CVE-2026-34364: Wwbn/avideo AVideo Has User Group-Based Category Vulnerability

MODERATE
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-73gr-r64q-7jh4
CVSS 5.3
CWE-863
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-34364 is a MODERATE (CVSS 5.3) avideo has user group-based category vulnerability (CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization) affecting Wwbn/avideo libraries in the Packagist ecosystem. The issue involves avideo has user group-based category access control bypass via missing and broken group filtering in categories.json.php. Remediation is available in the latest vendor maintenance releases.

CVE-2026-34364 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-34364
GHSA Identifier GHSA-73gr-r64q-7jh4
Severity MODERATE
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 5.3
CWE Classification CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization
Affected Product Wwbn/avideo
Package Ecosystem Packagist
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 5.3

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality Low (C:L)
Integrity None (I:N)
Availability None (A:N)

How to Fix CVE-2026-34364

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Wwbn/avideo dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

wwbn/avideo fixed: Latest secure release
Upgrade wwbn/avideo to Latest secure release
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for wwbn/avideo

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-34364, inspect your project dependencies for Wwbn/avideo:

inspect dependencies for wwbn/avideo

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Wwbn/avideo in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than the patched release), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization, where the product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check. In Wwbn/avideo, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Summary The `categories.json.php` endpoint, which serves the category listing API, fails to enforce user group-based access controls on categories. In the default request path (no `?user=` parameter), user group filtering is entirely skipped, exposing all non-private categories including those restricted to specific user groups. When the `?user=` parameter is supplied, a type confusion bug causes the filter to use the admin user's (user_id=1) group memberships instead of the current user's, rendering the filter ineffective. ## Details The vulnerability has two related failures in `objects/categories.json.php` and `objects/category.php`: **1. Default request — group filtering completely skipped** In `categories.json.php:17-24`, when `$_GET['user']` is not set, `$sameUserGroupAsMe` defaults to `false`: ```php // categories.json.php:17-24 $onlyWithVideos = false; $sameUserGroupAsMe = false; if(!empty($_GET['user'])){ $onlyWithVideos = true; $sameUserGroupAsMe = true; } $categories = Category::getAllCategories(true, $onlyWithVideos, false, $sameUserGroupAsMe); ``` In `category.php:438-452`, the user group filter is gated on `$sameUserGroupAsMe` being truthy: ```php // category.php:438-452 if ($sameUserGroupAsMe) { $users_groups = UserGroups::getUserGroups($sameUserGroupAsMe); $users_groups_id = array(0); foreach ($users_groups as $value) { $users_groups_id[] = $value['id']; } $sql .= " AND (" . "(SELECT count(*) FROM categories_has_users_groups chug WHERE c.id = chug.categories_id) = 0 OR " . "(SELECT count(*) FROM categories_has_users_groups chug2 WHERE c.id = chug2.categories_id AND users_groups_id IN (" . implode(',', $users_groups_id) . ")) >= 1 " . ")"; } ``` Since `$sameUserGroupAsMe = false`, the entire block is skipped. All non-private categories are returned regardless of their user group restrictions set via the `categories_has_users_groups` table. **2. With `?user=` parameter — boolean-to-integer type confusion** When `$_GET['user']` is non-empty, `$sameUserGroupAsMe` is set to boolean `true` (line 21). This value is passed to `UserGroups::getUserGroups($sameUserGroupAsMe)` at `category.php:440`. In `userGroups.php:349-379`, the parameter is used as `$users_id`: ```php // userGroups.php:349,371,379 public static function getUserGroups($users_id){ // ... $sql = "SELECT uug.*, ug.