CVE-2026-42081: Github.com/free5gc/amf Free5GC AMF Bypasses UE Security Vulnerability

MODERATE
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-77x9-rf64-92gv
CVSS 6.1
CWE-358
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-42081 is a MODERATE (CVSS 6.1) free5gc amf bypasses ue security vulnerability (CWE-358: Improperly Implemented Security Check for Standard) affecting Github.com/free5gc/amf libraries in the Go ecosystem. The issue involves free5gc amf bypasses ue security capabilities on ngap pathswitchrequest. Remediation is available in the latest vendor maintenance releases.

CVE-2026-42081 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-42081
GHSA Identifier GHSA-77x9-rf64-92gv
Severity MODERATE
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 6.1
CWE Classification CWE-358: Improperly Implemented Security Check for Standard
Affected Product Github.com/free5gc/amf
Package Ecosystem Go
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 6.1

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:L).

Attack Vector Adjacent (AV:A)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Changed (S:C)
Confidentiality None (C:N)
Integrity Low (I:L)
Availability Low (A:L)

How to Fix CVE-2026-42081

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Github.com/free5gc/amf dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

github.com/free5gc/amf fixed: Latest secure release
Upgrade github.com/free5gc/amf to Latest secure release
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for github.com/free5gc/amf

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-42081, inspect your project dependencies for Github.com/free5gc/amf:

inspect dependencies for github.com/free5gc/amf

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Github.com/free5gc/amf in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than the patched release), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-358: Improperly Implemented Security Check for Standard, where the product does not implement or incorrectly implements one or more security-relevant checks as specified by the design of a standardized algorithm, protocol, or technique. In Github.com/free5gc/amf, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Summary The AMF in Free5GC v4.2.1 does not verify the UE Security Capabilities received in NGAP PathSwitchRequest messages against its locally stored values, as mandated by 3GPP TS 33.501 §6.7.3.1. A malicious gNB can overwrite the AMF's stored UE security capabilities with arbitrary values, which are then propagated in PathSwitchRequest Acknowledge messages and subsequent Handover Request messages. This leads to persistent handover denial-of-service for affected UEs. ### Details **Affected File:** `amf/internal/ngap/handler.go` — `handlePathSwitchRequestMain` function **Root Cause:** When the AMF receives a PathSwitchRequest during an Xn-handover, it processes the UESecurityCapabilities IE by directly overwriting the stored values without comparing them to the previously stored capabilities: ```go if uESecurityCapabilities != nil { amfUe.UESecurityCapability.SetEA1_128_5G(uESecurityCapabilities.NRencryptionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0] & 0x80) amfUe.UESecurityCapability.SetEA2_128_5G(uESecurityCapabilities.NRencryptionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0] & 0x40) amfUe.UESecurityCapability.SetEA3_128_5G(uESecurityCapabilities.NRencryptionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0] & 0x20) amfUe.UESecurityCapability.SetIA1_128_5G(uESecurityCapabilities.NRintegrityProtectionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0] & 0x80) amfUe.UESecurityCapability.SetIA2_128_5G(uESecurityCapabilities.NRintegrityProtectionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0] & 0x40) amfUe.UESecurityCapability.SetIA3_128_5G(uESecurityCapabilities.NRintegrityProtectionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0] & 0x20) } ``` **3GPP TS 33.501 §6.7.3.1 requires three actions, none of which are implemented:** 1. **Verification (SHALL):** "The AMF shall verify that the UE's 5G security capabilities received from the target gNB/ng-eNB are the same as the UE's 5G security capabilities that the AMF has locally stored." → Not implemented. The AMF unconditionally overwrites stored values. 2. **Correction (SHALL):** "If there is a mismatch, the AMF shall send its locally stored 5G security capabilities of the UE to the target gNB/ng-eNB in the Path-Switch Acknowledge message." → Not implemented. The PathSwitchRequestAcknowledge contains the corrupted values. 3. **Logging (SHALL):** "The AMF shall support logging capabilities for this event and may take additional measures, such as raising an alarm." → Not implemented. No mismatch detection or logging exists. **Propagation:** The corrupted values are propagated in: - **PathSwitchRequestAcknowledge:** Contains corrupted UESecurityCapabilities (demonstrated in pcap) - **Subsequent HandoverRequest messages:** AMF sends corrupted capabilities to target gNBs Per TS 38.413 §8.4.2.4, if the supported algorithms in the UE Security Capabilities do not match any allowed algorithms configured in the target gNB, the target gNB is required to reject the procedure using a HANDOVER FAILURE message. ### PoC **Environment:** - Free5GC v4.2.1 AMF (Docker container) with full NF stack (NRF, AUSF, UDM, UDR, NSSF, PCF, SMF, UPF) - UERANSIM v3.2.7 gNB with custom inspection-tool extension - tshark for packet capture **Reproduction Steps:** 1. Start Free5GC full stack and register a UE through a gNB (NG Setup → Registration → PDU Session Setup). 2. Send a normal HandoverRequired from the gNB. Capture the resulting HandoverRequest from the AMF and confirm `nRintegrityProtectionAlgorithms = 0xe000` (NIA1, NIA2, NIA3 all supported). This is the baseline. 3. Send a PathSwitchRequest with `nRintegrityProtectionAlgorithms = 0x0000` (all integrity algorithms set to not supported). The AMF responds with PathSwitchRequestAcknowledge. 4. Observe that the PathSwitchRequestAcknowledge contains `nRintegrityProtectionAlgorithms = 0x0000` — the corrupted values are propagated back. **Observed Result (from pcap capture):** | Packet | Message | nRintegrityProtectionAlgorithms | |--------|---------|-------------------------------| | #20 | HandoverRequest (AMF→gNB) | `0xe000` (NIA1 ✓ NIA2 ✓ NIA3 ✓) — **baseline** | | #30 | PathSwitchRequest (gNB→AMF) | `0x0000` — **poison** | | #47 | PathSwitchRequestAcknowledge (AMF→gNB) | `0x0000` (NIA1 ✗ NIA2 ✗ NIA3 ✗) — **corrupted** | ### Impact **Availability (HIGH):** A malicious gNB can send a single PathSwitchRequest message to corrupt the AMF's stored UE security capabilities for any UE. All subsequent inter-gNB handovers for the affected UE are expected to fail (per TS 38.413 §8.4.2.4), resulting in denial-of-service that persists until the UE performs a new registration. **Integrity (LOW):** The AMF's internal UE security context is corrupted with attacker-controlled values. These corrupted values are propagated to other network elements via PathSwitchRequestAcknowledge and HandoverRequest messages. **Who is impacted:** Any deployment using Free5GC as the AMF where a gNB could be compromised or where untrusted gNBs exist (e.g., O-RAN multi-vendor deployments).

