CVE-2026-46475: FlowiseAI Assistant Create+update Mass-assignment Allows Cross-workspace Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-78pr-c5x5-jggc
CVSS 8.8
CWE-915
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-46475 is a HIGH (CVSS 8.8) assistant create+update mass-assignment allows cross-workspace vulnerability (CWE-915: Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes) affecting FlowiseAI libraries in the npm ecosystem. The issue involves assistant create+update mass-assignment allows cross-workspace assistant takeover. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 3.1.2.

CVE-2026-46475 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-46475
GHSA Identifier GHSA-78pr-c5x5-jggc
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 8.8
CWE Classification CWE-915: Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes
Affected Product FlowiseAI
Package Ecosystem npm
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 8.8

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2026-46475

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected FlowiseAI dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

flowise fixed: 3.1.2
npm install flowise@3.1.2
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

npm ls flowise

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Node.js application is affected by CVE-2026-46475, inspect your project dependencies using npm:

npm ls flowise

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of FlowiseAI in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 3.1.2), your application is affected.

Note: The npm ls flowise command inspects dependencies declared in your package.json and lockfile; it does not perform automated runtime dynamic scanning.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-915: Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes, where the product receives input from an upstream component that specifies multiple attributes, properties, or fields that are to be initialized or updated in an object, but it does not properly control which attributes can be modified. In FlowiseAI, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Summary **Type:** Mass assignment via `Object.assign(entity, body)` -> client-controlled `workspaceId` (and on create, `id`) overwritten on the Assistant entity -> cross-workspace data takeover and IDOR. **File:** `packages/server/src/services/assistants/index.ts` **Root cause:** The Assistant controller/service constructs a `new Assistant()` and copies the request body into it via `Object.assign(...)` without an explicit field allowlist. The request body therefore can include `workspaceId`, `id`, `createdDate`, `updatedDate`. The server only rebinds *some* of these after the assign (e.g. on create, it overwrites `workspaceId` but not `id`; on update, it overwrites `id` but not `workspaceId`). The remaining client-controlled values land directly on the persisted row, breaking workspace isolation. Same root pattern as the assistant entity's sibling controllers and as `DocumentStore` before it was patched in commit 840d2ae. ## Affected Code **File:** `packages/server/src/services/assistants/index.ts` ```ts // create (line 303) and update (line 381) Object.assign(newAssistant, requestBody) // <-- BUG: requestBody.id, requestBody.workspaceId accepted ``` **Why it's wrong:** `Object.assign(target, source)` copies every own enumerable property of `source` onto `target`. The TypeORM/SQL persistence layer below it does not strip ownership-bearing columns, so `workspaceId` set in the request body lands as the new `workspaceId` of the persisted row. The DocumentStore patch (commit 840d2ae) demonstrated the intended fix shape (explicit field-by-field allowlist) but it has not been applied to this entity. ## Exploit Chain 1. Attacker is an authenticated member of workspace A. They have a session cookie / JWT for the Flowise web UI. State at this point: attacker can read and write entities scoped to workspace A. 2. Attacker creates a assistant in workspace A via the documented API (or reuses an existing one they own). They note its entity `id`. 3. Attacker issues a `PUT /api/v1/assistants/<id>` (or equivalent endpoint) with a JSON body that includes `"workspaceId": "<workspace-B-id>"` (an arbitrary other workspace's UUID). State at this point: the request reaches the controller as a workspace-A authenticated request. 4. The controller calls `Object.assign(updateEntity, body)`. The body's `workspaceId` overwrites the entity's `workspaceId` field. The persistence layer commits the row. 5. Final state: the assistant row is now owned by workspace B. Workspace B members can see it, modify it, and use it. Workspace A loses access (it no longer satisfies their workspace filter). The original creator's workspace audit shows nothing because the operation looked like a normal update. ## Security Impact **Severity:** High. Cross-workspace boundary violation by any authenticated workspace member. **Attacker capability:** Any authenticated user with permission to update a assistant can move it to any workspace whose UUID they can guess or enumerate (workspace UUIDs are exposed in many API responses, so enumeration is trivial). Assistants encapsulate LLM configuration, instructions, attached tools, and credentials. Cross-workspace movement via `workspaceId` overwrite exposes the assistant (including its system prompt and tool list) to the destination workspace. **Preconditions:** Authenticated session with edit permission for the source assistant. No second factor required. Workspace UUIDs are exposed via the `/api/v1/workspaces` listing or via any cross-referenced object's `workspaceId` field, so target enumeration is trivial. **Differential:** PoC-verified by source inspection of the original GHSA-q4pr-4r26-c69r. Patched build (with the suggested fix below) refuses the `workspaceId` field; vulnerable build accepts it and persists it. ## Suggested Fix Already fixed in PR https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/pull/6128 (allowlist pattern applied). ```ts // Allowlist pattern (matches commit 840d2ae for DocumentStore): const updatedAssistant = new Assistant() if (body.<allowed_field_1> !== undefined) updatedAssistant.<allowed_field_1> = body.<allowed_field_1> if (body.<allowed_field_2> !== undefined) updatedAssistant.<allowed_field_2> = body.<allowed_field_2> // ...whitelist only the documented fields. Never copy id, workspaceId, createdDate, updatedDate from the client. ``` Regression tests should assert that a request body containing `workspaceId`, `id`, `createdDate`, or `updatedDate` is rejected (or at minimum: does not change those columns on the persisted row) for both create and update paths.