* FROM users_groups ug" . " LEFT JOIN users_has_users_groups uug ON users_groups_id = ug.id WHERE users_id = ? "; // ... $res = sqlDAL::readSql($sql, "i", [$users_id]); ``` PHP casts boolean `true` to integer `1` for the prepared statement bind, resulting in `WHERE users_id = 1` — fetching the **admin user's** group memberships. The filter then allows categories visible to admin groups, effectively granting any unauthenticated user the admin's category visibility. **3. getTotalCategories also unfiltered** `getTotalCategories()` at `category.php:978` does not accept a `$sameUserGroupAsMe` parameter at all, so the total count always reflects the unfiltered category set. The endpoint requires no authentication — it uses `allowOrigin()` (a CORS header helper) and is publicly routable via the `.htaccess` rewrite rule: `RewriteRule ^categories.json$ objects/categories.json.php`. ## PoC ```bash # 1. Fetch all categories without authentication — no group filtering applied curl -s 'https://target/categories.json' | jq '.rows[] | {id, name, private, users_groups_ids_array}' # Returns ALL non-private categories including those restricted to specific user groups. # The users_groups_ids_array field reveals which groups each category is restricted to. # Categories with non-empty users_groups_ids_array should be hidden from users not in those groups. # 2. Attempt the "filtered" path — still broken due to boolean->int cast curl -s 'https://target/categories.json?user=1' | jq '.rows[] | {id, name, private, users_groups_ids_array}' # This applies group filtering but uses admin's groups (users_id=1) instead of the # current user's groups, so group-restricted categories visible to admin are exposed. ``` ## Impact Any unauthenticated user can: - **Enumerate all non-private categories** regardless of user group restrictions, bypassing the intended access control model where categories are restricted to specific user groups via the CustomizeUser plugin's `categories_has_users_groups` table. - **Discover the user group configuration** for each category via the `users_groups_ids_array` field in the response, revealing the internal access control structure. - **Identify group-restricted content areas** that should be hidden, which could be used to target further access control bypasses on the videos within those categories. The severity is Medium because this is an information disclosure of category metadata (names, descriptions, icons, group assignments) rather than the actual video content within restricted categories. However, the exposure of the access control structure itself (which groups have access to which categories) is a meaningful information leak. ## Recommended Fix In `objects/categories.json.php`, pass the current user's ID (or 0 for unauthenticated users) instead of a boolean: ```php // categories.json.php — replace lines 17-24 $onlyWithVideos = false; $sameUserGroupAsMe = false; if(!empty($_GET['user'])){ $onlyWithVideos = true; } // Always apply user group filtering using the logged-in user's ID $currentUserId = User::getId(); if (!empty($currentUserId)) { $sameUserGroupAsMe = $currentUserId; } else { // For unauthenticated users, pass a value that will filter to only // categories with no group restrictions $sameUserGroupAsMe = -1; // Non-existent user ID, will match no groups } $categories = Category::getAllCategories(true, $onlyWithVideos, false, $sameUserGroupAsMe); ``` Additionally, in `category.php:getAllCategories()`, ensure the group filter block always runs when categories have group restrictions, not only when `$sameUserGroupAsMe` is truthy. A more robust approach: ```php // category.php — replace the sameUserGroupAsMe block (lines 438-452) // Always filter by user groups if any categories have group restrictions $users_groups_id = array(0); if ($sameUserGroupAsMe && $sameUserGroupAsMe > 0) { $users_groups = UserGroups::getUserGroups($sameUserGroupAsMe); foreach ($users_groups as $value) { $users_groups_id[] = $value['id']; } } $sql .= " AND (" . "(SELECT count(*) FROM categories_has_users_groups chug WHERE c.id = chug.categories_id) = 0 OR " . "(SELECT count(*) FROM categories_has_users_groups chug2 WHERE c.id = chug2.categories_id AND users_groups_id IN (" . implode(',', $users_groups_id) . ")) >= 1 " . ")"; ``` This ensures that even when no user is logged in, categories with group restrictions are hidden (only categories with zero group restrictions are shown). The `getTotalCategories()` function should also be updated to accept and apply the same `$sameUserGroupAsMe` filter.