CVE-2026-42081 Affected Github.com/free5gc/amf Versions

1 component(s)
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
github.com/free5gc/amf
Go
≤ 1.4.3

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-42081?
CVE-2026-42081 is a security vulnerability in Github.com/free5gc/amf involving Free5GC AMF Bypasses UE Security Capabilities on NGAP PathSwitchRequest under CWE-358: Improperly Implemented Security Check for Standard.
Which Github.com/free5gc/amf versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to current release patches across affected packages: github.com/free5gc/amf.
What version fixes CVE-2026-42081?
Upgrading to current release patches (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is github.com/free5gc/amf affected?
Yes, github.com/free5gc/amf is affected in releases prior to Latest secure release. Upgrade your dependency to Latest secure release or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-42081?
CVE-2026-42081 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 6.1 (MODERATE) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:L.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-42081?
CVE-2026-42081 is classified under CWE-358: Improperly Implemented Security Check for Standard (The product does not implement or incorrectly implements one or more security-relevant checks as specified by the design of a standardized algorithm, protocol, or technique.).
How can I check Go dependencies for CVE-2026-42081?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for github.com/free5gc/amf'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-77x9-rf64-92gv",
  "modified" : "2026-06-08T23:46:37Z",
  "published" : "2026-05-07T01:53:47Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-42081" ],
  "summary" : "Free5GC AMF Bypasses UE Security Capabilities on NGAP PathSwitchRequest",
  "details" : "### Summary\nThe AMF in Free5GC v4.2.1 does not verify the UE Security Capabilities received in NGAP PathSwitchRequest messages against its locally stored values, as mandated by 3GPP TS 33.501 §6.7.3.1. A malicious gNB can overwrite the AMF's stored UE security capabilities with arbitrary values, which are then propagated in PathSwitchRequest Acknowledge messages and subsequent Handover Request messages. This leads to persistent handover denial-of-service for affected UEs.\n\n### Details\n**Affected File:** `amf/internal/ngap/handler.go` — `handlePathSwitchRequestMain` function\n\n**Root Cause:**\n\nWhen the AMF receives a PathSwitchRequest during an Xn-handover, it processes the UESecurityCapabilities IE by directly overwriting the stored values without comparing them to the previously stored capabilities:\n\n```go\nif uESecurityCapabilities != nil {\n    amfUe.UESecurityCapability.SetEA1_128_5G(uESecurityCapabilities.NRencryptionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0] & 0x80)\n    amfUe.UESecurityCapability.SetEA2_128_5G(uESecurityCapabilities.NRencryptionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0] & 0x40)\n    amfUe.UESecurityCapability.SetEA3_128_5G(uESecurityCapabilities.NRencryptionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0] & 0x20)\n    amfUe.UESecurityCapability.SetIA1_128_5G(uESecurityCapabilities.NRintegrityProtectionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0] & 0x80)\n    amfUe.UESecurityCapability.SetIA2_128_5G(uESecurityCapabilities.NRintegrityProtectionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0] & 0x40)\n    amfUe.UESecurityCapability.SetIA3_128_5G(uESecurityCapabilities.NRintegrityProtectionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0] & 0x20)\n}\n```\n\n**3GPP TS 33.501 §6.7.3.1 requires three actions, none of which are implemented:**\n\n1. **Verification (SHALL):** \"The AMF shall verify that the UE's 5G security capabilities received from the target gNB/ng-eNB are the same as the UE's 5G security capabilities that the AMF has locally stored.