CVE-2026-46475 Affected FlowiseAI Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
3.1.2
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
flowise
npm
< 3.1.2
3.1.2

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-46475?
CVE-2026-46475 is a security vulnerability in FlowiseAI involving Assistant create+update mass-assignment allows cross-workspace assistant takeover under CWE-915: Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes.
Which FlowiseAI versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 3.1.2 across affected packages: flowise.
What version fixes CVE-2026-46475?
Upgrading to 3.1.2 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is flowise affected?
Yes, flowise is affected in releases prior to 3.1.2. Upgrade your dependency to 3.1.2 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-46475?
CVE-2026-46475 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 8.8 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-46475?
CVE-2026-46475 is classified under CWE-915: Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes (The product receives input from an upstream component that specifies multiple attributes, properties, or fields that are to be initialized or updated in an object, but it does not properly control which attributes can be modified.).
How can I check npm dependencies for CVE-2026-46475?
Run the dependency tree command: 'npm ls flowise'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-78pr-c5x5-jggc",
  "modified" : "2026-06-12T19:31:03Z",
  "published" : "2026-05-14T16:19:28Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-46475" ],
  "summary" : "FlowiseAI: Assistant create+update mass-assignment allows cross-workspace assistant takeover",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\n**Type:** Mass assignment via `Object.assign(entity, body)` -> client-controlled `workspaceId` (and on create, `id`) overwritten on the Assistant entity -> cross-workspace data takeover and IDOR.\n**File:** `packages/server/src/services/assistants/index.ts`\n**Root cause:** The Assistant controller/service constructs a `new Assistant()` and copies the request body into it via `Object.assign(...)` without an explicit field allowlist. The request body therefore can include `workspaceId`, `id`, `createdDate`, `updatedDate`. The server only rebinds *some* of these after the assign (e.g. on create, it overwrites `workspaceId` but not `id`; on update, it overwrites `id` but not `workspaceId`). The remaining client-controlled values land directly on the persisted row, breaking workspace isolation. Same root pattern as the assistant entity's sibling controllers and as `DocumentStore` before it was patched in commit 840d2ae.\n\n## Affected Code\n\n**File:** `packages/server/src/services/assistants/index.ts`\n\n```ts\n// create (line 303) and update (line 381)\nObject.assign(newAssistant, requestBody) // <-- BUG: requestBody.id, requestBody.workspaceId accepted\n```\n\n**Why it's wrong:** `Object.assign(target, source)` copies every own enumerable property of `source` onto `target`. The TypeORM/SQL persistence layer below it does not strip ownership-bearing columns, so `workspaceId` set in the request body lands as the new `workspaceId` of the persisted row. The DocumentStore patch (commit 840d2ae) demonstrated the intended fix shape (explicit field-by-field allowlist) but it has not been applied to this entity.\n\n## Exploit Chain\n\n1. Attacker is an authenticated member of workspace A. They have a session cookie / JWT for the Flowise web UI. State at this point: attacker can read and write entities scoped to workspace A.\n2. Attacker creates a assistant in workspace A via the documented API (or reuses an existing one they own). They note its entity `id`.\n3. Attacker issues a `PUT /api/v1/assistants/<id>` (or equivalent endpoint) with a JSON body that includes `\"workspaceId\": \"<workspace-B-id>\"` (an arbitrary other workspace's UUID). State at this point: the request reaches the controller as a workspace-A authenticated request.\n4. The controller calls `Object.assign(updateEntity, body)`. The body's `workspaceId` overwrites the entity's `workspaceId` field. The persistence layer commits the row.\n5. Final state: the assistant row is now owned by workspace B. Workspace B members can see it, modify it, and use it. Workspace A loses access (it no longer satisfies their workspace filter). The original creator's workspace audit shows nothing because the operation looked like a normal update.\n\n## Security Impact\n\n**Severity:** High. Cross-workspace boundary violation by any authenticated workspace member.\n**Attacker capability:** Any authenticated user with permission to update a assistant can move it to any workspace whose UUID they can guess or enumerate (workspace UUIDs are exposed in many API responses, so enumeration is trivial). Assistants encapsulate LLM configuration, instructions, attached tools, and credentials. Cross-workspace movement via `workspaceId` overwrite exposes the assistant (including its system prompt and tool list) to the destination workspace.\n**Preconditions:** Authenticated session with edit permission for the source assistant. No second factor required. Workspace UUIDs are exposed via the `/api/v1/workspaces` listing or via any cross-referenced object's `workspaceId` field, so target enumeration is trivial.\n**Differential:** PoC-verified by source inspection of the original GHSA-q4pr-4r26-c69r. Patched build (with the suggested fix below) refuses the `workspaceId` field; vulnerable build accepts it and persists it.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nAlready fixed in PR https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/pull/6128 (allowlist pattern applied).\n\n```ts\n// Allowlist pattern (matches commit 840d2ae for DocumentStore):\nconst updatedAssistant = new Assistant()\nif (body.<allowed_field_1> !== undefined) updatedAssistant.<allowed_field_1> = body.<allowed_field_1>\nif (body.<allowed_field_2> !== undefined) updatedAssistant.<allowed_field_2> = body.<allowed_field_2>\n// ...whitelist only the documented fields. Never copy id, workspaceId, createdDate, updatedDate from the client.\n```\n\nRegression tests should assert that a request body containing `workspaceId`, `id`, `createdDate`, or `updatedDate` is rejected (or at minimum: does not change those columns on the persisted row) for both create and update paths.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  }, {
    "type" : "CVSS_V4",
    "score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "npm",
      "name" : "flowise"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "3.1.2"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 3.1.1"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories/GHSA-78pr-c5x5-jggc"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46475"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/pull/6128"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/commit/1cf247eab35c7c3d4db381d23e4dca682fba527b"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/releases/tag/flowise%403.1.2"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-915" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-05-14T16:19:28Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-06-08T16:16:41Z"
  }
}