CVE-2026-34364 Affected Wwbn/avideo Versions

1 component(s)
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
wwbn/avideo
Packagist
≤ 26.0

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-34364?
CVE-2026-34364 is a security vulnerability in Wwbn/avideo involving AVideo has User Group-Based Category Access Control Bypass via Missing and Broken Group Filtering in categories.json.php under CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization.
Which Wwbn/avideo versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to current release patches across affected packages: wwbn/avideo.
What version fixes CVE-2026-34364?
Upgrading to current release patches (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is wwbn/avideo affected?
Yes, wwbn/avideo is affected in releases prior to Latest secure release. Upgrade your dependency to Latest secure release or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-34364?
CVE-2026-34364 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 5.3 (MODERATE) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-34364?
CVE-2026-34364 is classified under CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization (The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.).
How can I check Packagist dependencies for CVE-2026-34364?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for wwbn/avideo'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-73gr-r64q-7jh4",
  "modified" : "2026-03-30T17:49:57Z",
  "published" : "2026-03-30T17:49:57Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-34364" ],
  "summary" : "AVideo has User Group-Based Category Access Control Bypass via Missing and Broken Group Filtering in categories.json.php",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\nThe `categories.json.php` endpoint, which serves the category listing API, fails to enforce user group-based access controls on categories. In the default request path (no `?user=` parameter), user group filtering is entirely skipped, exposing all non-private categories including those restricted to specific user groups. When the `?user=` parameter is supplied, a type confusion bug causes the filter to use the admin user's (user_id=1) group memberships instead of the current user's, rendering the filter ineffective.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerability has two related failures in `objects/categories.json.php` and `objects/category.php`:\n\n**1. Default request — group filtering completely skipped**\n\nIn `categories.json.php:17-24`, when `$_GET['user']` is not set, `$sameUserGroupAsMe` defaults to `false`:\n\n```php\n// categories.json.php:17-24\n$onlyWithVideos = false;\n$sameUserGroupAsMe = false;\nif(!empty($_GET['user'])){\n    $onlyWithVideos = true;\n    $sameUserGroupAsMe = true;\n}\n$categories = Category::getAllCategories(true, $onlyWithVideos, false, $sameUserGroupAsMe);\n```\n\nIn `category.php:438-452`, the user group filter is gated on `$sameUserGroupAsMe` being truthy:\n\n```php\n// category.php:438-452\nif ($sameUserGroupAsMe) {\n    $users_groups = UserGroups::getUserGroups($sameUserGroupAsMe);\n    $users_groups_id = array(0);\n    foreach ($users_groups as $value) {\n        $users_groups_id[] = $value['id'];\n    }\n    $sql .= \" AND (\"\n        . \"(SELECT count(*) FROM categories_has_users_groups chug WHERE c.id = chug.categories_id) = 0 OR \"\n        . \"(SELECT count(*) FROM categories_has_users_groups chug2 WHERE c.id = chug2.categories_id AND users_groups_id IN (\" . implode(',', $users_groups_id) . \")) >= 1 \"\n        . \")\";\n}\n```\n\nSince `$sameUserGroupAsMe = false`, the entire block is skipped. All non-private categories are returned regardless of their user group restrictions set via the `categories_has_users_groups` table.\n\n**2. With `?user=` parameter — boolean-to-integer type confusion**\n\nWhen `$_GET['user']` is non-empty, `$sameUserGroupAsMe` is set to boolean `true` (line 21). This value is passed to `UserGroups::getUserGroups($sameUserGroupAsMe)` at `category.php:440`.\n\nIn `userGroups.php:349-379`, the parameter is used as `$users_id`:\n\n```php\n// userGroups.php:349,371,379\npublic static function getUserGroups($users_id){\n    // ...\n    $sql = \"SELECT uug.*, ug.* FROM users_groups ug\"\n            . \" LEFT JOIN users_has_users_groups uug ON users_groups_id = ug.id WHERE users_id = ? \";\n    // ...\n    $res = sqlDAL::readSql($sql, \"i\", [$users_id]);\n```\n\nPHP casts boolean `true` to integer `1` for the prepared statement bind, resulting in `WHERE users_id = 1` — fetching the **admin user's** group memberships. The filter then allows categories visible to admin groups, effectively granting any unauthenticated user the admin's category visibility.