\"\n   → Not implemented. The AMF unconditionally overwrites stored values.\n\n2. **Correction (SHALL):** \"If there is a mismatch, the AMF shall send its locally stored 5G security capabilities of the UE to the target gNB/ng-eNB in the Path-Switch Acknowledge message.\"\n   → Not implemented. The PathSwitchRequestAcknowledge contains the corrupted values.\n\n3. **Logging (SHALL):** \"The AMF shall support logging capabilities for this event and may take additional measures, such as raising an alarm.\"\n   → Not implemented. No mismatch detection or logging exists.\n\n**Propagation:**\n\nThe corrupted values are propagated in:\n- **PathSwitchRequestAcknowledge:** Contains corrupted UESecurityCapabilities (demonstrated in pcap)\n- **Subsequent HandoverRequest messages:** AMF sends corrupted capabilities to target gNBs\n\nPer TS 38.413 §8.4.2.4, if the supported algorithms in the UE Security Capabilities do not match any allowed algorithms configured in the target gNB, the target gNB is required to reject the procedure using a HANDOVER FAILURE message.\n\n### PoC\n**Environment:**\n- Free5GC v4.2.1 AMF (Docker container) with full NF stack (NRF, AUSF, UDM, UDR, NSSF, PCF, SMF, UPF)\n- UERANSIM v3.2.7 gNB with custom inspection-tool extension\n- tshark for packet capture\n\n**Reproduction Steps:**\n\n1. Start Free5GC full stack and register a UE through a gNB (NG Setup → Registration → PDU Session Setup).\n\n2. Send a normal HandoverRequired from the gNB. Capture the resulting HandoverRequest from the AMF and confirm `nRintegrityProtectionAlgorithms = 0xe000` (NIA1, NIA2, NIA3 all supported). This is the baseline.\n\n3. Send a PathSwitchRequest with `nRintegrityProtectionAlgorithms = 0x0000` (all integrity algorithms set to not supported). The AMF responds with PathSwitchRequestAcknowledge.\n\n4. Observe that the PathSwitchRequestAcknowledge contains `nRintegrityProtectionAlgorithms = 0x0000` — the corrupted values are propagated back.\n\n**Observed Result (from pcap capture):**\n\n| Packet | Message | nRintegrityProtectionAlgorithms |\n|--------|---------|-------------------------------|\n| #20 | HandoverRequest (AMF→gNB) | `0xe000` (NIA1 ✓ NIA2 ✓ NIA3 ✓) — **baseline** |\n| #30 | PathSwitchRequest (gNB→AMF) | `0x0000` — **poison** |\n| #47 | PathSwitchRequestAcknowledge (AMF→gNB) | `0x0000` (NIA1 ✗ NIA2 ✗ NIA3 ✗) — **corrupted** |\n\n### Impact\n**Availability (HIGH):** A malicious gNB can send a single PathSwitchRequest message to corrupt the AMF's stored UE security capabilities for any UE. All subsequent inter-gNB handovers for the affected UE are expected to fail (per TS 38.413 §8.4.2.4), resulting in denial-of-service that persists until the UE performs a new registration.\n\n**Integrity (LOW):** The AMF's internal UE security context is corrupted with attacker-controlled values. These corrupted values are propagated to other network elements via PathSwitchRequestAcknowledge and HandoverRequest messages.\n\n**Who is impacted:** Any deployment using Free5GC as the AMF where a gNB could be compromised or where untrusted gNBs exist (e.g., O-RAN multi-vendor deployments).",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:L"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/free5gc/amf"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "last_affected" : "1.4.3"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc/security/advisories/GHSA-77x9-rf64-92gv"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42081"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/free5gc/amf/blame/v1.4.3/internal/ngap/handler.go"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-358" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-05-07T01:53:47Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-05-27T17:16:34Z"
  }
}