CVE-2026-74700: Software Security Vulnerability Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-696w-35hf-m34q
CVSS 7.8
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-74700 is a HIGH (CVSS 7.8) security vulnerability vulnerability (General Security Weakness) affecting Software libraries in the Maven ecosystem. Remediation is available in the latest vendor maintenance releases.

CVE-2026-74700 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-74700
GHSA Identifier GHSA-696w-35hf-m34q
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 7.8
CWE Classification General Security Weakness
Affected Product Software
Package Ecosystem Maven
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 7.8

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).

Attack Vector Local (AV:L)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2026-74700

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Software dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

mvn dependency:tree

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Java application is affected by CVE-2026-74700, inspect your build dependencies using the Maven Dependency Plugin:

mvn dependency:tree

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Software in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than the patched release), your application is affected.

Note: The mvn dependency:tree command inspects the resolved dependency graph declared in your project's POM files; it does not perform automated security scanning or inspect runtime dynamic classpaths. Always verify runtime container classpaths and shaded JARs.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under General Security Weakness. In Software, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: cls_api: Always acquire rtnl_lock when destroying locked classifiers Another challenge with unlocked filters. There is a short window in tc_new_tfilter where a tcf_proto can be found and briefly referenced by a totally unrelated, unlocked classifier's request and cause a race. Feng created a poc which created this race with two threads, one creating a u32 filter and other a flower filter in the same chain/prio: 1. Both threads enter tc_new_tfilter, both find the chain empty, both drop filter_chain_lock 2. u32 finishes tcf_proto_create("u32") first, calls tcf_chain_tp_insert_unique() -> inserts u32_tp into the chain 3. flower finishes tcf_proto_create("flower") later, calls tcf_chain_tp_insert_unique() -> tcf_chain_tp_find() now sees u32_tp already there, takes a reference on it, destroys flower's own tp_new and returns u32_tp to the caller. Flower then hits the kind mismatch check (because it requested for kind "flower" but tp->ops->kind is "u32") and goes through the errout path which calls tcf_proto_put() on u32_tp. If the u32 thread has already gone through its own errout (its change() call failed on the PoC's empty options) and dropped its create and insert refs, flower's put is the last one and drops u32_tp's refcnt to zero. At this point tp->ops->destroy() runs in a context that never took rtnl_lock. When that happens, it might cause a UAF like the following (illustrated by the PoC): [ +0.000710] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in u32_init (net/sched/cls_u32.c:393) [ +0.000281] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888120022f00 by task poc_feng_xue/524 Call Trace: u32_init (net/sched/cls_u32.c:393) tc_new_tfilter (net/sched/cls_api.c:2378) Allocated by task 526: u32_init (net/sched/cls_u32.c:378) tc_new_tfilter (net/sched/cls_api.c:2378) Freed by task 522: kfree u32_destroy (net/sched/cls_u32.c:662) tcf_proto_destroy (net/sched/cls_api.c:446) tcf_proto_put (net/sched/cls_api.c:459) tc_new_tfilter (net/sched/cls_api.c:2459) Fix this by having tcf_proto_destroy() take rtnl_lock around tp->ops->destroy() for locked classifiers whenever rtnl is not held. To explain why I used a temp variable "not_lockless" I'd like to point to a semi-related note on rtnl_held vs TCF_PROTO_OPS_DOIT_UNLOCKED (adding here for future cleanup if deemed necessary): The rtnl_held parameter and the TCF_PROTO_OPS_DOIT_UNLOCKED flag are redundant sources of truth for whether rtnl_lock is held. Among the nine classifier destroy(..rtnl_held..) callbacks, only flower consults the rtnl_held parameter which it propagates to tc_setup_cb_destroy() and tc_setup_cb_call(). The other eight (u32, flow, bpf, cgroup, route, basic, fw, mall) ignore it entirely;-> those that call tc_setup_cb_destroy() (u32, bpf, mall) hardcode true always instead of forwarding the parameter. A future cleanup should remove the rtnl_held parameter from the destroy callback signature entirely and have callers rely solely on their knowledge whether they are running in an unlocked context.

