CVE-2026-42184: Tauri Tauri Has An Origin Confusion Vulnerability

MODERATE
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-7gmj-67g7-phm9
CVSS 8.8
CWE-918
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-42184 is a MODERATE (CVSS 8.8) tauri has an origin confusion vulnerability (CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)) affecting Tauri libraries in the crates.io ecosystem. The issue involves tauri has an origin confusion issue that allows remote pages to invoke local-only ipc commands. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 2.11.1.

CVE-2026-42184 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-42184
GHSA Identifier GHSA-7gmj-67g7-phm9
Severity MODERATE
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 8.8
CWE Classification CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Affected Product Tauri
Package Ecosystem crates.io
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 8.8

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction Required (UI:R)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2026-42184

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Tauri dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

tauri fixed: 2.11.1
Upgrade tauri to 2.11.1
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for tauri

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-42184, inspect your project dependencies for Tauri:

inspect dependencies for tauri

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Tauri in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 2.11.1), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), where the web server receives a url or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this url, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination. In Tauri, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Summary A flaw in Tauri's `is_local_url()` function causes it to incorrectly classify remote URLs as trusted local origins on Windows and Android. On these systems, Tauri maps custom URI scheme protocols to `http://<scheme>.localhost/` because those platforms' WebView implementations cannot serve custom URI schemes directly. The issue is that Tauri's check to see if the origin is local, only checks the first subdomain of the URL. An attacker can abuse this by hosting a page on a domain whose subdomain matches the custom scheme of the application (e.g. http://app.attacker.com/)." Example: - Local URL: `app://localhost/` → on Android/Windows: `http://app.localhost/` - The check passes for any URL starting with `http://app.`, including `http://app.evil.com/` As a result, the attacker page can invoke backend commands that the developer intended to be accessible only to the app's own frontend and that are explicitly restricted from being called by external or remote origins. ### Details Vulnerable function: ```rust #[cfg(any(windows, target_os = "android"))] let local = { let protocol_url = self.manager().tauri_protocol_url(uses_https); let maybe_protocol = current_url .domain() .and_then(|d| d.split_once('.')) // BUG: only splits on first dot .unwrap_or_default() .0; protocols.contains_key(maybe_protocol) && scheme == protocol_url.scheme() }; ``` Link: https://github.com/tauri-apps/tauri/blob/1ef6a119b1571d1da0acc08bdb7fd5521a4c6d52/crates/tauri/src/webview/mod.rs#L1680 `split_once('.')` discards everything after the first `.`. For http://app.evil.com/, the extracted label is app. If the application has registered a protocol named app, `protocols.contains_key("app")` returns `true` and the URL is classified as `Origin::Local`. The correct check must assert the full domain is exactly `<protocol>.localhost`. ### PoC We created a proof of concept app that can be found [here](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1YME6YMSKv69JxFF7Ne0OrZ6tGC_OH7Jw/view?usp=sharing). The app registers a custom app:// protocol and exposes a ping command restricted to local origins only. It provides a button to open a URL in a WebView, pre-filled with https://app.robbe-bc9.workers.dev/, an attacker-controlled page that invokes ping on load. Because the domain's first label matches the registered app protocol, is_local_url() classifies it as a local origin and the command succeeds. `capabilities/main.json` contains the following code, which only exposes `ping` locally: ```json { "$schema": "../../../crates/tauri-schema-generator/schemas/capability.schema.json", "identifier": "main", "local": true, "windows": ["*"], "permissions": [ "sample:allow-ping" ] } ``` `src/lib.rs` contains the following code, to register a custom scheme: ```rust tauri::Builder::default() .register_uri_scheme_protocol("app", |_ctx, _request| { ... }) ``` ### Impact The attacker page can invoke backend commands that the developer intended to be accessible only to the app's own frontend and that are explicitly restricted from being called by external or remote origins.