\n\n**3. getTotalCategories also unfiltered**\n\n`getTotalCategories()` at `category.php:978` does not accept a `$sameUserGroupAsMe` parameter at all, so the total count always reflects the unfiltered category set.\n\nThe endpoint requires no authentication — it uses `allowOrigin()` (a CORS header helper) and is publicly routable via the `.htaccess` rewrite rule: `RewriteRule ^categories.json$ objects/categories.json.php`.\n\n## PoC\n\n```bash\n# 1. Fetch all categories without authentication — no group filtering applied\ncurl -s 'https://target/categories.json' | jq '.rows[] | {id, name, private, users_groups_ids_array}'\n\n# Returns ALL non-private categories including those restricted to specific user groups.\n# The users_groups_ids_array field reveals which groups each category is restricted to.\n# Categories with non-empty users_groups_ids_array should be hidden from users not in those groups.\n\n# 2. Attempt the \"filtered\" path — still broken due to boolean->int cast\ncurl -s 'https://target/categories.json?user=1' | jq '.rows[] | {id, name, private, users_groups_ids_array}'\n\n# This applies group filtering but uses admin's groups (users_id=1) instead of the\n# current user's groups, so group-restricted categories visible to admin are exposed.\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAny unauthenticated user can:\n\n- **Enumerate all non-private categories** regardless of user group restrictions, bypassing the intended access control model where categories are restricted to specific user groups via the CustomizeUser plugin's `categories_has_users_groups` table.\n- **Discover the user group configuration** for each category via the `users_groups_ids_array` field in the response, revealing the internal access control structure.\n- **Identify group-restricted content areas** that should be hidden, which could be used to target further access control bypasses on the videos within those categories.\n\nThe severity is Medium because this is an information disclosure of category metadata (names, descriptions, icons, group assignments) rather than the actual video content within restricted categories. However, the exposure of the access control structure itself (which groups have access to which categories) is a meaningful information leak.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nIn `objects/categories.json.php`, pass the current user's ID (or 0 for unauthenticated users) instead of a boolean:\n\n```php\n// categories.json.php — replace lines 17-24\n$onlyWithVideos = false;\n$sameUserGroupAsMe = false;\nif(!empty($_GET['user'])){\n    $onlyWithVideos = true;\n}\n// Always apply user group filtering using the logged-in user's ID\n$currentUserId = User::getId();\nif (!empty($currentUserId)) {\n    $sameUserGroupAsMe = $currentUserId;\n} else {\n    // For unauthenticated users, pass a value that will filter to only\n    // categories with no group restrictions\n    $sameUserGroupAsMe = -1; // Non-existent user ID, will match no groups\n}\n\n$categories = Category::getAllCategories(true, $onlyWithVideos, false, $sameUserGroupAsMe);\n```\n\nAdditionally, in `category.php:getAllCategories()`, ensure the group filter block always runs when categories have group restrictions, not only when `$sameUserGroupAsMe` is truthy. A more robust approach:\n\n```php\n// category.php — replace the sameUserGroupAsMe block (lines 438-452)\n// Always filter by user groups if any categories have group restrictions\n$users_groups_id = array(0);\nif ($sameUserGroupAsMe && $sameUserGroupAsMe > 0) {\n    $users_groups = UserGroups::getUserGroups($sameUserGroupAsMe);\n    foreach ($users_groups as $value) {\n        $users_groups_id[] = $value['id'];\n    }\n}\n$sql .= \" AND (\"\n    . \"(SELECT count(*) FROM categories_has_users_groups chug WHERE c.id = chug.categories_id) = 0 OR \"\n    . \"(SELECT count(*) FROM categories_has_users_groups chug2 WHERE c.id = chug2.categories_id AND users_groups_id IN (\" . implode(',', $users_groups_id) . \")) >= 1 \"\n    . \")\";\n```\n\nThis ensures that even when no user is logged in, categories with group restrictions are hidden (only categories with zero group restrictions are shown). The `getTotalCategories()` function should also be updated to accept and apply the same `$sameUserGroupAsMe` filter.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Packagist",
      "name" : "wwbn/avideo"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "last_affected" : "26.0"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-73gr-r64q-7jh4"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34364"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/6e8a673eed07be5628d0b60fbfabd171f3ce74c9"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-863" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-03-30T17:49:57Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-03-27T18:16:05Z"
  }
}