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-74700?
CVE-2026-74700 is a security vulnerability in Software classified as a security vulnerability vulnerability under General Security Weakness.
Which Software versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to current release patches.
What version fixes CVE-2026-74700?
Upgrading to current release patches (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-74700?
CVE-2026-74700 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 7.8 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-74700?
CVE-2026-74700 is classified under General Security Weakness.
How can I check Maven dependencies for CVE-2026-74700?
Run the dependency tree command: 'mvn dependency:tree'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-696w-35hf-m34q",
  "modified" : "2026-08-25T06:31:28Z",
  "published" : "2026-08-22T18:30:29Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-74700" ],
  "details" : "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/sched: cls_api: Always acquire rtnl_lock when destroying locked classifiers\n\nAnother challenge with unlocked filters.\nThere is a short window in tc_new_tfilter where a tcf_proto can be found\nand briefly referenced by a totally unrelated, unlocked classifier's request\nand cause a race.\n\nFeng created a poc which created this race with two threads, one creating a\nu32 filter and other a flower filter in the same chain/prio:\n\n1. Both threads enter tc_new_tfilter, both find the chain empty, both\n   drop filter_chain_lock\n2. u32 finishes tcf_proto_create(\"u32\") first, calls\n   tcf_chain_tp_insert_unique() -> inserts u32_tp into the chain\n3. flower finishes tcf_proto_create(\"flower\") later, calls\n   tcf_chain_tp_insert_unique() -> tcf_chain_tp_find() now sees u32_tp\n   already there, takes a reference on it, destroys flower's own tp_new\n   and returns u32_tp to the caller.\n\nFlower then hits the kind mismatch check (because it requested for kind\n\"flower\" but tp->ops->kind is \"u32\") and goes through the errout path\nwhich calls tcf_proto_put() on u32_tp. If the u32 thread has already\ngone through its own errout (its change() call failed on the PoC's empty\noptions) and dropped its create and insert refs, flower's put is the\nlast one and drops u32_tp's refcnt to zero.\n\nAt this point tp->ops->destroy() runs in a context that never took\nrtnl_lock. When that happens, it might cause a UAF like the following\n(illustrated by the PoC):\n\n[  +0.000710] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in u32_init (net/sched/cls_u32.c:393)\n[  +0.000281] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888120022f00 by task poc_feng_xue/524\n\n  Call Trace:\n   u32_init (net/sched/cls_u32.c:393)\n   tc_new_tfilter (net/sched/cls_api.c:2378)\n\n  Allocated by task 526:\n   u32_init (net/sched/cls_u32.c:378)\n   tc_new_tfilter (net/sched/cls_api.c:2378)\n\n  Freed by task 522:\n   kfree\n   u32_destroy (net/sched/cls_u32.c:662)\n   tcf_proto_destroy (net/sched/cls_api.c:446)\n   tcf_proto_put (net/sched/cls_api.c:459)\n   tc_new_tfilter (net/sched/cls_api.c:2459)\n\nFix this by having tcf_proto_destroy() take rtnl_lock around\ntp->ops->destroy() for locked classifiers whenever rtnl is not held.\n\nTo explain why I used a temp variable \"not_lockless\" I'd like to point to a\nsemi-related note on rtnl_held vs TCF_PROTO_OPS_DOIT_UNLOCKED (adding here\nfor future cleanup if deemed necessary):\nThe rtnl_held parameter and the TCF_PROTO_OPS_DOIT_UNLOCKED flag are\nredundant sources of truth for whether rtnl_lock is held. Among the nine\nclassifier destroy(..rtnl_held..) callbacks, only flower consults the\nrtnl_held parameter which it propagates to tc_setup_cb_destroy()\nand tc_setup_cb_call(). The other eight (u32, flow, bpf, cgroup, route, basic,\nfw, mall) ignore it entirely;-> those that call tc_setup_cb_destroy()\n(u32, bpf, mall) hardcode true always instead of forwarding the parameter.\n\nA future cleanup should remove the rtnl_held parameter from the destroy callback\nsignature entirely and have callers rely solely on their knowledge whether\nthey are running in an unlocked context.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74700"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/34e77d8e3570f9df3952496ddb402833695662fd"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a347304b2ca1a5377d5bd2d8a72e4b4f12afe648"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a81f9c44d87fb59d99fce72e29e02cab3a49a1c3"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b648c8a56531aeabd1c14f6b5cf1891e269b3756"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d6222af7274f08e7a1848131dc30319993d8f377"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : false,
    "github_reviewed_at" : null,
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-08-22T16:16:44Z"
  }
}