CVE-2026-42184 Affected Tauri Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
2.11.1
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
tauri
crates.io
≥ 2.0.0
< 2.11.1
2.11.1

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-42184?
CVE-2026-42184 is a security vulnerability in Tauri involving Tauri has an Origin Confusion Issue that Allows Remote Pages to Invoke Local-Only IPC Commands under CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF).
Which Tauri versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 2.11.1 across affected packages: tauri.
What version fixes CVE-2026-42184?
Upgrading to 2.11.1 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is tauri affected?
Yes, tauri is affected in releases prior to 2.11.1. Upgrade your dependency to 2.11.1 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-42184?
CVE-2026-42184 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 8.8 (MODERATE) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-42184?
CVE-2026-42184 is classified under CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) (The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.).
How can I check crates.io dependencies for CVE-2026-42184?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for tauri'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-7gmj-67g7-phm9",
  "modified" : "2026-06-08T23:41:37Z",
  "published" : "2026-05-06T16:58:35Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-42184" ],
  "summary" : "Tauri has an Origin Confusion Issue that Allows Remote Pages to Invoke Local-Only IPC Commands",
  "details" : "### Summary\nA flaw in Tauri's `is_local_url()` function causes it to incorrectly classify remote URLs as trusted local origins on Windows and Android. On these systems, Tauri maps custom URI scheme protocols to `http://<scheme>.localhost/` because those platforms' WebView implementations cannot serve custom URI schemes directly.\n\nThe issue is that Tauri's check to see if the origin is local, only checks the first subdomain of the URL. An attacker can abuse this by hosting a page on a domain whose subdomain matches the custom scheme of the application (e.g. http://app.attacker.com/).\"\n\nExample:\n- Local URL: `app://localhost/` → on Android/Windows: `http://app.localhost/`\n- The check passes for any URL starting with `http://app.`, including `http://app.evil.com/`\n\nAs a result, the attacker page can invoke backend commands that the developer intended to be accessible only to the app's own frontend and that are explicitly restricted from being called by external or remote origins.\n\n### Details\nVulnerable function:\n\n```rust\n#[cfg(any(windows, target_os = \"android\"))]\nlet local = {\n  let protocol_url = self.manager().tauri_protocol_url(uses_https);\n  let maybe_protocol = current_url\n    .domain()\n    .and_then(|d| d.split_once('.'))  // BUG: only splits on first dot\n    .unwrap_or_default()\n    .0;\n\n  protocols.contains_key(maybe_protocol) && scheme == protocol_url.scheme()\n};\n```\n\nLink: https://github.com/tauri-apps/tauri/blob/1ef6a119b1571d1da0acc08bdb7fd5521a4c6d52/crates/tauri/src/webview/mod.rs#L1680\n\n`split_once('.')` discards everything after the first `.`. For http://app.evil.com/, the extracted label is app. If the application has registered a protocol named app, `protocols.contains_key(\"app\")` returns `true` and the URL is classified as `Origin::Local`. The correct check must assert the full domain is exactly `<protocol>.localhost`.\n\n### PoC\nWe created a proof of concept app that can be found [here](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1YME6YMSKv69JxFF7Ne0OrZ6tGC_OH7Jw/view?usp=sharing). The app registers a custom app:// protocol and exposes a ping command restricted to local origins only. It provides a button to open a URL in a WebView, pre-filled with https://app.robbe-bc9.workers.dev/, an attacker-controlled page that invokes ping on load. Because the domain's first label matches the registered app protocol, is_local_url() classifies it as a local origin and the command succeeds.\n\n`capabilities/main.json` contains the following code, which only exposes `ping` locally:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"$schema\": \"../../../crates/tauri-schema-generator/schemas/capability.schema.json\",\n  \"identifier\": \"main\",\n  \"local\": true,\n  \"windows\": [\"*\"],\n  \"permissions\": [\n    \"sample:allow-ping\"\n  ]\n}\n```\n\n`src/lib.rs` contains the following code, to register a custom scheme:\n\n```rust\ntauri::Builder::default()\n  .register_uri_scheme_protocol(\"app\", |_ctx, _request| { ... })\n```\n\n### Impact\nThe attacker page can invoke backend commands that the developer intended to be accessible only to the app's own frontend and that are explicitly restricted from being called by external or remote origins.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  }, {
    "type" : "CVSS_V4",
    "score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "crates.io",
      "name" : "tauri"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "2.0.0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "2.11.1"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 2.11.0"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/tauri-apps/tauri/security/advisories/GHSA-7gmj-67g7-phm9"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42184"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/tauri-apps/tauri"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-918" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-05-06T16:58:35Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-05-27T15:16:27Z"
  }
}