\nTo run:\n```bash\ncd pnpm-bypass-integrity-poc\n./run-poc.sh\n```\n\nThe output shows that each install (with `pnpm store prune` between them) downloads different code despite having a committed lockfile.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker who publishes a package with an HTTP tarball dependency can serve different code to different users or CI/CD environments. This enables:\n\n- Targeted attacks based on request metadata (IP, headers, timing)\n- Evasion of security audits (serve benign code during review, malicious code later)\n- Supply chain attacks where the malicious payload changes over time\n\nThe attack requires the victim to install a package that has an HTTP/git tarball in its dependency tree. The victim's lockfile provides no protection.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "npm",
      "name" : "pnpm"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "10.26.0"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-69263"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/commit/0958027f88a99ccefe7e9676cdebba393dfbdc85"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-494" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-01-07T19:06:59Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-01-07T22:15:43Z"
  }
}